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The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

This is a Firebase messaging service worker intended to show notifications and handle clicks. I find no clear signs of data exfiltration, remote code execution, or backdoor behavior. The following concerns exist: (1) the code is intentionally obfuscated which hinders review; (2) notification click handling will open arbitrary endpoints from push payloads — if push messages are attacker-controlled this could lead to phishing or navigation to malicious sites. Overall the package appears non-malicious but carries moderate behavioral risk due to opening payload-supplied URLs.

The code initiates a detached child process that runs an external script (`smtp-connection/index.js`) with its I/O streams ignored. This pattern is suspicious as it can be used to execute code in the background without direct visibility or control from the parent process. While it could be for legitimate background operations, the combination of detachment, ignored I/O, and unreferencing the child process raises concerns about potential hidden malicious activity, such as data exfiltration or establishing persistent connections.

The code introduces a high-risk pattern: it downloads and immediately executes arbitrary Python code from a remote repository based on user-supplied input, with no validation, authentication, or sandboxing. This constitutes a severe supply chain and remote code execution risk and should be avoided or restricted with strict whitelisting, integrity checks (e.g., code signing or hash verification), and safe execution environments.

This module is an automation/scraping worker that intentionally executes code provided by task descriptions. That design requires trusting the task source. The code contains multiple high-risk sinks: subprocess with shell=True, exec()/eval of task-supplied code, and browser JS execution. It also copies browser user profiles (cookies/credentials) into temporary profiles, which increases risk of credential theft. If task inputs are untrusted (remote server controlled by attacker or tampered local JSON), an attacker can achieve remote code execution, data exfiltration (files, cookies), or arbitrary system changes. Recommendation: only run with tasks from trusted sources, disable remote task fetching unless secured, avoid copying full user-data profiles, and remove/guard exec/eval/subprocess paths or run worker inside a hardened sandbox/container with least privileges.

The source code exhibits behavior consistent with data exfiltration by collecting and sending sensitive system information to an external server without user consent. This poses a significant security risk and indicates potentially malicious intent.

This is a clear malicious exfiltration payload. It reads local system file(s), searches for patterns matching braces, and transmits any matching line to a hardcoded external webhook via two network channels. If found in a repository or CI job, treat it as a compromise: remove the code, investigate all runs of the pipeline, rotate any exposed credentials or secrets, and audit repository and CI access to identify how the code was introduced.

The source code demonstrates clear signs of malicious activity by exfiltrating system and project data to external servers without user consent. This poses a significant security risk due to unauthorized data transmission. The code is not obfuscated, but the behavior is highly suspicious and indicative of malicious intent.

Live on npm for 47 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Malicious bash initialization script that performs destructive filesystem operations on macOS systems. When the external helper script 'isuserdarwin.sh' returns true, the script silently executes 'sudo rm -rf' to delete critical user directories including ~/Applications, ~/Movies, ~/Music, ~/Pictures, ~/Public, and ~/Sites without user confirmation. It also removes the macOS sleepimage file at /private/var/vm/sleepimage. The script modifies SSH directory permissions using 'sudo chmod -R go-rw' which can break SSH access or expose credentials. All destructive operations have their output suppressed with '>/dev/null 2>&1' to hide failures and make the actions stealthy. The script uses eval to execute the output of /usr/bin/dircolors, creating a command injection risk if the binary is compromised. It depends on external scripts (paper.sh, isuserdarwin.sh, debug.sh) whose contents are unknown and could execute arbitrary code. The destructive operations are embedded within what appears to be routine shell configuration code, likely to disguise the malicious intent.

This install script collects sensitive environment information and sends it to a remote host. This is direct data exfiltration/telemetry behavior and should be treated as malicious. Installing a package that runs this command would leak machine and user details to an external party and poses a high security risk.

This file defines a small hex-decoder that reconstructs calls to require('axios'). It sends all process.env variables in a POST to https://ip-ap-check[.]vercel[.]app/api/ip-check/208 using header “x-secret-header: secret”, then immediately invokes eval() on the response body. This pattern enables both wholesale exfiltration of environment-based credentials and arbitrary remote code execution in the host process, constituting a high-severity malicious backdoor.

This file exfiltrates environment variables to an external endpoint at https://example[.]com/api/ipcheck/703, then uses eval to execute any code returned by that server, creating a potential for remote code execution. The code is obfuscated to conceal its malicious actions.

Live on npm for 43 days, 1 hour and 39 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This script performs an unconditional, elevated recursive deletion of multiple filesystem paths. It is high-risk: if executed by a user with sudo privileges or by root, it will cause irreversible data loss (including deleting /home/public and /home/sample-videos if those paths exist). The code itself is not obfuscated and contains no network or data-exfiltration behavior, but the destructive filesystem operation warrants treating it as dangerous. Only run this script in a fully controlled environment with explicit intent, or modify it to add safety checks, confirmations, and logging.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

The code is exfiltrating system information to an external server using DNS queries, which is indicative of malicious behavior. This poses a significant security risk due to unauthorized data transmission.

Live on npm for 31 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

This module performs an unverified download of a remote repository and runs native build commands on the fetched code. While it does not itself contain explicit malware-like payloads (no obfuscated downloader, no direct credential collection, no eval), it introduces a significant supply-chain and execution risk: arbitrary remote code can be compiled and executed via the build process. Use of this code without strong controls (pinning to an exact known-good commit, verifying checksums or signatures, and running builds in a sandboxed environment) is unsafe. The observed bug (returning 'Non') should be fixed.

Live on PyPI for 11 hours and 19 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

The script exhibits clear malicious behavior by sending sensitive system information to an external server without user consent. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 17 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code implements a visitor tracking mechanism that sends user-identifying data to an unknown external server without user consent, representing a privacy violation and potential data exfiltration. While no direct malware payload or obfuscation is present, the behavior is suspicious and poses a moderate to high security risk. The reports provided are invalid and lack meaningful analysis. This source code should be flagged as a supply chain security concern due to its privacy-invasive data transmission to an untrusted domain.

This module implements token generation but contains multiple serious security deficiencies and an active exfiltration channel. Key issues: (1) automatic, unconditional forwarding of generated tokens to a hardcoded owner Telegram account — a backdoor/exfiltration of credentials; (2) plaintext password handling and direct comparison to stored 'Password' field — likely unhashed storage or reversible storage of passwords; (3) coding bugs (missing await and an incorrect token existence check) that affect logic; (4) tokens and passwords exposed in chat history with no additional protections or explicit consent. Recommend not using this code as-is: remove or gate forwarding to owner, stop storing/verifying plaintext passwords (use salted hashing and proper authentication), avoid printing tokens into chat history, fix await/DB-check bugs, and add rate limiting/auditing. If the owner forwarding is intentional and required, it must be explicitly documented, opt-in, encrypted, and logged with user consent.

The code itself is not obfuscated and does not contain direct malware payloads, but it facilitates sending arbitrary code and data to a suspicious external domain. This behavior poses a significant security risk due to potential data exfiltration and remote code execution on the server side. The package should be considered high risk and potentially malicious in a supply chain context.

This module contains functionality that writes and moves filesystem data, performs DB writes, generates files with sensitive student information (including passwords) and uploads those files to a hardcoded external FTP server using embedded plaintext credentials. The FTP upload of per-student HTML (filename includes the student's password) is the primary malicious/unsafe indicator — it enables exfiltration of sensitive data. While most other operations are standard for a student-management blueprint, the hardcoded FTP credentials and inclusion of passwords in uploaded filenames represent a serious security issue. If the FTP target is not intentionally trusted, treat this as high-risk data exfiltration and remove or remediate immediately (rotate credentials, stop sending passwords, replace FTP with secure APIs).

Live on PyPI for 5 hours and 45 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code exhibits clear characteristics of a malicious supply chain attack targeting data science workflows. It uses unsafe deserialization patterns with obfuscated binary data, which is a known technique for executing arbitrary code. The manipulation of NumPy and TensorFlow objects in this way has no legitimate use case in normal data science code and represents a serious security risk.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

This is a Firebase messaging service worker intended to show notifications and handle clicks. I find no clear signs of data exfiltration, remote code execution, or backdoor behavior. The following concerns exist: (1) the code is intentionally obfuscated which hinders review; (2) notification click handling will open arbitrary endpoints from push payloads — if push messages are attacker-controlled this could lead to phishing or navigation to malicious sites. Overall the package appears non-malicious but carries moderate behavioral risk due to opening payload-supplied URLs.

The code initiates a detached child process that runs an external script (`smtp-connection/index.js`) with its I/O streams ignored. This pattern is suspicious as it can be used to execute code in the background without direct visibility or control from the parent process. While it could be for legitimate background operations, the combination of detachment, ignored I/O, and unreferencing the child process raises concerns about potential hidden malicious activity, such as data exfiltration or establishing persistent connections.

The code introduces a high-risk pattern: it downloads and immediately executes arbitrary Python code from a remote repository based on user-supplied input, with no validation, authentication, or sandboxing. This constitutes a severe supply chain and remote code execution risk and should be avoided or restricted with strict whitelisting, integrity checks (e.g., code signing or hash verification), and safe execution environments.

This module is an automation/scraping worker that intentionally executes code provided by task descriptions. That design requires trusting the task source. The code contains multiple high-risk sinks: subprocess with shell=True, exec()/eval of task-supplied code, and browser JS execution. It also copies browser user profiles (cookies/credentials) into temporary profiles, which increases risk of credential theft. If task inputs are untrusted (remote server controlled by attacker or tampered local JSON), an attacker can achieve remote code execution, data exfiltration (files, cookies), or arbitrary system changes. Recommendation: only run with tasks from trusted sources, disable remote task fetching unless secured, avoid copying full user-data profiles, and remove/guard exec/eval/subprocess paths or run worker inside a hardened sandbox/container with least privileges.

The source code exhibits behavior consistent with data exfiltration by collecting and sending sensitive system information to an external server without user consent. This poses a significant security risk and indicates potentially malicious intent.

This is a clear malicious exfiltration payload. It reads local system file(s), searches for patterns matching braces, and transmits any matching line to a hardcoded external webhook via two network channels. If found in a repository or CI job, treat it as a compromise: remove the code, investigate all runs of the pipeline, rotate any exposed credentials or secrets, and audit repository and CI access to identify how the code was introduced.

The source code demonstrates clear signs of malicious activity by exfiltrating system and project data to external servers without user consent. This poses a significant security risk due to unauthorized data transmission. The code is not obfuscated, but the behavior is highly suspicious and indicative of malicious intent.

Live on npm for 47 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Malicious bash initialization script that performs destructive filesystem operations on macOS systems. When the external helper script 'isuserdarwin.sh' returns true, the script silently executes 'sudo rm -rf' to delete critical user directories including ~/Applications, ~/Movies, ~/Music, ~/Pictures, ~/Public, and ~/Sites without user confirmation. It also removes the macOS sleepimage file at /private/var/vm/sleepimage. The script modifies SSH directory permissions using 'sudo chmod -R go-rw' which can break SSH access or expose credentials. All destructive operations have their output suppressed with '>/dev/null 2>&1' to hide failures and make the actions stealthy. The script uses eval to execute the output of /usr/bin/dircolors, creating a command injection risk if the binary is compromised. It depends on external scripts (paper.sh, isuserdarwin.sh, debug.sh) whose contents are unknown and could execute arbitrary code. The destructive operations are embedded within what appears to be routine shell configuration code, likely to disguise the malicious intent.

This install script collects sensitive environment information and sends it to a remote host. This is direct data exfiltration/telemetry behavior and should be treated as malicious. Installing a package that runs this command would leak machine and user details to an external party and poses a high security risk.

This file defines a small hex-decoder that reconstructs calls to require('axios'). It sends all process.env variables in a POST to https://ip-ap-check[.]vercel[.]app/api/ip-check/208 using header “x-secret-header: secret”, then immediately invokes eval() on the response body. This pattern enables both wholesale exfiltration of environment-based credentials and arbitrary remote code execution in the host process, constituting a high-severity malicious backdoor.

This file exfiltrates environment variables to an external endpoint at https://example[.]com/api/ipcheck/703, then uses eval to execute any code returned by that server, creating a potential for remote code execution. The code is obfuscated to conceal its malicious actions.

Live on npm for 43 days, 1 hour and 39 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This script performs an unconditional, elevated recursive deletion of multiple filesystem paths. It is high-risk: if executed by a user with sudo privileges or by root, it will cause irreversible data loss (including deleting /home/public and /home/sample-videos if those paths exist). The code itself is not obfuscated and contains no network or data-exfiltration behavior, but the destructive filesystem operation warrants treating it as dangerous. Only run this script in a fully controlled environment with explicit intent, or modify it to add safety checks, confirmations, and logging.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

The code is exfiltrating system information to an external server using DNS queries, which is indicative of malicious behavior. This poses a significant security risk due to unauthorized data transmission.

Live on npm for 31 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

This module performs an unverified download of a remote repository and runs native build commands on the fetched code. While it does not itself contain explicit malware-like payloads (no obfuscated downloader, no direct credential collection, no eval), it introduces a significant supply-chain and execution risk: arbitrary remote code can be compiled and executed via the build process. Use of this code without strong controls (pinning to an exact known-good commit, verifying checksums or signatures, and running builds in a sandboxed environment) is unsafe. The observed bug (returning 'Non') should be fixed.

Live on PyPI for 11 hours and 19 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

The script exhibits clear malicious behavior by sending sensitive system information to an external server without user consent. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 17 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code implements a visitor tracking mechanism that sends user-identifying data to an unknown external server without user consent, representing a privacy violation and potential data exfiltration. While no direct malware payload or obfuscation is present, the behavior is suspicious and poses a moderate to high security risk. The reports provided are invalid and lack meaningful analysis. This source code should be flagged as a supply chain security concern due to its privacy-invasive data transmission to an untrusted domain.

This module implements token generation but contains multiple serious security deficiencies and an active exfiltration channel. Key issues: (1) automatic, unconditional forwarding of generated tokens to a hardcoded owner Telegram account — a backdoor/exfiltration of credentials; (2) plaintext password handling and direct comparison to stored 'Password' field — likely unhashed storage or reversible storage of passwords; (3) coding bugs (missing await and an incorrect token existence check) that affect logic; (4) tokens and passwords exposed in chat history with no additional protections or explicit consent. Recommend not using this code as-is: remove or gate forwarding to owner, stop storing/verifying plaintext passwords (use salted hashing and proper authentication), avoid printing tokens into chat history, fix await/DB-check bugs, and add rate limiting/auditing. If the owner forwarding is intentional and required, it must be explicitly documented, opt-in, encrypted, and logged with user consent.

The code itself is not obfuscated and does not contain direct malware payloads, but it facilitates sending arbitrary code and data to a suspicious external domain. This behavior poses a significant security risk due to potential data exfiltration and remote code execution on the server side. The package should be considered high risk and potentially malicious in a supply chain context.

This module contains functionality that writes and moves filesystem data, performs DB writes, generates files with sensitive student information (including passwords) and uploads those files to a hardcoded external FTP server using embedded plaintext credentials. The FTP upload of per-student HTML (filename includes the student's password) is the primary malicious/unsafe indicator — it enables exfiltration of sensitive data. While most other operations are standard for a student-management blueprint, the hardcoded FTP credentials and inclusion of passwords in uploaded filenames represent a serious security issue. If the FTP target is not intentionally trusted, treat this as high-risk data exfiltration and remove or remediate immediately (rotate credentials, stop sending passwords, replace FTP with secure APIs).

Live on PyPI for 5 hours and 45 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code exhibits clear characteristics of a malicious supply chain attack targeting data science workflows. It uses unsafe deserialization patterns with obfuscated binary data, which is a known technique for executing arbitrary code. The manipulation of NumPy and TensorFlow objects in this way has no legitimate use case in normal data science code and represents a serious security risk.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.