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A Python encryption library implemented in Rust. It supports AEAD with various ciphers. It uses multiple providers to handle encryption.
[!WARNING] This crate hasn't been audited, but it's mostly a wrapper over several libs like
ring
(well known and audited library),RustCrypto
(AES-GCM
andChaCha20Poly1305
ciphers are audited) but also others which are NOT audited, so in principle at least the primitives should offer a similar level of security.
A Python encryption library implemented in Rust. It supports AEAD
with varius ciphers. It
uses ring, RustCrypto (and
derivates), sodiumoxide and orion to handle
encryption.
If offers slightly higher speed compared to other Python libs, especially for small chunks of data (especially
the Ring
provider with AES-GCM
ciphers). The API also tries to be easy to use but it's more optimized for speed than
usability.
So if you want to use a vast variaety of ciphers and/or achieve the highest possible encryption speed, consider giving it a try.
Some benchmarks comparing it to PyFLocker which from my benchmarks is the
fastest among other Python libs like cryptography
, NaCl
(libsodium
), PyCryptodome
.
This is useful when you keep a buffer, set your plaintext/ciphertext in there, and then encrypt/decrypt in-place in that
buffer. This is the most performant way to use it, because it does't copy any bytes nor allocate new memory.
rencrypt
is faster on small buffers, less than few MB, PyFLocker
is comming closer for larger buffers.
Encrypt seconds
Decrypt seconds
Block size and duration in seconds
MB | rencrypt encrypt | PyFLocker encrypt | rencrypt decrypt | PyFLocker decrypt |
---|---|---|---|---|
0.03125 | 0.00001 | 0.00091 | 0.00001 | 0.00004 |
0.0625 | 0.00001 | 0.00005 | 0.00001 | 0.00004 |
0.125 | 0.00002 | 0.00005 | 0.00003 | 0.00005 |
0.25 | 0.00004 | 0.00008 | 0.00005 | 0.00009 |
0.5 | 0.00010 | 0.00014 | 0.00011 | 0.00015 |
1 | 0.00021 | 0.00024 | 0.00021 | 0.00029 |
2 | 0.00043 | 0.00052 | 0.00044 | 0.00058 |
4 | 0.00089 | 0.00098 | 0.00089 | 0.00117 |
8 | 0.00184 | 0.00190 | 0.00192 | 0.00323 |
16 | 0.00353 | 0.00393 | 0.00367 | 0.00617 |
32 | 0.00678 | 0.00748 | 0.00749 | 0.01348 |
64 | 0.01361 | 0.01461 | 0.01460 | 0.02697 |
128 | 0.02923 | 0.03027 | 0.03134 | 0.05410 |
256 | 0.06348 | 0.06188 | 0.06136 | 0.10417 |
512 | 0.11782 | 0.13463 | 0.12090 | 0.21114 |
1024 | 0.25001 | 0.24953 | 0.25377 | 0.42581 |
Encrypt seconds
Decrypt seconds
File size and duration in seconds
MB | rencrypt encrypt | PyFLocker encrypt | rencrypt decrypt | PyFLocker decrypt |
---|---|---|---|---|
0.031251 | 0.00010 | 0.00280 | 0.00004 | 0.00479 |
0.062501 | 0.00009 | 0.00218 | 0.00005 | 0.00143 |
0.125 | 0.00020 | 0.00212 | 0.00014 | 0.00129 |
0.25 | 0.00034 | 0.00232 | 0.00020 | 0.00165 |
0.5 | 0.00050 | 0.00232 | 0.00035 | 0.00181 |
1 | 0.00087 | 0.00356 | 0.00065 | 0.00248 |
2 | 0.00215 | 0.00484 | 0.00154 | 0.00363 |
4 | 0.00361 | 0.00765 | 0.00301 | 0.00736 |
8 | 0.00688 | 0.01190 | 0.00621 | 0.00876 |
16 | 0.01503 | 0.02097 | 0.01202 | 0.01583 |
32 | 0.02924 | 0.03642 | 0.02563 | 0.02959 |
64 | 0.05737 | 0.06473 | 0.04431 | 0.05287 |
128 | 0.11098 | 0.12646 | 0.08944 | 0.09926 |
256 | 0.22964 | 0.24716 | 0.17402 | 0.19420 |
512 | 0.43506 | 0.46444 | 0.38143 | 0.38242 |
1024 | 0.97147 | 0.95803 | 0.78137 | 0.87363 |
2048 | 2.07143 | 2.10766 | 1.69471 | 2.99210 |
4096 | 4.85395 | 4.69722 | 5.40580 | 8.73779 |
8192 | 10.76984 | 11.76741 | 10.29253 | 21.00636 |
16384 | 21.84490 | 26.27385 | 39.56230 | 43.55530 |
Laptop LG Gram 17Z90Q
SSD: 1 TB M.2 NVMe SSD (Samsung PM9A1) – 2x M.2 2280 slots
CPU: 12th Gen Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-1260P
CPU ID: GenuineIntel,6,154,3
CPU Architecture: x86_64
CPUs Online: 16
CPUs Available: 16
CPU Sibling Cores: [0-15]
CPU Sibling Threads: [0-1], [2-3], [4-5], [6-7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15]
Total Memory: 33.4 GB LPDDR5 5200 MHz
Linux Kernel Version: 6.9.5-1-MANJARO
There are two ways in which you can use the lib, the first one is a bit faster, the second offers a bit more flexible way to use it sacrificing a bit of performance.
seal_in_place()
/open_in_place()
, is useful when you keep a buffer (or have it
from somewhere), set your plaintext/ciphertext in there, and then encrypt/decrypt in-place in that buffer. This is
the most performant way to use it, because it does't copy any bytes nor allocate new memory.
The buffer has to be a numpy array
, so that it's easier for you to collect data with slices that reference to
underlying data. This is because the whole buffer needs to be the size of ciphertext (which is plaintext_len +
tag_len + nonce_len) but you may pass a slice of the buffer to a BufferedReader to read_into()
the plaintext.
If you can directly collect the data to that buffer, like BufferedReader.read_into()
, this is the preffered way
to go.seal_in_place_from()
/open_in_place_from()
, when you have some
arbitrary data that you want to work with. It will first copy those bytes to the buffer then do the operation
in-place in the buffer. This is a bit slower, especially for large data, because it first needs to copy the bytes to
the buffer.block_index
, aad
and nonce
are optional.
If nonce
is not provided, on each encrypt operation (seal_in_place*()
) it will generate a cryptographically secure
random nonce using ChaCha20
. You can also provide your own nonce, there is an example below.
seal_in_place*()
) shall not exceed 2^32
, including
all nonce lengths and all instances of Cipher
with the given key. Following this guideline, only 4,294,967,296
messages with random nonces can be encrypted under a given key. While this bound is high, it's possible to encounter
in practice, and systems which might reach it should consider alternatives to purely random nonces, like a counter or
a combination of a random nonce + counter.block_index
as it's more secure because it ensures the
order of the blocks was not changed in ciphertext.mlock()
in which you keep sensitive data like
passwords or encrryption keys, or any other plaintext sensitive content. Also it's important to zeroize the data when
not used anymore.In the examples below you will see how to do it.
You will notice in the examples we create the Cipher
from something like
this cipher_meta = CipherMeta.Ring(RingAlgorithm.Aes256Gcm)
. The first part CipherMeta.Ring
is the encryption
provider. The last part is the algorithm for that provider, in this case Aes256Gcm
. Each provier might expose specific
algorithms.
enum CipherMeta {
Ring { alg: RingAlgorithm },
RustCrypto { alg: RustCryptoAlgorithm },
Sodiumoxide { alg: SodiumoxideAlgorithm },
Orion { alg: OrionAlgorithm },
}
Ring
: Based on ring crate. ring is focused on the implementation, testing, and
optimization of a core set of cryptographic operations exposed via an easy-to-use (and hard-to-misuse) API. ring
exposes a Rust API and is written in a hybrid of Rust, C, and assembly language.
Particular attention is being paid to making it easy to build and integrate ring into applications and higher-level
frameworks, and to ensuring that ring works optimally on small devices, and eventually microcontrollers, to support
Internet of Things (IoT) applications.
Most of the C and assembly language code in ring comes from BoringSSL, and BoringSSL is derived from OpenSSL. ring
merges changes from BoringSSL regularly. Also, several changes that were developed for ring have been contributed to
and integrated into BoringSSL.RustCrypto
: Based on RustCrypto collection of Authenticated Encryption with
Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms written in pure Rust. AEADs are high-level symmetric encryption primitives which
defend against a wide range of potential attacks (i.e. IND-CCA3).Sodiumoxide
: Based on sodiumoxide crate which aims to provide a type-safe
and efficient Rust binding that's just as easy to use.
NaCl
(pronounced "salt") is a new easy-to-use high-speed software library for network
communication, encryption, decryption, signatures, etc. NaCl's goal is to provide all of the core operations needed to
build higher-level cryptographic tools. Of course, other libraries already exist for these core operations. NaCl
advances the state of the art by improving security, by improving usability, and by improving speed.
Sodium is a portable, cross-compilable, installable, packageable fork of
NaCl (based on the latest released upstream version nacl-20110221), with a compatible API.Orion
: Based on orion crate. Written in pure Rust, it aims to provide easy and
usable crypto while trying to minimize the use of unsafe code. You can read more about Orion in
the wiki.enum RingAlgorithm {
ChaCha20Poly1305,
Aes128Gcm,
Aes256Gcm,
}
enum RustCryptoAlgorithm {
ChaCha20Poly1305,
XChaCha20Poly1305,
Aes128Gcm,
Aes256Gcm,
Aes128GcmSiv,
Aes256GcmSiv,
Aes128Siv,
Aes256Siv,
Ascon128,
Ascon128a,
Ascon80pq,
DeoxysI128,
DeoxysI256,
DeoxysII128,
DeoxysII256,
Aes128Eax,
Aes256Eax,
}
enum SodiumoxideAlgorithm {
ChaCha20Poly1305,
ChaCha20Poly1305Ietf,
XChaCha20Poly1305Ietf,
}
enum OrionAlgorithm {
ChaCha20Poly1305,
XChaCha20Poly1305,
}
Only for Aes128Gcm
, Aes256Gcm
and ChaCha20Poly1305
with Ring
and RustCrypto
providers underlying crates have
been audited.
Aes128Gcm
/Aes256Gcm
: If you have hardware acceleration (
e.g. AES-NI
), then AES-GCM
provides better performance. If you do not have a hardware acceleration, AES-GCM
is
either slower than ChaCha20Poly1305
, or it leaks your encryption keys in cache timing. With RustCrypto
provider
the underlying aes-gcm
has received one security audit by NCC Group, with no significant findings. With Ring
provider the underlying ring
crate was also audited.ChaCha20Poly1305
: Is notable for being simple and fast when
implemented in pure software. The underlying ChaCha20
stream cipher uses a simple combination of add
, rotate
,
and XOR
instructions (a.k.a. "ARX"
), and the Poly1305
hash function is likewise extremely simple.
With RustCrypto
provider the underlying chacha20poly1305
has received one security audit by NCC Group, with no
significant findings. With Ring
provider the underlying ring
crtate was also audited.
If you do not have a hardware acceleration, ChaCha20Poly1305
is faster than AES-GCM
.
While it hasn't received approval from certain standards bodies (i.e. NIST) the algorithm is widely used and deployed.
Notably it's mandatory to implement in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The underlying ChaCha20
cipher
is also widely used as a cryptographically secure random number generator, including internal use by the Rust standard
library.XChaCha20Poly1305
:
A variant of ChaCha20Poly1305
with an extended 192-bit (24-byte) nonce.USE AT YOUR OWN RISK!
Aes128GcmSiv
/ Aes256GcmSiv
: Provides nonce reuse misuse resistance.
Suitable as a general purpose symmetric encryption cipher, AES-GCM-SIV
also removes many of the "sharp edges"
of AES-GCM
, providing significantly better security bounds while simultaneously eliminating the most catastrophic
risks of nonce reuse that exist in AES-GCM
. Decryption performance is equivalent to AES-GCM
. Encryption is
marginally slower.Aes128Siv
/ Aes256Siv
: Cipher which also provides nonce reuse
misuse resistance.Ascon128
/ Ascon128a
/ Ascon80pq
: Designed to be lightweight and easy to
implement, even with added countermeasures against side-channel attacks. Ascon has been selected as new standard for
lightweight cryptography in the NIST Lightweight Cryptography competition (2019–2023). Ascon has also been selected as
the primary choice for lightweight authenticated encryption in the final portfolio of the CAESAR competition (
2014–2019).Deoxys
: Based on a 128-bit lightweight ad-hoc tweakable block cipher.
It may be used in two modes to handle nonce-respecting users (Deoxys-I
) or nonce-reusing
user (Deoxys-II
). Deoxys-II
has been selected as first choice for the "in-depth security" portfolio of
the CAESAR
competition.Aes128Eax
/ Aes256Eax
: Designed with a two-pass scheme, one pass for
achieving privacy and one for authenticity for each block. EAX
mode was submitted on October 3, 2003, to the
attention of NIST in order to replace CCM
as standard AEAD
mode of operation, since CCM
mode lacks some
desirable attributes of EAX
and is more complex.Sodiumoxide
provider ChaCha20Poly1305
:
The original ChaCha20-Poly1305
construction can safely encrypt a pratically unlimited number of messages with the
same key, without any practical limit to the size of a message (up to ~ 2^64 bytes).Sodiumoxide
provider ChaChaCha20Poly1305Ietf
:
The IETF variant of the ChaCha20-Poly1305
construction can safely encrypt a practically unlimited number of
messages, but individual messages cannot exceed 64*(2^32)-64 bytes (approximatively 256 GB).You can see more in examples directory and in bench.py which has some benchmarks. Here are few simple examples:
seal_in_place()
/open_in_place()
This is the most performant way to use it as it will not copy bytes to the buffer nor allocate new memory for plaintext and ciphertext.
from rencrypt import Cipher, CipherMeta, RingAlgorithm
import os
from zeroize import zeroize1, mlock, munlock
import numpy as np
import platform
def setup_memory_limit():
if not platform.system() == "Windows":
return
import ctypes
from ctypes import wintypes
# Define the Windows API functions
kernel32 = ctypes.WinDLL('kernel32', use_last_error=True)
GetCurrentProcess = kernel32.GetCurrentProcess
GetCurrentProcess.restype = wintypes.HANDLE
SetProcessWorkingSetSize = kernel32.SetProcessWorkingSetSize
SetProcessWorkingSetSize.restype = wintypes.BOOL
SetProcessWorkingSetSize.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE, ctypes.c_size_t, ctypes.c_size_t]
# Get the handle of the current process
current_process = GetCurrentProcess()
# Set the working set size
min_size = 6 * 1024 * 1024 # Minimum working set size
max_size = 10 * 1024 * 1024 # Maximum working set size
result = SetProcessWorkingSetSize(current_process, min_size, max_size)
if not result:
error_code = ctypes.get_last_error()
error_message = ctypes.FormatError(error_code)
raise RuntimeError(f"SetProcessWorkingSetSize failed with error code {error_code}: {error_message}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
setup_memory_limit()
# You can use also other algorithms like cipher_meta = CipherMeta.Ring(RingAlgorithm.ChaCha20Poly1305)`.
cipher_meta = CipherMeta.Ring(RingAlgorithm.Aes256Gcm)
key_len = cipher_meta.key_len()
key = bytearray(key_len)
# for security reasons we lock the memory of the key so it won't be swapped to disk
mlock(key)
cipher_meta.generate_key(key)
# The key is copied and the input key is zeroized for security reasons.
# The copied key will also be zeroized when the object is dropped.
cipher = Cipher(cipher_meta, key)
# it was zeroized we can unlock it
munlock(key)
# we create a buffer based on plaintext block len of 4096
# the actual buffer needs to be a bit larger as the ciphertext also includes the tag and nonce
plaintext_len = 4096
ciphertext_len = cipher_meta.ciphertext_len(plaintext_len)
buf = np.array([0] * ciphertext_len, dtype=np.uint8)
# for security reasons we lock the memory of the buffer so it won't be swapped to disk, because it contains plaintext after decryption
mlock(buf)
aad = b"AAD"
# put some plaintext in the buffer, it would be ideal if you can directly collect the data into the buffer without allocating new memory
# but for the sake of example we will allocate and copy the data
plaintext = bytearray(os.urandom(plaintext_len))
# for security reasons we lock the memory of the plaintext so it won't be swapped to disk
mlock(plaintext)
# cipher.copy_slice is slighlty faster than buf[:plaintext_len] = plaintext, especially for large plaintext, because it copies the data in parallel
# cipher.copy_slice takes bytes as input, cipher.copy_slice1 takes bytearray
cipher.copy_slice(plaintext, buf)
# encrypt it, this will encrypt in-place the data in the buffer
print("encrypting...")
ciphertext_len = cipher.seal_in_place(buf, plaintext_len, 42, aad)
cipertext = buf[:ciphertext_len]
# you can do something with the ciphertext
# decrypt it
# if you need to copy ciphertext to buffer, we don't need to do it now as it's already in the buffer
# cipher.copy_slice(ciphertext, buf[:len(ciphertext)])
print("decrypting...")
plaintext_len = cipher.open_in_place(buf, ciphertext_len, 42, aad)
plaintext2 = buf[:plaintext_len]
# for security reasons we lock the memory of the plaintext so it won't be swapped to disk
mlock(plaintext2)
assert plaintext == plaintext2
finally:
# best practice, you should always zeroize the plaintext and keys after you are done with it (key will be zeroized when the enc object is dropped)
zeroize1(plaintext)
zeroize1(buf)
munlock(buf)
munlock(plaintext)
print("bye!")
You can use other ciphers like cipher_meta = CipherMeta.Ring(RingAlgorithm.ChaCha20Poly1305)
.
You can also provide your own nonce that you can generate based on your contraints.
from rencrypt import Cipher, CipherMeta, RingAlgorithm
import os
from zeroize import zeroize1, mlock, munlock
import numpy as np
import platform
def setup_memory_limit():
if not platform.system() == "Windows":
return
import ctypes
from ctypes import wintypes
# Define the Windows API functions
kernel32 = ctypes.WinDLL('kernel32', use_last_error=True)
GetCurrentProcess = kernel32.GetCurrentProcess
GetCurrentProcess.restype = wintypes.HANDLE
SetProcessWorkingSetSize = kernel32.SetProcessWorkingSetSize
SetProcessWorkingSetSize.restype = wintypes.BOOL
SetProcessWorkingSetSize.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE, ctypes.c_size_t, ctypes.c_size_t]
# Get the handle of the current process
current_process = GetCurrentProcess()
# Set the working set size
min_size = 6 * 1024 * 1024 # Minimum working set size
max_size = 10 * 1024 * 1024 # Maximum working set size
result = SetProcessWorkingSetSize(current_process, min_size, max_size)
if not result:
error_code = ctypes.get_last_error()
error_message = ctypes.FormatError(error_code)
raise RuntimeError(f"SetProcessWorkingSetSize failed with error code {error_code}: {error_message}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
setup_memory_limit()
# You can use also other algorithms like cipher_meta = CipherMeta.Ring(RingAlgorithm.ChaCha20Poly1305)`.
cipher_meta = CipherMeta.Ring(RingAlgorithm.Aes256Gcm)
key_len = cipher_meta.key_len()
key = bytearray(key_len)
# for security reasons we lock the memory of the key so it won't be swapped to disk
mlock(key)
cipher_meta.generate_key(key)
# The key is copied and the input key is zeroized for security reasons.
# The copied key will also be zeroized when the object is dropped.
cipher = Cipher(cipher_meta, key)
# it was zeroized we can unlock it
munlock(key)
# we create a buffer based on plaintext block len of 4096
# the actual buffer needs to be a bit larger as the ciphertext also includes the tag and nonce
plaintext_len = 4096
ciphertext_len = cipher_meta.ciphertext_len(plaintext_len)
buf = np.array([0] * ciphertext_len, dtype=np.uint8)
# for security reasons we lock the memory of the buffer so it won't be swapped to disk, because it contains plaintext after decryption
mlock(buf)
aad = b"AAD"
# create our own nonce
nonce = os.urandom(cipher_meta.nonce_len())
# put some plaintext in the buffer, it would be ideal if you can directly collect the data into the buffer without allocating new memory
# but for the sake of example we will allocate and copy the data
plaintext = bytearray(os.urandom(plaintext_len))
# for security reasons we lock the memory of the plaintext so it won't be swapped to disk
mlock(plaintext)
# cipher.copy_slice is slighlty faster than buf[:plaintext_len] = plaintext, especially for large plaintext, because it copies the data in parallel
# cipher.copy_slice takes bytes as input, cipher.copy_slice1 takes bytearray
cipher.copy_slice(plaintext, buf)
# encrypt it, this will encrypt in-place the data in the buffer
print("encrypting...")
ciphertext_len = cipher.seal_in_place(buf, plaintext_len, 42, aad, nonce)
cipertext = buf[:ciphertext_len]
# you can do something with the ciphertext
# decrypt it
# if you need to copy ciphertext to buffer, we don't need to do it now as it's already in the buffer
# cipher.copy_slice(ciphertext, buf[:len(ciphertext)])
print("decrypting...")
plaintext_len = cipher.open_in_place(buf, ciphertext_len, 42, aad, nonce)
plaintext2 = buf[:plaintext_len]
# for security reasons we lock the memory of the plaintext so it won't be swapped to disk
mlock(plaintext2)
assert plaintext == plaintext2
finally:
# best practice, you should always zeroize the plaintext and keys after you are done with it (key will be zeroized when the enc object is dropped)
zeroize1(plaintext)
zeroize1(buf)
munlock(buf)
munlock(plaintext)
print("bye!")
import errno
import io
import os
from pathlib import Path
import shutil
from rencrypt import Cipher, CipherMeta, RingAlgorithm
import hashlib
from zeroize import zeroize1, mlock, munlock
import numpy as np
import platform
def setup_memory_limit():
if not platform.system() == "Windows":
return
import ctypes
from ctypes import wintypes
# Define the Windows API functions
kernel32 = ctypes.WinDLL('kernel32', use_last_error=True)
GetCurrentProcess = kernel32.GetCurrentProcess
GetCurrentProcess.restype = wintypes.HANDLE
SetProcessWorkingSetSize = kernel32.SetProcessWorkingSetSize
SetProcessWorkingSetSize.restype = wintypes.BOOL
SetProcessWorkingSetSize.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE, ctypes.c_size_t, ctypes.c_size_t]
# Get the handle of the current process
current_process = GetCurrentProcess()
# Set the working set size
min_size = 6 * 1024 * 1024 # Minimum working set size
max_size = 10 * 1024 * 1024 # Maximum working set size
result = SetProcessWorkingSetSize(current_process, min_size, max_size)
if not result:
error_code = ctypes.get_last_error()
error_message = ctypes.FormatError(error_code)
raise RuntimeError(f"SetProcessWorkingSetSize failed with error code {error_code}: {error_message}")
def read_file_in_chunks(file_path, buf):
with open(file_path, "rb") as file:
buffered_reader = io.BufferedReader(file, buffer_size=len(buf))
while True:
read = buffered_reader.readinto(buf)
if read == 0:
break
yield read
def hash_file(file_path):
hash_algo = hashlib.sha256()
with open(file_path, "rb") as f:
for chunk in iter(lambda: f.read(4096), b""):
hash_algo.update(chunk)
return hash_algo.hexdigest()
def compare_files_by_hash(file1, file2):
return hash_file(file1) == hash_file(file2)
def silentremove(filename):
try:
os.remove(filename)
except OSError as e: # this would be "except OSError, e:" before Python 2.6
if e.errno != errno.ENOENT: # errno.ENOENT = no such file or directory
raise # re-raise exception if a different error occurred
def create_directory_in_home(dir_name):
# Get the user's home directory
home_dir = Path.home()
# Create the full path for the new directory
new_dir_path = home_dir / dir_name
# Create the directory
try:
new_dir_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
except Exception as e:
print(f"Error creating directory: {e}")
return new_dir_path.absolute().__str__()
def create_file_with_size(file_path_str, size_in_bytes):
with open(file_path_str, "wb") as f:
for _ in range((size_in_bytes // 4096) + 1):
f.write(os.urandom(min(4096, size_in_bytes)))
f.flush()
def delete_dir(path):
if os.path.exists(path):
shutil.rmtree(path)
else:
print(f"Directory {path} does not exist.")
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
setup_memory_limit()
tmp_dir = create_directory_in_home("rencrypt_tmp")
fin = tmp_dir + "/" + "fin"
fout = tmp_dir + "/" + "fout.enc"
create_file_with_size(fin, 1 * 1024 * 1024)
chunk_len = 256 * 1024
# You can use also other algorithms like cipher_meta = CipherMeta.Ring(RingAlgorithm.ChaCha20Poly1305)`.
cipher_meta = CipherMeta.Ring(RingAlgorithm.Aes256Gcm)
key_len = cipher_meta.key_len()
key = bytearray(key_len)
# for security reasons we lock the memory of the key so it won't be swapped to disk
mlock(key)
cipher_meta.generate_key(key)
# The key is copied and the input key is zeroized for security reasons.
# The copied key will also be zeroized when the object is dropped.
cipher = Cipher(cipher_meta, key)
# it was zeroized we can unlock it
munlock(key)
plaintext_len = chunk_len
ciphertext_len = cipher_meta.ciphertext_len(plaintext_len)
buf = np.array([0] * ciphertext_len, dtype=np.uint8)
mlock(buf)
# use some random per file in additional authenticated data to prevent blocks from being swapped between files
aad = os.urandom(16)
# encrypt
print("encrypting...")
with open(fout, "wb", buffering=plaintext_len) as file_out:
i = 0
for read in read_file_in_chunks(fin, buf[:plaintext_len]):
ciphertext_len = cipher.seal_in_place(buf, read, i, aad)
file_out.write(buf[:ciphertext_len])
i += 1
file_out.flush()
# decrypt
print("decrypting...")
tmp = fout + ".dec"
with open(tmp, "wb", buffering=plaintext_len) as file_out:
i = 0
for read in read_file_in_chunks(fout, buf):
plaintext_len2 = cipher.open_in_place(buf, read, i, aad)
file_out.write(buf[:plaintext_len2])
i += 1
file_out.flush()
assert compare_files_by_hash(fin, tmp)
delete_dir(tmp_dir)
finally:
# best practice, you should always zeroize the plaintext and keys after you are done with it (key will be zeroized when the enc object is dropped)
# buf will containt the last block plaintext so we need to zeroize it
zeroize1(buf)
munlock(buf)
print("bye!")
encrypt_from()
/decrypt_from()
This is a bit slower than handling data only via the buffer, especially for large plaintext, but there are situations when you can't directly collect the data to the buffer but have some data from somewhere else.
from rencrypt import Cipher, CipherMeta, RingAlgorithm
import os
from zeroize import zeroize1, mlock, munlock
import numpy as np
import platform
def setup_memory_limit():
if not platform.system() == "Windows":
return
import ctypes
from ctypes import wintypes
# Define the Windows API functions
kernel32 = ctypes.WinDLL('kernel32', use_last_error=True)
GetCurrentProcess = kernel32.GetCurrentProcess
GetCurrentProcess.restype = wintypes.HANDLE
SetProcessWorkingSetSize = kernel32.SetProcessWorkingSetSize
SetProcessWorkingSetSize.restype = wintypes.BOOL
SetProcessWorkingSetSize.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE, ctypes.c_size_t, ctypes.c_size_t]
# Get the handle of the current process
current_process = GetCurrentProcess()
# Set the working set size
min_size = 6 * 1024 * 1024 # Minimum working set size
max_size = 10 * 1024 * 1024 # Maximum working set size
result = SetProcessWorkingSetSize(current_process, min_size, max_size)
if not result:
error_code = ctypes.get_last_error()
error_message = ctypes.FormatError(error_code)
raise RuntimeError(f"SetProcessWorkingSetSize failed with error code {error_code}: {error_message}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
setup_memory_limit()
# You can use also other algorithms like cipher_meta = CipherMeta.Ring(RingAlgorithm.ChaCha20Poly1305)`.
cipher_meta = CipherMeta.Ring(RingAlgorithm.Aes256Gcm)
key_len = cipher_meta.key_len()
key = bytearray(key_len)
# for security reasons we lock the memory of the key so it won't be swapped to disk
mlock(key)
cipher_meta.generate_key(key)
# The key is copied and the input key is zeroized for security reasons.
# The copied key will also be zeroized when the object is dropped.
cipher = Cipher(cipher_meta, key)
# it was zeroized we can unlock it
munlock(key)
# we create a buffer based on plaintext block len of 4096
# the actual buffer needs to be a bit larger as the ciphertext also includes the tag and nonce
plaintext_len = 4096
ciphertext_len = cipher_meta.ciphertext_len(plaintext_len)
buf = np.array([0] * ciphertext_len, dtype=np.uint8)
# for security reasons we lock the memory of the buffer so it won't be swapped to disk, because it contains plaintext after decryption
mlock(buf)
aad = b"AAD"
plaintext = bytearray(os.urandom(plaintext_len))
# for security reasons we lock the memory of the plaintext so it won't be swapped to disk
mlock(plaintext)
# encrypt it, after this will have the ciphertext in the buffer
print("encrypting...")
ciphertext_len = cipher.seal_in_place_from(plaintext, buf, 42, aad)
cipertext = bytes(buf[:ciphertext_len])
# decrypt it
print("decrypting...")
plaintext_len = cipher.open_in_place_from(cipertext, buf, 42, aad)
plaintext2 = buf[:plaintext_len]
# for security reasons we lock the memory of the plaintext so it won't be swapped to disk
mlock(plaintext2)
assert plaintext == plaintext2
finally:
# best practice, you should always zeroize the plaintext and keys after you are done with it (key will be zeroized when the enc object is dropped)
zeroize1(plaintext)
zeroize1(buf)
munlock(buf)
munlock(plaintext)
print("bye!")
This mitigates the problems that appears on Copy-on-write fork. You need to zeroize the data before forking the child process.
import os
from zeroize import zeroize1, mlock, munlock
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
# Maximum you can mlock is 4MB
sensitive_data = bytearray(b"Sensitive Information")
mlock(sensitive_data)
print("Before zeroization:", sensitive_data)
zeroize1(sensitive_data)
print("After zeroization:", sensitive_data)
# Forking after zeroization to ensure no sensitive data is copied
pid = os.fork()
if pid == 0:
# This is the child process
print("Child process memory after fork:", sensitive_data)
else:
# This is the parent process
os.wait() # Wait for the child process to exit
print("all good, bye!")
finally:
# Unlock the memory
print("unlocking memory")
munlock(sensitive_data)
Skip this if you're starting it in browser.
git clone https://github.com/radumarias/rencrypt-python && cd Cipher-python
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh
To configure your current shell, you need to source the corresponding env file under $HOME/.cargo. This is usually done by running one of the following (note the leading DOT):
. "$HOME/.cargo/env"
python -m venv .env
source .env/bin/activate
pip install -r requirements.txt
maturin develop --release
pytest
python examples/encrypt.py
python examples/encrypt_into.py
python examples/encrypt_from.py
python examples/encrypt_file.py
python benches/bench.py
Encrypt
Decrypt
Block size and duration in seconds
MB | rencrypt encrypt | PyFLocker encrypt update_into | rencrypt encrypt_from | PyFLocker encrypt update | rencrypt decrypt | PyFLocker decrypt update_into | rencrypt decrypt_from |
PyFLocker
decrypt update |
0.03125 | 0.00001 | 0.00091 | 0.00001 | 0.00009 | 0.00001 | 0.00004 | 0.00001 | 0.00005 |
0.0625 | 0.00001 | 0.00005 | 0.00002 | 0.00005 | 0.00001 | 0.00004 | 0.00002 | 0.00008 |
0.125 | 0.00002 | 0.00005 | 0.00003 | 0.00011 | 0.00003 | 0.00005 | 0.00003 | 0.00013 |
0.25 | 0.00004 | 0.00008 | 0.00007 | 0.00019 | 0.00005 | 0.00009 | 0.00007 | 0.00023 |
0.5 | 0.0001 | 0.00014 | 0.00015 | 0.00035 | 0.00011 | 0.00015 | 0.00014 | 0.00043 |
1 | 0.00021 | 0.00024 | 0.0008 | 0.00082 | 0.00021 | 0.00029 | 0.00044 | 0.00103 |
2 | 0.00043 | 0.00052 | 0.00082 | 0.00147 | 0.00044 | 0.00058 | 0.00089 | 0.00176 |
4 | 0.00089 | 0.00098 | 0.00174 | 0.00284 | 0.00089 | 0.00117 | 0.0013 | 0.0034 |
8 | 0.00184 | 0.0019 | 0.00263 | 0.00523 | 0.00192 | 0.00323 | 0.00283 | 0.00571 |
16 | 0.00353 | 0.00393 | 0.00476 | 0.0141 | 0.00367 | 0.00617 | 0.00509 | 0.01031 |
32 | 0.00678 | 0.00748 | 0.00904 | 0.0244 | 0.00749 | 0.01348 | 0.01014 | 0.02543 |
64 | 0.01361 | 0.01461 | 0.01595 | 0.05064 | 0.0146 | 0.02697 | 0.0192 | 0.05296 |
128 | 0.02923 | 0.03027 | 0.03343 | 0.10362 | 0.03134 | 0.0541 | 0.03558 | 0.1138 |
256 | 0.06348 | 0.06188 | 0.07303 | 0.20911 | 0.06136 | 0.10417 | 0.07572 | 0.20828 |
512 | 0.11782 | 0.13463 | 0.14283 | 0.41929 | 0.1209 | 0.21114 | 0.14434 | 0.41463 |
1024 | 0.25001 | 0.24953 | 0.28912 | 0.8237 | 0.25377 | 0.42581 | 0.29795 | 0.82588 |
256KB
seems to be the sweet spot for buffer size that offers the max MB/s
speed for encryption, on benchmarks that
seem to be the case.
We performed 10.000
encryption operations for each size varying from 1KB
to 16MB
.
MB | MB/s |
---|---|
0.0009765625 | 1083 |
0.001953125 | 1580 |
0.00390625 | 2158 |
0.0078125 | 2873 |
0.015625 | 3348 |
0.03125 | 3731 |
0.0625 | 4053 |
0.125 | 4156 |
0.25 | 4247 |
0.5 | 4182 |
1.0 | 3490 |
2.0 | 3539 |
4.0 | 3684 |
8.0 | 3787 |
16.0 | 3924 |
KDF
)RSA
and Elliptic-curve cryptography
This lib hasn't been audited, but it wraps ring
crate (well known and audited library) and RustCrypto
(AES-GCM
and ChaCha20Poly1305
ciphers are audited), so in principle at least the primitives should offer a similar level of
security.
Feel free to fork it, change and use it in any way that you want. If you build something interesting and feel like sharing pull requests are always appreciated.
Please see CONTRIBUTING.md.
FAQs
A Python encryption library implemented in Rust. It supports AEAD with various ciphers. It uses multiple providers to handle encryption.
We found that rencrypt demonstrated a healthy version release cadence and project activity because the last version was released less than a year ago. It has 1 open source maintainer collaborating on the project.
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