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This code is a highly reliable malware-loader pattern: it spawns PowerShell to download arbitrary content from a hard-coded URL and immediately executes it using `iex`, with no integrity or safety checks. Based on the deterministic network-to-execution flow, it is extremely likely malicious.

Live on pypi for 2 days, 13 hours and 30 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is highly suspicious and exhibits several characteristics of malware. It is obfuscated, collects sensitive system information, and sends this information to a remote server using a covert method. The risk, malware, and obfuscation scores should all be high due to the serious nature of these activities.

Live on npm for 9 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The branch of the codebase presents non-trivial security risks due to dynamic code execution pathways (allowUnsafeEval, allowUnsafeNewFunction, Function wrapper) and a dependency-loading mechanism (loadDependency) that can execute modules from disk based on untrusted inputs. These patterns create strong potential for supply-chain or runtime code injection if inputs/dependencies are tampered. While the rest of the utilities are common for an extension system, the unsafe pathways should be removed or tightly restricted, with explicit whitelisting, sandboxing, and input provenance checks. Recommended actions include eliminating or locking down unsafe evaluators, validating dependencyPath against allowed sets, isolating dependency execution, and minimizing writes to the user’s home directory without strict validation.

The code is highly suspicious due to its collection and transmission of system information to external servers without user consent. The use of hardcoded IP addresses and fallback mechanisms for data transmission indicates potential malicious intent.

Live on npm for 1 day, 6 hours and 10 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code exhibits highly suspicious and malicious behavior. It collects sensitive environment data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded, obfuscated domain using intentionally obscured data. The author has gone to great lengths to hide their intent through string manipulation, complex filters, and anti-analysis checks. This code serves no legitimate purpose and poses a severe security risk by stealing potentially sensitive data from the environment. It has all the hallmarks of malware designed for data theft from compromised npm packages or developer machines. Under no circumstances should this code be run, used or included in any project.

Live on npm for 2 hours and 31 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code fragment is strongly indicative of malicious credential/token theft. It enumerates local browser/Slack storage, copies and queries cookie databases, decrypts protected Slack cookies (xoxd-) using OS key mechanisms (macOS Keychain, Windows DPAPI via PowerShell, Linux keyring/derived keys), scans LevelDB/IndexedDB/blob data for Slack access tokens (xoxc-), reconstructs/parses them, and returns deduplicated tokens and cookies for downstream unauthorized authentication/session compromise. Treat the package as dangerous; investigate for additional exfiltration and execution logic outside this module.

This module is an obfuscated dynamic loader/launcher. It decodes strings from large numeric/byte blobs, performs dynamic __import__ and globals().update to populate names, and then calls a nested chain of dynamically-resolved callables built from the decoded payload. Because the actual imported modules and functions are computed at runtime from obfuscated data, the file can execute arbitrary code and therefore poses a high supply-chain risk. Recommend treating this package as suspicious: do not run it in production, perform dynamic analysis in a safe sandbox to decode the imports/payload, and if this appears unexpectedly in a dependency, consider revoking the dependency and auditing the source repository.

Live on pypi for 1 day, 5 hours and 55 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Significant security risk due to a hardcoded backdoor admin path and an always-present @root admin connected to process.stdout. This undermines supply-chain security and remote control integrity. Recommendation: remove hardcoded credentials, replace sudo with proper authentication/authorization mechanisms, eliminate non-network admin handlers, implement robust input validation, and adopt least-privilege admin models with audit trails.

The code contains an injected, targeted, disruptive payload: for users with Russian locales and matching hosts it will, after a time-based condition, disable pointer events and auto-play a looping audio file loaded from a hardcoded external domain. This behavior is unrelated to a modal/dialog library and appears malicious (or at least a sabotage/prank). Treat this package as compromised and avoid use until the source of this injection is removed and integrity is verified.

This module is not overtly malicious (no encoded payloads, no external exfiltration, no reverse shell), but it contains high-risk insecure patterns: user-controlled values are directly interpolated into shell command strings and passed to node_utils.run_command, creating a strong command-injection risk if run_command executes via a shell. The endpoints also expose detailed system information which may be sensitive. Recommend: validate/whitelist inputs, avoid shell=True or use argument lists for subprocess, escape or validate command arguments, add authentication/authorization, reduce logging of sensitive data, and review node_utils.run_command implementation. Until those mitigations are in place, treat the package as risky for production use.

The analyzed bundle presents a mixed risk profile: legitimate utilities for cross-platform browser launching and telemetry, but with strong data-access capabilities (clipboard, registry probing) and host-command execution paths (EncodedCommand, spawn/execFile). This combination can enable covert data exfiltration or unintended system actions if data sources are untrusted or misused. Recommend a thorough security audit by extension maintainers, including: explicit user consent prompts for clipboard usage, clear disclosure of data sent over the network and its destinations, restriction or hardening of encoded PowerShell commands, sanitization of inputs feeding into browser-launch paths, and a review of third-party library integrations for unnecessary privilege elevation or data collection. Overall risk: elevated (moderate to high) until a full audit confirms safe usage patterns.

The code primarily serves to provide alert functionality using the SweetAlert2 library. However, it includes potentially risky behavior, such as the use of new Function(), and dynamically playing a remote audio file based on locale and domain conditions. This requires further scrutiny for any context-specific vulnerabilities.

This module intentionally conceals a Python payload and executes it at import/runtime. That pattern is high risk: it provides arbitrary code execution and circumvents static inspection. Without decoding the embedded payload, one cannot determine if it is malicious; however, the concealment and exec() usage are characteristic of supply-chain backdoors or other malicious implants. Treat this package as untrusted until the embedded payload is decoded and audited in a safe environment. Do not run this code in production or on systems with sensitive data.

Live on pypi for 1 day, 14 hours and 51 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The module implements Facebook Messenger realtime MQTT handling and mostly contains plausible, legitimate logic. However, it includes a large intentionally obfuscated payload that is decoded and executed with eval() during message processing. That is a strong supply-chain/malware indicator: runtime-evaluated concealed code, dynamic require and dynamic global mutation. Even if the visible surrounding logic is benign, the eval block could perform data exfiltration, load additional modules, or alter behavior unpredictably. I recommend treating this package as high risk until the obfuscated evaled code is decoded and reviewed; do not use in sensitive environments.

This package runs a local script (index.js) silently during npm install. Because the script runs with the installer's privileges and its output is suppressed, it is a high-risk behavior — inspect the contents of index.js before installing, avoid installing into sensitive environments, or run installation in an isolated/sandboxed environment.

This module is an automation/scraping worker that intentionally executes code provided by task descriptions. That design requires trusting the task source. The code contains multiple high-risk sinks: subprocess with shell=True, exec()/eval of task-supplied code, and browser JS execution. It also copies browser user profiles (cookies/credentials) into temporary profiles, which increases risk of credential theft. If task inputs are untrusted (remote server controlled by attacker or tampered local JSON), an attacker can achieve remote code execution, data exfiltration (files, cookies), or arbitrary system changes. Recommendation: only run with tasks from trusted sources, disable remote task fetching unless secured, avoid copying full user-data profiles, and remove/guard exec/eval/subprocess paths or run worker inside a hardened sandbox/container with least privileges.

This module is a high-risk bootstrapper that conditionally auto-installs a binary by downloading OS-specific installer scripts from a hardcoded GitHub Releases URL and executing them immediately (PowerShell 'iwr|iex' with ExecutionPolicy Bypass on Windows; 'curl ... | sh' on non-Windows) with no integrity/signature verification. After installation, it executes the resulting binary with user-supplied arguments. The primary supply-chain risk is arbitrary remote code execution if the hosted installer content is altered or compromised.

This module implements privileged node and device management and exposes HTTP endpoints that accept user input used directly in shell commands and Docker operations. Main risks: command injection (unsanitized string interpolation into shell commands and os.popen), destructive device operations (partitioning, bind/unbind), supplying arbitrary images to be pulled and run as privileged containers, and use of an unencrypted/unprotected Docker TCP socket (tcp://...:2375). I assess this as not manifestly malware but a high-risk administrative component that must be strictly access-controlled and hardened (validate/sanitize inputs, avoid passing raw user values into shell/Docker operations, use secure Docker API access, avoid exposing endpoints publicly).

This package runs a local script during install. That behavior enables untrusted code execution and is a high security risk unless you can inspect and verify index.js. The presence of network libraries increases the likelihood that the script could perform remote communications or exfiltrate data. Review the contents of index.js before installing or run the installation in an isolated environment.

Live on npm for 5 hours and 21 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

High-risk pattern: the installer executes arbitrary JS produced at install time. This is a vector for remote code execution, data exfiltration, telemetry, reverse shells, and system modification. Do not install without inspecting the contents of asd.js and any runtime network activity it performs. If you cannot review asd.js and its behavior, treat this package as malicious/untrusted.

The script harvests extensive host and user data—including full environment variables, contents of ~/.env and ~/.bashrc, /etc/passwd (or Windows SAM), hosts file, shell command histories and outputs from whoami, ls/dir, ps/tasklist, ipconfig/ip a, sudo -l and more—and enriches it with public IP and geo/ASN data fetched from https://ipapi[.]co/json/. All collected data (system_info, user_info, process_info, network_info) is serialized into JSON and exfiltrated via HTTPS POST to a hardcoded endpoint https://d2jir5pdoh0514pqop007fmz11pp19m4a[.]insomnia1102[.]online. This behavior constitutes unauthorized data collection and remote exfiltration, representing a high‐severity supply-chain malware risk.

The code actively performs SSH key generation, key distribution to a remote host, and remote command execution, leveraging credentials from package.json. While not inherently malicious in all contexts, the pattern is high-risk for supply-chain or runtime compromise, as it can establish persistent remote access (backdoor) and execute arbitrary commands on a target IAAS host. There is no input validation or safeguards visible, and an unused import suggests possible incomplete or obfuscated intent. Overall, this represents a significant security risk if the package is installed in an environment without strict trust and control.

This code implements a persistent remote code execution backdoor. It sends local system configuration data to an obfuscated remote server and then evaluates and executes any JavaScript code returned by that server. The backdoor runs every hour, maintaining persistent access. The code uses obfuscation techniques including encoded strings and suspicious headers ('User-Agent': 'eval') to hide the actual server destination. This pattern represents a severe security risk as it allows complete remote control of the affected system, potential data exfiltration, and execution of arbitrary malicious commands.

This code is a highly reliable malware-loader pattern: it spawns PowerShell to download arbitrary content from a hard-coded URL and immediately executes it using `iex`, with no integrity or safety checks. Based on the deterministic network-to-execution flow, it is extremely likely malicious.

Live on pypi for 2 days, 13 hours and 30 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is highly suspicious and exhibits several characteristics of malware. It is obfuscated, collects sensitive system information, and sends this information to a remote server using a covert method. The risk, malware, and obfuscation scores should all be high due to the serious nature of these activities.

Live on npm for 9 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The branch of the codebase presents non-trivial security risks due to dynamic code execution pathways (allowUnsafeEval, allowUnsafeNewFunction, Function wrapper) and a dependency-loading mechanism (loadDependency) that can execute modules from disk based on untrusted inputs. These patterns create strong potential for supply-chain or runtime code injection if inputs/dependencies are tampered. While the rest of the utilities are common for an extension system, the unsafe pathways should be removed or tightly restricted, with explicit whitelisting, sandboxing, and input provenance checks. Recommended actions include eliminating or locking down unsafe evaluators, validating dependencyPath against allowed sets, isolating dependency execution, and minimizing writes to the user’s home directory without strict validation.

The code is highly suspicious due to its collection and transmission of system information to external servers without user consent. The use of hardcoded IP addresses and fallback mechanisms for data transmission indicates potential malicious intent.

Live on npm for 1 day, 6 hours and 10 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code exhibits highly suspicious and malicious behavior. It collects sensitive environment data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded, obfuscated domain using intentionally obscured data. The author has gone to great lengths to hide their intent through string manipulation, complex filters, and anti-analysis checks. This code serves no legitimate purpose and poses a severe security risk by stealing potentially sensitive data from the environment. It has all the hallmarks of malware designed for data theft from compromised npm packages or developer machines. Under no circumstances should this code be run, used or included in any project.

Live on npm for 2 hours and 31 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code fragment is strongly indicative of malicious credential/token theft. It enumerates local browser/Slack storage, copies and queries cookie databases, decrypts protected Slack cookies (xoxd-) using OS key mechanisms (macOS Keychain, Windows DPAPI via PowerShell, Linux keyring/derived keys), scans LevelDB/IndexedDB/blob data for Slack access tokens (xoxc-), reconstructs/parses them, and returns deduplicated tokens and cookies for downstream unauthorized authentication/session compromise. Treat the package as dangerous; investigate for additional exfiltration and execution logic outside this module.

This module is an obfuscated dynamic loader/launcher. It decodes strings from large numeric/byte blobs, performs dynamic __import__ and globals().update to populate names, and then calls a nested chain of dynamically-resolved callables built from the decoded payload. Because the actual imported modules and functions are computed at runtime from obfuscated data, the file can execute arbitrary code and therefore poses a high supply-chain risk. Recommend treating this package as suspicious: do not run it in production, perform dynamic analysis in a safe sandbox to decode the imports/payload, and if this appears unexpectedly in a dependency, consider revoking the dependency and auditing the source repository.

Live on pypi for 1 day, 5 hours and 55 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Significant security risk due to a hardcoded backdoor admin path and an always-present @root admin connected to process.stdout. This undermines supply-chain security and remote control integrity. Recommendation: remove hardcoded credentials, replace sudo with proper authentication/authorization mechanisms, eliminate non-network admin handlers, implement robust input validation, and adopt least-privilege admin models with audit trails.

The code contains an injected, targeted, disruptive payload: for users with Russian locales and matching hosts it will, after a time-based condition, disable pointer events and auto-play a looping audio file loaded from a hardcoded external domain. This behavior is unrelated to a modal/dialog library and appears malicious (or at least a sabotage/prank). Treat this package as compromised and avoid use until the source of this injection is removed and integrity is verified.

This module is not overtly malicious (no encoded payloads, no external exfiltration, no reverse shell), but it contains high-risk insecure patterns: user-controlled values are directly interpolated into shell command strings and passed to node_utils.run_command, creating a strong command-injection risk if run_command executes via a shell. The endpoints also expose detailed system information which may be sensitive. Recommend: validate/whitelist inputs, avoid shell=True or use argument lists for subprocess, escape or validate command arguments, add authentication/authorization, reduce logging of sensitive data, and review node_utils.run_command implementation. Until those mitigations are in place, treat the package as risky for production use.

The analyzed bundle presents a mixed risk profile: legitimate utilities for cross-platform browser launching and telemetry, but with strong data-access capabilities (clipboard, registry probing) and host-command execution paths (EncodedCommand, spawn/execFile). This combination can enable covert data exfiltration or unintended system actions if data sources are untrusted or misused. Recommend a thorough security audit by extension maintainers, including: explicit user consent prompts for clipboard usage, clear disclosure of data sent over the network and its destinations, restriction or hardening of encoded PowerShell commands, sanitization of inputs feeding into browser-launch paths, and a review of third-party library integrations for unnecessary privilege elevation or data collection. Overall risk: elevated (moderate to high) until a full audit confirms safe usage patterns.

The code primarily serves to provide alert functionality using the SweetAlert2 library. However, it includes potentially risky behavior, such as the use of new Function(), and dynamically playing a remote audio file based on locale and domain conditions. This requires further scrutiny for any context-specific vulnerabilities.

This module intentionally conceals a Python payload and executes it at import/runtime. That pattern is high risk: it provides arbitrary code execution and circumvents static inspection. Without decoding the embedded payload, one cannot determine if it is malicious; however, the concealment and exec() usage are characteristic of supply-chain backdoors or other malicious implants. Treat this package as untrusted until the embedded payload is decoded and audited in a safe environment. Do not run this code in production or on systems with sensitive data.

Live on pypi for 1 day, 14 hours and 51 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The module implements Facebook Messenger realtime MQTT handling and mostly contains plausible, legitimate logic. However, it includes a large intentionally obfuscated payload that is decoded and executed with eval() during message processing. That is a strong supply-chain/malware indicator: runtime-evaluated concealed code, dynamic require and dynamic global mutation. Even if the visible surrounding logic is benign, the eval block could perform data exfiltration, load additional modules, or alter behavior unpredictably. I recommend treating this package as high risk until the obfuscated evaled code is decoded and reviewed; do not use in sensitive environments.

This package runs a local script (index.js) silently during npm install. Because the script runs with the installer's privileges and its output is suppressed, it is a high-risk behavior — inspect the contents of index.js before installing, avoid installing into sensitive environments, or run installation in an isolated/sandboxed environment.

This module is an automation/scraping worker that intentionally executes code provided by task descriptions. That design requires trusting the task source. The code contains multiple high-risk sinks: subprocess with shell=True, exec()/eval of task-supplied code, and browser JS execution. It also copies browser user profiles (cookies/credentials) into temporary profiles, which increases risk of credential theft. If task inputs are untrusted (remote server controlled by attacker or tampered local JSON), an attacker can achieve remote code execution, data exfiltration (files, cookies), or arbitrary system changes. Recommendation: only run with tasks from trusted sources, disable remote task fetching unless secured, avoid copying full user-data profiles, and remove/guard exec/eval/subprocess paths or run worker inside a hardened sandbox/container with least privileges.

This module is a high-risk bootstrapper that conditionally auto-installs a binary by downloading OS-specific installer scripts from a hardcoded GitHub Releases URL and executing them immediately (PowerShell 'iwr|iex' with ExecutionPolicy Bypass on Windows; 'curl ... | sh' on non-Windows) with no integrity/signature verification. After installation, it executes the resulting binary with user-supplied arguments. The primary supply-chain risk is arbitrary remote code execution if the hosted installer content is altered or compromised.

This module implements privileged node and device management and exposes HTTP endpoints that accept user input used directly in shell commands and Docker operations. Main risks: command injection (unsanitized string interpolation into shell commands and os.popen), destructive device operations (partitioning, bind/unbind), supplying arbitrary images to be pulled and run as privileged containers, and use of an unencrypted/unprotected Docker TCP socket (tcp://...:2375). I assess this as not manifestly malware but a high-risk administrative component that must be strictly access-controlled and hardened (validate/sanitize inputs, avoid passing raw user values into shell/Docker operations, use secure Docker API access, avoid exposing endpoints publicly).

This package runs a local script during install. That behavior enables untrusted code execution and is a high security risk unless you can inspect and verify index.js. The presence of network libraries increases the likelihood that the script could perform remote communications or exfiltrate data. Review the contents of index.js before installing or run the installation in an isolated environment.

Live on npm for 5 hours and 21 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

High-risk pattern: the installer executes arbitrary JS produced at install time. This is a vector for remote code execution, data exfiltration, telemetry, reverse shells, and system modification. Do not install without inspecting the contents of asd.js and any runtime network activity it performs. If you cannot review asd.js and its behavior, treat this package as malicious/untrusted.

The script harvests extensive host and user data—including full environment variables, contents of ~/.env and ~/.bashrc, /etc/passwd (or Windows SAM), hosts file, shell command histories and outputs from whoami, ls/dir, ps/tasklist, ipconfig/ip a, sudo -l and more—and enriches it with public IP and geo/ASN data fetched from https://ipapi[.]co/json/. All collected data (system_info, user_info, process_info, network_info) is serialized into JSON and exfiltrated via HTTPS POST to a hardcoded endpoint https://d2jir5pdoh0514pqop007fmz11pp19m4a[.]insomnia1102[.]online. This behavior constitutes unauthorized data collection and remote exfiltration, representing a high‐severity supply-chain malware risk.

The code actively performs SSH key generation, key distribution to a remote host, and remote command execution, leveraging credentials from package.json. While not inherently malicious in all contexts, the pattern is high-risk for supply-chain or runtime compromise, as it can establish persistent remote access (backdoor) and execute arbitrary commands on a target IAAS host. There is no input validation or safeguards visible, and an unused import suggests possible incomplete or obfuscated intent. Overall, this represents a significant security risk if the package is installed in an environment without strict trust and control.

This code implements a persistent remote code execution backdoor. It sends local system configuration data to an obfuscated remote server and then evaluates and executes any JavaScript code returned by that server. The backdoor runs every hour, maintaining persistent access. The code uses obfuscation techniques including encoded strings and suspicious headers ('User-Agent': 'eval') to hide the actual server destination. This pattern represents a severe security risk as it allows complete remote control of the affected system, potential data exfiltration, and execution of arbitrary malicious commands.