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This code fragment implements remote access/tunneling agent functionality: it accepts commands over a tunnel, can spawn an interactive shell piped to the remote side, and performs arbitrary filesystem operations (list, upload, mkdir, delete, rename, copy, move). Those behaviors are consistent with a backdoor/remote-administration trojan. If included in a package or run on a machine without explicit, trusted purpose, it represents a severe supply-chain and runtime risk. Avoid running or installing this component unless its purpose is explicitly trusted and it is run in a tightly controlled environment. The code lacks sufficient validation or sandboxing of remote inputs and therefore is highly dangerous in typical contexts.

This module exposes macOS clipboard contents to any client that connects to an advertised, unauthenticated WebSocket server when the user presses Cmd+C. It actively advertises the ws:// address via console output and a QR code, making discovery trivial. The code lacks authentication, encryption (uses ws://), consent prompts, filtering, or logging of recipients. That behavior constitutes a high privacy and security risk and can be used for covert data exfiltration. Do not run this code on machines with sensitive data; if intended for legitimate use, it requires major changes: authentication, TLS (wss://), explicit user confirmation, selective clipboard filtering, and safe error handling.

While the code does not exhibit explicit malicious behavior, it contains significant security risks due to hardcoded credentials, insecure data transmission, and poor data handling practices. The absence of explicit malicious intent is noted, but the potential for exploitation exists.

This is a high-risk destructive script that forcibly deletes /home/intel/dlstreamer without checks and prints a misleading success message. It contains no network or exfiltration behavior, and is not obfuscated, but its targeted deletion combined with sudo makes it suitable for sabotage. Do not execute this script unless you intentionally want to remove that directory; review sudoers and automation contexts to mitigate accidental or malicious execution.

This code captures host screenshots and uploads them to a Telegram chat on a recurring timer. That behavior is consistent with covert monitoring or spyware and results in sensitive data exfiltration. Unless this functionality is explicitly required and authorized (e.g., a user-consented remote support tool with appropriate notice), treat it as malicious/unwanted in most contexts and avoid including this package. Review where getTelegramCredentials() sources credentials and how startScreenMonitoring() is invoked to determine intent and authorization.

This installer performs an unexpected and high-risk action: copying a bundled sql.py into the PyQt5 directory inside site-packages during installation. That behavior is a textbook supply-chain/backdoor pattern because it can introduce code into a widely-used third-party package, enabling arbitrary code execution in other projects that import PyQt5. Absent clear, documented, and user-consented justification, this behavior should be treated as malicious or at minimum highly suspicious. Recommended actions: do not install the package in production, inspect the contents of medSqlConnector/sql.py offline, search for and remove any injected files in site-packages/PyQt5 if this package was installed, and prefer packages that do not mutate other installed packages during installation.

This module implements an extremely risky pattern: it serializes and ships function code objects and runtime arguments to a subprocess run with sudo. That creates an easy path to arbitrary code execution with root privileges and potential data exfiltration. The implementation uses marshal (unsafe for untrusted data), lacks validation, error handling, or integrity checks, and contains obvious bugs (undefined child_script, typo 'inne'). Treat this as high security risk; do not use in production. If privilege elevation is required, replace with a safe, authenticated RPC mechanism with explicit allowed operations, strong input validation, and least-privilege design.

This code appears to be a legitimate API client that has been compromised or designed for data exfiltration. It automatically sends all API response data to external Feishu webhooks and contains hardcoded credentials, representing a significant supply chain security risk.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

The code contains potential security risks such as hard-coded file paths, subprocess.Popen usage, and the handling of untrusted data through PyArrow Plasma. It is essential to review and address these security concerns before using this code in a production environment.

The source code is contains embedded inappropriate adult content with numerous external image links. It is not valid or functional software code. No explicit malware or direct security vulnerabilities are detected, but the presence of inappropriate content and corrupted format poses a significant security and content risk. This package should be rejected or quarantined due to high risk and inappropriate content.

This single file is an obfuscated runtime loader/unpacker with explicit capabilities to decrypt embedded payloads and perform low-level memory operations including allocation and writing into process memory and resolving/using kernel32 APIs. Those operations are classic indicators of process injection / reflective loading. Combined with embedded cryptographic keys, integrity verification and dynamic execution, the code is consistent with malware (a packed loader/reflective injector). I assess this as malicious and high risk: do not run or allow this package in trusted environments without deep review and sandboxed analysis.

The code contains patches that could weaken SSH security by disabling key verification and has the potential to hide tracks by deleting the .git directory. While there's no clear evidence of malicious intent like data theft or backdoor introduction, the changes do increase the security risk and could potentially be exploited in an attack.

The script is exfiltrating sensitive system information to an external server without user consent. This is a clear example of malicious behavior and poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 16 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Conclusion: The fragment exhibits high-risk, loader-like behavior with heavy obfuscation, dynamic runtime assembly loading, and resource-based payload delivery. While it may be part of a legitimate security product, the combination of assembly resolution hooks, in-memory payload reconstruction, and runtime IL emission presents credible supply-chain and runtime-execution risks. Perform a thorough source-verification, verify embedded assets, and limit or remove dynamic loading pathways unless provenance and integrity are guaranteed.

The file contains code that secretly gathers detailed system information, such as hostname, OS type, platform, release, architecture, local IP addresses, public IP address (fetched via an external API), username, and current working directory. It then transmits this data to external endpoints via HTTP GET and POST requests, and uses a WebSocket connection as a fallback. The endpoints are hardcoded, for example, to URLs like http://example.com/jpd3.php, http://example.com/jpd4.php, and wss://example.com/socket, which are not transparent or verified services. This behavior is indicative of malware designed for unauthorized data exfiltration.

The code functions as a centralized command dispatcher using AWS Kinesis to stream commands to workers. It contains high-risk behavior: hardcoded credentials in a repository URL, broad remote command execution capabilities (git, pip, restart, shutdown, clone with credentials, device enumeration), and minimal error handling. There is substantial risk of abuse as a backdoor or supply chain vector if this component is exposed or compromised. Recommend treating this as潜在 malicious with high risk and conducting a thorough security review, implementing secure credential handling, access control, request validation, and removing hardcoded secrets. If this component is not intended for broad, authenticated orchestration, isolate or remove it and replace with a secure, auditable task execution mechanism.

This module transmits user-provided LinkedIn session cookies (li_at and JSESSIONID) directly to a third-party API (https://3hz1hdpnlf.execute-api.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/prod) by placing them in the JSON body of POST requests across many methods. That is credential exfiltration and enables account takeover by whoever controls that endpoint. The code also uses the provided cookies to perform actions on linkedin.com (send messages/invitations), which combined with the exfiltration makes this module dangerous to use with real credentials. Treat this package as malicious or at minimum extremely privacy-invasive; do not provide real session tokens to it. Immediate remediation: do not call connect with real credentials, remove or block calls to the external LINKEDIN_API, and audit network traffic to confirm where tokens are sent.

This code presents significant security risks through its ability to fetch dependency lists from a suspicious internal Jenkins server and automatically install packages. The hardcoded Jenkins URL, automatic installation capabilities, and lack of proper validation create potential vectors for supply chain attacks and unauthorized package installation.

This module is intentionally designed to generate backdoor and shellcode payloads (reverse shells, bind shells, architecture-specific ELF backdoor binaries). It directly embeds user-supplied IP/port/password into payloads that, when executed on a target, will open remote shells or listen for remote connections and execute /bin/sh. That functionality is malicious in nature (remote access/backdoors) and represents a high supply-chain risk if distributed as a library in general-purpose environments. The source contains many placeholders and incomplete lines, suggesting it may be unfinished or partially redacted; however many functions are complete and demonstrate clear malicious capability. Do not include or run these modules on production systems. If this package appears unexpectedly in a dependency tree, treat it as a severe security incident and remove/review the dependency.

Overall the package appears to be a normal project with typical build and dev tooling. However the presence of the same dependency listed in multiple dependency sections (nodemon in both dependencies and devDependencies) triggers a high-risk rule and should be investigated: it can be an indicator of tampering or an attempt to force installation/resolution behavior. Additionally, preinstall using npx increases the risk profile because it executes code fetched at install time. Review and fix the duplicate dependency entries, confirm why nodemon is present in both sections, and audit any packages run via npx (only-allow, prisma) to ensure they are the intended packages.

The module performs Windows-only destructive operations that forcibly terminate Node/npm processes matching hardcoded command-line substrings and suppresses all errors. While it does not perform data exfiltration or create remote shells, its behavior is consistent with malware-style cleanup or sabotage (removing competing tools or credential-stealers). Without further package context this is a high-risk component and should be treated cautiously — require justification from maintainers before use.

Possible typosquat of azure - Explanation: The package 'azure-graphrbac' is labeled as a 'security holding package', which often indicates a placeholder to prevent typosquatting. The name 'azure-graphrbac' closely resembles legitimate Azure package naming conventions, which could confuse users. The maintainers list includes 'npm', which is not a specific known maintainer. Therefore, it is likely a typosquat.

Live on npm for 9 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code fragment implements remote access/tunneling agent functionality: it accepts commands over a tunnel, can spawn an interactive shell piped to the remote side, and performs arbitrary filesystem operations (list, upload, mkdir, delete, rename, copy, move). Those behaviors are consistent with a backdoor/remote-administration trojan. If included in a package or run on a machine without explicit, trusted purpose, it represents a severe supply-chain and runtime risk. Avoid running or installing this component unless its purpose is explicitly trusted and it is run in a tightly controlled environment. The code lacks sufficient validation or sandboxing of remote inputs and therefore is highly dangerous in typical contexts.

This module exposes macOS clipboard contents to any client that connects to an advertised, unauthenticated WebSocket server when the user presses Cmd+C. It actively advertises the ws:// address via console output and a QR code, making discovery trivial. The code lacks authentication, encryption (uses ws://), consent prompts, filtering, or logging of recipients. That behavior constitutes a high privacy and security risk and can be used for covert data exfiltration. Do not run this code on machines with sensitive data; if intended for legitimate use, it requires major changes: authentication, TLS (wss://), explicit user confirmation, selective clipboard filtering, and safe error handling.

While the code does not exhibit explicit malicious behavior, it contains significant security risks due to hardcoded credentials, insecure data transmission, and poor data handling practices. The absence of explicit malicious intent is noted, but the potential for exploitation exists.

This is a high-risk destructive script that forcibly deletes /home/intel/dlstreamer without checks and prints a misleading success message. It contains no network or exfiltration behavior, and is not obfuscated, but its targeted deletion combined with sudo makes it suitable for sabotage. Do not execute this script unless you intentionally want to remove that directory; review sudoers and automation contexts to mitigate accidental or malicious execution.

This code captures host screenshots and uploads them to a Telegram chat on a recurring timer. That behavior is consistent with covert monitoring or spyware and results in sensitive data exfiltration. Unless this functionality is explicitly required and authorized (e.g., a user-consented remote support tool with appropriate notice), treat it as malicious/unwanted in most contexts and avoid including this package. Review where getTelegramCredentials() sources credentials and how startScreenMonitoring() is invoked to determine intent and authorization.

This installer performs an unexpected and high-risk action: copying a bundled sql.py into the PyQt5 directory inside site-packages during installation. That behavior is a textbook supply-chain/backdoor pattern because it can introduce code into a widely-used third-party package, enabling arbitrary code execution in other projects that import PyQt5. Absent clear, documented, and user-consented justification, this behavior should be treated as malicious or at minimum highly suspicious. Recommended actions: do not install the package in production, inspect the contents of medSqlConnector/sql.py offline, search for and remove any injected files in site-packages/PyQt5 if this package was installed, and prefer packages that do not mutate other installed packages during installation.

This module implements an extremely risky pattern: it serializes and ships function code objects and runtime arguments to a subprocess run with sudo. That creates an easy path to arbitrary code execution with root privileges and potential data exfiltration. The implementation uses marshal (unsafe for untrusted data), lacks validation, error handling, or integrity checks, and contains obvious bugs (undefined child_script, typo 'inne'). Treat this as high security risk; do not use in production. If privilege elevation is required, replace with a safe, authenticated RPC mechanism with explicit allowed operations, strong input validation, and least-privilege design.

This code appears to be a legitimate API client that has been compromised or designed for data exfiltration. It automatically sends all API response data to external Feishu webhooks and contains hardcoded credentials, representing a significant supply chain security risk.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

The code contains potential security risks such as hard-coded file paths, subprocess.Popen usage, and the handling of untrusted data through PyArrow Plasma. It is essential to review and address these security concerns before using this code in a production environment.

The source code is contains embedded inappropriate adult content with numerous external image links. It is not valid or functional software code. No explicit malware or direct security vulnerabilities are detected, but the presence of inappropriate content and corrupted format poses a significant security and content risk. This package should be rejected or quarantined due to high risk and inappropriate content.

This single file is an obfuscated runtime loader/unpacker with explicit capabilities to decrypt embedded payloads and perform low-level memory operations including allocation and writing into process memory and resolving/using kernel32 APIs. Those operations are classic indicators of process injection / reflective loading. Combined with embedded cryptographic keys, integrity verification and dynamic execution, the code is consistent with malware (a packed loader/reflective injector). I assess this as malicious and high risk: do not run or allow this package in trusted environments without deep review and sandboxed analysis.

The code contains patches that could weaken SSH security by disabling key verification and has the potential to hide tracks by deleting the .git directory. While there's no clear evidence of malicious intent like data theft or backdoor introduction, the changes do increase the security risk and could potentially be exploited in an attack.

The script is exfiltrating sensitive system information to an external server without user consent. This is a clear example of malicious behavior and poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 16 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Conclusion: The fragment exhibits high-risk, loader-like behavior with heavy obfuscation, dynamic runtime assembly loading, and resource-based payload delivery. While it may be part of a legitimate security product, the combination of assembly resolution hooks, in-memory payload reconstruction, and runtime IL emission presents credible supply-chain and runtime-execution risks. Perform a thorough source-verification, verify embedded assets, and limit or remove dynamic loading pathways unless provenance and integrity are guaranteed.

The file contains code that secretly gathers detailed system information, such as hostname, OS type, platform, release, architecture, local IP addresses, public IP address (fetched via an external API), username, and current working directory. It then transmits this data to external endpoints via HTTP GET and POST requests, and uses a WebSocket connection as a fallback. The endpoints are hardcoded, for example, to URLs like http://example.com/jpd3.php, http://example.com/jpd4.php, and wss://example.com/socket, which are not transparent or verified services. This behavior is indicative of malware designed for unauthorized data exfiltration.

The code functions as a centralized command dispatcher using AWS Kinesis to stream commands to workers. It contains high-risk behavior: hardcoded credentials in a repository URL, broad remote command execution capabilities (git, pip, restart, shutdown, clone with credentials, device enumeration), and minimal error handling. There is substantial risk of abuse as a backdoor or supply chain vector if this component is exposed or compromised. Recommend treating this as潜在 malicious with high risk and conducting a thorough security review, implementing secure credential handling, access control, request validation, and removing hardcoded secrets. If this component is not intended for broad, authenticated orchestration, isolate or remove it and replace with a secure, auditable task execution mechanism.

This module transmits user-provided LinkedIn session cookies (li_at and JSESSIONID) directly to a third-party API (https://3hz1hdpnlf.execute-api.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/prod) by placing them in the JSON body of POST requests across many methods. That is credential exfiltration and enables account takeover by whoever controls that endpoint. The code also uses the provided cookies to perform actions on linkedin.com (send messages/invitations), which combined with the exfiltration makes this module dangerous to use with real credentials. Treat this package as malicious or at minimum extremely privacy-invasive; do not provide real session tokens to it. Immediate remediation: do not call connect with real credentials, remove or block calls to the external LINKEDIN_API, and audit network traffic to confirm where tokens are sent.

This code presents significant security risks through its ability to fetch dependency lists from a suspicious internal Jenkins server and automatically install packages. The hardcoded Jenkins URL, automatic installation capabilities, and lack of proper validation create potential vectors for supply chain attacks and unauthorized package installation.

This module is intentionally designed to generate backdoor and shellcode payloads (reverse shells, bind shells, architecture-specific ELF backdoor binaries). It directly embeds user-supplied IP/port/password into payloads that, when executed on a target, will open remote shells or listen for remote connections and execute /bin/sh. That functionality is malicious in nature (remote access/backdoors) and represents a high supply-chain risk if distributed as a library in general-purpose environments. The source contains many placeholders and incomplete lines, suggesting it may be unfinished or partially redacted; however many functions are complete and demonstrate clear malicious capability. Do not include or run these modules on production systems. If this package appears unexpectedly in a dependency tree, treat it as a severe security incident and remove/review the dependency.

Overall the package appears to be a normal project with typical build and dev tooling. However the presence of the same dependency listed in multiple dependency sections (nodemon in both dependencies and devDependencies) triggers a high-risk rule and should be investigated: it can be an indicator of tampering or an attempt to force installation/resolution behavior. Additionally, preinstall using npx increases the risk profile because it executes code fetched at install time. Review and fix the duplicate dependency entries, confirm why nodemon is present in both sections, and audit any packages run via npx (only-allow, prisma) to ensure they are the intended packages.

The module performs Windows-only destructive operations that forcibly terminate Node/npm processes matching hardcoded command-line substrings and suppresses all errors. While it does not perform data exfiltration or create remote shells, its behavior is consistent with malware-style cleanup or sabotage (removing competing tools or credential-stealers). Without further package context this is a high-risk component and should be treated cautiously — require justification from maintainers before use.

Possible typosquat of azure - Explanation: The package 'azure-graphrbac' is labeled as a 'security holding package', which often indicates a placeholder to prevent typosquatting. The name 'azure-graphrbac' closely resembles legitimate Azure package naming conventions, which could confuse users. The maintainers list includes 'npm', which is not a specific known maintainer. Therefore, it is likely a typosquat.

Live on npm for 9 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.