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The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

This module is not overtly malicious (no encoded payloads, no external exfiltration, no reverse shell), but it contains high-risk insecure patterns: user-controlled values are directly interpolated into shell command strings and passed to node_utils.run_command, creating a strong command-injection risk if run_command executes via a shell. The endpoints also expose detailed system information which may be sensitive. Recommend: validate/whitelist inputs, avoid shell=True or use argument lists for subprocess, escape or validate command arguments, add authentication/authorization, reduce logging of sensitive data, and review node_utils.run_command implementation. Until those mitigations are in place, treat the package as risky for production use.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

The code is part of a legitimate C2 framework used for security testing. It includes typical features like session management and encryption. However, it can be misused for malicious purposes if deployed without authorization. The use of insecure random number generation is a minor concern.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

The code poses a high security risk by sending sensitive system information to an unknown domain without proper authorization. The script should be reviewed and the destination URL should be verified for security purposes.

Live on npm for 36 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

This code sample implements a clear data capture-to-network exfiltration path for camera frames to a hard-coded local server, with minimal user disclosure or consent. In supply-chain terms, this pattern is a privacy/surveillance risk and could indicate covert data leakage if integrated into broader software. Recommend removing hard-coded local sink behavior, adding explicit user consent prompts, and ensuring transparent destination requests and network telemetry in any open-source component used in production.

The fragment embeds a very large base64 payload decoded at runtime, a known pattern for obfuscated or packed code. While static evidence of direct malicious actions (like network exfiltration or file writes) is not visible in the snippet, the combination of embedded opaque payloads and potential downstream dynamic execution constitutes a high-risk supply-chain concern for an OpenVSX extension. Requires thorough review of rest of the extension to confirm how the decoded data is consumed and whether any dangerous sinks are invoked.

The code fragment is highly suspicious and functions as a sophisticated, obfuscated loader. It uses marshal to conceal a dynamic payload that is executed via exec, performs outbound network communication (including credential-related endpoints), engages in file writes for tracking results, and executes OS commands that can modify the host. The combination of obfuscation, external network activity, and credential-like patterns indicates high risk of malware, credential theft, and supply-chain abuse. Do not trust or execute this fragment in any environment; isolate for forensics if needed.

This module contains high-risk practices: a hardcoded GitHub Personal Access Token, unsafely invoked local git subprocesses that commit and push changes, and filesystem operations (create/delete) based on unvalidated inputs. While the code has implementation bugs that may prevent successful execution as-is, the credential exposure alone is critical and should be treated as compromised. Rotate the PAT and do not use this code in production until remediated. Treat repository and any systems accessed by the PAT as potentially compromised.

This source code contains a hidden cryptocurrency miner that runs without user consent, connecting to a hardcoded mining pool and user account. This is a clear example of malicious behavior typical of supply chain attacks embedding cryptomining malware. The code is not obfuscated but performs unauthorized resource usage, posing a high security risk. It should be considered malware and avoided.

The Python module itself is not directly implementing typical malware behaviors, but it creates a high-risk execution surface: it runs local shell scripts (some with sudo) with unvalidated inputs and passes secrets on the command line. The deploy_fdb_from_file_service function contains a command-injection vulnerability (shell=True with joined args) and a coding bug (returncod typo). Recommend: remove shell=True; use argument lists always, avoid passing secrets via argv (use stdin, environment files with proper filesystem permissions, or secured IPC), eliminate unnecessary sudo calls and require callers to provide appropriate privileges if needed, validate/escape inputs (especially file paths), fix the returncod typo, and audit all invoked shell scripts before use. Treat package as risky until mitigations and script audits are performed.

The code collects sensitive system information and sends it to a remote server without user consent. This behavior is highly suspicious and indicates potential data exfiltration, posing a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 14 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

`njongto_zon` advertises itself as a Windows-only autoposter for Naver stock-discussion boards (종목토론방) and Kakao OpenTalk rooms, a niche tool pitched at grey-hat promoters who want to flood finance forums with ticker hype. At launch it opens a Korean-language Glimmer-DSL-LibUI window that asks for the operator’s Naver ID and password. The moment those credentials are supplied (before any automated posting begins) the script silently bundles the plaintext ID, password, and the host’s MAC address and exfiltrates the package via HTTP POST to https://programzon[.]com/auth/program/signin, infrastructure controlled by the zon threat actor. The MAC address serves as a persistent hardware fingerprint, allowing the threat actor to correlate victims across separate installations and campaigns. Although the gem does proceed with its promised stock-forum spam routine, this covert exfiltration turns `njongto_zon` into an infostealer: users hoping to amplify their market chatter instead hand over their own sensitive credentials to the operator behind the wider “zon” malware cluster.

The code snippet demonstrates malicious behavior by exfiltrating the system's username to an external domain. This poses a significant security risk as it leaks potentially sensitive information without user consent.

This module implements privileged node and device management and exposes HTTP endpoints that accept user input used directly in shell commands and Docker operations. Main risks: command injection (unsanitized string interpolation into shell commands and os.popen), destructive device operations (partitioning, bind/unbind), supplying arbitrary images to be pulled and run as privileged containers, and use of an unencrypted/unprotected Docker TCP socket (tcp://...:2375). I assess this as not manifestly malware but a high-risk administrative component that must be strictly access-controlled and hardened (validate/sanitize inputs, avoid passing raw user values into shell/Docker operations, use secure Docker API access, avoid exposing endpoints publicly).

The code contains high-risk unsafe behavior: exec() is used to run Python code derived directly from OpenAI function_call arguments with no sandboxing or validation, and os.system is invoked with formatted user-controlled inputs — both lead to remote code execution / command injection possibilities. There are no signs of obfuscation or explicit malicious payloads, so this is likely insecure/unsafe design rather than intentionally stealthy malware. Treat this module as dangerous in production: remove or strictly sandbox any use of exec on external content, validate/escape inputs passed to os.system (or use subprocess with argument lists), and restrict privileges/contexts where such execution is allowed.

Live on PyPI for 9 hours and 13 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code collects sensitive system and user information, including directory paths, environment variables, user credentials, and network configuration, and transmits it to an external server at 66av2iv4znn55vqoi91b6medu40volca[.]pentestcollaborator[.]com via an HTTPS POST request without user consent. This behavior indicates malicious intent and poses a significant security risk due to potential data theft.

This code implements a remote-controlled decorator that queries a hardcoded external HTTP endpoint to decide if a local function should run and optionally notifies that endpoint. The pattern is a high supply-chain and privacy risk: cleartext network calls to a hardcoded IP, no authentication or integrity checks, and remote control of execution. The snippet contains a runtime typo that prevents it from working as written, but the intended behavior is clear and concerning. While there is no direct evidence of data exfiltration in this fragment, the remote kill-switch/telemetry capability makes inclusion of this module risky and it should be treated as suspicious and reviewed/removed unless explicitly required and secured (use HTTPS, authentication, validate responses, and avoid remote kill-switches).

This module contains high-risk behavior: it builds and executes Python source code derived from template contents and includes/extends filenames without proper sanitization or sandboxing. That creates straightforward template injection and local file read/exfiltration attack vectors. The presence of implementation bugs does not mitigate the fundamental insecurity; rather, it increases unpredictability. Treat this code as dangerous for untrusted templates and prioritize using a well-maintained, sandboxed template engine (e.g., jinja2) or fix by removing exec usage and strictly sanitizing/limiting evaluated expressions.

The code is heavily obfuscated and interacts with external modules, including Bluetooth and database operations. While there is no clear evidence of malicious behavior, the obfuscation and dynamic behavior warrant further inspection.

Live on npm for 6 hours and 9 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

This script downloads and executes a remote file based on the contents of a base64-encoded image file. This behavior is highly suspicious and potentially malicious.

Live on npm for 29 days, 11 hours and 34 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code implements a login function that sends user credentials (username and password) in plaintext over unencrypted HTTP to a hardcoded external server at jinsul[.]co[.]kr/erp/login/alogin[.]php. This behavior constitutes credential theft as sensitive authentication data is transmitted without encryption to an external domain, exposing users to credential interception and potential account compromise. The function extracts and returns session cookies from the server response. This represents malicious data exfiltration in a supply chain context, as user credentials are sent to an untrusted third-party domain without user consent or awareness.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

This module is not overtly malicious (no encoded payloads, no external exfiltration, no reverse shell), but it contains high-risk insecure patterns: user-controlled values are directly interpolated into shell command strings and passed to node_utils.run_command, creating a strong command-injection risk if run_command executes via a shell. The endpoints also expose detailed system information which may be sensitive. Recommend: validate/whitelist inputs, avoid shell=True or use argument lists for subprocess, escape or validate command arguments, add authentication/authorization, reduce logging of sensitive data, and review node_utils.run_command implementation. Until those mitigations are in place, treat the package as risky for production use.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

The code is part of a legitimate C2 framework used for security testing. It includes typical features like session management and encryption. However, it can be misused for malicious purposes if deployed without authorization. The use of insecure random number generation is a minor concern.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

The code poses a high security risk by sending sensitive system information to an unknown domain without proper authorization. The script should be reviewed and the destination URL should be verified for security purposes.

Live on npm for 36 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

This code sample implements a clear data capture-to-network exfiltration path for camera frames to a hard-coded local server, with minimal user disclosure or consent. In supply-chain terms, this pattern is a privacy/surveillance risk and could indicate covert data leakage if integrated into broader software. Recommend removing hard-coded local sink behavior, adding explicit user consent prompts, and ensuring transparent destination requests and network telemetry in any open-source component used in production.

The fragment embeds a very large base64 payload decoded at runtime, a known pattern for obfuscated or packed code. While static evidence of direct malicious actions (like network exfiltration or file writes) is not visible in the snippet, the combination of embedded opaque payloads and potential downstream dynamic execution constitutes a high-risk supply-chain concern for an OpenVSX extension. Requires thorough review of rest of the extension to confirm how the decoded data is consumed and whether any dangerous sinks are invoked.

The code fragment is highly suspicious and functions as a sophisticated, obfuscated loader. It uses marshal to conceal a dynamic payload that is executed via exec, performs outbound network communication (including credential-related endpoints), engages in file writes for tracking results, and executes OS commands that can modify the host. The combination of obfuscation, external network activity, and credential-like patterns indicates high risk of malware, credential theft, and supply-chain abuse. Do not trust or execute this fragment in any environment; isolate for forensics if needed.

This module contains high-risk practices: a hardcoded GitHub Personal Access Token, unsafely invoked local git subprocesses that commit and push changes, and filesystem operations (create/delete) based on unvalidated inputs. While the code has implementation bugs that may prevent successful execution as-is, the credential exposure alone is critical and should be treated as compromised. Rotate the PAT and do not use this code in production until remediated. Treat repository and any systems accessed by the PAT as potentially compromised.

This source code contains a hidden cryptocurrency miner that runs without user consent, connecting to a hardcoded mining pool and user account. This is a clear example of malicious behavior typical of supply chain attacks embedding cryptomining malware. The code is not obfuscated but performs unauthorized resource usage, posing a high security risk. It should be considered malware and avoided.

The Python module itself is not directly implementing typical malware behaviors, but it creates a high-risk execution surface: it runs local shell scripts (some with sudo) with unvalidated inputs and passes secrets on the command line. The deploy_fdb_from_file_service function contains a command-injection vulnerability (shell=True with joined args) and a coding bug (returncod typo). Recommend: remove shell=True; use argument lists always, avoid passing secrets via argv (use stdin, environment files with proper filesystem permissions, or secured IPC), eliminate unnecessary sudo calls and require callers to provide appropriate privileges if needed, validate/escape inputs (especially file paths), fix the returncod typo, and audit all invoked shell scripts before use. Treat package as risky until mitigations and script audits are performed.

The code collects sensitive system information and sends it to a remote server without user consent. This behavior is highly suspicious and indicates potential data exfiltration, posing a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 14 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

`njongto_zon` advertises itself as a Windows-only autoposter for Naver stock-discussion boards (종목토론방) and Kakao OpenTalk rooms, a niche tool pitched at grey-hat promoters who want to flood finance forums with ticker hype. At launch it opens a Korean-language Glimmer-DSL-LibUI window that asks for the operator’s Naver ID and password. The moment those credentials are supplied (before any automated posting begins) the script silently bundles the plaintext ID, password, and the host’s MAC address and exfiltrates the package via HTTP POST to https://programzon[.]com/auth/program/signin, infrastructure controlled by the zon threat actor. The MAC address serves as a persistent hardware fingerprint, allowing the threat actor to correlate victims across separate installations and campaigns. Although the gem does proceed with its promised stock-forum spam routine, this covert exfiltration turns `njongto_zon` into an infostealer: users hoping to amplify their market chatter instead hand over their own sensitive credentials to the operator behind the wider “zon” malware cluster.

The code snippet demonstrates malicious behavior by exfiltrating the system's username to an external domain. This poses a significant security risk as it leaks potentially sensitive information without user consent.

This module implements privileged node and device management and exposes HTTP endpoints that accept user input used directly in shell commands and Docker operations. Main risks: command injection (unsanitized string interpolation into shell commands and os.popen), destructive device operations (partitioning, bind/unbind), supplying arbitrary images to be pulled and run as privileged containers, and use of an unencrypted/unprotected Docker TCP socket (tcp://...:2375). I assess this as not manifestly malware but a high-risk administrative component that must be strictly access-controlled and hardened (validate/sanitize inputs, avoid passing raw user values into shell/Docker operations, use secure Docker API access, avoid exposing endpoints publicly).

The code contains high-risk unsafe behavior: exec() is used to run Python code derived directly from OpenAI function_call arguments with no sandboxing or validation, and os.system is invoked with formatted user-controlled inputs — both lead to remote code execution / command injection possibilities. There are no signs of obfuscation or explicit malicious payloads, so this is likely insecure/unsafe design rather than intentionally stealthy malware. Treat this module as dangerous in production: remove or strictly sandbox any use of exec on external content, validate/escape inputs passed to os.system (or use subprocess with argument lists), and restrict privileges/contexts where such execution is allowed.

Live on PyPI for 9 hours and 13 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code collects sensitive system and user information, including directory paths, environment variables, user credentials, and network configuration, and transmits it to an external server at 66av2iv4znn55vqoi91b6medu40volca[.]pentestcollaborator[.]com via an HTTPS POST request without user consent. This behavior indicates malicious intent and poses a significant security risk due to potential data theft.

This code implements a remote-controlled decorator that queries a hardcoded external HTTP endpoint to decide if a local function should run and optionally notifies that endpoint. The pattern is a high supply-chain and privacy risk: cleartext network calls to a hardcoded IP, no authentication or integrity checks, and remote control of execution. The snippet contains a runtime typo that prevents it from working as written, but the intended behavior is clear and concerning. While there is no direct evidence of data exfiltration in this fragment, the remote kill-switch/telemetry capability makes inclusion of this module risky and it should be treated as suspicious and reviewed/removed unless explicitly required and secured (use HTTPS, authentication, validate responses, and avoid remote kill-switches).

This module contains high-risk behavior: it builds and executes Python source code derived from template contents and includes/extends filenames without proper sanitization or sandboxing. That creates straightforward template injection and local file read/exfiltration attack vectors. The presence of implementation bugs does not mitigate the fundamental insecurity; rather, it increases unpredictability. Treat this code as dangerous for untrusted templates and prioritize using a well-maintained, sandboxed template engine (e.g., jinja2) or fix by removing exec usage and strictly sanitizing/limiting evaluated expressions.

The code is heavily obfuscated and interacts with external modules, including Bluetooth and database operations. While there is no clear evidence of malicious behavior, the obfuscation and dynamic behavior warrant further inspection.

Live on npm for 6 hours and 9 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

This script downloads and executes a remote file based on the contents of a base64-encoded image file. This behavior is highly suspicious and potentially malicious.

Live on npm for 29 days, 11 hours and 34 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code implements a login function that sends user credentials (username and password) in plaintext over unencrypted HTTP to a hardcoded external server at jinsul[.]co[.]kr/erp/login/alogin[.]php. This behavior constitutes credential theft as sensitive authentication data is transmitted without encryption to an external domain, exposing users to credential interception and potential account compromise. The function extracts and returns session cookies from the server response. This represents malicious data exfiltration in a supply chain context, as user credentials are sent to an untrusted third-party domain without user consent or awareness.