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This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

The code fragment constitutes a malicious PoC exploit designed to leverage CVE-2023-20889 for command execution and information disclosure, including potential data exfiltration via an out-of-band channel. It employs obfuscated-like techniques (base64 payloads, eval) and uses an authenticated flow to reach the payload delivery stage. This demonstrates strong supply-chain risk if surfaced in open-source samples, emphasizing the need for patching and cautious review of example payloads.

High risk due to dynamic remote code execution via eval driven by a public componentAddr. This is a textbook supply-chain-style risk within a component loader: remote code is executed in the consumer's environment, with potential data exposure, backdoors, or malware installation. The synchronous XHR and absence of CSP/sanitization further amplify risk. This fragment should be treated as suspicious and removed or strictly sandboxed with strict integrity checks, CSP, and non-dynamic bundling.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

Conclusions and short summary of your findings

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This module automates consolidating funds by reading private keys from an HTML file and sending a large fixed amount to a configured master wallet. The behavior strongly matches malicious siphoning of funds (supply-chain/backdoor style). Treat as high risk: do not run on files containing third-party private keys, audit WrapContract.getNewTronClient implementation and package provenance, and remove or sandbox this code. If the code was intended for legitimate wallet management, add strong safeguards (authentication, confirmations, encryption of keys, audit logging, dry-run, and rate limits) and make intent explicit.

This code is not obviously malicious in itself; it is intended to call an external solver (msolve) and parse its output. However, it contains a high-risk design choice: it executes an external binary and directly evaluates that binary's stdout via sage_eval, which yields arbitrary code execution if the external binary or its output is tampered with. If the msolve executable can be compromised (supply-chain attack, replaced binary, or attacker-controlled output), this code can execute arbitrary Python. Recommended mitigations: avoid eval-style parsing of external output, use a strict parser or sandbox evaluation, validate output structure and types before evaluation, and ensure the msolve binary is obtained and verified from a trusted source. Overall: low probability the code is intentionally malicious, but a significant security risk exists due to unsafe evaluation of external output.

This module implements anti-termination and persistence mechanisms: it intercepts termination signals and replaces them with a log message, puts stdin into raw mode with a no-op handler (disrupting terminal controls), keeps the event loop alive with a perpetual timer, and respawns the same process from an exit handler. While not obviously exfiltrative or networked, these behaviors enable stealthy persistence and make the process difficult to stop. Treat this code as high risk in a supply-chain context — avoid including it in libraries or untrusted dependencies unless its behavior is explicitly required, well-documented, and consented to by operators.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This module implements a command-and-control agent: it establishes a Tor connection to a hardcoded .onion C2, downloads a payload, writes it to a temporary file, sets it executable, and runs it — all without validation — and provides a POST endpoint for C2 communication. These are canonical backdoor behaviors (remote code execution, persistence, and concealed C2). Treat the code as malicious: do not execute, block the domain, and investigate any systems where this package or its parent repository was installed or run.

This module implements an unauthenticated, unsandboxed injection server enabling arbitrary code upload, execution, and unsafe deserialization via a UNIX-domain socket. In practical terms it provides a remote code execution/backdoor capability in any process that starts it. Treat this as a high security risk: do not run in production or include in dependencies without rigorous controls (authentication, signing, sandboxing, removal). Immediate mitigations: remove or disable the injection server in production builds, restrict socket creation and location, require strong authentication and signed payloads, and avoid pickle/untrusted exec.

The code implements a high-risk dynamic evaluation pattern by evaluating tokens within the caller’s scope. This creates a strong possibility of arbitrary code execution and data leakage if tokens originate from untrusted inputs. Hardening should include removing eval, replacing with safe resolvers, sandboxing, or strict token whitelisting and restricting scope access. This pattern is unsuitable for trusted libraries exposes in open-source supply chains without significant safeguards.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This bundle contains a deliberate, unsolicited global side-effect: after load it schedules and displays a hard-coded political message and opens external links (including Tor and an onion BBC mirror). That behavior is unrelated to the library's UI purpose and constitutes an injection/backdoor/defacement. The rest of the bundle implements UI components and network interactions (fetch, postMessage) typical for such widgets, but combined with the injected global actions this indicates the package has been tampered or deliberately weaponized. Do not use this version.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

The code fragment constitutes a malicious PoC exploit designed to leverage CVE-2023-20889 for command execution and information disclosure, including potential data exfiltration via an out-of-band channel. It employs obfuscated-like techniques (base64 payloads, eval) and uses an authenticated flow to reach the payload delivery stage. This demonstrates strong supply-chain risk if surfaced in open-source samples, emphasizing the need for patching and cautious review of example payloads.

High risk due to dynamic remote code execution via eval driven by a public componentAddr. This is a textbook supply-chain-style risk within a component loader: remote code is executed in the consumer's environment, with potential data exposure, backdoors, or malware installation. The synchronous XHR and absence of CSP/sanitization further amplify risk. This fragment should be treated as suspicious and removed or strictly sandboxed with strict integrity checks, CSP, and non-dynamic bundling.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

Conclusions and short summary of your findings

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This module automates consolidating funds by reading private keys from an HTML file and sending a large fixed amount to a configured master wallet. The behavior strongly matches malicious siphoning of funds (supply-chain/backdoor style). Treat as high risk: do not run on files containing third-party private keys, audit WrapContract.getNewTronClient implementation and package provenance, and remove or sandbox this code. If the code was intended for legitimate wallet management, add strong safeguards (authentication, confirmations, encryption of keys, audit logging, dry-run, and rate limits) and make intent explicit.

This code is not obviously malicious in itself; it is intended to call an external solver (msolve) and parse its output. However, it contains a high-risk design choice: it executes an external binary and directly evaluates that binary's stdout via sage_eval, which yields arbitrary code execution if the external binary or its output is tampered with. If the msolve executable can be compromised (supply-chain attack, replaced binary, or attacker-controlled output), this code can execute arbitrary Python. Recommended mitigations: avoid eval-style parsing of external output, use a strict parser or sandbox evaluation, validate output structure and types before evaluation, and ensure the msolve binary is obtained and verified from a trusted source. Overall: low probability the code is intentionally malicious, but a significant security risk exists due to unsafe evaluation of external output.

This module implements anti-termination and persistence mechanisms: it intercepts termination signals and replaces them with a log message, puts stdin into raw mode with a no-op handler (disrupting terminal controls), keeps the event loop alive with a perpetual timer, and respawns the same process from an exit handler. While not obviously exfiltrative or networked, these behaviors enable stealthy persistence and make the process difficult to stop. Treat this code as high risk in a supply-chain context — avoid including it in libraries or untrusted dependencies unless its behavior is explicitly required, well-documented, and consented to by operators.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This module implements a command-and-control agent: it establishes a Tor connection to a hardcoded .onion C2, downloads a payload, writes it to a temporary file, sets it executable, and runs it — all without validation — and provides a POST endpoint for C2 communication. These are canonical backdoor behaviors (remote code execution, persistence, and concealed C2). Treat the code as malicious: do not execute, block the domain, and investigate any systems where this package or its parent repository was installed or run.

This module implements an unauthenticated, unsandboxed injection server enabling arbitrary code upload, execution, and unsafe deserialization via a UNIX-domain socket. In practical terms it provides a remote code execution/backdoor capability in any process that starts it. Treat this as a high security risk: do not run in production or include in dependencies without rigorous controls (authentication, signing, sandboxing, removal). Immediate mitigations: remove or disable the injection server in production builds, restrict socket creation and location, require strong authentication and signed payloads, and avoid pickle/untrusted exec.

The code implements a high-risk dynamic evaluation pattern by evaluating tokens within the caller’s scope. This creates a strong possibility of arbitrary code execution and data leakage if tokens originate from untrusted inputs. Hardening should include removing eval, replacing with safe resolvers, sandboxing, or strict token whitelisting and restricting scope access. This pattern is unsuitable for trusted libraries exposes in open-source supply chains without significant safeguards.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This bundle contains a deliberate, unsolicited global side-effect: after load it schedules and displays a hard-coded political message and opens external links (including Tor and an onion BBC mirror). That behavior is unrelated to the library's UI purpose and constitutes an injection/backdoor/defacement. The rest of the bundle implements UI components and network interactions (fetch, postMessage) typical for such widgets, but combined with the injected global actions this indicates the package has been tampered or deliberately weaponized. Do not use this version.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.