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The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

This script is potentially malicious as it sends sensitive environment variables to a remote server without any clear legitimate purpose. It could be used for data exfiltration or unauthorized access.

Live on npm for 15 days, 13 hours and 58 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The source code is heavily obfuscated and employs dynamic code execution and anti-debugging techniques typical of malicious scripts. While no explicit malicious actions (e.g., network communication or data theft) are directly visible, the code's design strongly suggests it is either malicious or extremely high risk. The provided reports are invalid and uninformative. This code should be treated as suspicious and potentially dangerous, warranting thorough manual review and dynamic analysis before use.

This code functions as a malware-enabling packer/dropper builder: it reads arbitrary files, applies obfuscating transforms and weak custom encryption, embeds payloads into Python stubs that decode and exec at runtime, and can package them into Windows executables via PyInstaller. Treat this module and artifacts produced by it as malicious. Avoid execution and distribution; perform further forensic review in an isolated environment if needed.

This module itself is not obfuscated and contains no obvious hard-coded secrets or explicit malicious payloads. However it intentionally executes external code (registry files) and exposes registered Python callables to be invoked from request data. If an attacker can supply or modify the registry file, or can reach the server and the registry contains dangerous methods, they can achieve arbitrary code execution on the host. Recommended caution: only load trusted registry files, run behind authentication/authorization, and ensure the runtime transport is secured. For untrusted environments, treat this as high-risk functionality.

This module is designed to harvest a Discord bot token resulting from automated bot creation/reset. It uses multiple token extraction techniques (network response parsing, DOM scraping, and clipboard reading), then persists the token to local disk and logs/returns it. It also uses runtime dependency installation and persistent browser profiles, further increasing risk. The behavior is strongly consistent with malicious credential/secret theft and subsequent account/bot abuse.

The Deployment class exhibits multiple high-risk patterns: hardcoded credentials, webhook-triggered remote code updates, privileged system modifications, and network interactions that could be leveraged for data exfiltration or host compromise. While some deployment tooling is legitimate, the embedded secrets and broad privileged capabilities present meaningful supply-chain and host-security risks. Recommendation: remove all hardcoded credentials, avoid executing privileged actions from PHP in production, secure webhooks with robust authentication, isolate DNS/Apache changes behind secure pipelines, and eliminate dynamic autoload injection that could be abused. Treat as medium-to-high risk with potential for significant impact if compromised.

This module intentionally accesses local Slack Desktop artifacts (LevelDB and Cookies), reads the macOS Keychain entry for 'Slack Safe Storage' to decrypt Chromium cookies, and uses those credentials in a headless browser to obtain a live Slack API token and perform API actions (list messages, send messages, add reactions). Functionally, it extracts credentials and performs account actions on behalf of the user. That behavior can be used for legitimate automation or testing, but it is high-risk from a supply-chain/malicious standpoint because it harvests sensitive authentication material and performs remote actions. Treat this package as potentially dangerous: only run in trusted, explicitly authorized contexts.

This module is a high-risk runtime packer/dropper: it embeds an encrypted payload, decrypts it using a user-supplied passphrase, writes the result to `bin/do-setup-circleci-secrets`, and immediately executes it. Because there is no integrity/authenticity validation of the decrypted artifact and the executed code is not shown here, the module should be treated as potentially malicious until the decrypted `bin/do-setup-circleci-secrets` content is inspected and validated in a safe environment.

This script establishes a stealthy, persistent SSH local port forward from the host (local port 9999) to remote host 67.202.15.57 targeting remote localhost:27017. On machines matching the specified hostnames, this effectively exposes or forwards access to a local service (likely a database on port 27017) to an external host, creating a backdoor/exfiltration channel. The hard-coded IP, root user, targeted hostnames, backgrounded nohup invocation, and output redirection are strong indicators of malicious or unauthorized behavior. Recommend removing/ quarantining this script, auditing SSH keys and authorized connections on affected hosts, and investigating connections to 67.202.15.57.

This module strongly matches a malicious supply-chain loader/packer pattern: it reconstructs hidden strings/functions at runtime, uses new Function for dynamic execution, mutates module/export bindings via computed keys, bridges browser/Node contexts, and explicitly parses and extracts targeted values from document.cookie. While network exfiltration targets are not shown in the provided fragment, the presence of sensitive cookie harvesting and dynamic execution warrants treating the dependency as high security risk and investigating the full package behavior and integrity.

This module contains explicit data-exfiltration behavior: a plaintext Telegram bot token and an unconditional upload of a specific local file to a remote Telegram chat when executed. In a repository or dependency this constitutes a high-risk backdoor and credential leak. Treat as malicious/unsafe for reuse in packages; revoke the token and remove or modify the code to require explicit, authenticated configuration before any network file transfer.

The code exhibits potentially malicious behavior by automatically sending funds from a wallet derived from a seed phrase to 100 random addresses via a suspicious RPC endpoint. This behavior can lead to unauthorized fund loss and is consistent with malware designed to drain wallets. There is no obfuscation or direct evidence of data theft, but the financial risk is high. Users should be warned against using this code or providing their seed phrase to it.

This package was removed from npm. This code is malicious. It covertly collects and exfiltrates sensitive system and environment information to a suspicious remote server using multiple covert channels. The presence of a killswitch domain and silent error handling further indicate malware behavior. This package poses a high security risk and should be considered compromised and unsafe to use.

Live on npm for 3 hours and 23 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is an automation/scraping worker that intentionally executes code provided by task descriptions. That design requires trusting the task source. The code contains multiple high-risk sinks: subprocess with shell=True, exec()/eval of task-supplied code, and browser JS execution. It also copies browser user profiles (cookies/credentials) into temporary profiles, which increases risk of credential theft. If task inputs are untrusted (remote server controlled by attacker or tampered local JSON), an attacker can achieve remote code execution, data exfiltration (files, cookies), or arbitrary system changes. Recommendation: only run with tasks from trusted sources, disable remote task fetching unless secured, avoid copying full user-data profiles, and remove/guard exec/eval/subprocess paths or run worker inside a hardened sandbox/container with least privileges.

This package contains critical security vulnerabilities including code injection via eval() and potential SSRF through unvalidated network requests. The eval() usage allows arbitrary code execution making this extremely dangerous in production environments.

This module implements privileged node and device management and exposes HTTP endpoints that accept user input used directly in shell commands and Docker operations. Main risks: command injection (unsanitized string interpolation into shell commands and os.popen), destructive device operations (partitioning, bind/unbind), supplying arbitrary images to be pulled and run as privileged containers, and use of an unencrypted/unprotected Docker TCP socket (tcp://...:2375). I assess this as not manifestly malware but a high-risk administrative component that must be strictly access-controlled and hardened (validate/sanitize inputs, avoid passing raw user values into shell/Docker operations, use secure Docker API access, avoid exposing endpoints publicly).

The code is highly suspicious due to its collection and transmission of system information to external servers without user consent. The use of hardcoded IP addresses and fallback mechanisms for data transmission indicates potential malicious intent.

Live on npm for 2 hours and 6 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The script is not necessarily malicious, but it does involve dubious practices like automated publishing of npm packages and programmatically updating a WordPress site. It is also insecure due to the hardcoding of credentials and the potential misuse of automated npm package publishing.

Live on npm for 6 hours and 29 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is designed to exfiltrate system and user data to external servers without user consent, indicating malicious behavior. The use of an infinite loop for directory traversal and data transmission to suspicious domains further supports this conclusion.

Live on npm for 12 days and 20 hours before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is a runtime loader/stager that decodes and executes obfuscated embedded payloads. The top-level exec and subsequent calls to runtime-defined, obfuscated functions are high-risk patterns consistent with malicious loaders/backdoors or stealthy supply-chain artifacts. Treat the package as potentially malicious: do not import or run it in trusted environments; analyze payloads only in a strictly isolated sandbox. Further definitive determination requires decompressing and inspecting the embedded payloads in a controlled environment.

This module is a highly likely malicious supply-chain trojan: it executes automatically during package installation, downloads a remote VBScript from a hardcoded external URL into the user’s TEMP directory, and runs it hidden using PowerShell with an execution-policy bypass. There is no verification of payload integrity and no benign rationale in the code path.

Live on pypi for 2 hours and 11 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The deploy.js hook contains a hard-coded, base64-encoded ZIP payload that is unpacked and deployed as a Node.js 8 function whose sole purpose is to return an environment variable named “token.” The script first calls an external API (fcAPI.token) to retrieve the token, injects it into both the function’s environmentVariables and the embedded function code, then creates an HTTP trigger at https://<account>.<region>.fc.aliyuncs[.]com/…, invokes fcAPI.domain with the token, and finally deletes the function and trigger. During its brief lifetime this backdoor-style function can be invoked by any caller to leak the token. Use of a deprecated runtime (nodejs8) and hidden payloads compounds the supply-chain risk. Recommend removing the embedded ZIP payload, upgrading to a supported runtime, and enforcing strict code-scan/allow-list controls to eliminate unintended credential exposure.

The code contains potential security risks due to the use of eval for dynamic module loading and hardcoded network operations. These could be exploited if not properly secured, leading to data leakage or unauthorized access.

Live on npm for 43 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

This script is potentially malicious as it sends sensitive environment variables to a remote server without any clear legitimate purpose. It could be used for data exfiltration or unauthorized access.

Live on npm for 15 days, 13 hours and 58 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The source code is heavily obfuscated and employs dynamic code execution and anti-debugging techniques typical of malicious scripts. While no explicit malicious actions (e.g., network communication or data theft) are directly visible, the code's design strongly suggests it is either malicious or extremely high risk. The provided reports are invalid and uninformative. This code should be treated as suspicious and potentially dangerous, warranting thorough manual review and dynamic analysis before use.

This code functions as a malware-enabling packer/dropper builder: it reads arbitrary files, applies obfuscating transforms and weak custom encryption, embeds payloads into Python stubs that decode and exec at runtime, and can package them into Windows executables via PyInstaller. Treat this module and artifacts produced by it as malicious. Avoid execution and distribution; perform further forensic review in an isolated environment if needed.

This module itself is not obfuscated and contains no obvious hard-coded secrets or explicit malicious payloads. However it intentionally executes external code (registry files) and exposes registered Python callables to be invoked from request data. If an attacker can supply or modify the registry file, or can reach the server and the registry contains dangerous methods, they can achieve arbitrary code execution on the host. Recommended caution: only load trusted registry files, run behind authentication/authorization, and ensure the runtime transport is secured. For untrusted environments, treat this as high-risk functionality.

This module is designed to harvest a Discord bot token resulting from automated bot creation/reset. It uses multiple token extraction techniques (network response parsing, DOM scraping, and clipboard reading), then persists the token to local disk and logs/returns it. It also uses runtime dependency installation and persistent browser profiles, further increasing risk. The behavior is strongly consistent with malicious credential/secret theft and subsequent account/bot abuse.

The Deployment class exhibits multiple high-risk patterns: hardcoded credentials, webhook-triggered remote code updates, privileged system modifications, and network interactions that could be leveraged for data exfiltration or host compromise. While some deployment tooling is legitimate, the embedded secrets and broad privileged capabilities present meaningful supply-chain and host-security risks. Recommendation: remove all hardcoded credentials, avoid executing privileged actions from PHP in production, secure webhooks with robust authentication, isolate DNS/Apache changes behind secure pipelines, and eliminate dynamic autoload injection that could be abused. Treat as medium-to-high risk with potential for significant impact if compromised.

This module intentionally accesses local Slack Desktop artifacts (LevelDB and Cookies), reads the macOS Keychain entry for 'Slack Safe Storage' to decrypt Chromium cookies, and uses those credentials in a headless browser to obtain a live Slack API token and perform API actions (list messages, send messages, add reactions). Functionally, it extracts credentials and performs account actions on behalf of the user. That behavior can be used for legitimate automation or testing, but it is high-risk from a supply-chain/malicious standpoint because it harvests sensitive authentication material and performs remote actions. Treat this package as potentially dangerous: only run in trusted, explicitly authorized contexts.

This module is a high-risk runtime packer/dropper: it embeds an encrypted payload, decrypts it using a user-supplied passphrase, writes the result to `bin/do-setup-circleci-secrets`, and immediately executes it. Because there is no integrity/authenticity validation of the decrypted artifact and the executed code is not shown here, the module should be treated as potentially malicious until the decrypted `bin/do-setup-circleci-secrets` content is inspected and validated in a safe environment.

This script establishes a stealthy, persistent SSH local port forward from the host (local port 9999) to remote host 67.202.15.57 targeting remote localhost:27017. On machines matching the specified hostnames, this effectively exposes or forwards access to a local service (likely a database on port 27017) to an external host, creating a backdoor/exfiltration channel. The hard-coded IP, root user, targeted hostnames, backgrounded nohup invocation, and output redirection are strong indicators of malicious or unauthorized behavior. Recommend removing/ quarantining this script, auditing SSH keys and authorized connections on affected hosts, and investigating connections to 67.202.15.57.

This module strongly matches a malicious supply-chain loader/packer pattern: it reconstructs hidden strings/functions at runtime, uses new Function for dynamic execution, mutates module/export bindings via computed keys, bridges browser/Node contexts, and explicitly parses and extracts targeted values from document.cookie. While network exfiltration targets are not shown in the provided fragment, the presence of sensitive cookie harvesting and dynamic execution warrants treating the dependency as high security risk and investigating the full package behavior and integrity.

This module contains explicit data-exfiltration behavior: a plaintext Telegram bot token and an unconditional upload of a specific local file to a remote Telegram chat when executed. In a repository or dependency this constitutes a high-risk backdoor and credential leak. Treat as malicious/unsafe for reuse in packages; revoke the token and remove or modify the code to require explicit, authenticated configuration before any network file transfer.

The code exhibits potentially malicious behavior by automatically sending funds from a wallet derived from a seed phrase to 100 random addresses via a suspicious RPC endpoint. This behavior can lead to unauthorized fund loss and is consistent with malware designed to drain wallets. There is no obfuscation or direct evidence of data theft, but the financial risk is high. Users should be warned against using this code or providing their seed phrase to it.

This package was removed from npm. This code is malicious. It covertly collects and exfiltrates sensitive system and environment information to a suspicious remote server using multiple covert channels. The presence of a killswitch domain and silent error handling further indicate malware behavior. This package poses a high security risk and should be considered compromised and unsafe to use.

Live on npm for 3 hours and 23 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is an automation/scraping worker that intentionally executes code provided by task descriptions. That design requires trusting the task source. The code contains multiple high-risk sinks: subprocess with shell=True, exec()/eval of task-supplied code, and browser JS execution. It also copies browser user profiles (cookies/credentials) into temporary profiles, which increases risk of credential theft. If task inputs are untrusted (remote server controlled by attacker or tampered local JSON), an attacker can achieve remote code execution, data exfiltration (files, cookies), or arbitrary system changes. Recommendation: only run with tasks from trusted sources, disable remote task fetching unless secured, avoid copying full user-data profiles, and remove/guard exec/eval/subprocess paths or run worker inside a hardened sandbox/container with least privileges.

This package contains critical security vulnerabilities including code injection via eval() and potential SSRF through unvalidated network requests. The eval() usage allows arbitrary code execution making this extremely dangerous in production environments.

This module implements privileged node and device management and exposes HTTP endpoints that accept user input used directly in shell commands and Docker operations. Main risks: command injection (unsanitized string interpolation into shell commands and os.popen), destructive device operations (partitioning, bind/unbind), supplying arbitrary images to be pulled and run as privileged containers, and use of an unencrypted/unprotected Docker TCP socket (tcp://...:2375). I assess this as not manifestly malware but a high-risk administrative component that must be strictly access-controlled and hardened (validate/sanitize inputs, avoid passing raw user values into shell/Docker operations, use secure Docker API access, avoid exposing endpoints publicly).

The code is highly suspicious due to its collection and transmission of system information to external servers without user consent. The use of hardcoded IP addresses and fallback mechanisms for data transmission indicates potential malicious intent.

Live on npm for 2 hours and 6 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The script is not necessarily malicious, but it does involve dubious practices like automated publishing of npm packages and programmatically updating a WordPress site. It is also insecure due to the hardcoding of credentials and the potential misuse of automated npm package publishing.

Live on npm for 6 hours and 29 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is designed to exfiltrate system and user data to external servers without user consent, indicating malicious behavior. The use of an infinite loop for directory traversal and data transmission to suspicious domains further supports this conclusion.

Live on npm for 12 days and 20 hours before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is a runtime loader/stager that decodes and executes obfuscated embedded payloads. The top-level exec and subsequent calls to runtime-defined, obfuscated functions are high-risk patterns consistent with malicious loaders/backdoors or stealthy supply-chain artifacts. Treat the package as potentially malicious: do not import or run it in trusted environments; analyze payloads only in a strictly isolated sandbox. Further definitive determination requires decompressing and inspecting the embedded payloads in a controlled environment.

This module is a highly likely malicious supply-chain trojan: it executes automatically during package installation, downloads a remote VBScript from a hardcoded external URL into the user’s TEMP directory, and runs it hidden using PowerShell with an execution-policy bypass. There is no verification of payload integrity and no benign rationale in the code path.

Live on pypi for 2 hours and 11 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The deploy.js hook contains a hard-coded, base64-encoded ZIP payload that is unpacked and deployed as a Node.js 8 function whose sole purpose is to return an environment variable named “token.” The script first calls an external API (fcAPI.token) to retrieve the token, injects it into both the function’s environmentVariables and the embedded function code, then creates an HTTP trigger at https://<account>.<region>.fc.aliyuncs[.]com/…, invokes fcAPI.domain with the token, and finally deletes the function and trigger. During its brief lifetime this backdoor-style function can be invoked by any caller to leak the token. Use of a deprecated runtime (nodejs8) and hidden payloads compounds the supply-chain risk. Recommend removing the embedded ZIP payload, upgrading to a supported runtime, and enforcing strict code-scan/allow-list controls to eliminate unintended credential exposure.

The code contains potential security risks due to the use of eval for dynamic module loading and hardcoded network operations. These could be exploited if not properly secured, leading to data leakage or unauthorized access.

Live on npm for 43 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.