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The script exhibits clear signs of malicious activity by exfiltrating sensitive system information to an external server and performing suspicious DNS queries. The use of encoding and compression techniques indicates an attempt to obfuscate the data being transmitted.

Live on npm for 4 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains potential security risks such as hard-coded file paths, subprocess.Popen usage, and the handling of untrusted data through PyArrow Plasma. It is essential to review and address these security concerns before using this code in a production environment.

The code imports several modules and calls an unusual method 'functame' on each. The combination of modules and the method names appear suspicious and potentially obfuscated, indicating that there may be hidden functionality not apparent from this code alone. Additional investigation into the referenced modules and their methods is required to determine if there is any malicious intent.

Live on npm for 56 days, 16 hours and 25 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains multiple potential security risks, including unauthorized data exfiltration, data leak, and arbitrary code execution. It is crucial to review and mitigate these risks by implementing proper input validation and sanitization. The presence of 'eval' and the 'evilFunction' indicates potential malicious behavior or an attempt to obfuscate malicious code, posing significant security risks.

Live on npm for 10 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code is not obviously malicious in itself; it is intended to call an external solver (msolve) and parse its output. However, it contains a high-risk design choice: it executes an external binary and directly evaluates that binary's stdout via sage_eval, which yields arbitrary code execution if the external binary or its output is tampered with. If the msolve executable can be compromised (supply-chain attack, replaced binary, or attacker-controlled output), this code can execute arbitrary Python. Recommended mitigations: avoid eval-style parsing of external output, use a strict parser or sandbox evaluation, validate output structure and types before evaluation, and ensure the msolve binary is obtained and verified from a trusted source. Overall: low probability the code is intentionally malicious, but a significant security risk exists due to unsafe evaluation of external output.

The `Poppler` class itself does not contain overtly malicious code. However, its heavy reliance on executing external command-line tools (`pdftoppm`, `pdfinfo`) via `execa` presents a significant supply chain risk. The ability to dynamically set the paths to these executables (`setPdfToPpmPath`, `setPdfInfoPath`) is a critical vulnerability vector. If an attacker can control the arguments passed to these setters, they could potentially redirect the execution to malicious binaries, leading to arbitrary command execution and severe security implications, including malware deployment or data exfiltration.

The code is designed to create a reverse shell, which is a serious security risk. It allows unauthorized remote access and control over the system, representing a high security threat.

Live on PyPI for 18 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file contains malicious code that collects sensitive system information (IP address, hostname, username, and organization name) and exfiltrates it using DNS tunneling. The code first retrieves the system's registered organization using the 'systeminfo' command, obtains the public IP address from ipinfo[.]io, and collects the hostname and username from the system. It then combines this data, encodes it in hexadecimal, and splits it into parts to construct a domain name with the pattern '[encoded_data].3.560ba22e.log.nat.cloudns[.]ph'. Finally, it executes a ping command to this domain, which sends the encoded system information to a remote server through DNS queries.

Live on npm for 4 days, 8 hours and 17 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code performs covert collection of environment identifiers (hostname, username, cwd, home directory) and exfiltrates them in plaintext to a hardcoded external server, using evasion checks to skip analysis/cloud environments and forging request headers. The behavior is consistent with a malicious reconnaissance/backdoor component in a supply-chain attack. Treat as malicious code: remove, investigate repository integrity, and rotate any potentially exposed credentials or secrets.

The code implements functionality that can exfiltrate arbitrary files and logs over the network without encryption or user consent. This behavior constitutes a significant security risk and matches malware patterns related to data theft. Although the code is not obfuscated and does not contain explicit malware payloads like backdoors or reverse shells, the potential for unauthorized data leakage is high. Use of this code in a supply chain context should be carefully controlled and audited.

The code is designed to exfiltrate sensitive system and network information to an external server. The conditions in `isValid` and use of specific encoding functions suggest a deliberate attempt to hide the true nature and selectively activate this behavior, indicative of a malware-like payload.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 1 minute before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

A custom PostInstallCommand in the setup script opens a TCP connection to IP 123[.]56[.]142[.]180 on port 12345 and sends the message “Hello, Server!” during package installation. This unsolicited network activity is not required for normal operation and may serve as a covert channel or backdoor for data exfiltration.

Live on PyPI for 13 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is functionally a supervisor that uses pickle-based serialization over ZeroMQ. The code contains high-risk unsafe deserialization: it accepts pickle-formatted data from sockets (recv_multipart / recv_pyobj) and unpickles it without validation, then performs dynamic dispatch based on untrusted data. The temporary monkey-patch of torch.storage._load_from_bytes inside pickle_loads increases the attack surface for malicious payloads that embed torch storage objects. There are no authentication or integrity checks on incoming messages. Therefore the code is unsafe to use in untrusted-network environments: an attacker who can send messages to the supervisor sockets (or control SUPERVISOR_PIPE/SUPERVISOR_IDENT) can achieve remote code execution. No other explicit exfiltration, cryptomining, or backdoor code is present in this fragment, but the deserialization pattern makes arbitrary malicious behavior possible.

The code exhibits behavior associated with downloading and executing potentially malicious scripts, posing a high security risk.

Live on npm for 4 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is a straightforward Slowloris DoS tool. It intentionally opens and maintains many TCP connections and sends periodic partial headers to a target host to exhaust server resources. The code is not obfuscated and its malicious purpose is explicit. It should not be executed against systems without explicit authorization. Operational risks include legal exposure and local resource exhaustion. No signs of credential harvesting or stealthy backdoor behavior were found, but the package is nonetheless malicious in function.

This Rust module contains code to build fake/controlled stack frames and locate ROP-style gadgets in system modules, then hand over a crafted Config to external native routines named Spoof/SpoofSynthetic to execute either arbitrary functions or syscalls stealthily. These behaviors are consistent with offensive techniques (syscall spoofing, evasion of user-mode hooks/monitoring) rather than benign functionality. The code uses low-level unsafe operations, direct TEB/stack inspection, gadget hunting, obfuscated strings and hashed API resolution, and randomization — all indicators of evasion and potential malicious intent. Without the external Spoof implementations, this module is a preparatory component for runtime stealthy execution and should be treated as high risk and likely malicious for supply-chain purposes.

The script covertly ensures a background SSH local port-forward to a hard-coded external host as root, clearing any existing ssh on the same local port first. This pattern is consistent with establishing a covert access or exfiltration channel (notably to a MongoDB-like service on port 27017). It is high-risk: investigate origins of the script, the remote IP, root SSH keys and authorized_keys, and any processes or tools that use local:9999. If unexpected, remove and rotate credentials/keys and perform host compromise analysis.

This module implements dynamic generation, compilation (nvcc), and loading of native CUDA code. That behavior is legitimate for a GPU JIT tool but is a significant supply-chain / local RCE risk: any attacker-controlled input that reaches result['code'], HARD_CODE, or influencable include paths (via YIRAGE_ROOT or DEPS) can result in arbitrary native code being compiled and executed in the host process. I found no evidence of built-in network exfiltration, hardcoded credentials, or obfuscated payloads in this fragment, but the presence of an appendable HARD_CODE and the compile/load execution flow are high-risk features. Recommend treating sources of generated code and HARD_CODE as fully untrusted until audited, restrict who can set YIRAGE_ROOT/DEPS, avoid persisting generated binaries in world-writable locations, and consider sandboxing compilation/load or validating generated code before compiling.

Live on PyPI for 2 hours and 20 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code deliberately provides capabilities to execute arbitrary Python code, write and run files, read directory contents/files, and install packages via pip. The module itself does not contain obfuscated or directly malicious payloads, nor hardcoded credentials, but it exposes powerful primitives that can be trivially abused for supply-chain attacks, remote code execution, data exfiltration, persistence, and system compromise if fed untrusted inputs or used in an insecure environment. Use only with trusted users and strong containment (sandboxing, restricted globals/locals, strict validation).

Live on PyPI for 11 hours and 8 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code uses the exec function to run shell commands, which poses a significant security risk. It could potentially execute malicious code if the input to exec is manipulated. Redirecting output to /dev/null to hide execution details is suspicious.

Live on npm for 34 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern of intercepting and exfiltrating data via XHR header manipulation. Overriding XMLHttpRequest to capture and transform request payloads and place them into a custom header (sktk) constitutes a covert data-leak channel and serious supply-chain risk, regardless of other legitimate GraphQL features present. Recommend removing the XHR override, validating all data-transform hooks (notably top.charcleaner.a), enforcing explicit opt-in/visibility, and adding instrumentation/tests to detect unauthorized header modifications.

This batch fragment performs immediate, irreversible filesystem deletions via wildcard file removal and a silent recursive directory deletion. The code is dangerous and should be treated as high risk. If found inside a package or repository, it is a critical red flag: require human review, provenance verification, and either remove or isolate the script. Absent strong justification and safeguards, do not execute.

The script makes a network request to an external URL, which raises significant security concerns. The nature of the request and the destination URL suggest a high likelihood of malicious intent.

The script exhibits clear signs of malicious activity by exfiltrating sensitive system information to an external server and performing suspicious DNS queries. The use of encoding and compression techniques indicates an attempt to obfuscate the data being transmitted.

Live on npm for 4 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains potential security risks such as hard-coded file paths, subprocess.Popen usage, and the handling of untrusted data through PyArrow Plasma. It is essential to review and address these security concerns before using this code in a production environment.

The code imports several modules and calls an unusual method 'functame' on each. The combination of modules and the method names appear suspicious and potentially obfuscated, indicating that there may be hidden functionality not apparent from this code alone. Additional investigation into the referenced modules and their methods is required to determine if there is any malicious intent.

Live on npm for 56 days, 16 hours and 25 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains multiple potential security risks, including unauthorized data exfiltration, data leak, and arbitrary code execution. It is crucial to review and mitigate these risks by implementing proper input validation and sanitization. The presence of 'eval' and the 'evilFunction' indicates potential malicious behavior or an attempt to obfuscate malicious code, posing significant security risks.

Live on npm for 10 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code is not obviously malicious in itself; it is intended to call an external solver (msolve) and parse its output. However, it contains a high-risk design choice: it executes an external binary and directly evaluates that binary's stdout via sage_eval, which yields arbitrary code execution if the external binary or its output is tampered with. If the msolve executable can be compromised (supply-chain attack, replaced binary, or attacker-controlled output), this code can execute arbitrary Python. Recommended mitigations: avoid eval-style parsing of external output, use a strict parser or sandbox evaluation, validate output structure and types before evaluation, and ensure the msolve binary is obtained and verified from a trusted source. Overall: low probability the code is intentionally malicious, but a significant security risk exists due to unsafe evaluation of external output.

The `Poppler` class itself does not contain overtly malicious code. However, its heavy reliance on executing external command-line tools (`pdftoppm`, `pdfinfo`) via `execa` presents a significant supply chain risk. The ability to dynamically set the paths to these executables (`setPdfToPpmPath`, `setPdfInfoPath`) is a critical vulnerability vector. If an attacker can control the arguments passed to these setters, they could potentially redirect the execution to malicious binaries, leading to arbitrary command execution and severe security implications, including malware deployment or data exfiltration.

The code is designed to create a reverse shell, which is a serious security risk. It allows unauthorized remote access and control over the system, representing a high security threat.

Live on PyPI for 18 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file contains malicious code that collects sensitive system information (IP address, hostname, username, and organization name) and exfiltrates it using DNS tunneling. The code first retrieves the system's registered organization using the 'systeminfo' command, obtains the public IP address from ipinfo[.]io, and collects the hostname and username from the system. It then combines this data, encodes it in hexadecimal, and splits it into parts to construct a domain name with the pattern '[encoded_data].3.560ba22e.log.nat.cloudns[.]ph'. Finally, it executes a ping command to this domain, which sends the encoded system information to a remote server through DNS queries.

Live on npm for 4 days, 8 hours and 17 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code performs covert collection of environment identifiers (hostname, username, cwd, home directory) and exfiltrates them in plaintext to a hardcoded external server, using evasion checks to skip analysis/cloud environments and forging request headers. The behavior is consistent with a malicious reconnaissance/backdoor component in a supply-chain attack. Treat as malicious code: remove, investigate repository integrity, and rotate any potentially exposed credentials or secrets.

The code implements functionality that can exfiltrate arbitrary files and logs over the network without encryption or user consent. This behavior constitutes a significant security risk and matches malware patterns related to data theft. Although the code is not obfuscated and does not contain explicit malware payloads like backdoors or reverse shells, the potential for unauthorized data leakage is high. Use of this code in a supply chain context should be carefully controlled and audited.

The code is designed to exfiltrate sensitive system and network information to an external server. The conditions in `isValid` and use of specific encoding functions suggest a deliberate attempt to hide the true nature and selectively activate this behavior, indicative of a malware-like payload.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 1 minute before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

A custom PostInstallCommand in the setup script opens a TCP connection to IP 123[.]56[.]142[.]180 on port 12345 and sends the message “Hello, Server!” during package installation. This unsolicited network activity is not required for normal operation and may serve as a covert channel or backdoor for data exfiltration.

Live on PyPI for 13 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is functionally a supervisor that uses pickle-based serialization over ZeroMQ. The code contains high-risk unsafe deserialization: it accepts pickle-formatted data from sockets (recv_multipart / recv_pyobj) and unpickles it without validation, then performs dynamic dispatch based on untrusted data. The temporary monkey-patch of torch.storage._load_from_bytes inside pickle_loads increases the attack surface for malicious payloads that embed torch storage objects. There are no authentication or integrity checks on incoming messages. Therefore the code is unsafe to use in untrusted-network environments: an attacker who can send messages to the supervisor sockets (or control SUPERVISOR_PIPE/SUPERVISOR_IDENT) can achieve remote code execution. No other explicit exfiltration, cryptomining, or backdoor code is present in this fragment, but the deserialization pattern makes arbitrary malicious behavior possible.

The code exhibits behavior associated with downloading and executing potentially malicious scripts, posing a high security risk.

Live on npm for 4 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is a straightforward Slowloris DoS tool. It intentionally opens and maintains many TCP connections and sends periodic partial headers to a target host to exhaust server resources. The code is not obfuscated and its malicious purpose is explicit. It should not be executed against systems without explicit authorization. Operational risks include legal exposure and local resource exhaustion. No signs of credential harvesting or stealthy backdoor behavior were found, but the package is nonetheless malicious in function.

This Rust module contains code to build fake/controlled stack frames and locate ROP-style gadgets in system modules, then hand over a crafted Config to external native routines named Spoof/SpoofSynthetic to execute either arbitrary functions or syscalls stealthily. These behaviors are consistent with offensive techniques (syscall spoofing, evasion of user-mode hooks/monitoring) rather than benign functionality. The code uses low-level unsafe operations, direct TEB/stack inspection, gadget hunting, obfuscated strings and hashed API resolution, and randomization — all indicators of evasion and potential malicious intent. Without the external Spoof implementations, this module is a preparatory component for runtime stealthy execution and should be treated as high risk and likely malicious for supply-chain purposes.

The script covertly ensures a background SSH local port-forward to a hard-coded external host as root, clearing any existing ssh on the same local port first. This pattern is consistent with establishing a covert access or exfiltration channel (notably to a MongoDB-like service on port 27017). It is high-risk: investigate origins of the script, the remote IP, root SSH keys and authorized_keys, and any processes or tools that use local:9999. If unexpected, remove and rotate credentials/keys and perform host compromise analysis.

This module implements dynamic generation, compilation (nvcc), and loading of native CUDA code. That behavior is legitimate for a GPU JIT tool but is a significant supply-chain / local RCE risk: any attacker-controlled input that reaches result['code'], HARD_CODE, or influencable include paths (via YIRAGE_ROOT or DEPS) can result in arbitrary native code being compiled and executed in the host process. I found no evidence of built-in network exfiltration, hardcoded credentials, or obfuscated payloads in this fragment, but the presence of an appendable HARD_CODE and the compile/load execution flow are high-risk features. Recommend treating sources of generated code and HARD_CODE as fully untrusted until audited, restrict who can set YIRAGE_ROOT/DEPS, avoid persisting generated binaries in world-writable locations, and consider sandboxing compilation/load or validating generated code before compiling.

Live on PyPI for 2 hours and 20 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code deliberately provides capabilities to execute arbitrary Python code, write and run files, read directory contents/files, and install packages via pip. The module itself does not contain obfuscated or directly malicious payloads, nor hardcoded credentials, but it exposes powerful primitives that can be trivially abused for supply-chain attacks, remote code execution, data exfiltration, persistence, and system compromise if fed untrusted inputs or used in an insecure environment. Use only with trusted users and strong containment (sandboxing, restricted globals/locals, strict validation).

Live on PyPI for 11 hours and 8 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code uses the exec function to run shell commands, which poses a significant security risk. It could potentially execute malicious code if the input to exec is manipulated. Redirecting output to /dev/null to hide execution details is suspicious.

Live on npm for 34 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern of intercepting and exfiltrating data via XHR header manipulation. Overriding XMLHttpRequest to capture and transform request payloads and place them into a custom header (sktk) constitutes a covert data-leak channel and serious supply-chain risk, regardless of other legitimate GraphQL features present. Recommend removing the XHR override, validating all data-transform hooks (notably top.charcleaner.a), enforcing explicit opt-in/visibility, and adding instrumentation/tests to detect unauthorized header modifications.

This batch fragment performs immediate, irreversible filesystem deletions via wildcard file removal and a silent recursive directory deletion. The code is dangerous and should be treated as high risk. If found inside a package or repository, it is a critical red flag: require human review, provenance verification, and either remove or isolate the script. Absent strong justification and safeguards, do not execute.

The script makes a network request to an external URL, which raises significant security concerns. The nature of the request and the destination URL suggest a high likelihood of malicious intent.