Secure your dependencies. Ship with confidence.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

The preinstall script makes an outbound network request (ping) to an external OAST domain during npm install. This is high-risk behavior consistent with telemetry, beaconing, or potential exfiltration and should be treated as malicious or at least highly suspicious. Do not install in production or on sensitive machines without further investigation.

This module is an automation/scraping worker that intentionally executes code provided by task descriptions. That design requires trusting the task source. The code contains multiple high-risk sinks: subprocess with shell=True, exec()/eval of task-supplied code, and browser JS execution. It also copies browser user profiles (cookies/credentials) into temporary profiles, which increases risk of credential theft. If task inputs are untrusted (remote server controlled by attacker or tampered local JSON), an attacker can achieve remote code execution, data exfiltration (files, cookies), or arbitrary system changes. Recommendation: only run with tasks from trusted sources, disable remote task fetching unless secured, avoid copying full user-data profiles, and remove/guard exec/eval/subprocess paths or run worker inside a hardened sandbox/container with least privileges.

The package contains a hidden payload that targets Russian language users visiting Russian and Belarusian sites. For those users, it will disable user interaction and play a looping audio of the Ukrainian anthem after 3 days. Therefore, it is marked as protestware only because it freezes interactions for many users. This behavior is not disclosed in any documentation of the package and seriously disrupts user experience.

This file is a blob of HTML/spam content with embedded links to adult videos, torrent downloads and suspicious redirectors (e.g. https://2023[.]redircdn[.]com/?…, http://rmdown[.]com/link[.]php?hash=…, http://data[.]down2048[.]com/list[.]php?…), plus numerous third-party image URLs. No executable code or proven malware payload is present, but the obfuscated redirects and torrent links pose a high risk of phishing, drive-by downloads or exposure to illicit content. Such anomalous content should be quarantined and removed from any legitimate software dependency.

This module contains high-risk functionality: it executes shell commands (subprocess.Popen with shell=True) and writes to files based on external inputs without validation or sanitization. There is no evidence of built-in exfiltration or backdoor behavior in the provided fragment, but the presence of arbitrary shell execution and unrestricted filesystem writes means this code could be abused as a supply-chain execution vector if steps_json or interactive inputs are controlled by an attacker. Recommendation: treat this as dangerous when running in untrusted environments — enforce strict allowlists for commands, validate and normalize file paths, avoid shell=True (use list of args), run commands in a sandbox/limited environment, and sanitize any content derived from stderr before using it as a command.

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 3 hours and 50 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file contains a prompt template that implements a nested jailbreak attack against AI systems. The template describes a fictional scenario in which a student experiences a dream and is prompted to supply detailed, step-by-step instructions on how to accomplish a task specified by a parameter. The template deliberately isolates the harmful instruction set by instructing the model to return only the second paragraph of the generated text. A reference is made to academic research (see https://arx[.]iv/abs/23111[.]08268) that documents this bypass method. Although it does not function as traditional malware, its purpose is malicious: to compromise AI safety measures and induce the production of dangerous or unethical outputs when processed.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

`lotusbail` is a malicious npm package that masquerades as a WhatsApp Web API library by forking legitimate Baileys-based code and preserving working messaging functionality. In addition to normal API behavior, it inserts a wrapper around the WhatsApp WebSocket client so that all traffic passing through the library is duplicated for collection. Reported data theft includes WhatsApp authentication tokens and session keys, full message content (sent/received and historical), contact lists (including phone numbers), and transferred media/files. The package also attempts to establish persistent unauthorized access by hijacking the WhatsApp device-linking (“pairing”) workflow using a hardcoded pairing code, effectively linking an attacker-controlled device to the victim’s account; removing the npm dependency does not automatically remove the linked device. To hinder detection, the exfiltration endpoint is hidden behind multiple obfuscation layers, collected data is encrypted (including a custom RSA implementation), and the code includes anti-debugging traps designed to disrupt analysis.

The code contains patches that could weaken SSH security by disabling key verification and has the potential to hide tracks by deleting the .git directory. While there's no clear evidence of malicious intent like data theft or backdoor introduction, the changes do increase the security risk and could potentially be exploited in an attack.

The code fragment exhibits high-risk patterns: a broad AMT tooling surface combined with a WebSocket relay proxy that can forward to arbitrary destinations, plus a large opaque payload and insecure TLS handling. This strongly indicates potential malicious activity or backdoor-like capabilities if deployed as part of a library. Recommend treating as suspicious, performing thorough audit, removing the TLS verification bypass, constraining allowed destinations, enforcing authentication, and isolating any embedded payload with a verifiable origin. In a supply-chain context, this warrants at least a medium-high security risk assessment and caution in adoption.

The code implements a replication-queue mechanism for MongoDB collections. It does not contain obvious remote-exfiltration, cryptomining, or backdoor network connections. However, it uses eval() to convert string-encoded arguments coming from queued DB documents into Python objects before calling replica operations. This is a high-risk code-execution vector: any attacker or process that can insert or tamper with queue/error documents (or cause untrusted strings to be persisted) can execute arbitrary Python code in the process and then cause arbitrary actions on the replica DB. Other issues are some implementation bugs (non-returning __getattr__) and broad exception handling. Recommend removing eval(), replacing it with safe parsing (json), validating queued data, and ensuring only trusted code writes to the queue/error collections.

The code exhibits clear signs of malicious behavior, including downloading executables from the internet and executing them without verification. The use of Discord CDN for hosting the executable file and the lack of any form of integrity check or error handling suggest a high risk of this script being used for malicious purposes.

Live on npm for 5 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

This source code is a malicious exploit script designed to remotely install a PHP webshell (vvv<?php eval($_POST[zzz]);?>) on a target web server by delivering an eval-wrapped, chr()-encoded payload via the HTTP User-Agent header and then verifying installation. Despite syntactic errors in the provided fragment, the intent, payload, and delivery mechanism are clear. Do not run this code; treat any occurrences as a high-risk compromise indicator and remove/report accordingly.

The snippet implements explicit credential exfiltration: it reads a TOKEN from a local settings.json and transmits it to a hardcoded Discord webhook. This is malicious behavior and constitutes a severe supply-chain and credential-theft risk. If present in a dependency, assume compromise, remove the package, rotate any affected tokens, and investigate distribution and invocation paths.

This code is part of an offensive implant framework (Sliver). It intentionally reads alias manifests and payload binaries from disk, registers CLI commands, and forwards raw payload bytes, arguments and evasive flags to remote implants via RPC (ExecuteAssembly, SpawnDll, Sideload). There is no evidence of obfuscation or hidden backdoors beyond the tool's explicit purpose. From a supply-chain/security perspective, this module is high-risk: it enables distribution and remote execution of arbitrary binaries on compromised hosts and includes flags to bypass defenses. Use with caution and only within a legitimate, authorized testing environment.

Conclusion: The fragment is an unreadable binary/encoded payload with likely obfuscation. There is insufficient evidence to assert specific malicious behavior from the fragment alone. However, the presence of such binary data in a distribution artifact warrants caution: verify provenance, obtain a decoded/unpacked version, and perform dynamic analysis in a controlled environment before trusting or integrating the artifact.

This setup.py strongly indicates a malicious or abusive package. Explicit 'malware' and related keywords, the installation of automation/input-capture dependencies, and console_scripts entry points create a high-risk packaging configuration for a remote access trojan/stealer/backdoor. The file itself does not contain payload code, but it facilitates installation and execution of code that likely implements malicious behavior. Do not install or run this package without thorough, isolated analysis of the package modules (especially triple._cmd_ and any networking or persistence code).

The code is designed to collect and exfiltrate sensitive data from a Windows system without user consent. It uses hardcoded credentials and bypasses SSL verification, indicating potential malicious intent. The script exhibits behaviors typical of spyware or data-stealing malware.

Live on PyPI for 1 day, 7 hours and 28 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Conclusion: Among the three reports, Report 1 presents the most credible, high-risk indicators for malicious or covert activity within a JavaScript dependency. The presence of heavy obfuscation, numerous base64 payloads, data URLs, and dynamic execution paths strongly suggests a loader/backdoor style mechanism that could exfiltrate data or modify behavior at runtime. It warrants urgent, in-depth dynamic analysis in a controlled environment, deobfuscation efforts, and likely removal or replacement with audited alternatives. A formal security advisory should be raised with the maintainers, requesting a source-level deobfuscation and a thorough disclosure of intended behavior.

This script is high-risk and exhibits likely malicious or unauthorized remote-access behavior. It downloads and executes unsigned remote binaries, configures and runs multiple proxy/tunneling services, generates/uses cryptographic keys, registers the host to remote management/agent infrastructure (Nezha/Argo-like), and exfiltrates node/subscription information to external endpoints and Telegram. Even if intended for benign proxy provisioning, the lack of integrity checks, execution of arbitrary remote code, embedded keys, and automated publishing/exposure of host endpoints make it unsafe to run. Treat as malicious or potentially backdoor-capable — do not run on trusted systems.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

The preinstall script makes an outbound network request (ping) to an external OAST domain during npm install. This is high-risk behavior consistent with telemetry, beaconing, or potential exfiltration and should be treated as malicious or at least highly suspicious. Do not install in production or on sensitive machines without further investigation.

This module is an automation/scraping worker that intentionally executes code provided by task descriptions. That design requires trusting the task source. The code contains multiple high-risk sinks: subprocess with shell=True, exec()/eval of task-supplied code, and browser JS execution. It also copies browser user profiles (cookies/credentials) into temporary profiles, which increases risk of credential theft. If task inputs are untrusted (remote server controlled by attacker or tampered local JSON), an attacker can achieve remote code execution, data exfiltration (files, cookies), or arbitrary system changes. Recommendation: only run with tasks from trusted sources, disable remote task fetching unless secured, avoid copying full user-data profiles, and remove/guard exec/eval/subprocess paths or run worker inside a hardened sandbox/container with least privileges.

The package contains a hidden payload that targets Russian language users visiting Russian and Belarusian sites. For those users, it will disable user interaction and play a looping audio of the Ukrainian anthem after 3 days. Therefore, it is marked as protestware only because it freezes interactions for many users. This behavior is not disclosed in any documentation of the package and seriously disrupts user experience.

This file is a blob of HTML/spam content with embedded links to adult videos, torrent downloads and suspicious redirectors (e.g. https://2023[.]redircdn[.]com/?…, http://rmdown[.]com/link[.]php?hash=…, http://data[.]down2048[.]com/list[.]php?…), plus numerous third-party image URLs. No executable code or proven malware payload is present, but the obfuscated redirects and torrent links pose a high risk of phishing, drive-by downloads or exposure to illicit content. Such anomalous content should be quarantined and removed from any legitimate software dependency.

This module contains high-risk functionality: it executes shell commands (subprocess.Popen with shell=True) and writes to files based on external inputs without validation or sanitization. There is no evidence of built-in exfiltration or backdoor behavior in the provided fragment, but the presence of arbitrary shell execution and unrestricted filesystem writes means this code could be abused as a supply-chain execution vector if steps_json or interactive inputs are controlled by an attacker. Recommendation: treat this as dangerous when running in untrusted environments — enforce strict allowlists for commands, validate and normalize file paths, avoid shell=True (use list of args), run commands in a sandbox/limited environment, and sanitize any content derived from stderr before using it as a command.

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 3 hours and 50 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file contains a prompt template that implements a nested jailbreak attack against AI systems. The template describes a fictional scenario in which a student experiences a dream and is prompted to supply detailed, step-by-step instructions on how to accomplish a task specified by a parameter. The template deliberately isolates the harmful instruction set by instructing the model to return only the second paragraph of the generated text. A reference is made to academic research (see https://arx[.]iv/abs/23111[.]08268) that documents this bypass method. Although it does not function as traditional malware, its purpose is malicious: to compromise AI safety measures and induce the production of dangerous or unethical outputs when processed.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

`lotusbail` is a malicious npm package that masquerades as a WhatsApp Web API library by forking legitimate Baileys-based code and preserving working messaging functionality. In addition to normal API behavior, it inserts a wrapper around the WhatsApp WebSocket client so that all traffic passing through the library is duplicated for collection. Reported data theft includes WhatsApp authentication tokens and session keys, full message content (sent/received and historical), contact lists (including phone numbers), and transferred media/files. The package also attempts to establish persistent unauthorized access by hijacking the WhatsApp device-linking (“pairing”) workflow using a hardcoded pairing code, effectively linking an attacker-controlled device to the victim’s account; removing the npm dependency does not automatically remove the linked device. To hinder detection, the exfiltration endpoint is hidden behind multiple obfuscation layers, collected data is encrypted (including a custom RSA implementation), and the code includes anti-debugging traps designed to disrupt analysis.

The code contains patches that could weaken SSH security by disabling key verification and has the potential to hide tracks by deleting the .git directory. While there's no clear evidence of malicious intent like data theft or backdoor introduction, the changes do increase the security risk and could potentially be exploited in an attack.

The code fragment exhibits high-risk patterns: a broad AMT tooling surface combined with a WebSocket relay proxy that can forward to arbitrary destinations, plus a large opaque payload and insecure TLS handling. This strongly indicates potential malicious activity or backdoor-like capabilities if deployed as part of a library. Recommend treating as suspicious, performing thorough audit, removing the TLS verification bypass, constraining allowed destinations, enforcing authentication, and isolating any embedded payload with a verifiable origin. In a supply-chain context, this warrants at least a medium-high security risk assessment and caution in adoption.

The code implements a replication-queue mechanism for MongoDB collections. It does not contain obvious remote-exfiltration, cryptomining, or backdoor network connections. However, it uses eval() to convert string-encoded arguments coming from queued DB documents into Python objects before calling replica operations. This is a high-risk code-execution vector: any attacker or process that can insert or tamper with queue/error documents (or cause untrusted strings to be persisted) can execute arbitrary Python code in the process and then cause arbitrary actions on the replica DB. Other issues are some implementation bugs (non-returning __getattr__) and broad exception handling. Recommend removing eval(), replacing it with safe parsing (json), validating queued data, and ensuring only trusted code writes to the queue/error collections.

The code exhibits clear signs of malicious behavior, including downloading executables from the internet and executing them without verification. The use of Discord CDN for hosting the executable file and the lack of any form of integrity check or error handling suggest a high risk of this script being used for malicious purposes.

Live on npm for 5 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

This source code is a malicious exploit script designed to remotely install a PHP webshell (vvv<?php eval($_POST[zzz]);?>) on a target web server by delivering an eval-wrapped, chr()-encoded payload via the HTTP User-Agent header and then verifying installation. Despite syntactic errors in the provided fragment, the intent, payload, and delivery mechanism are clear. Do not run this code; treat any occurrences as a high-risk compromise indicator and remove/report accordingly.

The snippet implements explicit credential exfiltration: it reads a TOKEN from a local settings.json and transmits it to a hardcoded Discord webhook. This is malicious behavior and constitutes a severe supply-chain and credential-theft risk. If present in a dependency, assume compromise, remove the package, rotate any affected tokens, and investigate distribution and invocation paths.

This code is part of an offensive implant framework (Sliver). It intentionally reads alias manifests and payload binaries from disk, registers CLI commands, and forwards raw payload bytes, arguments and evasive flags to remote implants via RPC (ExecuteAssembly, SpawnDll, Sideload). There is no evidence of obfuscation or hidden backdoors beyond the tool's explicit purpose. From a supply-chain/security perspective, this module is high-risk: it enables distribution and remote execution of arbitrary binaries on compromised hosts and includes flags to bypass defenses. Use with caution and only within a legitimate, authorized testing environment.

Conclusion: The fragment is an unreadable binary/encoded payload with likely obfuscation. There is insufficient evidence to assert specific malicious behavior from the fragment alone. However, the presence of such binary data in a distribution artifact warrants caution: verify provenance, obtain a decoded/unpacked version, and perform dynamic analysis in a controlled environment before trusting or integrating the artifact.

This setup.py strongly indicates a malicious or abusive package. Explicit 'malware' and related keywords, the installation of automation/input-capture dependencies, and console_scripts entry points create a high-risk packaging configuration for a remote access trojan/stealer/backdoor. The file itself does not contain payload code, but it facilitates installation and execution of code that likely implements malicious behavior. Do not install or run this package without thorough, isolated analysis of the package modules (especially triple._cmd_ and any networking or persistence code).

The code is designed to collect and exfiltrate sensitive data from a Windows system without user consent. It uses hardcoded credentials and bypasses SSL verification, indicating potential malicious intent. The script exhibits behaviors typical of spyware or data-stealing malware.

Live on PyPI for 1 day, 7 hours and 28 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Conclusion: Among the three reports, Report 1 presents the most credible, high-risk indicators for malicious or covert activity within a JavaScript dependency. The presence of heavy obfuscation, numerous base64 payloads, data URLs, and dynamic execution paths strongly suggests a loader/backdoor style mechanism that could exfiltrate data or modify behavior at runtime. It warrants urgent, in-depth dynamic analysis in a controlled environment, deobfuscation efforts, and likely removal or replacement with audited alternatives. A formal security advisory should be raised with the maintainers, requesting a source-level deobfuscation and a thorough disclosure of intended behavior.

This script is high-risk and exhibits likely malicious or unauthorized remote-access behavior. It downloads and executes unsigned remote binaries, configures and runs multiple proxy/tunneling services, generates/uses cryptographic keys, registers the host to remote management/agent infrastructure (Nezha/Argo-like), and exfiltrates node/subscription information to external endpoints and Telegram. Even if intended for benign proxy provisioning, the lack of integrity checks, execution of arbitrary remote code, embedded keys, and automated publishing/exposure of host endpoints make it unsafe to run. Treat as malicious or potentially backdoor-capable — do not run on trusted systems.