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The script creates a persistent, predictable remote access vector by adding a user with a hardcoded password and by replacing SSH configuration to enable password and root logins and forwarding. This behavior is high-risk and consistent with a backdoor/persistence implant; treat any occurrence as malicious unless used in a tightly controlled, ephemeral testing environment with compensating controls. Do not run this script on production systems; if it has run, assume compromise, remove the user, restore secure SSH configuration, and rotate credentials.

This script is attempting to exfiltrate sensitive information by sending a POST request to a remote server. It poses a high security risk and should be considered malicious.

Live on npm for 14 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is designed to send sensitive system information to a remote server, which is a significant security risk. This behavior is consistent with malicious activity, specifically data exfiltration.

Live on npm for 6 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This source code is definitively malicious. It performs extensive data exfiltration of sensitive system, user, and project information to a suspicious external server. The code reads sensitive files, executes system commands, and scans local ports, all without user consent. There is no obfuscation, but the intent and actions clearly indicate malware designed for reconnaissance and data theft. The security risk is extremely high, and this package should not be used under any circumstances.

Live on npm for 5 days, 5 hours and 30 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file implements an unattended update mechanism that fetches and installs .tgz archives from unverified remote sources—both the npm registry (registry[.]npmjs[.]org) and a configurable Firebase-style database URL—by downloading, extracting them into the application directory and then restarting PM2-managed processes. Because there is no cryptographic signature or checksum validation beyond a simple version check, a compromised registry account or database endpoint could deliver arbitrary code to every host running this updater. Additionally, on startup the script gathers extensive system and package metadata—including public IP (via api[.]ipify[.]org), local IP addresses, hostname, OS/platform, Node.js version, CPU/memory statistics, load averages, working directory and package.json fields—and posts it to a configurable Discord webhook endpoint (discordapp[.]com). This behavior poses both a supply-chain risk and a telemetry/privacy exposure risk, as sensitive host information is sent to an external service without explicit user consent or granular control.

The script creates a persistent, predictable remote access vector by adding a user with a hardcoded password and by replacing SSH configuration to enable password and root logins and forwarding. This behavior is high-risk and consistent with a backdoor/persistence implant; treat any occurrence as malicious unless used in a tightly controlled, ephemeral testing environment with compensating controls. Do not run this script on production systems; if it has run, assume compromise, remove the user, restore secure SSH configuration, and rotate credentials.

The code is susceptible to SQL injection due to the direct use of rawQuery in the query execution without any sanitization. It doesn't appear to have any intentionally malicious behavior, such as data theft or unauthorized system access, but it poses a high security risk due to the potential for SQL injection.

Live on npm for 58 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module contains a critical vulnerability: unconstrained eval() of attacker-controlled 'input.expr' with access to local variables (including a formatted request object). This yields remote code execution and potential data exfiltration. The code likely represents an insecure design/bug rather than intentionally malicious code, but it must be remediated before handling untrusted inputs. Also fix the apparent syntax error in getAttr.

The analyzed fragment reveals a VSCode/OpenVSX extension with extensive capabilities to manage a local proxy, coordinate multiple AI providers, handle API keys, and perform system-level operations (process management, port checks, host commands). While some functionality could be legitimate (local services, data processing, UI integration), the combination of launching/killing processes, starting a local proxy, interacting with PM2, and accessing host resources without clear, restricted scope constitutes a non-trivial security risk. The presence of sensitive operations (secret storage, API keys, local version checks, and system command execution) in a VSCode extension increases the potential impact if abused or compromised. High caution is advised before including or distributing this package; a thorough security review, restricted permissions, and explicit user consent workflows are recommended.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

This code is not obviously a deliberate malware implant, but it contains serious supply-chain/security risks: multiple direct interpolations of untrusted UI input into shell commands with shell=True allow command injection and arbitrary filesystem manipulation. Treat this module as unsafe to use without remediation (sanitize/escape inputs or use safe stdlib calls).

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 18 hours and 13 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is highly obfuscated and uses dynamic execution via exec, indicating an attempt to conceal harmful functionality. It reverses a Base64-encoded, zlib-compressed payload and then executes it, which could enable arbitrary malicious actions. No specific URLs, domains, or IP addresses were identified in the code.

The code exhibits a dangerous remote code execution pattern: it downloads and immediately runs a remote Python payload without integrity checks, sandboxing, or input validation. This creates a severe supply-chain and runtime security risk. Recommended mitigations include removing dynamic downloads, validating payloads with cryptographic hashes or signatures, using safe subprocess invocations with argument lists, and implementing strict input sanitization. If remote functionality must remain, switch to a trusted-internal mechanism (e.g., plugin architecture with signed components, offline verification) and add robust error handling and logging.

The code presents several potential security risks and suggests the intent of managing a C2 server, which could be used for malicious purposes. Specifically, the handling of subprocesses with shell=True, the lack of proper input validation, and the exposure of sensitive file operations could facilitate unauthorized actions and access to sensitive data. Therefore, this code should be treated with caution and likely indicates malicious intent in its context.

This setup.py contains an explicit malicious side-effect: it executes os.system("cat /flag") at import/installation time, reading a local file and writing its contents to stdout/stderr. That creates a straightforward data-exfiltration vector (installer/CI logs, terminal). The rest of the file is packaging boilerplate. Do not install or run this package; treat it as a supply-chain backdoor.

This module implements explicit data collection from /opt and unconditional exfiltration to a hardcoded external HTTPS endpoint. The behavior matches a data-exfiltration backdoor. Treat this code as malicious/untrusted: remove or isolate the package, do not execute it in production, and investigate systems where it has run for potential data exposure. If secrets may have been present under /opt, rotate them and review outbound network logs for the indicated webhook.host and UUID path.

The code contains a large obfuscated module that performs resource decryption, dynamic code generation, native memory allocation/writing, and JIT/native hooking. Those behaviors enable runtime loading/execution of arbitrary code and process memory manipulation. Combined with heavy obfuscation and embedded encrypted payloads, this is consistent with a malicious loader/backdoor or supply-chain compromise. The rest of the file contains normal framework/service interfaces, but the obfuscated module represents a high-risk component and should be treated as malicious until a benign justification is provided and validated.

The script conditionally runs a package-defined 'download' script during installation into another project. That behavior can be legitimate (fetching required assets) but is also a vector for untrusted code execution, downloads, and persistence. Inspect the package.json 'download' script and any files it calls (or network endpoints it contacts) before trusting this package.

This source is highly suspicious and follows a classic staged loader/backdoor pattern: hard-coded compressed payload(s) -> decode/decompress -> exec -> runtime-defined functions invoked with further blobs. Even though the exact behavior of the hidden payloads is not visible here, the code provides arbitrary code execution on import and should be treated as malicious. Do not run this module; remove it from production systems and investigate installations where it may have executed.

This assembly contains a static initializer that performs an immediate outbound HTTPS request to a hardcoded, suspicious domain. The behavior is unexpected for a normal library, lacks configuration or consent, and resembles beaconing or telemetry that could be used for presence checking or exfiltration. Treat this package as highly suspicious: avoid using it in production until the author documents and justifies the network behavior or removes it. If discovered in a dependency tree, consider removing or blocking its network access and auditing dependent packages.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

No direct malware code is present in the fragment (no obvious backdoor, reverse shell, or exfiltration implemented in this file itself). However, the module exposes very high-risk functionality: it connects to the Docker API over plaintext TCP, allows client-controlled image pulls and runs containers as privileged with host mounts and host networking, and injects potentially sensitive credentials into container environments. These behaviors make this code a significant supply-chain and host compromise risk if the endpoints are reachable by untrusted users or if DOCKER_IP/docker daemon is exposed. Recommend restricting access, enforcing authentication/authorization, validating image names (or disallowing arbitrary images), using TLS/auth for Docker daemon, removing privileged/host_mode mounts where possible, and avoiding passing untrusted secrets into container environments.

This module does not execute any code or perform any actual operations, but it contains a suspicious message.

Live on npm for 28 days, 9 hours and 48 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The script creates a persistent, predictable remote access vector by adding a user with a hardcoded password and by replacing SSH configuration to enable password and root logins and forwarding. This behavior is high-risk and consistent with a backdoor/persistence implant; treat any occurrence as malicious unless used in a tightly controlled, ephemeral testing environment with compensating controls. Do not run this script on production systems; if it has run, assume compromise, remove the user, restore secure SSH configuration, and rotate credentials.

This script is attempting to exfiltrate sensitive information by sending a POST request to a remote server. It poses a high security risk and should be considered malicious.

Live on npm for 14 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is designed to send sensitive system information to a remote server, which is a significant security risk. This behavior is consistent with malicious activity, specifically data exfiltration.

Live on npm for 6 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This source code is definitively malicious. It performs extensive data exfiltration of sensitive system, user, and project information to a suspicious external server. The code reads sensitive files, executes system commands, and scans local ports, all without user consent. There is no obfuscation, but the intent and actions clearly indicate malware designed for reconnaissance and data theft. The security risk is extremely high, and this package should not be used under any circumstances.

Live on npm for 5 days, 5 hours and 30 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file implements an unattended update mechanism that fetches and installs .tgz archives from unverified remote sources—both the npm registry (registry[.]npmjs[.]org) and a configurable Firebase-style database URL—by downloading, extracting them into the application directory and then restarting PM2-managed processes. Because there is no cryptographic signature or checksum validation beyond a simple version check, a compromised registry account or database endpoint could deliver arbitrary code to every host running this updater. Additionally, on startup the script gathers extensive system and package metadata—including public IP (via api[.]ipify[.]org), local IP addresses, hostname, OS/platform, Node.js version, CPU/memory statistics, load averages, working directory and package.json fields—and posts it to a configurable Discord webhook endpoint (discordapp[.]com). This behavior poses both a supply-chain risk and a telemetry/privacy exposure risk, as sensitive host information is sent to an external service without explicit user consent or granular control.

The script creates a persistent, predictable remote access vector by adding a user with a hardcoded password and by replacing SSH configuration to enable password and root logins and forwarding. This behavior is high-risk and consistent with a backdoor/persistence implant; treat any occurrence as malicious unless used in a tightly controlled, ephemeral testing environment with compensating controls. Do not run this script on production systems; if it has run, assume compromise, remove the user, restore secure SSH configuration, and rotate credentials.

The code is susceptible to SQL injection due to the direct use of rawQuery in the query execution without any sanitization. It doesn't appear to have any intentionally malicious behavior, such as data theft or unauthorized system access, but it poses a high security risk due to the potential for SQL injection.

Live on npm for 58 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module contains a critical vulnerability: unconstrained eval() of attacker-controlled 'input.expr' with access to local variables (including a formatted request object). This yields remote code execution and potential data exfiltration. The code likely represents an insecure design/bug rather than intentionally malicious code, but it must be remediated before handling untrusted inputs. Also fix the apparent syntax error in getAttr.

The analyzed fragment reveals a VSCode/OpenVSX extension with extensive capabilities to manage a local proxy, coordinate multiple AI providers, handle API keys, and perform system-level operations (process management, port checks, host commands). While some functionality could be legitimate (local services, data processing, UI integration), the combination of launching/killing processes, starting a local proxy, interacting with PM2, and accessing host resources without clear, restricted scope constitutes a non-trivial security risk. The presence of sensitive operations (secret storage, API keys, local version checks, and system command execution) in a VSCode extension increases the potential impact if abused or compromised. High caution is advised before including or distributing this package; a thorough security review, restricted permissions, and explicit user consent workflows are recommended.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

This code is not obviously a deliberate malware implant, but it contains serious supply-chain/security risks: multiple direct interpolations of untrusted UI input into shell commands with shell=True allow command injection and arbitrary filesystem manipulation. Treat this module as unsafe to use without remediation (sanitize/escape inputs or use safe stdlib calls).

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 18 hours and 13 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is highly obfuscated and uses dynamic execution via exec, indicating an attempt to conceal harmful functionality. It reverses a Base64-encoded, zlib-compressed payload and then executes it, which could enable arbitrary malicious actions. No specific URLs, domains, or IP addresses were identified in the code.

The code exhibits a dangerous remote code execution pattern: it downloads and immediately runs a remote Python payload without integrity checks, sandboxing, or input validation. This creates a severe supply-chain and runtime security risk. Recommended mitigations include removing dynamic downloads, validating payloads with cryptographic hashes or signatures, using safe subprocess invocations with argument lists, and implementing strict input sanitization. If remote functionality must remain, switch to a trusted-internal mechanism (e.g., plugin architecture with signed components, offline verification) and add robust error handling and logging.

The code presents several potential security risks and suggests the intent of managing a C2 server, which could be used for malicious purposes. Specifically, the handling of subprocesses with shell=True, the lack of proper input validation, and the exposure of sensitive file operations could facilitate unauthorized actions and access to sensitive data. Therefore, this code should be treated with caution and likely indicates malicious intent in its context.

This setup.py contains an explicit malicious side-effect: it executes os.system("cat /flag") at import/installation time, reading a local file and writing its contents to stdout/stderr. That creates a straightforward data-exfiltration vector (installer/CI logs, terminal). The rest of the file is packaging boilerplate. Do not install or run this package; treat it as a supply-chain backdoor.

This module implements explicit data collection from /opt and unconditional exfiltration to a hardcoded external HTTPS endpoint. The behavior matches a data-exfiltration backdoor. Treat this code as malicious/untrusted: remove or isolate the package, do not execute it in production, and investigate systems where it has run for potential data exposure. If secrets may have been present under /opt, rotate them and review outbound network logs for the indicated webhook.host and UUID path.

The code contains a large obfuscated module that performs resource decryption, dynamic code generation, native memory allocation/writing, and JIT/native hooking. Those behaviors enable runtime loading/execution of arbitrary code and process memory manipulation. Combined with heavy obfuscation and embedded encrypted payloads, this is consistent with a malicious loader/backdoor or supply-chain compromise. The rest of the file contains normal framework/service interfaces, but the obfuscated module represents a high-risk component and should be treated as malicious until a benign justification is provided and validated.

The script conditionally runs a package-defined 'download' script during installation into another project. That behavior can be legitimate (fetching required assets) but is also a vector for untrusted code execution, downloads, and persistence. Inspect the package.json 'download' script and any files it calls (or network endpoints it contacts) before trusting this package.

This source is highly suspicious and follows a classic staged loader/backdoor pattern: hard-coded compressed payload(s) -> decode/decompress -> exec -> runtime-defined functions invoked with further blobs. Even though the exact behavior of the hidden payloads is not visible here, the code provides arbitrary code execution on import and should be treated as malicious. Do not run this module; remove it from production systems and investigate installations where it may have executed.

This assembly contains a static initializer that performs an immediate outbound HTTPS request to a hardcoded, suspicious domain. The behavior is unexpected for a normal library, lacks configuration or consent, and resembles beaconing or telemetry that could be used for presence checking or exfiltration. Treat this package as highly suspicious: avoid using it in production until the author documents and justifies the network behavior or removes it. If discovered in a dependency tree, consider removing or blocking its network access and auditing dependent packages.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

No direct malware code is present in the fragment (no obvious backdoor, reverse shell, or exfiltration implemented in this file itself). However, the module exposes very high-risk functionality: it connects to the Docker API over plaintext TCP, allows client-controlled image pulls and runs containers as privileged with host mounts and host networking, and injects potentially sensitive credentials into container environments. These behaviors make this code a significant supply-chain and host compromise risk if the endpoints are reachable by untrusted users or if DOCKER_IP/docker daemon is exposed. Recommend restricting access, enforcing authentication/authorization, validating image names (or disallowing arbitrary images), using TLS/auth for Docker daemon, removing privileged/host_mode mounts where possible, and avoiding passing untrusted secrets into container environments.

This module does not execute any code or perform any actual operations, but it contains a suspicious message.

Live on npm for 28 days, 9 hours and 48 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.