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The provided source code is a highly obfuscated and fragmented mess, with no discernible legitimate purpose. The associated reports are meaningless placeholders. The code exhibits strong indicators of being malicious malware due to its extreme obfuscation and the presence of numerous suspicious patterns. It is impossible to perform a meaningful security analysis or identify specific vulnerabilities from this input.

This script is designed to exfiltrate the contents of the '/etc/hostname' file to a remote server, posing a significant security risk and indicating malicious behavior.

Overall, the analyzed code exhibits strong indicators of covert behavior and supply-chain risk: remote content fetching that can influence runtime, hidden persistence via a hashed user-directory, cryptographic operations tied to runtime data, and disruptive kill-switch behaviors on certain conditions. The prevalence of obfuscated and generated constructs further complicates auditing and increases risk. Recommendation: treat as high-risk for public inclusion; require source disclosure, disable or sandbox load-time remote activities, sign/verify, and consider removing or isolating this component from open-source distributions unless a thorough security review confirms safety and intent.

The library contains a backdoor in the register_node function that exfiltrates source code to an attacker-controlled server. When the function is called, it inspects the Python call stack, reads the content of the caller's Python file, and sends both the filename and its content to http://84[.]54[.]44[.]100:3000/nodes/register. The malicious code includes evasion techniques, such as avoiding execution when 'fuzzer' is detected in the file content. This is a supply chain attack designed to steal source code from applications using this library.

Live on PyPI for 1 day, 1 hour and 24 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

The code is designed to collect and send sensitive information to a remote server without the user's knowledge or consent. It poses a high risk of data exfiltration and should be reviewed thoroughly.

Live on npm for 4 hours and 2 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

No explicit malware (no remote shell, no obfuscation, no code injection). However, there is a significant supply-chain/privacy/credential risk: a hardcoded proxy URL with embedded credentials is set and used (via DI) to route requests to an external host, and the script actively accesses local cameras and logs system information. This could enable data leakage or misuse if the proxy host is malicious. Recommend removing hardcoded credentials, avoid enabling camera checks by default, add request timeouts, and avoid logging sensitive system data.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

The code snippet is concerning as it involves sending potentially sensitive system information to an external endpoint without user consent. This behavior is indicative of data exfiltration and poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 24 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code contains clear data‑harvesting functionality: webcam capture, screenshots, and extraction of Windows Wi‑Fi passwords. It also queries an external IP/geolocation service. While the fragment does not itself upload the gathered data to a remote attacker, it provides all necessary capabilities to collect highly sensitive information and is therefore a significant privacy and supply‑chain risk. The code appears suspicious and should be treated as potentially malicious or at least high‑risk utility that must not be included in trusted environments without strong review and restrictions. Note: leak_all contains a bug ('return dat') indicating the snippet may be incomplete or poorly maintained.

This file collects system environment variables, including the system hostname and network interface details, and transmits them via an HTTPS POST request to a remote server at example[.]com without user consent. Such unauthorized transmission of system details constitutes data exfiltration and represents a significant security risk.

This script is a coordinator for credential-exfiltration: it collects Discord tokens and Telegram session data, validates tokens, and exfiltrates them to a Telegram-based receiver. The control-flow patterns (error suppression, throttling, cleanup, background cycles) indicate explicit attempts at stealth and persistence. Treat this package as malicious malware (credential stealer). Do not execute it; remove any instances and investigate systems where it ran for further compromise.

The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

This code is an administrative automation component that deliberately executes arbitrary ServiceNow server-side scripts and manipulates system tables. I found no clear signs of intentionally malicious code (no hardcoded external exfiltration endpoints, no obfuscated payload). However, it exposes powerful sinks: arbitrary script execution, creation of background script records, and storage of script output/trace in sys_properties. The primary security risk is abuse/misconfiguration (e.g., autoConfirm bypass, insufficient RBAC) leading to data theft or destructive changes. Treat this module as high-risk functionality that must be strictly access controlled, audited, and hardened before use.

The code contains patches that could weaken SSH security by disabling key verification and has the potential to hide tracks by deleting the .git directory. While there's no clear evidence of malicious intent like data theft or backdoor introduction, the changes do increase the security risk and could potentially be exploited in an attack.

This module is an exploit toolkit for attacking FastCGI/PHP: it constructs FastCGI frames that inject PHP code via PHP_ADMIN_VALUE or PHP_VALUE, wraps payloads into gopher:// SSRF URIs, and can patch native extension binaries to embed attacker-supplied commands. These capabilities are designed for remote code execution against PHP/FastCGI and for creating backdoored extensions. Treat this code as malicious/offensive: do not run it against systems you do not own; if found as a dependency it should be considered high risk and removed or investigated immediately.

The code imports multiple modules with unusual names and calls a non-standard method `functame` on each of them. This method name is consistent across all modules, which is highly suspicious and could indicate malicious behavior. Without more information about what these modules do, it's difficult to make a definitive conclusion. However, the consistent use of a non-standard method and unusual naming conventions raise significant red flags.

Live on npm for 57 days, 7 hours and 5 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code takes a base64 encoded string, decodes it, and evaluates it using the 'eval' function. This introduces a significant security risk as it allows arbitrary code execution. The code should be considered dangerous and should not be used.

Live on npm for 24 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

`lotusbail` is a malicious npm package that masquerades as a WhatsApp Web API library by forking legitimate Baileys-based code and preserving working messaging functionality. In addition to normal API behavior, it inserts a wrapper around the WhatsApp WebSocket client so that all traffic passing through the library is duplicated for collection. Reported data theft includes WhatsApp authentication tokens and session keys, full message content (sent/received and historical), contact lists (including phone numbers), and transferred media/files. The package also attempts to establish persistent unauthorized access by hijacking the WhatsApp device-linking (“pairing”) workflow using a hardcoded pairing code, effectively linking an attacker-controlled device to the victim’s account; removing the npm dependency does not automatically remove the linked device. To hinder detection, the exfiltration endpoint is hidden behind multiple obfuscation layers, collected data is encrypted (including a custom RSA implementation), and the code includes anti-debugging traps designed to disrupt analysis.

This code is designed to gather system information and directory contents and send them to a remote server. This behavior is highly suspicious and indicative of data exfiltration. The use of base64 encoding suggests an attempt to obscure the transmitted data, but it is not full obfuscation. The intent appears to be malicious as it collects potentially sensitive information without user consent and sends it to an external domain.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 21 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The analyzed fragment exhibits high-risk, potentially malicious dual-use capabilities: remote shell provisioning, Metaxploit integration, broad host-control commands, dynamic code/installer generation, and credential handling. In a supply-chain context, this strongly warrants containment, thorough provenance checks, and sanitization or removal of remote-access/exploit-oriented features before distribution. If this is an OpenVSX/Greybel component, treat as a high-alert candidate requiring a full security review and restricted deployment.

This module contains high-risk functionality: it programmatically adds Windows Defender exclusions for Node and PowerShell, invokes PowerShell with ExecutionPolicy Bypass, and runs hidden shell commands. These behaviors are consistent with anti-detection and stealthy remote command execution and are dangerous in a supply-chain context unless used by a clearly trusted installer or tooling with explicit user consent and clear documentation. Treat the package as high risk: require provenance review, ensure user-visible prompts and justification for AV exclusion, and restrict or audit any call-sites that supply commands to useAlternativeMethod.

This module does not execute any code or perform any actual operations, but it contains a message that indicates the possibility of a code injection vulnerability. This could be a sign of a malicious actor attempting to exploit a vulnerability in the system.

Live on npm for 6 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module exhibits strong indicators of a malicious supply-chain/backdoor — it hard-codes an external IP and replaces multiple ostensibly local functions with a network call that returns a remote-controlled value. While it does not perform obvious destructive operations locally, it allows remote control of return values across many application code paths and masks network failures by resolving true. Treat as high risk: remove or isolate the package, block the remote IP, and audit consumers for misuse of returned data.

The provided source code is a highly obfuscated and fragmented mess, with no discernible legitimate purpose. The associated reports are meaningless placeholders. The code exhibits strong indicators of being malicious malware due to its extreme obfuscation and the presence of numerous suspicious patterns. It is impossible to perform a meaningful security analysis or identify specific vulnerabilities from this input.

This script is designed to exfiltrate the contents of the '/etc/hostname' file to a remote server, posing a significant security risk and indicating malicious behavior.

Overall, the analyzed code exhibits strong indicators of covert behavior and supply-chain risk: remote content fetching that can influence runtime, hidden persistence via a hashed user-directory, cryptographic operations tied to runtime data, and disruptive kill-switch behaviors on certain conditions. The prevalence of obfuscated and generated constructs further complicates auditing and increases risk. Recommendation: treat as high-risk for public inclusion; require source disclosure, disable or sandbox load-time remote activities, sign/verify, and consider removing or isolating this component from open-source distributions unless a thorough security review confirms safety and intent.

The library contains a backdoor in the register_node function that exfiltrates source code to an attacker-controlled server. When the function is called, it inspects the Python call stack, reads the content of the caller's Python file, and sends both the filename and its content to http://84[.]54[.]44[.]100:3000/nodes/register. The malicious code includes evasion techniques, such as avoiding execution when 'fuzzer' is detected in the file content. This is a supply chain attack designed to steal source code from applications using this library.

Live on PyPI for 1 day, 1 hour and 24 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

The code is designed to collect and send sensitive information to a remote server without the user's knowledge or consent. It poses a high risk of data exfiltration and should be reviewed thoroughly.

Live on npm for 4 hours and 2 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

No explicit malware (no remote shell, no obfuscation, no code injection). However, there is a significant supply-chain/privacy/credential risk: a hardcoded proxy URL with embedded credentials is set and used (via DI) to route requests to an external host, and the script actively accesses local cameras and logs system information. This could enable data leakage or misuse if the proxy host is malicious. Recommend removing hardcoded credentials, avoid enabling camera checks by default, add request timeouts, and avoid logging sensitive system data.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

The code snippet is concerning as it involves sending potentially sensitive system information to an external endpoint without user consent. This behavior is indicative of data exfiltration and poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 24 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code contains clear data‑harvesting functionality: webcam capture, screenshots, and extraction of Windows Wi‑Fi passwords. It also queries an external IP/geolocation service. While the fragment does not itself upload the gathered data to a remote attacker, it provides all necessary capabilities to collect highly sensitive information and is therefore a significant privacy and supply‑chain risk. The code appears suspicious and should be treated as potentially malicious or at least high‑risk utility that must not be included in trusted environments without strong review and restrictions. Note: leak_all contains a bug ('return dat') indicating the snippet may be incomplete or poorly maintained.

This file collects system environment variables, including the system hostname and network interface details, and transmits them via an HTTPS POST request to a remote server at example[.]com without user consent. Such unauthorized transmission of system details constitutes data exfiltration and represents a significant security risk.

This script is a coordinator for credential-exfiltration: it collects Discord tokens and Telegram session data, validates tokens, and exfiltrates them to a Telegram-based receiver. The control-flow patterns (error suppression, throttling, cleanup, background cycles) indicate explicit attempts at stealth and persistence. Treat this package as malicious malware (credential stealer). Do not execute it; remove any instances and investigate systems where it ran for further compromise.

The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

This code is an administrative automation component that deliberately executes arbitrary ServiceNow server-side scripts and manipulates system tables. I found no clear signs of intentionally malicious code (no hardcoded external exfiltration endpoints, no obfuscated payload). However, it exposes powerful sinks: arbitrary script execution, creation of background script records, and storage of script output/trace in sys_properties. The primary security risk is abuse/misconfiguration (e.g., autoConfirm bypass, insufficient RBAC) leading to data theft or destructive changes. Treat this module as high-risk functionality that must be strictly access controlled, audited, and hardened before use.

The code contains patches that could weaken SSH security by disabling key verification and has the potential to hide tracks by deleting the .git directory. While there's no clear evidence of malicious intent like data theft or backdoor introduction, the changes do increase the security risk and could potentially be exploited in an attack.

This module is an exploit toolkit for attacking FastCGI/PHP: it constructs FastCGI frames that inject PHP code via PHP_ADMIN_VALUE or PHP_VALUE, wraps payloads into gopher:// SSRF URIs, and can patch native extension binaries to embed attacker-supplied commands. These capabilities are designed for remote code execution against PHP/FastCGI and for creating backdoored extensions. Treat this code as malicious/offensive: do not run it against systems you do not own; if found as a dependency it should be considered high risk and removed or investigated immediately.

The code imports multiple modules with unusual names and calls a non-standard method `functame` on each of them. This method name is consistent across all modules, which is highly suspicious and could indicate malicious behavior. Without more information about what these modules do, it's difficult to make a definitive conclusion. However, the consistent use of a non-standard method and unusual naming conventions raise significant red flags.

Live on npm for 57 days, 7 hours and 5 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code takes a base64 encoded string, decodes it, and evaluates it using the 'eval' function. This introduces a significant security risk as it allows arbitrary code execution. The code should be considered dangerous and should not be used.

Live on npm for 24 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

`lotusbail` is a malicious npm package that masquerades as a WhatsApp Web API library by forking legitimate Baileys-based code and preserving working messaging functionality. In addition to normal API behavior, it inserts a wrapper around the WhatsApp WebSocket client so that all traffic passing through the library is duplicated for collection. Reported data theft includes WhatsApp authentication tokens and session keys, full message content (sent/received and historical), contact lists (including phone numbers), and transferred media/files. The package also attempts to establish persistent unauthorized access by hijacking the WhatsApp device-linking (“pairing”) workflow using a hardcoded pairing code, effectively linking an attacker-controlled device to the victim’s account; removing the npm dependency does not automatically remove the linked device. To hinder detection, the exfiltration endpoint is hidden behind multiple obfuscation layers, collected data is encrypted (including a custom RSA implementation), and the code includes anti-debugging traps designed to disrupt analysis.

This code is designed to gather system information and directory contents and send them to a remote server. This behavior is highly suspicious and indicative of data exfiltration. The use of base64 encoding suggests an attempt to obscure the transmitted data, but it is not full obfuscation. The intent appears to be malicious as it collects potentially sensitive information without user consent and sends it to an external domain.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 21 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The analyzed fragment exhibits high-risk, potentially malicious dual-use capabilities: remote shell provisioning, Metaxploit integration, broad host-control commands, dynamic code/installer generation, and credential handling. In a supply-chain context, this strongly warrants containment, thorough provenance checks, and sanitization or removal of remote-access/exploit-oriented features before distribution. If this is an OpenVSX/Greybel component, treat as a high-alert candidate requiring a full security review and restricted deployment.

This module contains high-risk functionality: it programmatically adds Windows Defender exclusions for Node and PowerShell, invokes PowerShell with ExecutionPolicy Bypass, and runs hidden shell commands. These behaviors are consistent with anti-detection and stealthy remote command execution and are dangerous in a supply-chain context unless used by a clearly trusted installer or tooling with explicit user consent and clear documentation. Treat the package as high risk: require provenance review, ensure user-visible prompts and justification for AV exclusion, and restrict or audit any call-sites that supply commands to useAlternativeMethod.

This module does not execute any code or perform any actual operations, but it contains a message that indicates the possibility of a code injection vulnerability. This could be a sign of a malicious actor attempting to exploit a vulnerability in the system.

Live on npm for 6 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module exhibits strong indicators of a malicious supply-chain/backdoor — it hard-codes an external IP and replaces multiple ostensibly local functions with a network call that returns a remote-controlled value. While it does not perform obvious destructive operations locally, it allows remote control of return values across many application code paths and masks network failures by resolving true. Treat as high risk: remove or isolate the package, block the remote IP, and audit consumers for misuse of returned data.