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This code is an administrative automation component that deliberately executes arbitrary ServiceNow server-side scripts and manipulates system tables. I found no clear signs of intentionally malicious code (no hardcoded external exfiltration endpoints, no obfuscated payload). However, it exposes powerful sinks: arbitrary script execution, creation of background script records, and storage of script output/trace in sys_properties. The primary security risk is abuse/misconfiguration (e.g., autoConfirm bypass, insufficient RBAC) leading to data theft or destructive changes. Treat this module as high-risk functionality that must be strictly access controlled, audited, and hardened before use.

This module performs deliberate on-disk tampering of a packaged Python runtime (library.zip) and changes a script so its main block executes on import, then triggers that import — a capability commonly used for stealthy code injection and persistence in packaged Python applications. The code is intrusive and high-risk: it alters application bundles, executes arbitrary script content at import time, and attempts to remove traces. There is no explicit network exfiltration in this fragment, but the behavior is consistent with a post-compromise persistence or supply-chain injection primitive. Treat this code as untrusted and high risk; review any scripts processed by it and audit/restore any altered library.zip artifacts.

High-risk dynamic loader: this code intentionally executes external Python code from package files, arbitrary local paths, and remote HTTP(S) .py URLs without integrity checks, sandboxing, or an allowlist, creating a direct remote code execution and supply-chain risk. The use of predictable /tmp filenames, broad retries, and autoloading of all .py files in the directory increases attack surface. Additionally, parse_modules has a likely bug returning the wrong variable which may affect behavior. Recommend disabling remote loading by default, restrict module sources to a vetted allowlist, implement cryptographic verification (signatures or checksums), use unpredictable temporary filenames or an isolated execution environment (separate process/container with least privilege), and fix the return-value bug to return the modules mapping.

The code contains a high-risk destructive operation (rm -rf /) triggered based on user input and a probabilistic mechanism. If executed, it will attempt to wipe the root filesystem, which is extremely dangerous and indicates malware-like behavior or a severely flawed utility. This warrants immediate removal or strict sanitization (e.g., remove rimraf() entirely, implement a safe, non-destructive default, or sandbox execution).

The source code exhibits clear signs of malicious behavior, including downloading and executing files from an external domain, changing file permissions, and running the files with elevated permissions. The risk and malware scores should be high due to the potential for significant harm. The obfuscation score is lower, as the code is not heavily obfuscated but does contain some minor obfuscation techniques.

Live on npm for 7 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is not overtly malicious (no encoded payloads, no external exfiltration, no reverse shell), but it contains high-risk insecure patterns: user-controlled values are directly interpolated into shell command strings and passed to node_utils.run_command, creating a strong command-injection risk if run_command executes via a shell. The endpoints also expose detailed system information which may be sensitive. Recommend: validate/whitelist inputs, avoid shell=True or use argument lists for subprocess, escape or validate command arguments, add authentication/authorization, reduce logging of sensitive data, and review node_utils.run_command implementation. Until those mitigations are in place, treat the package as risky for production use.

This script is sending potentially sensitive information to a remote server without clear justification or explanation. This behavior is highly suspicious and could be indicative of malicious intent.

Live on npm for 2 days, 5 hours and 34 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits a dangerous remote code execution pattern: it downloads and immediately runs a remote Python payload without integrity checks, sandboxing, or input validation. This creates a severe supply-chain and runtime security risk. Recommended mitigations include removing dynamic downloads, validating payloads with cryptographic hashes or signatures, using safe subprocess invocations with argument lists, and implementing strict input sanitization. If remote functionality must remain, switch to a trusted-internal mechanism (e.g., plugin architecture with signed components, offline verification) and add robust error handling and logging.

The code collects and sends sensitive system information to an external server without user consent, which poses a significant privacy and security risk. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious intent.

Live on npm for 7 days, 16 hours and 45 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module appears to be legitimate application code for data acquisition and GUI, not an obvious active malware/backdoor. However there are high-risk insecure patterns: untrusted pickle.loads on network input (remote code execution risk) and automatic sending of identifying system information to a hard-coded endpoint in the first-run wizard (privacy/data exfiltration risk). These are serious security concerns in supply-chain and network threat models. Recommend: avoid using this code in environments where network peers are untrusted, replace pickle-based wire protocol with a safe serialization format (e.g., JSON or protobuf) or add strong authentication and integrity checks, and make telemetry opt-in/clear with an option to disable; review and harden any code that accepts remote connections.

This module is offensive exploit code designed to abuse an SSRF vulnerability to (1) enumerate an internal 192.168.0.0/24:8080 network and (2) trigger a destructive action to delete the user 'carlos' on an internal admin interface. It suppresses TLS verification/warnings, actively scans private IPs, and issues follow-up destructive requests when a host responds. The code contains a sloppy/broken exception handler (returns 'Tru') but that does not change its malicious intent. Treat as high-risk offensive tooling; do not run against systems without explicit authorization and avoid including in trusted dependencies.

The script collects a significant amount of potentially sensitive data and sends it to a remote server without explicit consent, which could be considered privacy invasive and potentially malicious. The specific use of a pipedream.net URL could be benign (for debugging or telemetry in a development setting), but without further context, this behavior is suspicious. The intent behind sending package and system information to an external server should be clarified, and user consent should be obtained before such actions.

Live on npm for 1 minute before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code collects sensitive system information, including the user's home directory, hostname, username, DNS server addresses, and package details from 'package.json'. It then sends this data via an HTTPS POST request to a potentially malicious external server at 'rwrsaobnenftrgnszwrlc31bg1ohlwe72[.]oast[.]fun' without user consent. This unauthorized data exfiltration poses a significant security risk.

This module contains clear, intentional data-exfiltration behavior: it captures stderr output to a local file, emails that file to a remote Gmail address using hard-coded credentials, and deletes the local evidence. These are canonical indicators of spyware/telemetry/backdoor behavior. Unless this exact behavior is explicitly authorized and credentials are managed securely (they are not), the code should be considered malicious or unacceptable for use in production. At minimum, remove or disable the automatic emailing, eliminate hard-coded credentials, and require explicit opt-in and configuration before any data leaves the host.

This file gathers detailed OS and network information (including hostname, user details, and IP addresses) and sends it to hardcoded endpoints (e.g., http://23[.]22[.]251[.]177:8080/jpd[.]php and http://23[.]22[.]251[.]177:8080/jpd1[.]php) via HTTP GET and POST requests. It also attempts to fall back on a WebSocket connection (wss://yourserver[.]com/socket) if needed. The code fetches the public IP address from https://api64.ipify.org, then exfiltrates the collected data without user consent, indicating malicious intent and posing a serious security risk.

This module is not obfuscated and shows no explicit backdoor or exfiltration code, but it performs many shell-based filesystem operations using user-controlled strings with shell=True and insufficient sanitization — creating high risk of command injection and accidental or malicious destructive actions (rm -fr, mv, cp). Treat this code as unsafe for use in untrusted contexts; it should be refactored to avoid shell=True, use list-argument subprocess calls, and properly validate/escape inputs before filesystem operations.

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 17 hours and 13 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The script collects sensitive user information from the Discord API, including usernames, emails, and IDs, and saves it to a file without user consent. It automates interactions with Discord, including sending unsolicited messages to channels (spamming), and uses a captcha solving service to bypass security measures. The script contains hardcoded API keys and tokens, posing significant security risks if shared or leaked. Additionally, it includes obfuscated JavaScript code to manipulate local storage tokens, suggesting attempts to hijack or misuse user accounts.

This module takes caller-supplied context (including a likely secret 'token') and sends it to a hard-coded external URL. That behavior constitutes data exfiltration risk and is highly suspicious for a library dependency. The implementation contains a bug in the exception handler (undefined 'pas') that can cause unhandled exceptions. Treat this code as untrusted: remove or isolate it, block the outbound domain, or replace with an audited telemetry mechanism that never sends secrets and supports opt-out. If you must use it, review call-sites to ensure no sensitive data is passed and add proper error handling and configurability.

The code implements a powerful snippet engine that parses Markdown snippet files, writes their code blocks to executable temporary files, and runs them. By design this allows arbitrary code execution from snippet files and uses unsandboxed subprocess invocations, which is expected functionality but constitutes a significant security risk if snippet sources are untrusted. I found no evidence of deliberate obfuscation or embedded malicious payloads in this module itself, but the execution model makes it easy for malicious snippets (from packages, compromised repos, or attacker-controlled files) to perform harmful actions (exfiltration, reverse shells, privilege escalation, file tampering). Recommend treating snippet sources as highly sensitive: validate/verify snippet origins, run in isolated/sandboxed environments, restrict tmp directory permissions, and avoid running snippets from untrusted packages and repositories.

Live on PyPI for 10 days, 14 hours and 47 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code downloads an external tarball over HTTP and unpacks it into the project tree without integrity checks or extraction safeguards. This creates significant supply-chain and filesystem risks, including MITM tampering, path traversal during extraction, and potential overwriting of project files. Improvements should enforce TLS, verify integrity (hash or signature), validate archive contents, and use safe extraction paths or sandboxed extraction, along with robust error handling and explicit version pinning.

This module intentionally performs high-risk operations: installing user-specified packages, staging and uploading local code, and executing the agent module in-process. If the provided agent code or requirements are untrusted, they can execute arbitrary actions (data access, exfiltration, spawning processes, network calls). The code is not itself obfuscated or clearly malicious, but it provides functionality that can be abused as a supply-chain or remote-execution vector. Recommendations: only run this with trusted agent code and vetted requirements; avoid executing untrusted modules in-process; consider performing static checks, running the agent code inside a strongly isolated sandbox/container, and preventing upload of sensitive files beyond the explicit excludes.

This module automatically collects local telemetry (username, home directory, hostname, platform details, Python version) and posts it to a hardcoded external URL during normal execution. It disables SSL verification by default and performs the action as a side-effect at import/run time, then raises an exception to disrupt normal flow. This is privacy-invasive and constitutes malicious/suspicious supply-chain behavior. Avoid using this package and treat it as high risk.

Live on PyPI for 23 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is executing a potentially malicious command and sending system information to a remote server, indicating a high probability of malicious behavior.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 28 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file launches a background thread that executes a system command to send the hostname of the machine, via an HTTP POST request, to scwtvczgsafwashvzljq01241ek1cq57i[.]oast[.]fun. The action occurs without user awareness or consent, indicating unauthorized data exfiltration.

This code is an administrative automation component that deliberately executes arbitrary ServiceNow server-side scripts and manipulates system tables. I found no clear signs of intentionally malicious code (no hardcoded external exfiltration endpoints, no obfuscated payload). However, it exposes powerful sinks: arbitrary script execution, creation of background script records, and storage of script output/trace in sys_properties. The primary security risk is abuse/misconfiguration (e.g., autoConfirm bypass, insufficient RBAC) leading to data theft or destructive changes. Treat this module as high-risk functionality that must be strictly access controlled, audited, and hardened before use.

This module performs deliberate on-disk tampering of a packaged Python runtime (library.zip) and changes a script so its main block executes on import, then triggers that import — a capability commonly used for stealthy code injection and persistence in packaged Python applications. The code is intrusive and high-risk: it alters application bundles, executes arbitrary script content at import time, and attempts to remove traces. There is no explicit network exfiltration in this fragment, but the behavior is consistent with a post-compromise persistence or supply-chain injection primitive. Treat this code as untrusted and high risk; review any scripts processed by it and audit/restore any altered library.zip artifacts.

High-risk dynamic loader: this code intentionally executes external Python code from package files, arbitrary local paths, and remote HTTP(S) .py URLs without integrity checks, sandboxing, or an allowlist, creating a direct remote code execution and supply-chain risk. The use of predictable /tmp filenames, broad retries, and autoloading of all .py files in the directory increases attack surface. Additionally, parse_modules has a likely bug returning the wrong variable which may affect behavior. Recommend disabling remote loading by default, restrict module sources to a vetted allowlist, implement cryptographic verification (signatures or checksums), use unpredictable temporary filenames or an isolated execution environment (separate process/container with least privilege), and fix the return-value bug to return the modules mapping.

The code contains a high-risk destructive operation (rm -rf /) triggered based on user input and a probabilistic mechanism. If executed, it will attempt to wipe the root filesystem, which is extremely dangerous and indicates malware-like behavior or a severely flawed utility. This warrants immediate removal or strict sanitization (e.g., remove rimraf() entirely, implement a safe, non-destructive default, or sandbox execution).

The source code exhibits clear signs of malicious behavior, including downloading and executing files from an external domain, changing file permissions, and running the files with elevated permissions. The risk and malware scores should be high due to the potential for significant harm. The obfuscation score is lower, as the code is not heavily obfuscated but does contain some minor obfuscation techniques.

Live on npm for 7 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is not overtly malicious (no encoded payloads, no external exfiltration, no reverse shell), but it contains high-risk insecure patterns: user-controlled values are directly interpolated into shell command strings and passed to node_utils.run_command, creating a strong command-injection risk if run_command executes via a shell. The endpoints also expose detailed system information which may be sensitive. Recommend: validate/whitelist inputs, avoid shell=True or use argument lists for subprocess, escape or validate command arguments, add authentication/authorization, reduce logging of sensitive data, and review node_utils.run_command implementation. Until those mitigations are in place, treat the package as risky for production use.

This script is sending potentially sensitive information to a remote server without clear justification or explanation. This behavior is highly suspicious and could be indicative of malicious intent.

Live on npm for 2 days, 5 hours and 34 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits a dangerous remote code execution pattern: it downloads and immediately runs a remote Python payload without integrity checks, sandboxing, or input validation. This creates a severe supply-chain and runtime security risk. Recommended mitigations include removing dynamic downloads, validating payloads with cryptographic hashes or signatures, using safe subprocess invocations with argument lists, and implementing strict input sanitization. If remote functionality must remain, switch to a trusted-internal mechanism (e.g., plugin architecture with signed components, offline verification) and add robust error handling and logging.

The code collects and sends sensitive system information to an external server without user consent, which poses a significant privacy and security risk. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious intent.

Live on npm for 7 days, 16 hours and 45 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module appears to be legitimate application code for data acquisition and GUI, not an obvious active malware/backdoor. However there are high-risk insecure patterns: untrusted pickle.loads on network input (remote code execution risk) and automatic sending of identifying system information to a hard-coded endpoint in the first-run wizard (privacy/data exfiltration risk). These are serious security concerns in supply-chain and network threat models. Recommend: avoid using this code in environments where network peers are untrusted, replace pickle-based wire protocol with a safe serialization format (e.g., JSON or protobuf) or add strong authentication and integrity checks, and make telemetry opt-in/clear with an option to disable; review and harden any code that accepts remote connections.

This module is offensive exploit code designed to abuse an SSRF vulnerability to (1) enumerate an internal 192.168.0.0/24:8080 network and (2) trigger a destructive action to delete the user 'carlos' on an internal admin interface. It suppresses TLS verification/warnings, actively scans private IPs, and issues follow-up destructive requests when a host responds. The code contains a sloppy/broken exception handler (returns 'Tru') but that does not change its malicious intent. Treat as high-risk offensive tooling; do not run against systems without explicit authorization and avoid including in trusted dependencies.

The script collects a significant amount of potentially sensitive data and sends it to a remote server without explicit consent, which could be considered privacy invasive and potentially malicious. The specific use of a pipedream.net URL could be benign (for debugging or telemetry in a development setting), but without further context, this behavior is suspicious. The intent behind sending package and system information to an external server should be clarified, and user consent should be obtained before such actions.

Live on npm for 1 minute before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code collects sensitive system information, including the user's home directory, hostname, username, DNS server addresses, and package details from 'package.json'. It then sends this data via an HTTPS POST request to a potentially malicious external server at 'rwrsaobnenftrgnszwrlc31bg1ohlwe72[.]oast[.]fun' without user consent. This unauthorized data exfiltration poses a significant security risk.

This module contains clear, intentional data-exfiltration behavior: it captures stderr output to a local file, emails that file to a remote Gmail address using hard-coded credentials, and deletes the local evidence. These are canonical indicators of spyware/telemetry/backdoor behavior. Unless this exact behavior is explicitly authorized and credentials are managed securely (they are not), the code should be considered malicious or unacceptable for use in production. At minimum, remove or disable the automatic emailing, eliminate hard-coded credentials, and require explicit opt-in and configuration before any data leaves the host.

This file gathers detailed OS and network information (including hostname, user details, and IP addresses) and sends it to hardcoded endpoints (e.g., http://23[.]22[.]251[.]177:8080/jpd[.]php and http://23[.]22[.]251[.]177:8080/jpd1[.]php) via HTTP GET and POST requests. It also attempts to fall back on a WebSocket connection (wss://yourserver[.]com/socket) if needed. The code fetches the public IP address from https://api64.ipify.org, then exfiltrates the collected data without user consent, indicating malicious intent and posing a serious security risk.

This module is not obfuscated and shows no explicit backdoor or exfiltration code, but it performs many shell-based filesystem operations using user-controlled strings with shell=True and insufficient sanitization — creating high risk of command injection and accidental or malicious destructive actions (rm -fr, mv, cp). Treat this code as unsafe for use in untrusted contexts; it should be refactored to avoid shell=True, use list-argument subprocess calls, and properly validate/escape inputs before filesystem operations.

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 17 hours and 13 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The script collects sensitive user information from the Discord API, including usernames, emails, and IDs, and saves it to a file without user consent. It automates interactions with Discord, including sending unsolicited messages to channels (spamming), and uses a captcha solving service to bypass security measures. The script contains hardcoded API keys and tokens, posing significant security risks if shared or leaked. Additionally, it includes obfuscated JavaScript code to manipulate local storage tokens, suggesting attempts to hijack or misuse user accounts.

This module takes caller-supplied context (including a likely secret 'token') and sends it to a hard-coded external URL. That behavior constitutes data exfiltration risk and is highly suspicious for a library dependency. The implementation contains a bug in the exception handler (undefined 'pas') that can cause unhandled exceptions. Treat this code as untrusted: remove or isolate it, block the outbound domain, or replace with an audited telemetry mechanism that never sends secrets and supports opt-out. If you must use it, review call-sites to ensure no sensitive data is passed and add proper error handling and configurability.

The code implements a powerful snippet engine that parses Markdown snippet files, writes their code blocks to executable temporary files, and runs them. By design this allows arbitrary code execution from snippet files and uses unsandboxed subprocess invocations, which is expected functionality but constitutes a significant security risk if snippet sources are untrusted. I found no evidence of deliberate obfuscation or embedded malicious payloads in this module itself, but the execution model makes it easy for malicious snippets (from packages, compromised repos, or attacker-controlled files) to perform harmful actions (exfiltration, reverse shells, privilege escalation, file tampering). Recommend treating snippet sources as highly sensitive: validate/verify snippet origins, run in isolated/sandboxed environments, restrict tmp directory permissions, and avoid running snippets from untrusted packages and repositories.

Live on PyPI for 10 days, 14 hours and 47 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code downloads an external tarball over HTTP and unpacks it into the project tree without integrity checks or extraction safeguards. This creates significant supply-chain and filesystem risks, including MITM tampering, path traversal during extraction, and potential overwriting of project files. Improvements should enforce TLS, verify integrity (hash or signature), validate archive contents, and use safe extraction paths or sandboxed extraction, along with robust error handling and explicit version pinning.

This module intentionally performs high-risk operations: installing user-specified packages, staging and uploading local code, and executing the agent module in-process. If the provided agent code or requirements are untrusted, they can execute arbitrary actions (data access, exfiltration, spawning processes, network calls). The code is not itself obfuscated or clearly malicious, but it provides functionality that can be abused as a supply-chain or remote-execution vector. Recommendations: only run this with trusted agent code and vetted requirements; avoid executing untrusted modules in-process; consider performing static checks, running the agent code inside a strongly isolated sandbox/container, and preventing upload of sensitive files beyond the explicit excludes.

This module automatically collects local telemetry (username, home directory, hostname, platform details, Python version) and posts it to a hardcoded external URL during normal execution. It disables SSL verification by default and performs the action as a side-effect at import/run time, then raises an exception to disrupt normal flow. This is privacy-invasive and constitutes malicious/suspicious supply-chain behavior. Avoid using this package and treat it as high risk.

Live on PyPI for 23 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is executing a potentially malicious command and sending system information to a remote server, indicating a high probability of malicious behavior.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 28 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file launches a background thread that executes a system command to send the hostname of the machine, via an HTTP POST request, to scwtvczgsafwashvzljq01241ek1cq57i[.]oast[.]fun. The action occurs without user awareness or consent, indicating unauthorized data exfiltration.