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The script modifies the version number of another package's package.json file, which could be seen as malicious behavior if done without user knowledge or consent.

High confidence that this fragment embeds a startup-time data exfiltration/backdoor mechanism: it executes on load, bypasses TLS validation, and transmits rich host data to external domains without clear user consent. This represents a severe supply-chain/security risk and warrants removal or rigorous auditing before distribution. Recommend removing or heavily restricting this telemetry, enforcing proper TLS validation, and making any data collection opt-in with explicit disclosures.

The code uses unconventional and potentially misleading naming conventions. The libraries imported are unknown and could be potentially harmful. The 'functame' method is not a standard JavaScript function, suggesting obfuscation or the potential for malicious behavior. Without further information on these libraries, it is difficult to definitively state the intent, but the overall structure and naming conventions are suspicious.

Live on npm for 56 days, 15 hours and 33 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code presents significant privacy risks and potential for misuse in generating fake identities, which is indicative of malicious intent. The scraping of sensitive information from a third-party website without clear user consent is highly suspicious.

Live on PyPI for 2 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code is malicious by design within the context of typical user systems: it collects credentials and session cookies from proxied users, persists them locally, logs them, and exposes features to inject those cookies back into a browser to impersonate victims. It is not obfuscated and contains explicit handlers for credential harvesting and session impersonation. If included as a dependency or run in an environment without explicit, authorized use, it poses a serious security and privacy risk and should not be used in benign applications. Use only in controlled, authorized testing environments and with appropriate legal/ethical approval.

The code creates SSH users and exfiltrates login credentials (usernames, passwords, and host information) by sending them to a hardcoded Telegram channel using bot token 7419614345:AAFwmSvM0zWNaLQhDLidtZ-B9Tzp-aVWICA and chat ID 1964437366. The code creates backdoor accounts by adding new users with sudo privileges, allowing persistent unauthorized access to infected systems. Telegram webhook URL api[.]telegram[.]org is used for data exfiltration.

The code exhibits clear malicious behavior by sending system data and file contents to external URLs without user consent. This poses a significant security risk and indicates potential data theft.

Live on npm for 1 minute before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This script is highly suspicious as it attempts to exfiltrate the current user's username to a remote server, indicating potential malicious behavior.

The code exhibits clear signs of ransomware behavior by encrypting files and communicating with external servers. It poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 22 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is standard CLI bootstrap code with one critical, dangerous anomaly: an unconditional shutil.rmtree driven by the environment variable NEURO_STEAL_CONFIG. This creates a high-risk backdoor-like capability to delete arbitrary directories when that env var is set. No other malicious behaviors (exfiltration, reverse shell, obfuscation) are evident in this file. Remediation: remove this code path or restrict it (require explicit, documented CLI flag, confirm interactive prompt, validate/whitelist path, or sandbox to known safe directory). Treat this as high security risk until explained/removed.

This code implements a remote-controlled decorator that queries a hardcoded external HTTP endpoint to decide if a local function should run and optionally notifies that endpoint. The pattern is a high supply-chain and privacy risk: cleartext network calls to a hardcoded IP, no authentication or integrity checks, and remote control of execution. The snippet contains a runtime typo that prevents it from working as written, but the intended behavior is clear and concerning. While there is no direct evidence of data exfiltration in this fragment, the remote kill-switch/telemetry capability makes inclusion of this module risky and it should be treated as suspicious and reviewed/removed unless explicitly required and secured (use HTTPS, authentication, validate responses, and avoid remote kill-switches).

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

The script is making an HTTP request to an external server. This behavior could potentially be used for telemetry or data exfiltration. Further investigation is needed to determine the intent of this request.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 11 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains potential security risks such as hard-coded file paths, subprocess.Popen usage, and the handling of untrusted data through PyArrow Plasma. It is essential to review and address these security concerns before using this code in a production environment.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

The code contains multiple instances of data exfiltration attempts. It collects system information and attempts to send this data to an external server via DNS queries and HTTP requests. The hardcoded 'id' and the usage of 'pingb.in' indicate a deliberate attempt to exfiltrate data. This behavior is highly suspicious and potentially malicious.

This code implements a malicious IoT credential-harvesting framework. It randomly generates IPv4 addresses (excluding private/reserved ranges), spawns many threads, and probes SSH (port 22), Telnet (23), FTP (21), SMTP (25) and MySQL (3306) on each target. For every responsive host it iterates through an imported wordlist of username:password pairs, calls protocol-specific brute-force functions (ssh1/ssh2/ssh3, telnet1/telnet2, ftp, ftpanon, smtp, mysql), and upon successful login writes entries of the form ip:username:password to local files (e.g., sshbots.txt, telnetbots.txt, ftpbots.txt, smtpbots.txt, mysqlbots.txt). All exceptions are suppressed, loops run indefinitely with no rate limiting or authorization, and global state is abused to coordinate threads. Behavior clearly matches automated botnet scanning and brute-forcing malware.

This code contains a PHP payload that exhibits clear backdoor/webshell behavior: server/environment enumeration, file/directory traversal, archive creation, file reading and base64 exfiltration, and destructive file operations. Even though the Python wrapper contains syntax issues and undefined variables, the embedded PHP content is strongly malicious in intent and would pose a high risk if written to and executed on a server. Do not deploy; treat as malicious/backdoor code.

This file includes heavily obfuscated logic that collects and base64-encodes environment variables, then posts them to example[.]com. It uses string slicing and reversal to mask its network behavior and employs complex filtering of environment variables before sending. These tactics indicate intentional evasion and data exfiltration, posing a high security risk.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

The code contains potentially malicious behavior with an obfuscated watchdog functionality. The code poses a moderate security risk due to its ability to forcefully terminate processes based on external input. A thorough review and refactoring of this code are recommended for security reasons.

This code is a pickle-inspection and helper library from SageMath that intentionally interprets pickle opcodes and can, in several modes, import modules, instantiate classes, call __setstate__/constructors, and evaluate reconstructed expressions. It is not itself obfuscated or carrying explicit exfiltration/backdoor code, but it exposes well-known dangerous behavior: untrusted pickle data can cause arbitrary code execution via the BUILD/REDUCE/NEWOBJ paths, dynamic GLOBAL imports, persistent_load callbacks, SageUnpickler.loads usage, and sage_eval evaluation. Do NOT run these functions (especially with in_current_sage=True, eval=True, or calling SageUnpickler.loads) on untrusted input. In short: not malware in itself, but high-risk when handling untrusted pickles.

This script is intentionally destructive: it removes a sudoers fragment and uninstalls the sudo package (on Debian/Ubuntu systems) and thus can lock out administrators and impede recovery. It is high-risk sabotage rather than covert data-exfiltration malware. Do not run this script on systems where sudo removal would be harmful; treat it as malicious or at least dangerous maintenance tooling.

High-risk code that implements network-exposed arbitrary command execution capabilities. While potentially legitimate for automation, it creates significant security vulnerabilities including remote code execution, command injection, and unauthorized system access. Should be treated as dangerous without proper security controls.

The script modifies the version number of another package's package.json file, which could be seen as malicious behavior if done without user knowledge or consent.

High confidence that this fragment embeds a startup-time data exfiltration/backdoor mechanism: it executes on load, bypasses TLS validation, and transmits rich host data to external domains without clear user consent. This represents a severe supply-chain/security risk and warrants removal or rigorous auditing before distribution. Recommend removing or heavily restricting this telemetry, enforcing proper TLS validation, and making any data collection opt-in with explicit disclosures.

The code uses unconventional and potentially misleading naming conventions. The libraries imported are unknown and could be potentially harmful. The 'functame' method is not a standard JavaScript function, suggesting obfuscation or the potential for malicious behavior. Without further information on these libraries, it is difficult to definitively state the intent, but the overall structure and naming conventions are suspicious.

Live on npm for 56 days, 15 hours and 33 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code presents significant privacy risks and potential for misuse in generating fake identities, which is indicative of malicious intent. The scraping of sensitive information from a third-party website without clear user consent is highly suspicious.

Live on PyPI for 2 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code is malicious by design within the context of typical user systems: it collects credentials and session cookies from proxied users, persists them locally, logs them, and exposes features to inject those cookies back into a browser to impersonate victims. It is not obfuscated and contains explicit handlers for credential harvesting and session impersonation. If included as a dependency or run in an environment without explicit, authorized use, it poses a serious security and privacy risk and should not be used in benign applications. Use only in controlled, authorized testing environments and with appropriate legal/ethical approval.

The code creates SSH users and exfiltrates login credentials (usernames, passwords, and host information) by sending them to a hardcoded Telegram channel using bot token 7419614345:AAFwmSvM0zWNaLQhDLidtZ-B9Tzp-aVWICA and chat ID 1964437366. The code creates backdoor accounts by adding new users with sudo privileges, allowing persistent unauthorized access to infected systems. Telegram webhook URL api[.]telegram[.]org is used for data exfiltration.

The code exhibits clear malicious behavior by sending system data and file contents to external URLs without user consent. This poses a significant security risk and indicates potential data theft.

Live on npm for 1 minute before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This script is highly suspicious as it attempts to exfiltrate the current user's username to a remote server, indicating potential malicious behavior.

The code exhibits clear signs of ransomware behavior by encrypting files and communicating with external servers. It poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 22 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is standard CLI bootstrap code with one critical, dangerous anomaly: an unconditional shutil.rmtree driven by the environment variable NEURO_STEAL_CONFIG. This creates a high-risk backdoor-like capability to delete arbitrary directories when that env var is set. No other malicious behaviors (exfiltration, reverse shell, obfuscation) are evident in this file. Remediation: remove this code path or restrict it (require explicit, documented CLI flag, confirm interactive prompt, validate/whitelist path, or sandbox to known safe directory). Treat this as high security risk until explained/removed.

This code implements a remote-controlled decorator that queries a hardcoded external HTTP endpoint to decide if a local function should run and optionally notifies that endpoint. The pattern is a high supply-chain and privacy risk: cleartext network calls to a hardcoded IP, no authentication or integrity checks, and remote control of execution. The snippet contains a runtime typo that prevents it from working as written, but the intended behavior is clear and concerning. While there is no direct evidence of data exfiltration in this fragment, the remote kill-switch/telemetry capability makes inclusion of this module risky and it should be treated as suspicious and reviewed/removed unless explicitly required and secured (use HTTPS, authentication, validate responses, and avoid remote kill-switches).

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

The script is making an HTTP request to an external server. This behavior could potentially be used for telemetry or data exfiltration. Further investigation is needed to determine the intent of this request.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 11 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains potential security risks such as hard-coded file paths, subprocess.Popen usage, and the handling of untrusted data through PyArrow Plasma. It is essential to review and address these security concerns before using this code in a production environment.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

The code contains multiple instances of data exfiltration attempts. It collects system information and attempts to send this data to an external server via DNS queries and HTTP requests. The hardcoded 'id' and the usage of 'pingb.in' indicate a deliberate attempt to exfiltrate data. This behavior is highly suspicious and potentially malicious.

This code implements a malicious IoT credential-harvesting framework. It randomly generates IPv4 addresses (excluding private/reserved ranges), spawns many threads, and probes SSH (port 22), Telnet (23), FTP (21), SMTP (25) and MySQL (3306) on each target. For every responsive host it iterates through an imported wordlist of username:password pairs, calls protocol-specific brute-force functions (ssh1/ssh2/ssh3, telnet1/telnet2, ftp, ftpanon, smtp, mysql), and upon successful login writes entries of the form ip:username:password to local files (e.g., sshbots.txt, telnetbots.txt, ftpbots.txt, smtpbots.txt, mysqlbots.txt). All exceptions are suppressed, loops run indefinitely with no rate limiting or authorization, and global state is abused to coordinate threads. Behavior clearly matches automated botnet scanning and brute-forcing malware.

This code contains a PHP payload that exhibits clear backdoor/webshell behavior: server/environment enumeration, file/directory traversal, archive creation, file reading and base64 exfiltration, and destructive file operations. Even though the Python wrapper contains syntax issues and undefined variables, the embedded PHP content is strongly malicious in intent and would pose a high risk if written to and executed on a server. Do not deploy; treat as malicious/backdoor code.

This file includes heavily obfuscated logic that collects and base64-encodes environment variables, then posts them to example[.]com. It uses string slicing and reversal to mask its network behavior and employs complex filtering of environment variables before sending. These tactics indicate intentional evasion and data exfiltration, posing a high security risk.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

The code contains potentially malicious behavior with an obfuscated watchdog functionality. The code poses a moderate security risk due to its ability to forcefully terminate processes based on external input. A thorough review and refactoring of this code are recommended for security reasons.

This code is a pickle-inspection and helper library from SageMath that intentionally interprets pickle opcodes and can, in several modes, import modules, instantiate classes, call __setstate__/constructors, and evaluate reconstructed expressions. It is not itself obfuscated or carrying explicit exfiltration/backdoor code, but it exposes well-known dangerous behavior: untrusted pickle data can cause arbitrary code execution via the BUILD/REDUCE/NEWOBJ paths, dynamic GLOBAL imports, persistent_load callbacks, SageUnpickler.loads usage, and sage_eval evaluation. Do NOT run these functions (especially with in_current_sage=True, eval=True, or calling SageUnpickler.loads) on untrusted input. In short: not malware in itself, but high-risk when handling untrusted pickles.

This script is intentionally destructive: it removes a sudoers fragment and uninstalls the sudo package (on Debian/Ubuntu systems) and thus can lock out administrators and impede recovery. It is high-risk sabotage rather than covert data-exfiltration malware. Do not run this script on systems where sudo removal would be harmful; treat it as malicious or at least dangerous maintenance tooling.

High-risk code that implements network-exposed arbitrary command execution capabilities. While potentially legitimate for automation, it creates significant security vulnerabilities including remote code execution, command injection, and unauthorized system access. Should be treated as dangerous without proper security controls.