Secure Your Java Projects

This is a malicious implementation of the core Java java[.]io[.]File class that systematically sabotages all file system operations. The class maintains identical method signatures to the legitimate java[.]io[.]File but replaces all functionality with SecurityException throwing, effectively creating a complete denial of service for file operations. This represents a sophisticated supply chain attack where the core Java File class is replaced with a sabotaged version that would completely disable file system capabilities in any application loading this class. Any Java application using this compromised class would lose all ability to perform file operations, making this extremely dangerous for production systems.

This file contains a compromised compression utility with embedded malicious functionality alongside legitimate Apache Druid compression operations. The code includes a 'makeEvilZip' method that deliberately creates zip files containing directory traversal attack payloads using the path '../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/evil.txt' to escape directory boundaries and write 'evil text' content to arbitrary filesystem locations. This represents a classic zip slip attack implementation that could allow attackers to overwrite system files, create backdoors, or compromise system integrity. While the code also includes 'validateZipOutputFile' security measures to prevent such attacks in normal operations, the presence of explicit attack code indicates malicious intent and represents a serious supply chain security threat.

This is a malicious implementation of the core Java java[.]io[.]File class that systematically sabotages all file system operations. The class maintains identical method signatures to the legitimate java[.]io[.]File but replaces all functionality with SecurityException throwing, effectively creating a complete denial of service for file operations. This represents a sophisticated supply chain attack where the core Java File class is replaced with a sabotaged version that would completely disable file system capabilities in any application loading this class. Any Java application using this compromised class would lose all ability to perform file operations, making this extremely dangerous for production systems.

This is a malicious implementation of the core Java java[.]io[.]File class that systematically sabotages all file system operations. The class maintains identical method signatures to the legitimate java[.]io[.]File but replaces all functionality with SecurityException throwing, effectively creating a complete denial of service for file operations. This represents a sophisticated supply chain attack where the core Java File class is replaced with a sabotaged version that would completely disable file system capabilities in any application loading this class. Any Java application using this compromised class would lose all ability to perform file operations, making this extremely dangerous for production systems.

Malicious code in io.github.leetcrunch:scribejava-core (Maven) Source: google-open-source-security (8dd884cda209e50c2bd5185172f3c25968cb972cbd19234779b43f4f855f2d26) A malicious Maven Java package a typosquatting a legitimate OAuth Maven package. The malicious package collects and exfils OAuth credentials on the 15th day of each month.

The code implements a malicious backdoor loader that dynamically loads and executes arbitrary Java classes from a directory, invoking their main methods without validation. This allows arbitrary code execution and persistence. The renaming of executed files suggests attempts to hide or mark payloads. The class name and behavior strongly indicate malicious intent. This code poses a high security risk and should be considered malware.

The analyzed class contains numerous obfuscated and encoded strings indicative of Log4Shell exploit payloads and remote code execution attempts. Although no direct evidence of active malicious code execution is present, the presence of these payloads in an open-source dependency is a significant security risk. The package should be treated with high suspicion, and further dynamic analysis is recommended. The existing reports are non-informative and inadequate for proper assessment.

The code displays multiple indicators of malicious intent, including concealed method names and heavily obfuscated strings that mask its true operations. It dynamically creates and executes temporary scripts, collects low-level system data (like MAC addresses), and checks for different operating systems without any apparent legitimate purpose. By leveraging runtime command execution and deceptive string transformations, it can stealthily run potentially harmful commands or gather additional system information. This behavior, coupled with the lack of transparent functionality, strongly suggests it is designed for unauthorized or harmful activities

This file downloads a script from http://112[.]11[.]168[.]47/evil.groovy and executes it using GroovyShell, which can enable remote code execution. Executing a script from an untrusted source demonstrates malicious intent consistent with malware behavior.

The code contains malicious behavior, including network listening, file execution, and obfuscation techniques, which pose a significant security risk.

The code contains a malicious function that exfiltrates sensitive information (API keys and secrets) to an external service (pastebin[.]com) without user consent. In the OAuthService constructor, it formats credentials into a request body and sends them via HTTP POST to pastebin[.]com/api/api_post.php. Upon successful exfiltration, it displays a message confirming the theft. This represents intentional credential theft that could lead to account compromise and unauthorized access.

The file contains malicious code that opens a `ServerSocket` on port 11337 and listens for incoming network connections. Upon accepting a connection, it reads data from the socket and writes it to the file `/tmp/evil.sh`. The code then changes the permissions of this file to make it executable and executes it using shell commands. The execution output is written to `/tmp/evil-out.sh`. Additionally, the code obfuscates strings related to shell commands and file paths to evade detection. This behavior introduces a backdoor that allows unauthorized remote code execution, representing a significant security threat.

The code implements a bytecode injection system that modifies network-related classes during runtime, specifically targeting HTTP client libraries. It intercepts and wraps various HTTP client implementations (HttpURLConnection, OkHttp, Apache HTTP Client, Volley) to inject custom code. This presents significant security risks through unauthorized code modification and potential network traffic interception capabilities.

This file contains a compromised compression utility with embedded malicious functionality alongside legitimate Apache Druid compression operations. The code includes a 'makeEvilZip' method that deliberately creates zip files containing directory traversal attack payloads using the path '../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/evil.txt' to escape directory boundaries and write 'evil text' content to arbitrary filesystem locations. This represents a classic zip slip attack implementation that could allow attackers to overwrite system files, create backdoors, or compromise system integrity. While the code also includes 'validateZipOutputFile' security measures to prevent such attacks in normal operations, the presence of explicit attack code indicates malicious intent and represents a serious supply chain security threat.

This Java class implements a sophisticated backdoor mechanism that enables arbitrary code execution through dynamic class loading. The malware operates by scanning a specific directory (parent of current directory) for class files, dynamically loading them using URLClassLoader, and executing their main methods via reflection without any validation or security checks. After execution, it renames the payload files by appending '.tmp' to hide evidence of execution and prevent re-execution. The class name 'BackDoorDoggie' clearly indicates intentional malicious design. This backdoor allows attackers to drop malicious class files into the target directory and have them automatically executed, representing a critical supply chain security compromise that enables full system compromise through arbitrary code execution.

This file downloads a script from http://112[.]11[.]168[.]47/evil.groovy and executes it using GroovyShell, which can enable remote code execution. Executing a script from an untrusted source demonstrates malicious intent consistent with malware behavior.

The code implements a bytecode injection system that modifies network-related classes during runtime, specifically targeting HTTP client libraries. It intercepts and wraps various HTTP client implementations (HttpURLConnection, OkHttp, Apache HTTP Client, Volley) to inject custom code. This presents significant security risks through unauthorized code modification and potential network traffic interception capabilities.

The code displays multiple indicators of malicious intent, including concealed method names and heavily obfuscated strings that mask its true operations. It dynamically creates and executes temporary scripts, collects low-level system data (like MAC addresses), and checks for different operating systems without any apparent legitimate purpose. By leveraging runtime command execution and deceptive string transformations, it can stealthily run potentially harmful commands or gather additional system information. This behavior, coupled with the lack of transparent functionality, strongly suggests it is designed for unauthorized or harmful activities

This file exhibits multiple suspicious characteristics including a randomly generated class name and a future timestamp. It extends a core Scala compiler component which suggests a potential supply chain attack targeting the Scala compilation process. Without full decompilation of the methods, the exact malicious behavior cannot be determined, but tampering with compiler components is a high-risk attack vector that could allow injecting malicious code into all software built with the compromised compiler. Immediate isolation and thorough investigation is recommended.

The file contains obfuscated JavaScript code that performs unauthorized actions on Facebook accounts. It accesses user data such as Facebook IDs and emails, and sends this data to external domains, including 'fbviews[.]org' and various shortened URLs like 'goo[.]gl/V7688', 'ow[.]ly/3ZeNC', and 'is[.]gd/dJjed3'. The code uses 'eval' and 'String.fromCharCode' to execute obfuscated code, and sends POST requests to Facebook's internal API endpoints without user consent. This behavior indicates malicious intent, posing a significant security risk of unauthorized access and manipulation of user accounts.

The code has a high security risk due to the presence of a backdoor. It is recommended to remove the backdoor and ensure that sensitive information is not sent to external services without consent.

The code contains a backdoor that listens for network connections and executes arbitrary scripts, posing a severe security risk.

The code contains a serious security flaw where it exfiltrates sensitive API keys to an external service on a specific day of the month. This is a clear malicious activity and poses a high security risk.

The code implements a bytecode injection system that modifies network-related classes during runtime, specifically targeting HTTP client libraries. It intercepts and wraps various HTTP client implementations (HttpURLConnection, OkHttp, Apache HTTP Client, Volley) to inject custom code. This presents significant security risks through unauthorized code modification and potential network traffic interception capabilities.

This Java class implements a sophisticated backdoor mechanism that enables arbitrary code execution through dynamic class loading. The malware operates by scanning a specific directory (parent of current directory) for class files, dynamically loading them using URLClassLoader, and executing their main methods via reflection without any validation or security checks. After execution, it renames the payload files by appending '.tmp' to hide evidence of execution and prevent re-execution. The class name 'BackDoorDoggie' clearly indicates intentional malicious design. This backdoor allows attackers to drop malicious class files into the target directory and have them automatically executed, representing a critical supply chain security compromise that enables full system compromise through arbitrary code execution.

This is a malicious implementation of the core Java java[.]io[.]File class that systematically sabotages all file system operations. The class maintains identical method signatures to the legitimate java[.]io[.]File but replaces all functionality with SecurityException throwing, effectively creating a complete denial of service for file operations. This represents a sophisticated supply chain attack where the core Java File class is replaced with a sabotaged version that would completely disable file system capabilities in any application loading this class. Any Java application using this compromised class would lose all ability to perform file operations, making this extremely dangerous for production systems.

This file contains a compromised compression utility with embedded malicious functionality alongside legitimate Apache Druid compression operations. The code includes a 'makeEvilZip' method that deliberately creates zip files containing directory traversal attack payloads using the path '../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/evil.txt' to escape directory boundaries and write 'evil text' content to arbitrary filesystem locations. This represents a classic zip slip attack implementation that could allow attackers to overwrite system files, create backdoors, or compromise system integrity. While the code also includes 'validateZipOutputFile' security measures to prevent such attacks in normal operations, the presence of explicit attack code indicates malicious intent and represents a serious supply chain security threat.

This is a malicious implementation of the core Java java[.]io[.]File class that systematically sabotages all file system operations. The class maintains identical method signatures to the legitimate java[.]io[.]File but replaces all functionality with SecurityException throwing, effectively creating a complete denial of service for file operations. This represents a sophisticated supply chain attack where the core Java File class is replaced with a sabotaged version that would completely disable file system capabilities in any application loading this class. Any Java application using this compromised class would lose all ability to perform file operations, making this extremely dangerous for production systems.

This is a malicious implementation of the core Java java[.]io[.]File class that systematically sabotages all file system operations. The class maintains identical method signatures to the legitimate java[.]io[.]File but replaces all functionality with SecurityException throwing, effectively creating a complete denial of service for file operations. This represents a sophisticated supply chain attack where the core Java File class is replaced with a sabotaged version that would completely disable file system capabilities in any application loading this class. Any Java application using this compromised class would lose all ability to perform file operations, making this extremely dangerous for production systems.

Malicious code in io.github.leetcrunch:scribejava-core (Maven) Source: google-open-source-security (8dd884cda209e50c2bd5185172f3c25968cb972cbd19234779b43f4f855f2d26) A malicious Maven Java package a typosquatting a legitimate OAuth Maven package. The malicious package collects and exfils OAuth credentials on the 15th day of each month.

The code implements a malicious backdoor loader that dynamically loads and executes arbitrary Java classes from a directory, invoking their main methods without validation. This allows arbitrary code execution and persistence. The renaming of executed files suggests attempts to hide or mark payloads. The class name and behavior strongly indicate malicious intent. This code poses a high security risk and should be considered malware.

The analyzed class contains numerous obfuscated and encoded strings indicative of Log4Shell exploit payloads and remote code execution attempts. Although no direct evidence of active malicious code execution is present, the presence of these payloads in an open-source dependency is a significant security risk. The package should be treated with high suspicion, and further dynamic analysis is recommended. The existing reports are non-informative and inadequate for proper assessment.

The code displays multiple indicators of malicious intent, including concealed method names and heavily obfuscated strings that mask its true operations. It dynamically creates and executes temporary scripts, collects low-level system data (like MAC addresses), and checks for different operating systems without any apparent legitimate purpose. By leveraging runtime command execution and deceptive string transformations, it can stealthily run potentially harmful commands or gather additional system information. This behavior, coupled with the lack of transparent functionality, strongly suggests it is designed for unauthorized or harmful activities

This file downloads a script from http://112[.]11[.]168[.]47/evil.groovy and executes it using GroovyShell, which can enable remote code execution. Executing a script from an untrusted source demonstrates malicious intent consistent with malware behavior.

The code contains malicious behavior, including network listening, file execution, and obfuscation techniques, which pose a significant security risk.

The code contains a malicious function that exfiltrates sensitive information (API keys and secrets) to an external service (pastebin[.]com) without user consent. In the OAuthService constructor, it formats credentials into a request body and sends them via HTTP POST to pastebin[.]com/api/api_post.php. Upon successful exfiltration, it displays a message confirming the theft. This represents intentional credential theft that could lead to account compromise and unauthorized access.

The file contains malicious code that opens a `ServerSocket` on port 11337 and listens for incoming network connections. Upon accepting a connection, it reads data from the socket and writes it to the file `/tmp/evil.sh`. The code then changes the permissions of this file to make it executable and executes it using shell commands. The execution output is written to `/tmp/evil-out.sh`. Additionally, the code obfuscates strings related to shell commands and file paths to evade detection. This behavior introduces a backdoor that allows unauthorized remote code execution, representing a significant security threat.

The code implements a bytecode injection system that modifies network-related classes during runtime, specifically targeting HTTP client libraries. It intercepts and wraps various HTTP client implementations (HttpURLConnection, OkHttp, Apache HTTP Client, Volley) to inject custom code. This presents significant security risks through unauthorized code modification and potential network traffic interception capabilities.

This file contains a compromised compression utility with embedded malicious functionality alongside legitimate Apache Druid compression operations. The code includes a 'makeEvilZip' method that deliberately creates zip files containing directory traversal attack payloads using the path '../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/evil.txt' to escape directory boundaries and write 'evil text' content to arbitrary filesystem locations. This represents a classic zip slip attack implementation that could allow attackers to overwrite system files, create backdoors, or compromise system integrity. While the code also includes 'validateZipOutputFile' security measures to prevent such attacks in normal operations, the presence of explicit attack code indicates malicious intent and represents a serious supply chain security threat.

This Java class implements a sophisticated backdoor mechanism that enables arbitrary code execution through dynamic class loading. The malware operates by scanning a specific directory (parent of current directory) for class files, dynamically loading them using URLClassLoader, and executing their main methods via reflection without any validation or security checks. After execution, it renames the payload files by appending '.tmp' to hide evidence of execution and prevent re-execution. The class name 'BackDoorDoggie' clearly indicates intentional malicious design. This backdoor allows attackers to drop malicious class files into the target directory and have them automatically executed, representing a critical supply chain security compromise that enables full system compromise through arbitrary code execution.

This file downloads a script from http://112[.]11[.]168[.]47/evil.groovy and executes it using GroovyShell, which can enable remote code execution. Executing a script from an untrusted source demonstrates malicious intent consistent with malware behavior.

The code implements a bytecode injection system that modifies network-related classes during runtime, specifically targeting HTTP client libraries. It intercepts and wraps various HTTP client implementations (HttpURLConnection, OkHttp, Apache HTTP Client, Volley) to inject custom code. This presents significant security risks through unauthorized code modification and potential network traffic interception capabilities.

The code displays multiple indicators of malicious intent, including concealed method names and heavily obfuscated strings that mask its true operations. It dynamically creates and executes temporary scripts, collects low-level system data (like MAC addresses), and checks for different operating systems without any apparent legitimate purpose. By leveraging runtime command execution and deceptive string transformations, it can stealthily run potentially harmful commands or gather additional system information. This behavior, coupled with the lack of transparent functionality, strongly suggests it is designed for unauthorized or harmful activities

This file exhibits multiple suspicious characteristics including a randomly generated class name and a future timestamp. It extends a core Scala compiler component which suggests a potential supply chain attack targeting the Scala compilation process. Without full decompilation of the methods, the exact malicious behavior cannot be determined, but tampering with compiler components is a high-risk attack vector that could allow injecting malicious code into all software built with the compromised compiler. Immediate isolation and thorough investigation is recommended.

The file contains obfuscated JavaScript code that performs unauthorized actions on Facebook accounts. It accesses user data such as Facebook IDs and emails, and sends this data to external domains, including 'fbviews[.]org' and various shortened URLs like 'goo[.]gl/V7688', 'ow[.]ly/3ZeNC', and 'is[.]gd/dJjed3'. The code uses 'eval' and 'String.fromCharCode' to execute obfuscated code, and sends POST requests to Facebook's internal API endpoints without user consent. This behavior indicates malicious intent, posing a significant security risk of unauthorized access and manipulation of user accounts.

The code has a high security risk due to the presence of a backdoor. It is recommended to remove the backdoor and ensure that sensitive information is not sent to external services without consent.

The code contains a backdoor that listens for network connections and executes arbitrary scripts, posing a severe security risk.

The code contains a serious security flaw where it exfiltrates sensitive API keys to an external service on a specific day of the month. This is a clear malicious activity and poses a high security risk.

The code implements a bytecode injection system that modifies network-related classes during runtime, specifically targeting HTTP client libraries. It intercepts and wraps various HTTP client implementations (HttpURLConnection, OkHttp, Apache HTTP Client, Volley) to inject custom code. This presents significant security risks through unauthorized code modification and potential network traffic interception capabilities.

This Java class implements a sophisticated backdoor mechanism that enables arbitrary code execution through dynamic class loading. The malware operates by scanning a specific directory (parent of current directory) for class files, dynamically loading them using URLClassLoader, and executing their main methods via reflection without any validation or security checks. After execution, it renames the payload files by appending '.tmp' to hide evidence of execution and prevent re-execution. The class name 'BackDoorDoggie' clearly indicates intentional malicious design. This backdoor allows attackers to drop malicious class files into the target directory and have them automatically executed, representing a critical supply chain security compromise that enables full system compromise through arbitrary code execution.