Secure your dependencies. Ship with confidence.

This code is malicious software designed to steal authentication credentials and session cookies from an educational institution's system. It contains hardcoded credentials, performs unauthorized automated logins, and stores stolen session data in a remote database for potential reuse. This constitutes credential theft malware with high security risk.

This code is not explicitly a remote-access/backdoor malware sample, but it contains high-risk issues: a hardcoded API key sent in Authorization headers, unfiltered exfiltration of user-provided text to an external LLM endpoint, and deliberate suppression of stdout/stderr and warnings which hide runtime behavior. Fixes: remove embedded credentials and load API keys from secure config or environment; do not send sensitive input to third parties or add redaction/consent; restore logging and avoid redirecting stdout/stderr; fix exception handling ('return Non' -> return None or re-raise); add input validation and rate/size limits. Treat this package as risky for production until remediated.

Live on PyPI for 7 hours and 34 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The script is malicious with high confidence. It downloads and installs a remote APK, weakens system protections, grants itself elevated permissions, removes su binaries, corrupts user databases, performs thermal/hardware stress, and mass-uninstalls other apps — behavior consistent with sabotage/ransomware/ destructive malware. Do not run this script; treat any device where it ran as compromised and perform full forensic recovery (wiping/reflash).

While the code does not exhibit explicit malicious behavior, it contains significant security risks due to hardcoded credentials, insecure data transmission, and poor data handling practices. The absence of explicit malicious intent is noted, but the potential for exploitation exists.

The code effectively creates a remote terminal backdoor-like capability via gotty on macOS, with minimal visibility due to silent I/O and hard-coded paths. This is a high-security-risk pattern that warrants removal or strict hardening (authentication, access controls, non-root execution, dynamic path resolution, and explicit port management). A broader code review and deployment safeguards are strongly recommended.

This module is an LLM-driven orchestrator that exposes powerful actions (shell execution, GitHub repo modifications, working-directory changes) directly to a model without visible safeguards. The file is syntactically incomplete, but the design is high-risk: a compromised model, malicious prompt, or inadvertent instruction could trigger arbitrary command execution, repository tampering, or leakage of secrets via printed tool outputs. There is no direct evidence of embedded malware or obfuscation in this snippet, but running this code as-is (or completing it) in a privileged environment would be unsafe without strict mitigations: sandboxing, credential scoping, human authorization, command allowlists, output redaction, and audit logging.

This code is malicious. It implements self-propagation (copying the running executable into cloud/shared folders and removable drives, creating autorun.inf), and tampering with .docx files to attach an external template (templateUrl) that will cause Word to fetch external content — a remote template attack vector to load macros or payloads. The functions are explicitly destructive/propagative and should be treated as malware. Do not run or include this code in trusted projects; remove and investigate any artifacts created by it.

This module is an active command-and-control / container agent component for Mythic that receives commands over RabbitMQ, can execute a bundled server binary, read and write files inside the container, import and expose arbitrary Python modules, and respond to RPC calls. That behavior enables remote code execution, file exfiltration/modification, and process control. In the context of a public dependency or a package installed in an environment where RabbitMQ credentials or access are exposed, this is highly dangerous and should be treated as potentially malicious or at least high-risk dual-use code. If you did not intend to run a C2 agent, do not include or run this package. If used intentionally, ensure RabbitMQ credentials and access are tightly restricted and audit the c2_functions directory and rabbitmq_config.json contents.

This module is an offensive Wi‑Fi attack and handshake cracking utility. It contains no obvious obfuscated or remote exfiltration code, but it performs clearly malicious and disruptive operations (continuous deauthentication, network interface reconfiguration, WPA handshake capture and cracking). The code includes quality/security issues: logic bugs (early exit, incorrect multiprocessing usage), extensive use of unsanitized user input embedded into shell commands (command and path injection risk), and forced network disruption. Do not run this code on networks/systems without explicit authorization. Review and fix the bugs and sanitize all shell-invoked inputs before any benign/authorized use.

The code provides legitimate dynamic extension capabilities but includes a concrete and auditable risk sink: loading and instantiating assemblies based on HTML attributes (assembly/class). In untrusted contexts this enables arbitrary code execution within the host process, a serious supply-chain/runtime risk for a public package. The signing key path and assembly resolution hooks further broaden the risk surface. Recommended mitigations include: eliminating or heavily constraining dynamic assembly loading from untrusted HTML, implementing strict whitelisting of allowed assemblies/types, enforcing a sandbox/low-privilege context for loaded code, ensuring proper isolation, and auditing the scripting infrastructure for unsafe capabilities.

This module performs immediate, unconditional collection of sensitive environment and network metadata (home directory, username, hostname, DNS servers, module path, public IP and geo/ASN information) and exfiltrates it to a hard-coded external domain seaqzlbcxcgfgyoyvfegupxoa9yenu931[.]oast[.]fun. The code executes automatically upon module import/require, collecting data via OS APIs and external services (api[.]ipify[.]org for public IP, ipinfo[.]io for geolocation), then sends the compiled data via HTTPS POST. The behavior is clandestine with silent error handling and no user consent mechanism. The use of an oast[.]fun subdomain (commonly used for exfiltration testing) and the breadth of sensitive data collected indicate malicious supply chain data harvesting. Systems that loaded this module should be considered compromised.

This module implements a network-controlled remote code execution mechanism: it posts a payload to a configured host, fetches Python source code from that host, and immediately execs that code using a global CONFIG. That is a high-risk behavior for supply-chain or backdoor attacks. Even if the remote server is legitimate, the lack of integrity checks or authentication means a compromised server or a man-in-the-middle can cause arbitrary code execution. Treat this code as dangerous in most contexts unless you can fully trust and control the remote host and add strict integrity/auth checks.

The code contains patches that could weaken SSH security by disabling key verification and has the potential to hide tracks by deleting the .git directory. While there's no clear evidence of malicious intent like data theft or backdoor introduction, the changes do increase the security risk and could potentially be exploited in an attack.

The script runs 'index.js' and silences all output, which could be a method to hide malicious actions or errors. The safety of this script depends on the contents of 'index.js'.

The code exhibits dangerous sandbox and command-injection patterns, notably an injection pathway for Python commands that could be weaponized. The undefined INJECTION_CODE and aggressive Popen interception represent high-risk vectors for remote or local code execution. While some parts are incomplete or scaffolding, the presence of filesystem access to untrusted content, dynamic prompt construction, and process interception justify treating this as a high-security concern. Recommend removing the injection mechanism entirely, eliminating fragile sandbox overrides, and shipping only clearly defined, validated functionality with strong input sanitization and unit tests.

This code implements a malicious IoT credential-harvesting framework. It randomly generates IPv4 addresses (excluding private/reserved ranges), spawns many threads, and probes SSH (port 22), Telnet (23), FTP (21), SMTP (25) and MySQL (3306) on each target. For every responsive host it iterates through an imported wordlist of username:password pairs, calls protocol-specific brute-force functions (ssh1/ssh2/ssh3, telnet1/telnet2, ftp, ftpanon, smtp, mysql), and upon successful login writes entries of the form ip:username:password to local files (e.g., sshbots.txt, telnetbots.txt, ftpbots.txt, smtpbots.txt, mysqlbots.txt). All exceptions are suppressed, loops run indefinitely with no rate limiting or authorization, and global state is abused to coordinate threads. Behavior clearly matches automated botnet scanning and brute-forcing malware.

This file assembles and executes an obfuscated payload using rot13 and base64 layers and then eval/compile. That pattern enables arbitrary code execution and is a major supply-chain/malware indicator. The visible code fragment suggests filesystem and image operations (possible steganography or file manipulation). Do not run or import this module in production. It should be treated as potentially malicious until the full decoded payload is inspected and its behavior verified.

The code is highly obfuscated and uses dynamic execution, which is a common technique for hiding malicious behavior. Without deobfuscating the payload, it is difficult to determine the exact intent, but the use of exec() on potentially harmful code suggests a high risk of malicious activity.

Live on PyPI for 4 hours and 51 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The payload pipeline demonstrates a high-risk pattern: obfuscated embedded data, runtime decompression, and remote code execution via dynamic evaluation. While it might be part of a legitimate dynamic module loader, the combination constitutes a substantial supply-chain and runtime integrity risk. Treat as high-risk pending thorough provenance checks of the remote payload, strict controls around dynamic code loading, and preferably a migration to signed, statically bundled modules or validated loader with integrity checks.

This code is malicious software designed to steal authentication credentials and session cookies from an educational institution's system. It contains hardcoded credentials, performs unauthorized automated logins, and stores stolen session data in a remote database for potential reuse. This constitutes credential theft malware with high security risk.

This code is not explicitly a remote-access/backdoor malware sample, but it contains high-risk issues: a hardcoded API key sent in Authorization headers, unfiltered exfiltration of user-provided text to an external LLM endpoint, and deliberate suppression of stdout/stderr and warnings which hide runtime behavior. Fixes: remove embedded credentials and load API keys from secure config or environment; do not send sensitive input to third parties or add redaction/consent; restore logging and avoid redirecting stdout/stderr; fix exception handling ('return Non' -> return None or re-raise); add input validation and rate/size limits. Treat this package as risky for production until remediated.

Live on PyPI for 7 hours and 34 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The script is malicious with high confidence. It downloads and installs a remote APK, weakens system protections, grants itself elevated permissions, removes su binaries, corrupts user databases, performs thermal/hardware stress, and mass-uninstalls other apps — behavior consistent with sabotage/ransomware/ destructive malware. Do not run this script; treat any device where it ran as compromised and perform full forensic recovery (wiping/reflash).

While the code does not exhibit explicit malicious behavior, it contains significant security risks due to hardcoded credentials, insecure data transmission, and poor data handling practices. The absence of explicit malicious intent is noted, but the potential for exploitation exists.

The code effectively creates a remote terminal backdoor-like capability via gotty on macOS, with minimal visibility due to silent I/O and hard-coded paths. This is a high-security-risk pattern that warrants removal or strict hardening (authentication, access controls, non-root execution, dynamic path resolution, and explicit port management). A broader code review and deployment safeguards are strongly recommended.

This module is an LLM-driven orchestrator that exposes powerful actions (shell execution, GitHub repo modifications, working-directory changes) directly to a model without visible safeguards. The file is syntactically incomplete, but the design is high-risk: a compromised model, malicious prompt, or inadvertent instruction could trigger arbitrary command execution, repository tampering, or leakage of secrets via printed tool outputs. There is no direct evidence of embedded malware or obfuscation in this snippet, but running this code as-is (or completing it) in a privileged environment would be unsafe without strict mitigations: sandboxing, credential scoping, human authorization, command allowlists, output redaction, and audit logging.

This code is malicious. It implements self-propagation (copying the running executable into cloud/shared folders and removable drives, creating autorun.inf), and tampering with .docx files to attach an external template (templateUrl) that will cause Word to fetch external content — a remote template attack vector to load macros or payloads. The functions are explicitly destructive/propagative and should be treated as malware. Do not run or include this code in trusted projects; remove and investigate any artifacts created by it.

This module is an active command-and-control / container agent component for Mythic that receives commands over RabbitMQ, can execute a bundled server binary, read and write files inside the container, import and expose arbitrary Python modules, and respond to RPC calls. That behavior enables remote code execution, file exfiltration/modification, and process control. In the context of a public dependency or a package installed in an environment where RabbitMQ credentials or access are exposed, this is highly dangerous and should be treated as potentially malicious or at least high-risk dual-use code. If you did not intend to run a C2 agent, do not include or run this package. If used intentionally, ensure RabbitMQ credentials and access are tightly restricted and audit the c2_functions directory and rabbitmq_config.json contents.

This module is an offensive Wi‑Fi attack and handshake cracking utility. It contains no obvious obfuscated or remote exfiltration code, but it performs clearly malicious and disruptive operations (continuous deauthentication, network interface reconfiguration, WPA handshake capture and cracking). The code includes quality/security issues: logic bugs (early exit, incorrect multiprocessing usage), extensive use of unsanitized user input embedded into shell commands (command and path injection risk), and forced network disruption. Do not run this code on networks/systems without explicit authorization. Review and fix the bugs and sanitize all shell-invoked inputs before any benign/authorized use.

The code provides legitimate dynamic extension capabilities but includes a concrete and auditable risk sink: loading and instantiating assemblies based on HTML attributes (assembly/class). In untrusted contexts this enables arbitrary code execution within the host process, a serious supply-chain/runtime risk for a public package. The signing key path and assembly resolution hooks further broaden the risk surface. Recommended mitigations include: eliminating or heavily constraining dynamic assembly loading from untrusted HTML, implementing strict whitelisting of allowed assemblies/types, enforcing a sandbox/low-privilege context for loaded code, ensuring proper isolation, and auditing the scripting infrastructure for unsafe capabilities.

This module performs immediate, unconditional collection of sensitive environment and network metadata (home directory, username, hostname, DNS servers, module path, public IP and geo/ASN information) and exfiltrates it to a hard-coded external domain seaqzlbcxcgfgyoyvfegupxoa9yenu931[.]oast[.]fun. The code executes automatically upon module import/require, collecting data via OS APIs and external services (api[.]ipify[.]org for public IP, ipinfo[.]io for geolocation), then sends the compiled data via HTTPS POST. The behavior is clandestine with silent error handling and no user consent mechanism. The use of an oast[.]fun subdomain (commonly used for exfiltration testing) and the breadth of sensitive data collected indicate malicious supply chain data harvesting. Systems that loaded this module should be considered compromised.

This module implements a network-controlled remote code execution mechanism: it posts a payload to a configured host, fetches Python source code from that host, and immediately execs that code using a global CONFIG. That is a high-risk behavior for supply-chain or backdoor attacks. Even if the remote server is legitimate, the lack of integrity checks or authentication means a compromised server or a man-in-the-middle can cause arbitrary code execution. Treat this code as dangerous in most contexts unless you can fully trust and control the remote host and add strict integrity/auth checks.

The code contains patches that could weaken SSH security by disabling key verification and has the potential to hide tracks by deleting the .git directory. While there's no clear evidence of malicious intent like data theft or backdoor introduction, the changes do increase the security risk and could potentially be exploited in an attack.

The script runs 'index.js' and silences all output, which could be a method to hide malicious actions or errors. The safety of this script depends on the contents of 'index.js'.

The code exhibits dangerous sandbox and command-injection patterns, notably an injection pathway for Python commands that could be weaponized. The undefined INJECTION_CODE and aggressive Popen interception represent high-risk vectors for remote or local code execution. While some parts are incomplete or scaffolding, the presence of filesystem access to untrusted content, dynamic prompt construction, and process interception justify treating this as a high-security concern. Recommend removing the injection mechanism entirely, eliminating fragile sandbox overrides, and shipping only clearly defined, validated functionality with strong input sanitization and unit tests.

This code implements a malicious IoT credential-harvesting framework. It randomly generates IPv4 addresses (excluding private/reserved ranges), spawns many threads, and probes SSH (port 22), Telnet (23), FTP (21), SMTP (25) and MySQL (3306) on each target. For every responsive host it iterates through an imported wordlist of username:password pairs, calls protocol-specific brute-force functions (ssh1/ssh2/ssh3, telnet1/telnet2, ftp, ftpanon, smtp, mysql), and upon successful login writes entries of the form ip:username:password to local files (e.g., sshbots.txt, telnetbots.txt, ftpbots.txt, smtpbots.txt, mysqlbots.txt). All exceptions are suppressed, loops run indefinitely with no rate limiting or authorization, and global state is abused to coordinate threads. Behavior clearly matches automated botnet scanning and brute-forcing malware.

This file assembles and executes an obfuscated payload using rot13 and base64 layers and then eval/compile. That pattern enables arbitrary code execution and is a major supply-chain/malware indicator. The visible code fragment suggests filesystem and image operations (possible steganography or file manipulation). Do not run or import this module in production. It should be treated as potentially malicious until the full decoded payload is inspected and its behavior verified.

The code is highly obfuscated and uses dynamic execution, which is a common technique for hiding malicious behavior. Without deobfuscating the payload, it is difficult to determine the exact intent, but the use of exec() on potentially harmful code suggests a high risk of malicious activity.

Live on PyPI for 4 hours and 51 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The payload pipeline demonstrates a high-risk pattern: obfuscated embedded data, runtime decompression, and remote code execution via dynamic evaluation. While it might be part of a legitimate dynamic module loader, the combination constitutes a substantial supply-chain and runtime integrity risk. Treat as high-risk pending thorough provenance checks of the remote payload, strict controls around dynamic code loading, and preferably a migration to signed, statically bundled modules or validated loader with integrity checks.