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The code is highly suspicious due to its obfuscation and the use of exec() to run potentially harmful code. It poses a significant security risk and likely contains malicious behavior.

Possible typosquat of [azure](https://socket.dev/npm/package/azure) Explanation: The package 'azure-graphrbac' is labeled as a 'security holding package', which often indicates a placeholder to prevent typosquatting. The name 'azure-graphrbac' closely resembles 'azure' and could be misleading. The maintainers list includes 'npm', which is not a specific known maintainer. The description does not provide enough information to determine a distinct purpose, and the similarity in naming suggests it could be a typosquat. azure-graphrbac is a security-holding package

Live on npm for 3 hours and 36 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This dependency fragment is highly indicative of an obfuscated loader/payload preparation stage: it reconstructs runtime strings via custom decodeURIComponent-based logic, caches decoded results, and uses extensive indirection/control-flow flattening to conceal the true dispatch targets. The excerpt does not explicitly show concrete malicious side effects (network exfiltration, filesystem/process manipulation, or credential theft), but the structure strongly warrants treating the full package as suspicious and requiring full deobfuscation plus end-to-end execution-path review beyond this truncated portion.

The code effectively creates a remote terminal backdoor-like capability via gotty on macOS, with minimal visibility due to silent I/O and hard-coded paths. This is a high-security-risk pattern that warrants removal or strict hardening (authentication, access controls, non-root execution, dynamic path resolution, and explicit port management). A broader code review and deployment safeguards are strongly recommended.

The mcporter CLI’s documented capabilities (arbitrary HTTP calls, --stdio process execution, and local credential storage) align with its stated purpose but present a moderate attack surface: misuse can lead to credential leakage or arbitrary code execution if inputs are untrusted or the environment is hostile. The fragment contains no explicit malicious code, obfuscation, or hard-coded attacker infrastructure. Recommended actions: review implementation for secure storage of tokens, minimize or sanitize construction of command strings, consider allowlisting target domains or prompting before sending credentials to unknown endpoints, and audit generated outputs for sensitive data leakage. Treat as functional but moderately risky in adversarial contexts.

The code exhibits malicious behavior, including data exfiltration and evasion techniques. It poses a significant risk to systems where this dependency is used.

The code exhibits a dangerous remote code execution pattern: it downloads and immediately runs a remote Python payload without integrity checks, sandboxing, or input validation. This creates a severe supply-chain and runtime security risk. Recommended mitigations include removing dynamic downloads, validating payloads with cryptographic hashes or signatures, using safe subprocess invocations with argument lists, and implementing strict input sanitization. If remote functionality must remain, switch to a trusted-internal mechanism (e.g., plugin architecture with signed components, offline verification) and add robust error handling and logging.

This fragment contains a clear malicious/anomalous payload embedded inside a polyfill/bootstrap region. The alert followed by a window.open to an external site represents a disruptive backdoor-like action, indicating probable supply-chain contamination or injected content. While the surrounding UI code appears legitimate, this payload demands immediate remediation, provenance verification, and tightened build integrity checks to prevent reoccurrence.

This file implements a high-impact automatic updater that, when enabled by a filesystem flag, will fetch PyPI metadata and, if a newer version exists, automatically install the 'simo' package and run multiple privileged/damaging maintenance commands (migrations, collectstatic, redis-cli flushall, supervisor restart). The code itself is not obfuscated and contains no direct data-exfiltration routines, but it creates a significant supply-chain and operational risk: automatic, unauthenticated upgrades from PyPI with no integrity verification and immediate execution of system-level commands can lead to remote code execution, data loss, service disruption, or full host compromise if an attacker controls the published package or the update path. Recommend disabling auto-updates, adding cryptographic verification/pinned versions, removing or gating destructive commands (redis-cli flushall), running upgrades in isolated environments, and adding logging/auditing and authorization checks before performing upgrades.

This module is a DDoS toolkit providing many explicit attack vectors (floods, amplification, slow attacks), evasion techniques (proxies, Tor, Cloudflare cookie bypass), and packet forging (raw sockets, spoofed IPs). It is malicious by purpose and should not be used in legitimate software. Including this package as a dependency in a project creates a high supply-chain risk and may expose maintainers/users to legal and operational consequences. Remove and avoid this code; if found in repositories, treat as malicious and investigate origin and distribution.

The script is suspicious and likely malicious in intent from a supply-chain perspective. It reads credentials, authenticates to an external service, extracts sensitive account information, and proactively emails an alert containing that data. This behavior constitutes data exfiltration and credential handling without user consent or clear benign purpose. It should be treated as malware-like in behavior and blocked or audited before inclusion in any package.

This assembly contains a heavily obfuscated runtime loader that decrypts embedded resources and performs in-memory code installation and method hooking via native APIs and DynamicMethod/IL emission. Those capabilities enable arbitrary code execution inside the host process and are not justifiable for a benign Revit/Dynamo utility. Treat this component and any package/version containing it as malicious/untrusted. Remove from environments, perform forensic analysis on systems where it was executed, and check supply chain for compromise.

The code exhibits ransomware-like behavior by encrypting files and communicating with external servers. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 37 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is performing a potentially malicious action by sending the system's username to an external domain, which is indicative of data exfiltration. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 1 day, 11 hours and 18 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code constitutes deliberate data-exfiltration behavior: it reads local repository files and environment variables from a targeted absolute path and sends them, unencrypted, to an external OAST-like callback domain. This is malicious in a supply-chain/CI context and should be treated as a high-severity security incident. Remove/quarantine the code, investigate its origin, rotate exposed secrets, and block the destination domain.

This module is primarily a formatting/polyfill utility, but it contains a severe security backdoor-like capability: it defines String.prototype.eval to execute arbitrary JavaScript via eval(this.toString()). This significantly elevates attack surface and enables direct code execution if any untrusted string can be passed to a .eval() call. While %j/%o can contribute to sensitive data exposure through returned serialized/enumerated strings, the eval polyfill is the dominant critical risk.

This script performs legitimate-sounding provisioning tasks but contains multiple high-risk actions that are consistent with establishing a persistent backdoor: it creates a privileged OS user with an empty password, mounts the host filesystem into the environment, and installs a persistent service that exposes an interactive console via a named pipe while skipping reauthentication. Even though there is no direct network exfiltration code here, the capabilities granted (privileged account, full FS access, interactive shell access) make this highly dangerous. Treat this package as malicious or severely risky and do not run it in production or on sensitive hosts without careful auditing and remediation (remove empty-password, avoid auto-admin membership, do not mount host drives, require authentication for console-server).

This module is a high-risk utility because it fetches Python code from remote URLs and local markdown files and executes that code directly via execute_py_script_string_as_new_proc without validation or sandboxing. The code itself does not contain obvious obfuscation or hardcoded credentials, but it provides an execution surface that enables remote code execution and potential data exfiltration or system compromise depending on the executed snippets and the implementation of execute_py_script_string_as_new_proc. Treat calls that use remote URLs or untrusted markdown as dangerous. Use only with trusted content or add validation/sandboxing (e.g., static analysis of snippets, running in containers with restricted privileges, allowlists, checksums/signatures).

This code is highly suspicious and should not be used without further investigation. The code is heavily obfuscated and could potentially contain malicious code. The purpose of the code is unclear and further investigation is necessary to determine its exact behavior.

Live on npm for 24 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file automatically sends internal dumpJSON items to a third-party AI Studio endpoint (https://bbqa2t5pfyfroyobmzknmktshckzto4btkfagxyjqwy[.]did[.]abtnet[.]io/ai-studio/api/datasets/443696818363039744/documents) whenever the module is loaded. It embeds a hard-coded Cookie header—including a login_token JWT—and uses it to first fetch existing documents and then PUT or POST JSON-serialized item data under “text” paths. There is no user consent, opt-in, or error handling; the behavior runs as a side effect, leaks potentially sensitive package metadata, and abuses embedded credentials to write to an external service. This is a high-risk supply-chain/backdoor indicator.

The code exhibits behavior consistent with data exfiltration by collecting and sending sensitive system and user information to an external server without user consent. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 11 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code is a network-amplification probing/exploitation toolkit: it crafts protocol-specific requests to services known for reflection/amplification and measures amplification factors. The functionality can be used for offensive DDoS attacks and to discover large numbers of vulnerable reflectors (especially when combined with get_public_dns). It is high risk and should be treated as potentially malicious in untrusted contexts. Use only with explicit authorization for testing; avoid including in supply-chain dependencies.

The code is highly suspicious due to its obfuscation and the use of exec() to run potentially harmful code. It poses a significant security risk and likely contains malicious behavior.

Possible typosquat of [azure](https://socket.dev/npm/package/azure) Explanation: The package 'azure-graphrbac' is labeled as a 'security holding package', which often indicates a placeholder to prevent typosquatting. The name 'azure-graphrbac' closely resembles 'azure' and could be misleading. The maintainers list includes 'npm', which is not a specific known maintainer. The description does not provide enough information to determine a distinct purpose, and the similarity in naming suggests it could be a typosquat. azure-graphrbac is a security-holding package

Live on npm for 3 hours and 36 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This dependency fragment is highly indicative of an obfuscated loader/payload preparation stage: it reconstructs runtime strings via custom decodeURIComponent-based logic, caches decoded results, and uses extensive indirection/control-flow flattening to conceal the true dispatch targets. The excerpt does not explicitly show concrete malicious side effects (network exfiltration, filesystem/process manipulation, or credential theft), but the structure strongly warrants treating the full package as suspicious and requiring full deobfuscation plus end-to-end execution-path review beyond this truncated portion.

The code effectively creates a remote terminal backdoor-like capability via gotty on macOS, with minimal visibility due to silent I/O and hard-coded paths. This is a high-security-risk pattern that warrants removal or strict hardening (authentication, access controls, non-root execution, dynamic path resolution, and explicit port management). A broader code review and deployment safeguards are strongly recommended.

The mcporter CLI’s documented capabilities (arbitrary HTTP calls, --stdio process execution, and local credential storage) align with its stated purpose but present a moderate attack surface: misuse can lead to credential leakage or arbitrary code execution if inputs are untrusted or the environment is hostile. The fragment contains no explicit malicious code, obfuscation, or hard-coded attacker infrastructure. Recommended actions: review implementation for secure storage of tokens, minimize or sanitize construction of command strings, consider allowlisting target domains or prompting before sending credentials to unknown endpoints, and audit generated outputs for sensitive data leakage. Treat as functional but moderately risky in adversarial contexts.

The code exhibits malicious behavior, including data exfiltration and evasion techniques. It poses a significant risk to systems where this dependency is used.

The code exhibits a dangerous remote code execution pattern: it downloads and immediately runs a remote Python payload without integrity checks, sandboxing, or input validation. This creates a severe supply-chain and runtime security risk. Recommended mitigations include removing dynamic downloads, validating payloads with cryptographic hashes or signatures, using safe subprocess invocations with argument lists, and implementing strict input sanitization. If remote functionality must remain, switch to a trusted-internal mechanism (e.g., plugin architecture with signed components, offline verification) and add robust error handling and logging.

This fragment contains a clear malicious/anomalous payload embedded inside a polyfill/bootstrap region. The alert followed by a window.open to an external site represents a disruptive backdoor-like action, indicating probable supply-chain contamination or injected content. While the surrounding UI code appears legitimate, this payload demands immediate remediation, provenance verification, and tightened build integrity checks to prevent reoccurrence.

This file implements a high-impact automatic updater that, when enabled by a filesystem flag, will fetch PyPI metadata and, if a newer version exists, automatically install the 'simo' package and run multiple privileged/damaging maintenance commands (migrations, collectstatic, redis-cli flushall, supervisor restart). The code itself is not obfuscated and contains no direct data-exfiltration routines, but it creates a significant supply-chain and operational risk: automatic, unauthenticated upgrades from PyPI with no integrity verification and immediate execution of system-level commands can lead to remote code execution, data loss, service disruption, or full host compromise if an attacker controls the published package or the update path. Recommend disabling auto-updates, adding cryptographic verification/pinned versions, removing or gating destructive commands (redis-cli flushall), running upgrades in isolated environments, and adding logging/auditing and authorization checks before performing upgrades.

This module is a DDoS toolkit providing many explicit attack vectors (floods, amplification, slow attacks), evasion techniques (proxies, Tor, Cloudflare cookie bypass), and packet forging (raw sockets, spoofed IPs). It is malicious by purpose and should not be used in legitimate software. Including this package as a dependency in a project creates a high supply-chain risk and may expose maintainers/users to legal and operational consequences. Remove and avoid this code; if found in repositories, treat as malicious and investigate origin and distribution.

The script is suspicious and likely malicious in intent from a supply-chain perspective. It reads credentials, authenticates to an external service, extracts sensitive account information, and proactively emails an alert containing that data. This behavior constitutes data exfiltration and credential handling without user consent or clear benign purpose. It should be treated as malware-like in behavior and blocked or audited before inclusion in any package.

This assembly contains a heavily obfuscated runtime loader that decrypts embedded resources and performs in-memory code installation and method hooking via native APIs and DynamicMethod/IL emission. Those capabilities enable arbitrary code execution inside the host process and are not justifiable for a benign Revit/Dynamo utility. Treat this component and any package/version containing it as malicious/untrusted. Remove from environments, perform forensic analysis on systems where it was executed, and check supply chain for compromise.

The code exhibits ransomware-like behavior by encrypting files and communicating with external servers. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 37 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is performing a potentially malicious action by sending the system's username to an external domain, which is indicative of data exfiltration. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 1 day, 11 hours and 18 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code constitutes deliberate data-exfiltration behavior: it reads local repository files and environment variables from a targeted absolute path and sends them, unencrypted, to an external OAST-like callback domain. This is malicious in a supply-chain/CI context and should be treated as a high-severity security incident. Remove/quarantine the code, investigate its origin, rotate exposed secrets, and block the destination domain.

This module is primarily a formatting/polyfill utility, but it contains a severe security backdoor-like capability: it defines String.prototype.eval to execute arbitrary JavaScript via eval(this.toString()). This significantly elevates attack surface and enables direct code execution if any untrusted string can be passed to a .eval() call. While %j/%o can contribute to sensitive data exposure through returned serialized/enumerated strings, the eval polyfill is the dominant critical risk.

This script performs legitimate-sounding provisioning tasks but contains multiple high-risk actions that are consistent with establishing a persistent backdoor: it creates a privileged OS user with an empty password, mounts the host filesystem into the environment, and installs a persistent service that exposes an interactive console via a named pipe while skipping reauthentication. Even though there is no direct network exfiltration code here, the capabilities granted (privileged account, full FS access, interactive shell access) make this highly dangerous. Treat this package as malicious or severely risky and do not run it in production or on sensitive hosts without careful auditing and remediation (remove empty-password, avoid auto-admin membership, do not mount host drives, require authentication for console-server).

This module is a high-risk utility because it fetches Python code from remote URLs and local markdown files and executes that code directly via execute_py_script_string_as_new_proc without validation or sandboxing. The code itself does not contain obvious obfuscation or hardcoded credentials, but it provides an execution surface that enables remote code execution and potential data exfiltration or system compromise depending on the executed snippets and the implementation of execute_py_script_string_as_new_proc. Treat calls that use remote URLs or untrusted markdown as dangerous. Use only with trusted content or add validation/sandboxing (e.g., static analysis of snippets, running in containers with restricted privileges, allowlists, checksums/signatures).

This code is highly suspicious and should not be used without further investigation. The code is heavily obfuscated and could potentially contain malicious code. The purpose of the code is unclear and further investigation is necessary to determine its exact behavior.

Live on npm for 24 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file automatically sends internal dumpJSON items to a third-party AI Studio endpoint (https://bbqa2t5pfyfroyobmzknmktshckzto4btkfagxyjqwy[.]did[.]abtnet[.]io/ai-studio/api/datasets/443696818363039744/documents) whenever the module is loaded. It embeds a hard-coded Cookie header—including a login_token JWT—and uses it to first fetch existing documents and then PUT or POST JSON-serialized item data under “text” paths. There is no user consent, opt-in, or error handling; the behavior runs as a side effect, leaks potentially sensitive package metadata, and abuses embedded credentials to write to an external service. This is a high-risk supply-chain/backdoor indicator.

The code exhibits behavior consistent with data exfiltration by collecting and sending sensitive system and user information to an external server without user consent. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 11 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code is a network-amplification probing/exploitation toolkit: it crafts protocol-specific requests to services known for reflection/amplification and measures amplification factors. The functionality can be used for offensive DDoS attacks and to discover large numbers of vulnerable reflectors (especially when combined with get_public_dns). It is high risk and should be treated as potentially malicious in untrusted contexts. Use only with explicit authorization for testing; avoid including in supply-chain dependencies.