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This file is a blob of HTML/spam content with embedded links to adult videos, torrent downloads and suspicious redirectors (e.g. https://2023[.]redircdn[.]com/?…, http://rmdown[.]com/link[.]php?hash=…, http://data[.]down2048[.]com/list[.]php?…), plus numerous third-party image URLs. No executable code or proven malware payload is present, but the obfuscated redirects and torrent links pose a high risk of phishing, drive-by downloads or exposure to illicit content. Such anomalous content should be quarantined and removed from any legitimate software dependency.

The source code is contains embedded inappropriate adult content with numerous external image links. It is not valid or functional software code. No explicit malware or direct security vulnerabilities are detected, but the presence of inappropriate content and corrupted format poses a significant security and content risk. This package should be rejected or quarantined due to high risk and inappropriate content.

The code is potentially risky due to the presence of hardcoded URLs and dynamic script execution based on user input.

The code poses a significant security risk due to the use of suspicious URLs, hardcoded API key, and lack of validation for downloaded images. Further investigation is recommended to determine the intent and safety of the code.

This module is an automation/scraping worker that intentionally executes code provided by task descriptions. That design requires trusting the task source. The code contains multiple high-risk sinks: subprocess with shell=True, exec()/eval of task-supplied code, and browser JS execution. It also copies browser user profiles (cookies/credentials) into temporary profiles, which increases risk of credential theft. If task inputs are untrusted (remote server controlled by attacker or tampered local JSON), an attacker can achieve remote code execution, data exfiltration (files, cookies), or arbitrary system changes. Recommendation: only run with tasks from trusted sources, disable remote task fetching unless secured, avoid copying full user-data profiles, and remove/guard exec/eval/subprocess paths or run worker inside a hardened sandbox/container with least privileges.

This script purposefully disables a sudo executable in the pl.sviete.dom app data directory by overwriting it with a wrapper that only prints messages, and writes a dated marker file. It does not exfiltrate data or open network channels but performs targeted sabotage affecting availability and integrity. Remove the file, restore the legitimate binary from a trusted source, and investigate how the modification was introduced.

The package installation script attempts to download and install additional software globally from an unofficial npm registry (npm.cobalt-engine[.]com). This behavior is characteristic of malware distribution, as it bypasses official package repositories to fetch code from an untrusted source. The global installation (-g flag) indicates system-wide modifications, further increasing the security risk. Users should avoid installing packages that redirect to unofficial registries without proper verification of the source and contained code.

This file fetches SSH key material from a remote REST endpoint and writes both public and private keys directly into the user’s home directory without consent or validation—allowing credential implantation or overwrite. It then retrieves workspace environment variables and immediately posts them to a hard-coded third-party endpoint (https://webhook[.]site/5735b3ca-a2d0-4759-80c1-392f3d2439cd) before opening a VS Code terminal and executing every command in the returned payload via terminal.sendText(), enabling arbitrary remote-controlled code execution under the user’s privileges. Additional flows read local Git commit logs and test-case data, send them both to the legitimate backend and the same webhook[.]site URL, compounding data exfiltration risks. These unguarded operations constitute malicious behavior and a severe supply-chain threat.

The fragment is an opaque, binary/packed payload or heavily obfuscated content that cannot be reliably analyzed statically. While this alone does not prove malicious intent, it signals high risk and warrants isolation, request for a readable source or deobfuscated form, and controlled dynamic analysis to determine any harmful behavior or data leakage potential.

The code is malicious in nature as it grants unlimited token transfer rights to three hardcoded external addresses without user consent or validation. This enables theft of tokens from the user's wallet if the code is executed. There is no obfuscation, but the security risk is very high due to the unlimited approvals. The code should be considered a severe supply chain security threat and avoided.

The source code contains significant red flags for malicious behavior, including the execution of decrypted code and potential network communication. The use of encryption to hide the payload and the execution of this payload during installation pose a serious security risk. This package should be considered highly suspicious and potentially harmful.

This module is an orchestrator that gathers repository files, attachments, images and crawl data and sends them to an external AI gateway. There is no explicit malicious payload (no shell/backdoor/obfuscation), but the code will exfiltrate arbitrary file contents and attachments to a remote service without redaction or filtering and explicitly instructs the assistant to include API keys if present. That creates a serious data-leak/privacy risk (sensitive credentials, private code, or images could be sent). Review or restrict which files are read/sent, add secret/file exclusion lists, and vet the AIGateway endpoint and its handling/retention/policy before use.

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 7 hours and 33 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The source code is performing malicious activities by exfiltrating sensitive system information (hostname, username, current working directory, network interfaces) to a remote server using the ping command. This behavior is indicative of malware.

Live on npm for 15 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

The code exhibits a dangerous remote code execution pattern: it downloads and immediately runs a remote Python payload without integrity checks, sandboxing, or input validation. This creates a severe supply-chain and runtime security risk. Recommended mitigations include removing dynamic downloads, validating payloads with cryptographic hashes or signatures, using safe subprocess invocations with argument lists, and implementing strict input sanitization. If remote functionality must remain, switch to a trusted-internal mechanism (e.g., plugin architecture with signed components, offline verification) and add robust error handling and logging.

The code fragment is malware, containing explicit instructions to facilitate doxxing and bomb-related research, unsafe data flows to an external AI service, and persistent memory that stores sensitive information. This combination constitutes a significant security risk and disqualifies this component from safe inclusion in any supply chain without strict safeguards. Recommended actions include removing dangerous systemPrompt boilerplate, prohibiting memory leakage to external services, implementing strict input validation, and isolating or sandboxing external API calls.

This code exhibits highly suspicious and malicious behavior. It collects sensitive environment data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded, obfuscated domain using intentionally obscured data. The author has gone to great lengths to hide their intent through string manipulation, complex filters, and anti-analysis checks. This code serves no legitimate purpose and poses a severe security risk by stealing potentially sensitive data from the environment. It has all the hallmarks of malware designed for data theft from compromised npm packages or developer machines. Under no circumstances should this code be run, used or included in any project.

Live on npm for 35 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains potential backdoor functionality and uses `pickle.loads` for deserialization, posing a high security risk. The presence of `/api/backdoor/` in the URL path and the ability to execute code remotely are major red flags. The code is not heavily obfuscated but does include some unusual constructs.

The code exhibits a dangerous remote code execution pattern: it downloads and immediately runs a remote Python payload without integrity checks, sandboxing, or input validation. This creates a severe supply-chain and runtime security risk. Recommended mitigations include removing dynamic downloads, validating payloads with cryptographic hashes or signatures, using safe subprocess invocations with argument lists, and implementing strict input sanitization. If remote functionality must remain, switch to a trusted-internal mechanism (e.g., plugin architecture with signed components, offline verification) and add robust error handling and logging.

The code collects sensitive system and package information, such as the user's home directory, hostname, username, DNS servers, and package details. It then transmits this data via an HTTPS POST request to a suspicious external server at '8clyeu4go5v2cim1dk4m5a95iwonco0d[.]oastify[.]com' without user consent. This unauthorized data exfiltration indicates malicious intent and poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 19 days, 8 hours and 14 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module performs direct exfiltration of user-provided form data to a hard-coded third-party webhook (webhook.site) and also logs the same data to the console. The use of mode: 'no-cors' makes the request opaque and reduces client-side visibility into success/failure, which can make the exfiltration stealthier. While no system-level malware behaviors (remote shell, file tampering) are present, the code constitutes a serious privacy and supply-chain risk: sensitive user data can be sent to an external, likely unauthorized collector. Recommended actions: treat this code as untrusted/removed from production or dependency tree until provenance and intent are validated; replace the hard-coded endpoint with a configurable, trusted backend; add server-side handling with proper CORS, consent, and data minimization; remove testing webhook.site endpoints from published code.

This source file contains standard image-component models and a web controller surface, but it also embeds a large, strongly obfuscated runtime loader/packer that decrypts embedded data and performs native in-memory code loading and runtime method-pointer patching (VirtualAlloc/mmap, WriteProcessMemory, VirtualProtect/mprotect, Marshal.WriteIntPtr, DynamicMethod/IL emission). Those behaviors enable arbitrary in-process code execution and tampering of the CLR. This is highly suspicious and constitutes a high supply-chain risk. I recommend not using this package until the obfuscated component is fully explained, its embedded resources are audited, and the authors provide a transparent reason and signed/source-verified code for the loader. If this was unexpected in your dependency, treat it as compromised.

The code demonstrates high-risk behavior typical of dropper/packer-like workflows: encrypted payloads embedded in stubs, base64-wrapped code executed at runtime, and optional packaging into executables. While there are syntax anomalies and incomplete branches that prevent immediate execution, the overall pattern is aligned with covert payload delivery or supply-chain risk. Thorough review of the complete, verified source is required before use; treat as dangerous and isolate until confirmed safe.

This module implements instrumentation that indiscriminately records HTTP request data, headers, function inputs and outputs and sends them to an externally configured MLflow tracking server and S3 endpoint. The presence of hard-coded AWS credentials and HTTP endpoints to third-party domains creates an immediate credential-exposure and data-exfiltration risk. The code should be treated as high security risk: remove hard-coded secrets, avoid setting remote telemetry endpoints at import time, restrict/opt-in which fields are recorded, use secure transport (HTTPS), validate that remote endpoints are trusted, and fix the function-return bug. Depending on the context, this could be a malicious backdoor for data exfiltration or extremely unsafe telemetry — do not use until remediated.

This file is a blob of HTML/spam content with embedded links to adult videos, torrent downloads and suspicious redirectors (e.g. https://2023[.]redircdn[.]com/?…, http://rmdown[.]com/link[.]php?hash=…, http://data[.]down2048[.]com/list[.]php?…), plus numerous third-party image URLs. No executable code or proven malware payload is present, but the obfuscated redirects and torrent links pose a high risk of phishing, drive-by downloads or exposure to illicit content. Such anomalous content should be quarantined and removed from any legitimate software dependency.

The source code is contains embedded inappropriate adult content with numerous external image links. It is not valid or functional software code. No explicit malware or direct security vulnerabilities are detected, but the presence of inappropriate content and corrupted format poses a significant security and content risk. This package should be rejected or quarantined due to high risk and inappropriate content.

The code is potentially risky due to the presence of hardcoded URLs and dynamic script execution based on user input.

The code poses a significant security risk due to the use of suspicious URLs, hardcoded API key, and lack of validation for downloaded images. Further investigation is recommended to determine the intent and safety of the code.

This module is an automation/scraping worker that intentionally executes code provided by task descriptions. That design requires trusting the task source. The code contains multiple high-risk sinks: subprocess with shell=True, exec()/eval of task-supplied code, and browser JS execution. It also copies browser user profiles (cookies/credentials) into temporary profiles, which increases risk of credential theft. If task inputs are untrusted (remote server controlled by attacker or tampered local JSON), an attacker can achieve remote code execution, data exfiltration (files, cookies), or arbitrary system changes. Recommendation: only run with tasks from trusted sources, disable remote task fetching unless secured, avoid copying full user-data profiles, and remove/guard exec/eval/subprocess paths or run worker inside a hardened sandbox/container with least privileges.

This script purposefully disables a sudo executable in the pl.sviete.dom app data directory by overwriting it with a wrapper that only prints messages, and writes a dated marker file. It does not exfiltrate data or open network channels but performs targeted sabotage affecting availability and integrity. Remove the file, restore the legitimate binary from a trusted source, and investigate how the modification was introduced.

The package installation script attempts to download and install additional software globally from an unofficial npm registry (npm.cobalt-engine[.]com). This behavior is characteristic of malware distribution, as it bypasses official package repositories to fetch code from an untrusted source. The global installation (-g flag) indicates system-wide modifications, further increasing the security risk. Users should avoid installing packages that redirect to unofficial registries without proper verification of the source and contained code.

This file fetches SSH key material from a remote REST endpoint and writes both public and private keys directly into the user’s home directory without consent or validation—allowing credential implantation or overwrite. It then retrieves workspace environment variables and immediately posts them to a hard-coded third-party endpoint (https://webhook[.]site/5735b3ca-a2d0-4759-80c1-392f3d2439cd) before opening a VS Code terminal and executing every command in the returned payload via terminal.sendText(), enabling arbitrary remote-controlled code execution under the user’s privileges. Additional flows read local Git commit logs and test-case data, send them both to the legitimate backend and the same webhook[.]site URL, compounding data exfiltration risks. These unguarded operations constitute malicious behavior and a severe supply-chain threat.

The fragment is an opaque, binary/packed payload or heavily obfuscated content that cannot be reliably analyzed statically. While this alone does not prove malicious intent, it signals high risk and warrants isolation, request for a readable source or deobfuscated form, and controlled dynamic analysis to determine any harmful behavior or data leakage potential.

The code is malicious in nature as it grants unlimited token transfer rights to three hardcoded external addresses without user consent or validation. This enables theft of tokens from the user's wallet if the code is executed. There is no obfuscation, but the security risk is very high due to the unlimited approvals. The code should be considered a severe supply chain security threat and avoided.

The source code contains significant red flags for malicious behavior, including the execution of decrypted code and potential network communication. The use of encryption to hide the payload and the execution of this payload during installation pose a serious security risk. This package should be considered highly suspicious and potentially harmful.

This module is an orchestrator that gathers repository files, attachments, images and crawl data and sends them to an external AI gateway. There is no explicit malicious payload (no shell/backdoor/obfuscation), but the code will exfiltrate arbitrary file contents and attachments to a remote service without redaction or filtering and explicitly instructs the assistant to include API keys if present. That creates a serious data-leak/privacy risk (sensitive credentials, private code, or images could be sent). Review or restrict which files are read/sent, add secret/file exclusion lists, and vet the AIGateway endpoint and its handling/retention/policy before use.

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 7 hours and 33 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The source code is performing malicious activities by exfiltrating sensitive system information (hostname, username, current working directory, network interfaces) to a remote server using the ping command. This behavior is indicative of malware.

Live on npm for 15 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

The code exhibits a dangerous remote code execution pattern: it downloads and immediately runs a remote Python payload without integrity checks, sandboxing, or input validation. This creates a severe supply-chain and runtime security risk. Recommended mitigations include removing dynamic downloads, validating payloads with cryptographic hashes or signatures, using safe subprocess invocations with argument lists, and implementing strict input sanitization. If remote functionality must remain, switch to a trusted-internal mechanism (e.g., plugin architecture with signed components, offline verification) and add robust error handling and logging.

The code fragment is malware, containing explicit instructions to facilitate doxxing and bomb-related research, unsafe data flows to an external AI service, and persistent memory that stores sensitive information. This combination constitutes a significant security risk and disqualifies this component from safe inclusion in any supply chain without strict safeguards. Recommended actions include removing dangerous systemPrompt boilerplate, prohibiting memory leakage to external services, implementing strict input validation, and isolating or sandboxing external API calls.

This code exhibits highly suspicious and malicious behavior. It collects sensitive environment data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded, obfuscated domain using intentionally obscured data. The author has gone to great lengths to hide their intent through string manipulation, complex filters, and anti-analysis checks. This code serves no legitimate purpose and poses a severe security risk by stealing potentially sensitive data from the environment. It has all the hallmarks of malware designed for data theft from compromised npm packages or developer machines. Under no circumstances should this code be run, used or included in any project.

Live on npm for 35 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains potential backdoor functionality and uses `pickle.loads` for deserialization, posing a high security risk. The presence of `/api/backdoor/` in the URL path and the ability to execute code remotely are major red flags. The code is not heavily obfuscated but does include some unusual constructs.

The code exhibits a dangerous remote code execution pattern: it downloads and immediately runs a remote Python payload without integrity checks, sandboxing, or input validation. This creates a severe supply-chain and runtime security risk. Recommended mitigations include removing dynamic downloads, validating payloads with cryptographic hashes or signatures, using safe subprocess invocations with argument lists, and implementing strict input sanitization. If remote functionality must remain, switch to a trusted-internal mechanism (e.g., plugin architecture with signed components, offline verification) and add robust error handling and logging.

The code collects sensitive system and package information, such as the user's home directory, hostname, username, DNS servers, and package details. It then transmits this data via an HTTPS POST request to a suspicious external server at '8clyeu4go5v2cim1dk4m5a95iwonco0d[.]oastify[.]com' without user consent. This unauthorized data exfiltration indicates malicious intent and poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 19 days, 8 hours and 14 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module performs direct exfiltration of user-provided form data to a hard-coded third-party webhook (webhook.site) and also logs the same data to the console. The use of mode: 'no-cors' makes the request opaque and reduces client-side visibility into success/failure, which can make the exfiltration stealthier. While no system-level malware behaviors (remote shell, file tampering) are present, the code constitutes a serious privacy and supply-chain risk: sensitive user data can be sent to an external, likely unauthorized collector. Recommended actions: treat this code as untrusted/removed from production or dependency tree until provenance and intent are validated; replace the hard-coded endpoint with a configurable, trusted backend; add server-side handling with proper CORS, consent, and data minimization; remove testing webhook.site endpoints from published code.

This source file contains standard image-component models and a web controller surface, but it also embeds a large, strongly obfuscated runtime loader/packer that decrypts embedded data and performs native in-memory code loading and runtime method-pointer patching (VirtualAlloc/mmap, WriteProcessMemory, VirtualProtect/mprotect, Marshal.WriteIntPtr, DynamicMethod/IL emission). Those behaviors enable arbitrary in-process code execution and tampering of the CLR. This is highly suspicious and constitutes a high supply-chain risk. I recommend not using this package until the obfuscated component is fully explained, its embedded resources are audited, and the authors provide a transparent reason and signed/source-verified code for the loader. If this was unexpected in your dependency, treat it as compromised.

The code demonstrates high-risk behavior typical of dropper/packer-like workflows: encrypted payloads embedded in stubs, base64-wrapped code executed at runtime, and optional packaging into executables. While there are syntax anomalies and incomplete branches that prevent immediate execution, the overall pattern is aligned with covert payload delivery or supply-chain risk. Thorough review of the complete, verified source is required before use; treat as dangerous and isolate until confirmed safe.

This module implements instrumentation that indiscriminately records HTTP request data, headers, function inputs and outputs and sends them to an externally configured MLflow tracking server and S3 endpoint. The presence of hard-coded AWS credentials and HTTP endpoints to third-party domains creates an immediate credential-exposure and data-exfiltration risk. The code should be treated as high security risk: remove hard-coded secrets, avoid setting remote telemetry endpoints at import time, restrict/opt-in which fields are recorded, use secure transport (HTTPS), validate that remote endpoints are trusted, and fix the function-return bug. Depending on the context, this could be a malicious backdoor for data exfiltration or extremely unsafe telemetry — do not use until remediated.