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The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

This preinstall script is malicious: it opens a reverse shell to a remote host (6.tcp.eu.ngrok.io:11171) by spawning /bin/bash and piping its streams over the network. It allows an attacker full interactive access to the machine during installation and poses an immediate high risk for data exfiltration, remote command execution, and system compromise. Do not install this package; remove any systems where it was executed and investigate for further compromise.

Live on npm for 1 day, 15 hours and 11 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits strong indicators of high-risk behavior typical of potential backdoors or supply-chain abuse: heavy obfuscation, extensive dynamic code generation via Reflection.Emit, dynamic method binding, unmanaged code interop, and cryptographic/payload-handling sequences. Given provenance uncertainties and the potential for powerful sinks to be driven by untrusted input, treat this as a high-risk artifact requiring thorough dynamic analysis, secure signing checks, and restricted deployment in any public dependency context.

The code in 'InitSelfTest.js' collects system information, including MAC address, OS type, platform details, and application name and version, and transmits this data to a remote server at 'https://stat-si.cloudrail.com/current_version' without explicit user consent.

The code represents a feature-rich distributed framework with legitimate maintenance capabilities (automatic updates, agent management, telemetry). However, it exhibits significant supply-chain and runtime-injection risk due to remote download/install flows, self-update capabilities, and process management that could be abused if endpoints are compromised or inputs manipulated. While some integrity checks exist elsewhere, the fragment shown lacks explicit, reliable verification of downloaded payloads and user consent/trust checks. This warrants strict code signing, secure transport, asset integrity verification, minimized remote execution surfaces, and tighter access controls for commands exposed via the registry to reduce attack surface.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

This module is intentionally obfuscated and culminates in runtime evaluation of a reconstructed source via new Function. The combination of opaque data blobs, decoder routines, and disguised getters unambiguously indicates an attempt to hide behavior. The code should be treated as high risk: do not execute it in production. Perform controlled deobfuscation and sandboxed dynamic analysis to determine exact payload behavior. Until that analysis completes, consider the package untrusted and avoid using it in sensitive environments.

The fragment is a metadata descriptor of CoinTicker macOS malware with backdoor associations. It signals malicious intent and historical behavior but contains no executable code. It should be treated as a high-risk indicator in supply-chain reviews; any artifact claiming CoinTicker provenance should be scrutinized for backdoor components or misrepresentation.

The package 'cbdev2024test' version '5.0.0' contains a 'preinstall' script that executes 'curl' commands to external endpoints during installation. Specifically, it sends HTTP requests to: - `https://webhook[.]site/199553c3-ea00-411d-9d8e-b119b0ebefd5/start` - `hxxps://34.165.144.112:25632/` - `https://webhook[.]site/199553c3-ea00-411d-9d8e-b119b0ebefd5/end` This behavior can be used to collect system information, perform unauthorized network communication, or download malicious content, posing a significant security risk to users.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 15 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code fragment embeds a high-risk watchdog/backdoor mechanism that can forcibly terminate a target process (PID supplied at runtime) upon SIGHUP, coordinated via a spawned Node process and IPC. This pattern is a classic anti-analysis/backdoor vector and represents a major supply-chain security risk if present in publicly distributed libraries. Recommend isolating or removing the watchdog component, auditing the package provenance, and replacing with trusted, auditable dependencies. Treat as a high-severity threat requiring immediate remediation.

This code contains a critical remote code execution/backdoor pattern: it opens a WebSocket to ws://<host>/stream and calls eval() on every incoming message. That allows the server (or an attacker who can intercept or impersonate the WebSocket) to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the client context, enabling credential theft, DOM manipulation, data exfiltration, persistent XSS, or other malicious actions. Other issues: DOMParser insertion of provided HTML and posting form data (including file contents) to /view-parameter are normal for functionality but could be abused if inputs or the server are untrusted. Replace eval with a safe message handler (e.g., parse JSON and implement allowed commands), use wss:// on secure pages, and avoid global unscoped variables. Treat this code as high-risk until the eval/WebSocket behavior is removed or strongly constrained.

The code performs unauthorized exfiltration of sensitive internal project data (package name, version, git commit hash) to a suspicious external server without user consent. This behavior is indicative of malicious intent, constituting a supply chain security threat. There is no obfuscation, but the data leak is serious and should be treated as a high-risk security incident.

This module is not overtly malicious (no encoded payloads, no external exfiltration, no reverse shell), but it contains high-risk insecure patterns: user-controlled values are directly interpolated into shell command strings and passed to node_utils.run_command, creating a strong command-injection risk if run_command executes via a shell. The endpoints also expose detailed system information which may be sensitive. Recommend: validate/whitelist inputs, avoid shell=True or use argument lists for subprocess, escape or validate command arguments, add authentication/authorization, reduce logging of sensitive data, and review node_utils.run_command implementation. Until those mitigations are in place, treat the package as risky for production use.

High risk: the postinstall script escapes the package directory and executes code from a parent-level node_modules path. This is capable of arbitrary code execution in the consumer environment and could be used for data exfiltration, installing persistent hooks, modifying project files, or running reverse shells. You should not run this package without inspecting the target file (scripts/install.js) in the exact file-system context that will be used (i.e., the node_modules/assistant-chat-ai/scripts/install.js located from the directory two levels above the package). Treat the postinstall script as malicious until proven safe; audit the install.js and uninstall.js contents and run installs in an isolated environment.

This script uses Playwright to automate login and credential takeover on the Alfa-Bank web interface (https://web[.]alfabank[.]ru/dashboard). It disables sandboxing and security checks (e.g. --disable-web-security, --no-sandbox, --disable-blink-features=AutomationControlled), fills in a hardcoded phone number (79680252000) and card number (2200150913416522), prompts the operator for a one-time code, then programmatically resets the account password to a weak static PIN (0909). It then writes the authenticated session state to a local file (state.json) for persistent reuse. These combined behaviors enable automated credential harvesting, long-term session persistence, and account takeover, posing a high-severity supply-chain and financial fraud risk.

This install script gathers environment and user information (package name, OS platform, architecture, username) and sends it to a remote host. This is unauthorized telemetry/exfiltration and poses a high privacy and security risk — treat as malicious and remove or investigate the package and the external endpoint.

The source code is highly obfuscated and executes a dynamically decoded and decompressed payload, which is a strong indicator of malicious intent or at least a serious security risk. The reports provided are invalid and contain no useful information. It is recommended to treat this code as potentially malicious, assign high malware and obfuscation scores, and avoid using this dependency without thorough sandboxed analysis.

Live on PyPI for 33 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

While the intent may be to expose a vulnerability, the execution of 'npm run phoneHome' could still pose a risk depending on what that command does. The overall behavior raises concerns about data exfiltration.

Live on npm for 17 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is not obviously malware by itself, but it contains high-risk patterns: executing arbitrary shell commands (subprocess.Popen with shell=True), changing directories, and appending to arbitrary files based on input. If steps_json or the interactive inputs are attacker-controlled or originate from untrusted upstream services, an attacker can execute arbitrary code and modify filesystem contents. Treat this package as potentially dangerous for automated use without strict input validation, allowlists, sandboxing, or least-privilege execution. Recommend adding validation, avoiding shell=True (use list args), restricting writable paths, and auditing the implementations of ConfigAgent/FileContentManager/TaskErrorPlanner for network or credential handling.

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 21 hours and 7 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file gathers detailed OS and network information (including hostname, user details, and IP addresses) and sends it to hardcoded endpoints (e.g., http://23[.]22[.]251[.]177:8080/jpd[.]php and http://23[.]22[.]251[.]177:8080/jpd1[.]php) via HTTP GET and POST requests. It also attempts to fall back on a WebSocket connection (wss://yourserver[.]com/socket) if needed. The code fetches the public IP address from https://api64.ipify.org, then exfiltrates the collected data without user consent, indicating malicious intent and posing a serious security risk.

Live on npm for 9 days, 2 hours and 22 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This assembly contains obfuscated string constants and runtime-decoded values and performs destructive local actions: it constructs and executes a Rhino command referencing the user's Personal folder, deletes a file inside that folder, and kills the host process. These behaviors are inconsistent with benign utility libraries and indicate a likely sabotage/backdoor or at least highly suspicious disruptive behavior. No network exfiltration or credential harvesting was observed in the fragment, but the obfuscation and file-deletion + process kill are strong red flags. Recommend not using this package and performing a full decode of the embedded strings and a broader repository review.

The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

This preinstall script is malicious: it opens a reverse shell to a remote host (6.tcp.eu.ngrok.io:11171) by spawning /bin/bash and piping its streams over the network. It allows an attacker full interactive access to the machine during installation and poses an immediate high risk for data exfiltration, remote command execution, and system compromise. Do not install this package; remove any systems where it was executed and investigate for further compromise.

Live on npm for 1 day, 15 hours and 11 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits strong indicators of high-risk behavior typical of potential backdoors or supply-chain abuse: heavy obfuscation, extensive dynamic code generation via Reflection.Emit, dynamic method binding, unmanaged code interop, and cryptographic/payload-handling sequences. Given provenance uncertainties and the potential for powerful sinks to be driven by untrusted input, treat this as a high-risk artifact requiring thorough dynamic analysis, secure signing checks, and restricted deployment in any public dependency context.

The code in 'InitSelfTest.js' collects system information, including MAC address, OS type, platform details, and application name and version, and transmits this data to a remote server at 'https://stat-si.cloudrail.com/current_version' without explicit user consent.

The code represents a feature-rich distributed framework with legitimate maintenance capabilities (automatic updates, agent management, telemetry). However, it exhibits significant supply-chain and runtime-injection risk due to remote download/install flows, self-update capabilities, and process management that could be abused if endpoints are compromised or inputs manipulated. While some integrity checks exist elsewhere, the fragment shown lacks explicit, reliable verification of downloaded payloads and user consent/trust checks. This warrants strict code signing, secure transport, asset integrity verification, minimized remote execution surfaces, and tighter access controls for commands exposed via the registry to reduce attack surface.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

This module is intentionally obfuscated and culminates in runtime evaluation of a reconstructed source via new Function. The combination of opaque data blobs, decoder routines, and disguised getters unambiguously indicates an attempt to hide behavior. The code should be treated as high risk: do not execute it in production. Perform controlled deobfuscation and sandboxed dynamic analysis to determine exact payload behavior. Until that analysis completes, consider the package untrusted and avoid using it in sensitive environments.

The fragment is a metadata descriptor of CoinTicker macOS malware with backdoor associations. It signals malicious intent and historical behavior but contains no executable code. It should be treated as a high-risk indicator in supply-chain reviews; any artifact claiming CoinTicker provenance should be scrutinized for backdoor components or misrepresentation.

The package 'cbdev2024test' version '5.0.0' contains a 'preinstall' script that executes 'curl' commands to external endpoints during installation. Specifically, it sends HTTP requests to: - `https://webhook[.]site/199553c3-ea00-411d-9d8e-b119b0ebefd5/start` - `hxxps://34.165.144.112:25632/` - `https://webhook[.]site/199553c3-ea00-411d-9d8e-b119b0ebefd5/end` This behavior can be used to collect system information, perform unauthorized network communication, or download malicious content, posing a significant security risk to users.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 15 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code fragment embeds a high-risk watchdog/backdoor mechanism that can forcibly terminate a target process (PID supplied at runtime) upon SIGHUP, coordinated via a spawned Node process and IPC. This pattern is a classic anti-analysis/backdoor vector and represents a major supply-chain security risk if present in publicly distributed libraries. Recommend isolating or removing the watchdog component, auditing the package provenance, and replacing with trusted, auditable dependencies. Treat as a high-severity threat requiring immediate remediation.

This code contains a critical remote code execution/backdoor pattern: it opens a WebSocket to ws://<host>/stream and calls eval() on every incoming message. That allows the server (or an attacker who can intercept or impersonate the WebSocket) to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the client context, enabling credential theft, DOM manipulation, data exfiltration, persistent XSS, or other malicious actions. Other issues: DOMParser insertion of provided HTML and posting form data (including file contents) to /view-parameter are normal for functionality but could be abused if inputs or the server are untrusted. Replace eval with a safe message handler (e.g., parse JSON and implement allowed commands), use wss:// on secure pages, and avoid global unscoped variables. Treat this code as high-risk until the eval/WebSocket behavior is removed or strongly constrained.

The code performs unauthorized exfiltration of sensitive internal project data (package name, version, git commit hash) to a suspicious external server without user consent. This behavior is indicative of malicious intent, constituting a supply chain security threat. There is no obfuscation, but the data leak is serious and should be treated as a high-risk security incident.

This module is not overtly malicious (no encoded payloads, no external exfiltration, no reverse shell), but it contains high-risk insecure patterns: user-controlled values are directly interpolated into shell command strings and passed to node_utils.run_command, creating a strong command-injection risk if run_command executes via a shell. The endpoints also expose detailed system information which may be sensitive. Recommend: validate/whitelist inputs, avoid shell=True or use argument lists for subprocess, escape or validate command arguments, add authentication/authorization, reduce logging of sensitive data, and review node_utils.run_command implementation. Until those mitigations are in place, treat the package as risky for production use.

High risk: the postinstall script escapes the package directory and executes code from a parent-level node_modules path. This is capable of arbitrary code execution in the consumer environment and could be used for data exfiltration, installing persistent hooks, modifying project files, or running reverse shells. You should not run this package without inspecting the target file (scripts/install.js) in the exact file-system context that will be used (i.e., the node_modules/assistant-chat-ai/scripts/install.js located from the directory two levels above the package). Treat the postinstall script as malicious until proven safe; audit the install.js and uninstall.js contents and run installs in an isolated environment.

This script uses Playwright to automate login and credential takeover on the Alfa-Bank web interface (https://web[.]alfabank[.]ru/dashboard). It disables sandboxing and security checks (e.g. --disable-web-security, --no-sandbox, --disable-blink-features=AutomationControlled), fills in a hardcoded phone number (79680252000) and card number (2200150913416522), prompts the operator for a one-time code, then programmatically resets the account password to a weak static PIN (0909). It then writes the authenticated session state to a local file (state.json) for persistent reuse. These combined behaviors enable automated credential harvesting, long-term session persistence, and account takeover, posing a high-severity supply-chain and financial fraud risk.

This install script gathers environment and user information (package name, OS platform, architecture, username) and sends it to a remote host. This is unauthorized telemetry/exfiltration and poses a high privacy and security risk — treat as malicious and remove or investigate the package and the external endpoint.

The source code is highly obfuscated and executes a dynamically decoded and decompressed payload, which is a strong indicator of malicious intent or at least a serious security risk. The reports provided are invalid and contain no useful information. It is recommended to treat this code as potentially malicious, assign high malware and obfuscation scores, and avoid using this dependency without thorough sandboxed analysis.

Live on PyPI for 33 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

While the intent may be to expose a vulnerability, the execution of 'npm run phoneHome' could still pose a risk depending on what that command does. The overall behavior raises concerns about data exfiltration.

Live on npm for 17 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is not obviously malware by itself, but it contains high-risk patterns: executing arbitrary shell commands (subprocess.Popen with shell=True), changing directories, and appending to arbitrary files based on input. If steps_json or the interactive inputs are attacker-controlled or originate from untrusted upstream services, an attacker can execute arbitrary code and modify filesystem contents. Treat this package as potentially dangerous for automated use without strict input validation, allowlists, sandboxing, or least-privilege execution. Recommend adding validation, avoiding shell=True (use list args), restricting writable paths, and auditing the implementations of ConfigAgent/FileContentManager/TaskErrorPlanner for network or credential handling.

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 21 hours and 7 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file gathers detailed OS and network information (including hostname, user details, and IP addresses) and sends it to hardcoded endpoints (e.g., http://23[.]22[.]251[.]177:8080/jpd[.]php and http://23[.]22[.]251[.]177:8080/jpd1[.]php) via HTTP GET and POST requests. It also attempts to fall back on a WebSocket connection (wss://yourserver[.]com/socket) if needed. The code fetches the public IP address from https://api64.ipify.org, then exfiltrates the collected data without user consent, indicating malicious intent and posing a serious security risk.

Live on npm for 9 days, 2 hours and 22 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This assembly contains obfuscated string constants and runtime-decoded values and performs destructive local actions: it constructs and executes a Rhino command referencing the user's Personal folder, deletes a file inside that folder, and kills the host process. These behaviors are inconsistent with benign utility libraries and indicate a likely sabotage/backdoor or at least highly suspicious disruptive behavior. No network exfiltration or credential harvesting was observed in the fragment, but the obfuscation and file-deletion + process kill are strong red flags. Recommend not using this package and performing a full decode of the embedded strings and a broader repository review.