Secure your dependencies. Ship with confidence.

The script is highly suspicious and shows strong signs of malicious activity. It gathers sensitive data from the host machine and sends it to an external server. It also tries to open a reverse shell. This could lead to unauthorized access and control of the host machine.

Live on npm for 4 days, 21 hours and 51 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module intentionally transmits API keys (either a hardcoded default decoded from base64 or any user-provided key) to an external, non-OpenAI endpoint via HTTP POST. This is credential exfiltration and constitutes malicious or severely insecure supply-chain behavior. Do not use this code. Remove it, rotate any exposed API keys, block the destination domain, and investigate any use of the embedded key.

This module is a purpose-built destructive utility: given a user-supplied directory, it enumerates all files ending in .zip and corrupts them by truncating them to half their size and appending deterministic junk data. The absence of safeguards (dry-run/confirmation/allowlists) and the deliberate sabotage operations make this strongly indicative of malicious intent within a supply-chain context, even though it does not show typical malware capabilities like networking or data exfiltration.

The code actively collects host-identifying information and transmits it as JSON to a hardcoded remote IP/port, then overwrites the local Makefile to no-op build/install steps. These behaviors align with covert telemetry/exfiltration and workspace tampering typical of supply-chain compromise. The file should be treated as malicious or unauthorized and removed; a thorough repository and environment investigation is warranted.

This code collects sensitive local identifiers (home directory, hostname, username, current directory) and exfiltrates them to an external domain using both DNS queries (with hex-encoded values embedded in subdomains) and a direct HTTPS POST. It executes on load with no consent or protections. This behavior is consistent with malicious data-harvesting/supply-chain backdoor activity and the package should not be trusted or used.

This module implements a GUI chat application that integrates with OpenAI and provides features that allow arbitrary Python and shell command execution based on selected text or user input, and loads plugins from the filesystem. I did not find explicit hardcoded backdoor/network exfiltration to a suspicious external domain. However, the code exposes powerful dangerous sinks (exec, eval, subprocess.run(..., shell=True), os.system) directly to user-supplied or file-supplied content without sandboxing. This is a high security risk for accidental misuse or malicious plugins/content; treat the package as potentially dangerous in contexts where untrusted data or plugins may be present. Recommended mitigation: remove or require explicit confirmation for run-as-command features, sandbox or restrict exec/context, avoid shell=True, avoid eval, and never auto-run plugin code from untrusted locations.

Live on pypi for 38 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Malicious code designed to automate Facebook account takeover by systematically bypassing the platform's security checkpoint system. The code implements a four-phase process that navigates through Facebook's epsilon security verification: (1) STEPPER_CONFIRMATION with token extraction, (2) CONTACT_POINT_REVIEW to bypass contact verification, (3) CHANGE_PASSWORD for credential modification, and (4) OUTRO to finalize the compromise. It makes requests to facebook[.]com/checkpoint/ endpoints and facebook[.]com/api/graphql/ to extract LSD tokens and manipulate authentication flows. The Find_And_Parse function extracts sensitive tokens from HTML script tags, specifically targeting 'any_eligible_challenges' data. This represents a serious security threat that could be used to compromise user accounts without authorization by circumventing Facebook's multi-factor security verification mechanisms.

The code permits runtime evaluation and loading of scripts discovered within its content, a capability that can be legitimate for dynamic features but poses strong security risks in supply chain contexts. Without sanitization, validation, or sandboxing, this pattern enables arbitrary code execution from untrusted input, increasing the risk of data leakage, unauthorized actions, and potential compromise of the host page.

The code collects and sends sensitive system information to a potentially malicious domain, which is a significant privacy and security concern. The behavior aligns with data exfiltration patterns, indicating a high risk of malicious intent.

Live on npm for 15 days, 9 hours and 15 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This script intentionally downloads a prebuilt Python runtime and a separate remote payload and executes that payload by piping it into the downloaded Python interpreter. The payload URL is mildly obfuscated via hex fragments. There is no integrity or authenticity verification for the downloaded tarball or the fetched payload. This results in straightforward remote code execution and supply-chain risk: if the remote resources are malicious or become compromised, arbitrary code will run on the host. Treat this as high-risk behavior: avoid running it in production or on sensitive hosts unless the sources are verified and additional safeguards (signatures, checksums, sandboxing) are added.

This module exposes multiple high-risk capabilities: arbitrary shell execution (subprocess.run with shell=True), process spawning from untrusted input, and unrestricted filesystem modification (create, move, copy, delete) based on user-provided parameters. There are no input validations, privilege checks or limits. I assess this as not clearly malicious by intent (it implements utility functions), but it is easily abuseable and dangerous in contexts where inputs are untrusted. Treat this code as high security risk if incorporated into environments that handle external input or run with elevated privileges.

The file contains code that secretly gathers detailed system information, such as hostname, OS type, platform, release, architecture, local IP addresses, public IP address (fetched via an external API), username, and current working directory. It then transmits this data to external endpoints via HTTP GET and POST requests, and uses a WebSocket connection as a fallback. The endpoints are hardcoded, for example, to URLs like http://example.com/jpd3.php, http://example.com/jpd4.php, and wss://example.com/socket, which are not transparent or verified services. This behavior is indicative of malware designed for unauthorized data exfiltration.

This setup.py contains deliberate concealment (encrypted payload + hardcoded key) and performs runtime decryption and exec() during installation on Windows. That pattern is a high-confidence indicator of malicious behavior (supply-chain/backdoor). Do not install or run this package; consider any systems where it was installed compromised and perform incident response. The exact payload cannot be fully assessed without executing decrypted code (which is unsafe), but the presence of decryption+exec and network-capable imports suffices to classify it as malicious.

Live on pypi for 59 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code implements a malicious install-time behavior: it downloads an archive from a suspicious hard-coded URL, extracts it to disk and attempts to run an executable during package installation. This is a high-risk supply-chain/backdoor behavior (remote code download and execution). Treat the package as malicious/untrusted, do not run setup.py from untrusted sources, and investigate any machine where this was executed.

The snippet signals malicious intent (runtime/container injection/backdoor-like manipulation) but provides no actionable code. If implemented, this would present a high-severity supply-chain and runtime security risk requiring immediate scrutiny, containment, and removal from any build or deployment pipeline.

The script collects various details about the system, including package information, user and directory info, and DNS servers. The data is then sent to a remote server using HTTPS.

Live on npm for 1 day, 12 hours and 2 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This package runs a local installation script that, per its description, performs network requests to track usage. Even if intended for research, telemetry executed at install time is a high security risk (data exfiltration and untrusted code execution). Inspect install.js before installing or avoid installing in production environments; treat this as suspicious and high-risk.

Live on npm for 2 days, 3 hours and 38 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is high risk and should be treated as untrusted until the embedded payload is decoded and audited. The combination of a large embedded blob and an immediate exec at import is a common malicious pattern because it prevents code review and enables arbitrary actions. Do not import or use this package in production. If you must analyze it, decode/decompress the payload in a isolated environment and fully audit the resulting code before granting trust.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

This module is an interactive email-sending tool that uses hardcoded Gmail credentials and provides multiple modes to send a large number of emails (including potentially infinite loops). The presence of embedded username/password and functionality aimed at mass email/splitting messages is a serious supply-chain and abuse risk: it can be used for spamming or account misuse. The code as provided is syntactically broken in places, but intent and dangerous behavior are clear. Recommend not using or publishing this module with embedded credentials and to treat it as high-risk for abuse.

The source code contains a reverse shell implementation, which is a serious security risk. It allows remote command execution on the host machine, indicating malicious intent.

Live on npm for 26 days, 10 hours and 49 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This package will execute a local script during installation. That behavior is a common vector for malicious activity in npm packages. You should inspect index.js before installing or remove/disable the preinstall script. If you cannot inspect it, treat the package as potentially risky.

This lockfile contains a notable supply-chain red flag: event-stream@3.3.4 (a version historically associated with a compromise). Combined with git-based dependencies and many network/telemetry libraries, this creates a non-trivial supply-chain risk. I recommend immediate remediation: remove or update any reference that pulls event-stream@3.3.4, audit and replace git dependencies where feasible, and perform a full package tarball inspection and runtime audit before use in production.

The script is highly suspicious and shows strong signs of malicious activity. It gathers sensitive data from the host machine and sends it to an external server. It also tries to open a reverse shell. This could lead to unauthorized access and control of the host machine.

Live on npm for 4 days, 21 hours and 51 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module intentionally transmits API keys (either a hardcoded default decoded from base64 or any user-provided key) to an external, non-OpenAI endpoint via HTTP POST. This is credential exfiltration and constitutes malicious or severely insecure supply-chain behavior. Do not use this code. Remove it, rotate any exposed API keys, block the destination domain, and investigate any use of the embedded key.

This module is a purpose-built destructive utility: given a user-supplied directory, it enumerates all files ending in .zip and corrupts them by truncating them to half their size and appending deterministic junk data. The absence of safeguards (dry-run/confirmation/allowlists) and the deliberate sabotage operations make this strongly indicative of malicious intent within a supply-chain context, even though it does not show typical malware capabilities like networking or data exfiltration.

The code actively collects host-identifying information and transmits it as JSON to a hardcoded remote IP/port, then overwrites the local Makefile to no-op build/install steps. These behaviors align with covert telemetry/exfiltration and workspace tampering typical of supply-chain compromise. The file should be treated as malicious or unauthorized and removed; a thorough repository and environment investigation is warranted.

This code collects sensitive local identifiers (home directory, hostname, username, current directory) and exfiltrates them to an external domain using both DNS queries (with hex-encoded values embedded in subdomains) and a direct HTTPS POST. It executes on load with no consent or protections. This behavior is consistent with malicious data-harvesting/supply-chain backdoor activity and the package should not be trusted or used.

This module implements a GUI chat application that integrates with OpenAI and provides features that allow arbitrary Python and shell command execution based on selected text or user input, and loads plugins from the filesystem. I did not find explicit hardcoded backdoor/network exfiltration to a suspicious external domain. However, the code exposes powerful dangerous sinks (exec, eval, subprocess.run(..., shell=True), os.system) directly to user-supplied or file-supplied content without sandboxing. This is a high security risk for accidental misuse or malicious plugins/content; treat the package as potentially dangerous in contexts where untrusted data or plugins may be present. Recommended mitigation: remove or require explicit confirmation for run-as-command features, sandbox or restrict exec/context, avoid shell=True, avoid eval, and never auto-run plugin code from untrusted locations.

Live on pypi for 38 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Malicious code designed to automate Facebook account takeover by systematically bypassing the platform's security checkpoint system. The code implements a four-phase process that navigates through Facebook's epsilon security verification: (1) STEPPER_CONFIRMATION with token extraction, (2) CONTACT_POINT_REVIEW to bypass contact verification, (3) CHANGE_PASSWORD for credential modification, and (4) OUTRO to finalize the compromise. It makes requests to facebook[.]com/checkpoint/ endpoints and facebook[.]com/api/graphql/ to extract LSD tokens and manipulate authentication flows. The Find_And_Parse function extracts sensitive tokens from HTML script tags, specifically targeting 'any_eligible_challenges' data. This represents a serious security threat that could be used to compromise user accounts without authorization by circumventing Facebook's multi-factor security verification mechanisms.

The code permits runtime evaluation and loading of scripts discovered within its content, a capability that can be legitimate for dynamic features but poses strong security risks in supply chain contexts. Without sanitization, validation, or sandboxing, this pattern enables arbitrary code execution from untrusted input, increasing the risk of data leakage, unauthorized actions, and potential compromise of the host page.

The code collects and sends sensitive system information to a potentially malicious domain, which is a significant privacy and security concern. The behavior aligns with data exfiltration patterns, indicating a high risk of malicious intent.

Live on npm for 15 days, 9 hours and 15 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This script intentionally downloads a prebuilt Python runtime and a separate remote payload and executes that payload by piping it into the downloaded Python interpreter. The payload URL is mildly obfuscated via hex fragments. There is no integrity or authenticity verification for the downloaded tarball or the fetched payload. This results in straightforward remote code execution and supply-chain risk: if the remote resources are malicious or become compromised, arbitrary code will run on the host. Treat this as high-risk behavior: avoid running it in production or on sensitive hosts unless the sources are verified and additional safeguards (signatures, checksums, sandboxing) are added.

This module exposes multiple high-risk capabilities: arbitrary shell execution (subprocess.run with shell=True), process spawning from untrusted input, and unrestricted filesystem modification (create, move, copy, delete) based on user-provided parameters. There are no input validations, privilege checks or limits. I assess this as not clearly malicious by intent (it implements utility functions), but it is easily abuseable and dangerous in contexts where inputs are untrusted. Treat this code as high security risk if incorporated into environments that handle external input or run with elevated privileges.

The file contains code that secretly gathers detailed system information, such as hostname, OS type, platform, release, architecture, local IP addresses, public IP address (fetched via an external API), username, and current working directory. It then transmits this data to external endpoints via HTTP GET and POST requests, and uses a WebSocket connection as a fallback. The endpoints are hardcoded, for example, to URLs like http://example.com/jpd3.php, http://example.com/jpd4.php, and wss://example.com/socket, which are not transparent or verified services. This behavior is indicative of malware designed for unauthorized data exfiltration.

This setup.py contains deliberate concealment (encrypted payload + hardcoded key) and performs runtime decryption and exec() during installation on Windows. That pattern is a high-confidence indicator of malicious behavior (supply-chain/backdoor). Do not install or run this package; consider any systems where it was installed compromised and perform incident response. The exact payload cannot be fully assessed without executing decrypted code (which is unsafe), but the presence of decryption+exec and network-capable imports suffices to classify it as malicious.

Live on pypi for 59 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code implements a malicious install-time behavior: it downloads an archive from a suspicious hard-coded URL, extracts it to disk and attempts to run an executable during package installation. This is a high-risk supply-chain/backdoor behavior (remote code download and execution). Treat the package as malicious/untrusted, do not run setup.py from untrusted sources, and investigate any machine where this was executed.

The snippet signals malicious intent (runtime/container injection/backdoor-like manipulation) but provides no actionable code. If implemented, this would present a high-severity supply-chain and runtime security risk requiring immediate scrutiny, containment, and removal from any build or deployment pipeline.

The script collects various details about the system, including package information, user and directory info, and DNS servers. The data is then sent to a remote server using HTTPS.

Live on npm for 1 day, 12 hours and 2 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This package runs a local installation script that, per its description, performs network requests to track usage. Even if intended for research, telemetry executed at install time is a high security risk (data exfiltration and untrusted code execution). Inspect install.js before installing or avoid installing in production environments; treat this as suspicious and high-risk.

Live on npm for 2 days, 3 hours and 38 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is high risk and should be treated as untrusted until the embedded payload is decoded and audited. The combination of a large embedded blob and an immediate exec at import is a common malicious pattern because it prevents code review and enables arbitrary actions. Do not import or use this package in production. If you must analyze it, decode/decompress the payload in a isolated environment and fully audit the resulting code before granting trust.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

This module is an interactive email-sending tool that uses hardcoded Gmail credentials and provides multiple modes to send a large number of emails (including potentially infinite loops). The presence of embedded username/password and functionality aimed at mass email/splitting messages is a serious supply-chain and abuse risk: it can be used for spamming or account misuse. The code as provided is syntactically broken in places, but intent and dangerous behavior are clear. Recommend not using or publishing this module with embedded credentials and to treat it as high-risk for abuse.

The source code contains a reverse shell implementation, which is a serious security risk. It allows remote command execution on the host machine, indicating malicious intent.

Live on npm for 26 days, 10 hours and 49 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This package will execute a local script during installation. That behavior is a common vector for malicious activity in npm packages. You should inspect index.js before installing or remove/disable the preinstall script. If you cannot inspect it, treat the package as potentially risky.

This lockfile contains a notable supply-chain red flag: event-stream@3.3.4 (a version historically associated with a compromise). Combined with git-based dependencies and many network/telemetry libraries, this creates a non-trivial supply-chain risk. I recommend immediate remediation: remove or update any reference that pulls event-stream@3.3.4, audit and replace git dependencies where feasible, and perform a full package tarball inspection and runtime audit before use in production.