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This module contains several high-risk patterns for supply-chain abuse: arbitrary code execution via exec and eval (including eval of files under the package's memory path and eval of package-provided strings), a method to start an HTTP server that can serve local files at a special path, and a bomber() wrapper that can perform abusive network/telephony actions. These behaviors are not safe in a widely distributed dependency. If you cannot fully trust the package source and its submodules (amirhoshein.*), treat it as dangerous. Remediation: avoid calling the exec wrapper, do not allow untrusted data to be written/read from the package memory files without sanitization, do not invoke __soc__ or bomber(), and audit the amirhoshein.* submodules for further unsafe constructs.

Live on PyPI for 5 hours and 31 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file contains code that reverses a string, decodes it from base64, decompresses it with zlib, and then executes it via exec(). Such obfuscation is a common tactic in malicious scripts to hide their true functionality, which can include data exfiltration, system compromise, or other unauthorized activities. No specific domain or IP address references were found in the decoded payload, but the obfuscation strongly indicates malicious intent.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

This module performs immediate, unconditional data exfiltration: it gathers local environment and package metadata (including potentially sensitive package.json contents, home directory, username, hostname, and DNS servers) and POSTs that data to a hardcoded external domain that resembles an out-of-band/callback service. This behavior is malicious or at minimum unacceptable telemetry for a third-party dependency. Remediation: remove or disable this code, block network egress to the specified domain, audit the package/version and repository for compromise, and rotate any secrets that might have been exposed in package.json or on the host. Treat the package as hostile until provenance and intent are verified.

The fragment is an opaque, binary/packed payload or heavily obfuscated content that cannot be reliably analyzed statically. While this alone does not prove malicious intent, it signals high risk and warrants isolation, request for a readable source or deobfuscated form, and controlled dynamic analysis to determine any harmful behavior or data leakage potential.

The code is performing malicious actions by exfiltrating environment variables to an external server, which is a serious security risk. The obfuscation further indicates an attempt to hide this behavior.

Live on npm for 9 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains potential security risks such as hard-coded file paths, subprocess.Popen usage, and the handling of untrusted data through PyArrow Plasma. It is essential to review and address these security concerns before using this code in a production environment.

This fragment unpacks and executes code from a bundled pyabr.zip without validation, running setup.py with the privileges of the importing process and then removing the unpacked files. That behavior constitutes a significant supply-chain risk: it enables arbitrary code execution by whoever can modify the pyabr.zip artifact (either publisher or an attacker who tampered with the distribution). Treat this package as suspicious until the archive contents are inspected and integrity/source verified. Do not execute in a production environment without review.

This module implements privileged node and device management and exposes HTTP endpoints that accept user input used directly in shell commands and Docker operations. Main risks: command injection (unsanitized string interpolation into shell commands and os.popen), destructive device operations (partitioning, bind/unbind), supplying arbitrary images to be pulled and run as privileged containers, and use of an unencrypted/unprotected Docker TCP socket (tcp://...:2375). I assess this as not manifestly malware but a high-risk administrative component that must be strictly access-controlled and hardened (validate/sanitize inputs, avoid passing raw user values into shell/Docker operations, use secure Docker API access, avoid exposing endpoints publicly).

This module implements a command-and-control server with encrypted communications, remote agent session management, capability to serve and distribute modules/packages over HTTP, and powerful remote execution primitives (exec/eval, spawn processes, send 'kill' tasks). The code is explicitly C2/botnet oriented and therefore malicious or at minimum extremely dangerous to run. It should not be used in legitimate environments and installing/running this package constitutes a high risk of compromise and unauthorized remote control.

The analyzed code fragment demonstrates clear data exfiltration of cryptocurrency wallet keys to a Telegram bot, coupled with persistence mechanisms (cycle-runner.js) and covert runtime survival tactics. Silent error handling and dynamic module imports compound the risk by masking failures and complicating containment. This pattern is characteristic of high-risk malware behavior in a package/component and warrants immediate review, removal, or strict sandboxing in any deployment. Recommendations include removing wallet exfiltration paths, eliminating covert persistence, adding robust logging and error handling, and verifying provenance of all dynamic imports.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

The code poses a significant security risk due to its reliance on remote servers for configuration and dynamic code execution. This could lead to arbitrary code execution if the remote servers are compromised or if an attacker can manipulate the configuration data.

This module intentionally obfuscates and dynamically executes a hidden, base64-encoded Python payload assembled from rot13-decoded fragments. That behavior is highly suspicious: it functions as a loader/loader-like construct and can conceal arbitrary and potentially malicious actions. Treat this package as unsafe until the decoded payload is inspected in a secure environment. Do not execute this code in a production or untrusted environment.

This script contains multiple high-risk behaviors consistent with supply-chain abuse and backdoor capabilities: hardcoded PyPI credentials, automatic twine upload, self-modification and deletion, dynamic decryption and import of code, and execution of arbitrary shell commands influenced by environment variables or command-line inputs. It is not safe to run. Even if parts are broken or buggy, the presence of credential embedding, hidden payloads, and remote upload capabilities makes this package dangerous and potentially malicious.

This code provides a remote-execution agent: it deserializes cloudpickled objects from the network and executes a received callable via multiprocessing.Pool.map, and it exfiltrates host metadata. Without authentication, integrity protection, or transport encryption, this pattern is a high-severity security risk and effectively provides remote code execution/backdoor capabilities. Treat the code as dangerous unless used only in fully trusted, isolated environments with additional external protections.

High risk due to untrusted deserialization via pickle.load from a path supplied externally (sys.argv[1]). The pattern can enable remote code execution if a crafted payload is supplied. The subsequent BM25 call on the untrusted object is suspicious but secondary to the deserialization risk. The syntax error should be resolved, but the core vulnerability remains and warrants removal of pickle-based loading or strict validation/sandboxing.

The fragment demonstrates a legitimate pattern for delegating planning to a remote service, but contains significant anomalies and placeholders that prevent safe execution. The data flow (capturing a screenshot and sending it with in-context messages to a remote API) introduces privacy and security risks if misused. Before any production use, fix syntax issues, replace placeholders with secure configurations, implement input validation, robust error handling, and establish data governance and consent controls.

The fragment exhibits strong indicators of malicious or highly suspicious provisioning and remote-control capabilities. Its blend of cloud-provider automation, remote execution hooks, token handling, and obfuscated payload content creates a significant attack surface and potential for abuse in supply chains. Treat as high risk; avoid usage in production and require thorough, auditable refactoring with explicit boundaries and safety checks.

The code presents a strong supply-chain and remote-execution risk by automatically downloading and executing remote Python payloads without integrity checks or sandboxing. It also creates and runs external services (Jupyter, Visdom, RStudio) based on user inputs, which can amplify impact if the remote payload is malicious. Mitigations include removing remote code execution paths, adding cryptographic verification (signatures or hash checks), isolating execution (sandboxes or containerization), validating inputs, and avoiding untrusted downloads or executions.

The code exhibits highly suspicious behavior: copying a file to a system directory and executing it with elevated permissions using a hidden PowerShell process. These actions could be part of a malware installation or a backdoor. The manipulation of filenames and the use of hidden execution are common tactics in malicious software.

Live on npm for 25 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

This module contains several high-risk patterns for supply-chain abuse: arbitrary code execution via exec and eval (including eval of files under the package's memory path and eval of package-provided strings), a method to start an HTTP server that can serve local files at a special path, and a bomber() wrapper that can perform abusive network/telephony actions. These behaviors are not safe in a widely distributed dependency. If you cannot fully trust the package source and its submodules (amirhoshein.*), treat it as dangerous. Remediation: avoid calling the exec wrapper, do not allow untrusted data to be written/read from the package memory files without sanitization, do not invoke __soc__ or bomber(), and audit the amirhoshein.* submodules for further unsafe constructs.

Live on PyPI for 5 hours and 31 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file contains code that reverses a string, decodes it from base64, decompresses it with zlib, and then executes it via exec(). Such obfuscation is a common tactic in malicious scripts to hide their true functionality, which can include data exfiltration, system compromise, or other unauthorized activities. No specific domain or IP address references were found in the decoded payload, but the obfuscation strongly indicates malicious intent.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

This module performs immediate, unconditional data exfiltration: it gathers local environment and package metadata (including potentially sensitive package.json contents, home directory, username, hostname, and DNS servers) and POSTs that data to a hardcoded external domain that resembles an out-of-band/callback service. This behavior is malicious or at minimum unacceptable telemetry for a third-party dependency. Remediation: remove or disable this code, block network egress to the specified domain, audit the package/version and repository for compromise, and rotate any secrets that might have been exposed in package.json or on the host. Treat the package as hostile until provenance and intent are verified.

The fragment is an opaque, binary/packed payload or heavily obfuscated content that cannot be reliably analyzed statically. While this alone does not prove malicious intent, it signals high risk and warrants isolation, request for a readable source or deobfuscated form, and controlled dynamic analysis to determine any harmful behavior or data leakage potential.

The code is performing malicious actions by exfiltrating environment variables to an external server, which is a serious security risk. The obfuscation further indicates an attempt to hide this behavior.

Live on npm for 9 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains potential security risks such as hard-coded file paths, subprocess.Popen usage, and the handling of untrusted data through PyArrow Plasma. It is essential to review and address these security concerns before using this code in a production environment.

This fragment unpacks and executes code from a bundled pyabr.zip without validation, running setup.py with the privileges of the importing process and then removing the unpacked files. That behavior constitutes a significant supply-chain risk: it enables arbitrary code execution by whoever can modify the pyabr.zip artifact (either publisher or an attacker who tampered with the distribution). Treat this package as suspicious until the archive contents are inspected and integrity/source verified. Do not execute in a production environment without review.

This module implements privileged node and device management and exposes HTTP endpoints that accept user input used directly in shell commands and Docker operations. Main risks: command injection (unsanitized string interpolation into shell commands and os.popen), destructive device operations (partitioning, bind/unbind), supplying arbitrary images to be pulled and run as privileged containers, and use of an unencrypted/unprotected Docker TCP socket (tcp://...:2375). I assess this as not manifestly malware but a high-risk administrative component that must be strictly access-controlled and hardened (validate/sanitize inputs, avoid passing raw user values into shell/Docker operations, use secure Docker API access, avoid exposing endpoints publicly).

This module implements a command-and-control server with encrypted communications, remote agent session management, capability to serve and distribute modules/packages over HTTP, and powerful remote execution primitives (exec/eval, spawn processes, send 'kill' tasks). The code is explicitly C2/botnet oriented and therefore malicious or at minimum extremely dangerous to run. It should not be used in legitimate environments and installing/running this package constitutes a high risk of compromise and unauthorized remote control.

The analyzed code fragment demonstrates clear data exfiltration of cryptocurrency wallet keys to a Telegram bot, coupled with persistence mechanisms (cycle-runner.js) and covert runtime survival tactics. Silent error handling and dynamic module imports compound the risk by masking failures and complicating containment. This pattern is characteristic of high-risk malware behavior in a package/component and warrants immediate review, removal, or strict sandboxing in any deployment. Recommendations include removing wallet exfiltration paths, eliminating covert persistence, adding robust logging and error handling, and verifying provenance of all dynamic imports.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

The code poses a significant security risk due to its reliance on remote servers for configuration and dynamic code execution. This could lead to arbitrary code execution if the remote servers are compromised or if an attacker can manipulate the configuration data.

This module intentionally obfuscates and dynamically executes a hidden, base64-encoded Python payload assembled from rot13-decoded fragments. That behavior is highly suspicious: it functions as a loader/loader-like construct and can conceal arbitrary and potentially malicious actions. Treat this package as unsafe until the decoded payload is inspected in a secure environment. Do not execute this code in a production or untrusted environment.

This script contains multiple high-risk behaviors consistent with supply-chain abuse and backdoor capabilities: hardcoded PyPI credentials, automatic twine upload, self-modification and deletion, dynamic decryption and import of code, and execution of arbitrary shell commands influenced by environment variables or command-line inputs. It is not safe to run. Even if parts are broken or buggy, the presence of credential embedding, hidden payloads, and remote upload capabilities makes this package dangerous and potentially malicious.

This code provides a remote-execution agent: it deserializes cloudpickled objects from the network and executes a received callable via multiprocessing.Pool.map, and it exfiltrates host metadata. Without authentication, integrity protection, or transport encryption, this pattern is a high-severity security risk and effectively provides remote code execution/backdoor capabilities. Treat the code as dangerous unless used only in fully trusted, isolated environments with additional external protections.

High risk due to untrusted deserialization via pickle.load from a path supplied externally (sys.argv[1]). The pattern can enable remote code execution if a crafted payload is supplied. The subsequent BM25 call on the untrusted object is suspicious but secondary to the deserialization risk. The syntax error should be resolved, but the core vulnerability remains and warrants removal of pickle-based loading or strict validation/sandboxing.

The fragment demonstrates a legitimate pattern for delegating planning to a remote service, but contains significant anomalies and placeholders that prevent safe execution. The data flow (capturing a screenshot and sending it with in-context messages to a remote API) introduces privacy and security risks if misused. Before any production use, fix syntax issues, replace placeholders with secure configurations, implement input validation, robust error handling, and establish data governance and consent controls.

The fragment exhibits strong indicators of malicious or highly suspicious provisioning and remote-control capabilities. Its blend of cloud-provider automation, remote execution hooks, token handling, and obfuscated payload content creates a significant attack surface and potential for abuse in supply chains. Treat as high risk; avoid usage in production and require thorough, auditable refactoring with explicit boundaries and safety checks.

The code presents a strong supply-chain and remote-execution risk by automatically downloading and executing remote Python payloads without integrity checks or sandboxing. It also creates and runs external services (Jupyter, Visdom, RStudio) based on user inputs, which can amplify impact if the remote payload is malicious. Mitigations include removing remote code execution paths, adding cryptographic verification (signatures or hash checks), isolating execution (sandboxes or containerization), validating inputs, and avoiding untrusted downloads or executions.

The code exhibits highly suspicious behavior: copying a file to a system directory and executing it with elevated permissions using a hidden PowerShell process. These actions could be part of a malware installation or a backdoor. The manipulation of filenames and the use of hidden execution are common tactics in malicious software.

Live on npm for 25 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).