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This script is highly malicious, masquerading as a simple gem uninstaller while performing extensive destruction of development environment. It removes critical tools including Xcode command line tools via sudo rm -rf, downloads and executes remote code from raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com, and completely destroys Ruby version manager installations. The destructive scope far exceeds what users would expect from a gem uninstaller, causing severe damage to the development environment with minimal warning.

The script executes a command with user-supplied input without proper sanitization, which may lead to command injection. Additionally, it sends the payload to an external server, which can leak sensitive data.

Live on npm for 361 days, 5 hours and 31 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file implements an LLMNR responder intended to forge/spoof LLMNR/DNS responses to clients after joining IPv4/IPv6 multicast groups. The behavior constitutes an active network attack capability (LLMNR poisoning), enabling name resolution hijacking and facilitating credential capture or MITM techniques. There is no obfuscation or direct evidence of external C2 or credential exfiltration in this fragment, but the module is inherently dangerous if used on production or unauthorized networks. Recommend treating it as high risk: restrict to authorized lab/pentest use, audit build_dns_answer and related modules, and ensure deployment policies prevent accidental inclusion in production systems.

This module contains high-risk behavior: it collects environment and system information, sends it to a remote endpoint, and executes whatever JavaScript the server returns with access to require and the module context. The presence of an example that triggers this flow at module load makes mere import dangerous. Treat this as a supply-chain backdoor/RCE vector. Do not use this package in production; remove or sandbox it and investigate any systems that have executed it.

This function implements an arbitrary remote binary downloader and executor. In absence of strict controls (trusted/verified URL, cryptographic signature checks, user consent, sandboxing, logging and least privilege execution), it is highly dangerous and can be abused as a dropper/backdoor. If found unexpectedly in a dependency, treat it as potentially malicious and require provenance and intent verification. Remediation: remove or restrict this capability, add URL validation, TLS/domain allowlist, digital signature verification of payloads, atomic and permission-restricted persistence, explicit user consent, robust logging, and avoid executing downloaded binaries directly.

This snippet is an explicit destructive command targeting a Go runtime installation directory. While not obfuscated and not performing data exfiltration, it poses a high supply-chain and operational risk (sabotage, breakage of CI/dev/production environments). If found in packaging/install scripts or repository files, treat as malicious or immediately remove/neutralize and investigate commit history and author intent. Do not execute without isolation and review.

`lotusbail` is a malicious npm package that masquerades as a WhatsApp Web API library by forking legitimate Baileys-based code and preserving working messaging functionality. In addition to normal API behavior, it inserts a wrapper around the WhatsApp WebSocket client so that all traffic passing through the library is duplicated for collection. Reported data theft includes WhatsApp authentication tokens and session keys, full message content (sent/received and historical), contact lists (including phone numbers), and transferred media/files. The package also attempts to establish persistent unauthorized access by hijacking the WhatsApp device-linking (“pairing”) workflow using a hardcoded pairing code, effectively linking an attacker-controlled device to the victim’s account; removing the npm dependency does not automatically remove the linked device. To hinder detection, the exfiltration endpoint is hidden behind multiple obfuscation layers, collected data is encrypted (including a custom RSA implementation), and the code includes anti-debugging traps designed to disrupt analysis.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

The code exhibits behavior consistent with malicious activity, specifically data exfiltration to suspicious domains. It collects and sends sensitive system information without user consent, indicating a high security risk.

Live on npm for 5 days, 15 hours and 56 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module intentionally conceals Python code by embedding a base64-encoded, zlib-compressed payload and executing it at import time. That design provides a direct, high-privilege channel for arbitrary actions and is a strong indicator of malicious or at least unsafe behavior. Because the actual payload content is not visible here, I cannot definitively label it as malware, but the pattern is high-risk: do not import or run this module in trusted environments until the inner payload is decompressed and audited in isolation.

This module implements privileged node and device management and exposes HTTP endpoints that accept user input used directly in shell commands and Docker operations. Main risks: command injection (unsanitized string interpolation into shell commands and os.popen), destructive device operations (partitioning, bind/unbind), supplying arbitrary images to be pulled and run as privileged containers, and use of an unencrypted/unprotected Docker TCP socket (tcp://...:2375). I assess this as not manifestly malware but a high-risk administrative component that must be strictly access-controlled and hardened (validate/sanitize inputs, avoid passing raw user values into shell/Docker operations, use secure Docker API access, avoid exposing endpoints publicly).

This code is malicious: it harvests form data (notably credit card details), persists them in cookies, and exfiltrates the data to a hard-coded external server via an image GET. It includes obfuscation and functionality to hide traces (clearing CC fields) and to avoid duplicate sends. It should be treated as credential-stealing malware and removed; any systems that included this code should assume compromise of users' payment data and rotate/notify as appropriate.

The code in the flagged file explicitly reads a local file from a fixed system path (/home/joben/Desktop/testsol/abstract_it.py) and transmits its contents via an HTTP request to a Discord webhook. The target URL is hardcoded as https://discordapp[.]com/api/webhooks/1278595755812327424/3xvzS30Bx8bOhooNJeY9gnYj2KjFb2-ZfV2rHpBdkS71tuibNeu56_mRFE38MrmQRa_j, with the embedded token included in the URL. This behavior is characteristic of malware designed for data exfiltration, as it automatically sends potentially sensitive file content to an external service without user consent.

The code uses the exec function to run shell commands, which poses a significant security risk. It could potentially execute malicious code if the input to exec is manipulated. Redirecting output to /dev/null to hide execution details is suspicious.

Live on npm for 59 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module performs unsafe deserialization: it downloads a pickle from an external storage backend and unpickles it without any integrity checks or validation. That pattern creates a high-risk remote code execution vector if an attacker can modify the stored file or if the storage backend is compromised. While the code itself does not contain obfuscated or clearly malicious payloads, its use of pickle with external inputs is dangerous and constitutes a significant supply-chain / execution risk. I recommend replacing pickle with a safe format (e.g., JSON) or adding strong integrity/authenticity checks (signatures/HMAC) and avoiding deserializing untrusted data.

Live on PyPI for 4 hours and 19 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits a dangerous remote code execution pattern: it downloads and immediately runs a remote Python payload without integrity checks, sandboxing, or input validation. This creates a severe supply-chain and runtime security risk. Recommended mitigations include removing dynamic downloads, validating payloads with cryptographic hashes or signatures, using safe subprocess invocations with argument lists, and implementing strict input sanitization. If remote functionality must remain, switch to a trusted-internal mechanism (e.g., plugin architecture with signed components, offline verification) and add robust error handling and logging.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

The package previously contained malicious code, necessitating a high malware score. The reports lack detail and do not provide adequate information for a thorough analysis, but the risk remains significant due to the confirmed malicious nature of the original package.

The script seems to be part of a spamming operation and uses bad security practices, such as hardcoding paths and credentials. Therefore, it's a potential security risk.

Live on npm for 21 hours and 16 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code presents a high-risk credential/cookie harvesting and exfiltration pattern via automated browser login and external webhook notification. Given the data flows and sensitive sinks, treat this as a severe security concern and isolate or remove the module from public distributions unless explicit user consent, secure handling, and robust access controls are provided. Recommend auditing dependencies and removing automated credential harvesting paths from supply chains.

This script is highly malicious, masquerading as a simple gem uninstaller while performing extensive destruction of development environment. It removes critical tools including Xcode command line tools via sudo rm -rf, downloads and executes remote code from raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com, and completely destroys Ruby version manager installations. The destructive scope far exceeds what users would expect from a gem uninstaller, causing severe damage to the development environment with minimal warning.

The script executes a command with user-supplied input without proper sanitization, which may lead to command injection. Additionally, it sends the payload to an external server, which can leak sensitive data.

Live on npm for 361 days, 5 hours and 31 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file implements an LLMNR responder intended to forge/spoof LLMNR/DNS responses to clients after joining IPv4/IPv6 multicast groups. The behavior constitutes an active network attack capability (LLMNR poisoning), enabling name resolution hijacking and facilitating credential capture or MITM techniques. There is no obfuscation or direct evidence of external C2 or credential exfiltration in this fragment, but the module is inherently dangerous if used on production or unauthorized networks. Recommend treating it as high risk: restrict to authorized lab/pentest use, audit build_dns_answer and related modules, and ensure deployment policies prevent accidental inclusion in production systems.

This module contains high-risk behavior: it collects environment and system information, sends it to a remote endpoint, and executes whatever JavaScript the server returns with access to require and the module context. The presence of an example that triggers this flow at module load makes mere import dangerous. Treat this as a supply-chain backdoor/RCE vector. Do not use this package in production; remove or sandbox it and investigate any systems that have executed it.

This function implements an arbitrary remote binary downloader and executor. In absence of strict controls (trusted/verified URL, cryptographic signature checks, user consent, sandboxing, logging and least privilege execution), it is highly dangerous and can be abused as a dropper/backdoor. If found unexpectedly in a dependency, treat it as potentially malicious and require provenance and intent verification. Remediation: remove or restrict this capability, add URL validation, TLS/domain allowlist, digital signature verification of payloads, atomic and permission-restricted persistence, explicit user consent, robust logging, and avoid executing downloaded binaries directly.

This snippet is an explicit destructive command targeting a Go runtime installation directory. While not obfuscated and not performing data exfiltration, it poses a high supply-chain and operational risk (sabotage, breakage of CI/dev/production environments). If found in packaging/install scripts or repository files, treat as malicious or immediately remove/neutralize and investigate commit history and author intent. Do not execute without isolation and review.

`lotusbail` is a malicious npm package that masquerades as a WhatsApp Web API library by forking legitimate Baileys-based code and preserving working messaging functionality. In addition to normal API behavior, it inserts a wrapper around the WhatsApp WebSocket client so that all traffic passing through the library is duplicated for collection. Reported data theft includes WhatsApp authentication tokens and session keys, full message content (sent/received and historical), contact lists (including phone numbers), and transferred media/files. The package also attempts to establish persistent unauthorized access by hijacking the WhatsApp device-linking (“pairing”) workflow using a hardcoded pairing code, effectively linking an attacker-controlled device to the victim’s account; removing the npm dependency does not automatically remove the linked device. To hinder detection, the exfiltration endpoint is hidden behind multiple obfuscation layers, collected data is encrypted (including a custom RSA implementation), and the code includes anti-debugging traps designed to disrupt analysis.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

The code exhibits behavior consistent with malicious activity, specifically data exfiltration to suspicious domains. It collects and sends sensitive system information without user consent, indicating a high security risk.

Live on npm for 5 days, 15 hours and 56 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module intentionally conceals Python code by embedding a base64-encoded, zlib-compressed payload and executing it at import time. That design provides a direct, high-privilege channel for arbitrary actions and is a strong indicator of malicious or at least unsafe behavior. Because the actual payload content is not visible here, I cannot definitively label it as malware, but the pattern is high-risk: do not import or run this module in trusted environments until the inner payload is decompressed and audited in isolation.

This module implements privileged node and device management and exposes HTTP endpoints that accept user input used directly in shell commands and Docker operations. Main risks: command injection (unsanitized string interpolation into shell commands and os.popen), destructive device operations (partitioning, bind/unbind), supplying arbitrary images to be pulled and run as privileged containers, and use of an unencrypted/unprotected Docker TCP socket (tcp://...:2375). I assess this as not manifestly malware but a high-risk administrative component that must be strictly access-controlled and hardened (validate/sanitize inputs, avoid passing raw user values into shell/Docker operations, use secure Docker API access, avoid exposing endpoints publicly).

This code is malicious: it harvests form data (notably credit card details), persists them in cookies, and exfiltrates the data to a hard-coded external server via an image GET. It includes obfuscation and functionality to hide traces (clearing CC fields) and to avoid duplicate sends. It should be treated as credential-stealing malware and removed; any systems that included this code should assume compromise of users' payment data and rotate/notify as appropriate.

The code in the flagged file explicitly reads a local file from a fixed system path (/home/joben/Desktop/testsol/abstract_it.py) and transmits its contents via an HTTP request to a Discord webhook. The target URL is hardcoded as https://discordapp[.]com/api/webhooks/1278595755812327424/3xvzS30Bx8bOhooNJeY9gnYj2KjFb2-ZfV2rHpBdkS71tuibNeu56_mRFE38MrmQRa_j, with the embedded token included in the URL. This behavior is characteristic of malware designed for data exfiltration, as it automatically sends potentially sensitive file content to an external service without user consent.

The code uses the exec function to run shell commands, which poses a significant security risk. It could potentially execute malicious code if the input to exec is manipulated. Redirecting output to /dev/null to hide execution details is suspicious.

Live on npm for 59 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module performs unsafe deserialization: it downloads a pickle from an external storage backend and unpickles it without any integrity checks or validation. That pattern creates a high-risk remote code execution vector if an attacker can modify the stored file or if the storage backend is compromised. While the code itself does not contain obfuscated or clearly malicious payloads, its use of pickle with external inputs is dangerous and constitutes a significant supply-chain / execution risk. I recommend replacing pickle with a safe format (e.g., JSON) or adding strong integrity/authenticity checks (signatures/HMAC) and avoiding deserializing untrusted data.

Live on PyPI for 4 hours and 19 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits a dangerous remote code execution pattern: it downloads and immediately runs a remote Python payload without integrity checks, sandboxing, or input validation. This creates a severe supply-chain and runtime security risk. Recommended mitigations include removing dynamic downloads, validating payloads with cryptographic hashes or signatures, using safe subprocess invocations with argument lists, and implementing strict input sanitization. If remote functionality must remain, switch to a trusted-internal mechanism (e.g., plugin architecture with signed components, offline verification) and add robust error handling and logging.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

The package previously contained malicious code, necessitating a high malware score. The reports lack detail and do not provide adequate information for a thorough analysis, but the risk remains significant due to the confirmed malicious nature of the original package.

The script seems to be part of a spamming operation and uses bad security practices, such as hardcoding paths and credentials. Therefore, it's a potential security risk.

Live on npm for 21 hours and 16 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code presents a high-risk credential/cookie harvesting and exfiltration pattern via automated browser login and external webhook notification. Given the data flows and sensitive sinks, treat this as a severe security concern and isolate or remove the module from public distributions unless explicit user consent, secure handling, and robust access controls are provided. Recommend auditing dependencies and removing automated credential harvesting paths from supply chains.