http-signature-server

http-signature-server

HTTP server agnostic Python implementation of the server side of the IETF draft "Signing HTTP Messages", with no dependencies other than the Python standard library, although cryptography would typically be used in client code to verify signatures using a public key.

See http-signature-client for a compatible client-side implementation.

Installation

pip install http-signature-server

Usage

from http_signature_server import verify

def verify(key_id, signature, signature_input):
    # If the key_id is not found, return None
    # If the key_id is found and the signature verifies the input, return True
    # If the key_is is found and the signature does not verify the input, return False

error, (key_id, verified_headers) = verify_headers(verify, max_skew, method, path, headers)

if error is not None:
    # Return error or raise exception as needed

Recipe: Verify using Ed25519 public key

from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidSignature
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import load_pem_public_key

public_key = \
    b'-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n' \
    b'MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAe9+zIz+CH9E++J0qiE6aS657qzxsNWIEf2BZcUAQF94=\n' \
    b'-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n'
public_key = load_pem_public_key(public_key, backend=default_backend())

def verify(key_id, signature, signature_input):
    # Could use the supplied key_id to lookup the public key
    try:
        public_key.verify(signature, signature_input)
    except InvalidSignature:
        return False
    return True

# method, path, and headers would be taken from the incoming HTTP request
error, (key_id, verified_headers) = verify_headers(verify, 10, method, path, headers)

Recipe: Create an Ed25519 public/private key pair

from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, NoEncryption, PrivateFormat, PublicFormat

private_key = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
print(private_key.private_bytes(encoding=Encoding.PEM, format=PrivateFormat.PKCS8, encryption_algorithm=NoEncryption()))
print(private_key.public_key().public_bytes(encoding=Encoding.PEM, format=PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo))

API

Parameters

• verify - A callable taking a str key_id and bytes signature and signature_input. It must return True if key_id is known and signature/signature_input is verified, for example by a corresponding public key; return False if key_id is known but the signature/signature_input is not verified; return None otherwise.

• max_skew - A maximum integer number of seconds difference from the time an incoming signature claimed to be constructed, and the current time.

• method - The HTTP method of the request, such as GET or POST.

• path - The full path of the request, including any query string.

• headers - A tuple of (key, value) pairs of HTTP headers to attempt to verify.

Returns

A tuple error, (key_id, verified_headers).

• error - If the request is verified, None. Otherwise a str containing a short reason in English as to why verification failed.

• key_id - If the request is verified, the keyId from the incoming request. Otherwise, None.

• verified_headers - If the request is verified, the (key, value) HTTP header pairs that were verified by the signature; this will be a sub-tuple of the headers parameter. Otherwise, None.

What's implemented

A deliberate subset of the signature algorithm is implemented/enforced:

• the (request-target) pseudo-header is required and verified;
• the created parameter is required, and the corresponding (created) pseudo-header must be signed;
• the headers parameter is required;
• the expires parameter, if sent, must not correspond to a signed (expires) pseudo-header;
• the algorithm parameter is ignored if sent.

There are a few places where the implementation is technically, and deliberately, non-conforming.

• The (created) pseudo-header: if this is in the future from the server's point of view, even 1 second, according to the spec verification should fail. Instead, there is a configurable maximum time skew that applies to the future as well as the past.

• The expires parameter: if this is sent and in the past from the server's point of view, according to the spec verification should fail.

• The algorithm parameter: if it's sent but does not match what the server expects, according to the spec verification should fail.

It is assumed that the (created) and (request-target) pseudo-headers were prepended to the list of real HTTP headers before canonicalisation at the client. This fact only makes a difference in the edge case of real HTTP headers called (created) or (request-target).