A free safety scanner for x402 buyer clients — the code your AI agent uses to pay for APIs. It attacks your client with the mistakes we keep finding in the wild and tells you which ones it falls for. Zero runtime dependencies, no keys, no chain, nothing settled.

npx @deepfirstsearch/x402-scan lint https://some-x402-endpoint.example/paid

Why

See FINDINGS.md for what we found reviewing a sample of published x402 buyer clients.

An agent that pays over x402 signs a USDC authorization based on a 402 the server sends. If the client trusts that 402 blindly, a hijacked server, a poisoned DNS record or a prompt-injected page can take the agent's money. Scanning a sample of published x402 clients, the same few holes show up again and again:

it pays whatever payee the 402 names (no payee pinning);
it prices with the decimals the server declares, so a huge amount can look like a cent;
it signs whatever price the 402 asks, with no cap;
it signs authorizations valid for months;
it signs on any network or token the 402 names;
some even sign an unlimited ERC-2612 Permit from a 402.

Two ways to use it

1. Lint a live endpoint (no client, no code)

Fetches a URL and flags the traps in its 402 terms — the ones that fool a naive buyer:

npx @deepfirstsearch/x402-scan lint https://api.example.com/paid
npx @deepfirstsearch/x402-scan lint https://api.example.com/paid -X POST -d '{"q":"hi"}'

x402-scan lint https://api.example.com/paid → HTTP 402

✗ [permit] asks the buyer to sign an ERC-2612 Permit (an approval, often unlimited)...
✗ [declared_decimals] declares extra.decimals=18 for USDC (which has 6)...
! [long_timeout] authorization validity is 365 days; a buyer should cap it to minutes.

2 dangerous trap(s) in this 402.

2. Attack a known client — one command, no wiring

If you use one of the common buyer clients, grade it with a single command. Run it in a project where the client is installed; the scanner builds it the standard way with a throwaway key (no funds, nothing settled) and reports what it signs:

npx @deepfirstsearch/x402-scan client @x402/fetch
npx @deepfirstsearch/x402-scan client @x402/axios

x402-scan client @x402/fetch

· Honest seller (control)   paid the approved payee 0x1111…1111
✗ Swapped payee             signed a payment to the attacker 0x9999…9999
✓ Decimals trick            refused: nothing signed
✗ Price bump                signed 1000000 atomic units, above the owner's price of 10000
…
Grade: F — 4 of 5 safety checks failed.

Exit code is 0 only for grade A, so it drops straight into CI. More clients are easy to add — open an issue or a PR with the adapter.

Add --json to either command (client or lint) for machine-readable output with the same exit codes:

npx @deepfirstsearch/x402-scan client @x402/fetch --json   # { grade, failures, tests, results: [...] }
npx @deepfirstsearch/x402-scan lint <url> --json           # { status, dangers, findings: [...] }

3. Attack a custom client (library)

Point your client at the scanner's attack server and see what it signs. Pass a factory that makes a fresh client per attack, wired to pay the honest baseline (payee DEFAULTS.payTo, 0.01 USDC, Base Sepolia) with your normal settings:

import { scan, formatReport } from "@deepfirstsearch/x402-scan";

const report = await scan(() => createMyClient({ /* your config */ }).fetch);
console.log(formatReport(report));

· Honest seller (control)
    paid the approved payee 0x1111…1111
✗ Swapped payee
    signed a payment to the attacker 0x9999…9999
    fix: Pin the payee the owner approved for each origin and refuse any 402 that names another.
✓ Decimals trick
    refused the inflated amount
✗ Price bump
    signed 1000000 atomic units, above the owner's price of 10000
...
Grade: F — 4 of 5 safety checks failed.

The adapter is a (url: string) => Promise<unknown> that makes one paid request through your client to url. For a client that takes a custom fetch, baseURL or payment client, it's a couple of lines.

What it checks

Attack	A safe client…
Swapped payee	refuses a 402 whose `payTo` isn't the one pinned for that origin
Decimals trick	prices in the asset's atomic units; ignores server-declared decimals
Price bump	pins the price / caps the amount, and refuses or asks above it
Year-long authorization	caps the validity window to minutes
Foreign network / asset	signs only on the networks and assets the owner allowed
(lint) Permit	never signs an ERC-2612 Permit from a 402

The fix for everything it flags

A payee-pinning, budgeted policy layer that runs before any signature. That's exactly what Agent Safe is — but the checks above are good practice with or without it, and this scanner is MIT and standalone.

Develop

npm ci && npm test        # unit tests: a naive client fails every check, a safe client passes
npm run build

Reports are responsible: scanning a client or endpoint shows only your own result. We never publish a named result without coordinating with its maintainer first.