@enclave-vm/core - npm Package Compare versions

Comparing version 2.15.0 to 2.15.1

enclave.d.ts

@@ -84,2 +84,3 @@ /**
      */
+    private applyComputedKeyGuard;
     private applyMemoryTrackingTransforms;
@@ -86,0 +87,0 @@ /**

package.json

 {
   "name": "@enclave-vm/core",
-  "version": "2.15.0",
+  "version": "2.15.1",
   "description": "Sandbox runtime for secure JavaScript code execution",
@@ -47,4 +47,4 @@ "author": "AgentFront <[e-mail]>",
     "@babel/standalone": "^7.29.0",
-    "@enclave-vm/ast": "2.15.0",
-    "@enclave-vm/types": "2.15.0",
+    "@enclave-vm/ast": "2.15.1",
+    "@enclave-vm/types": "2.15.1",
     "@types/estree": "1.0.8",
@@ -51,0 +51,0 @@ "acorn": "8.15.0",

secure-proxy.d.ts

@@ -19,2 +19,19 @@ /**
 /**
+ * Absolute floor for the membrane recursion cap.
+ *
+ * The recursion counter is a stack-safety backstop, NOT a security control: every level of the
+ * membrane already blocks the dangerous properties, so the cap value never decides whether an
+ * escape is possible. Its only job is to stop pathological recursion. It must therefore sit
+ * comfortably above the deepest value that can legitimately reach the membrane (a tool result is
+ * pre-sanitized to at most `maxSanitizeDepth`, which peaks at 50), or legitimate deep data would
+ * be rejected (custom host globals are not sanitize-bounded, hence the generous ~5x headroom).
+ * The membrane is lazy (one property access = one wrap = O(1) synchronous stack), so a large
+ * value costs nothing. Exceeding the cap fails CLOSED (throws) — it must never hand back a raw
+ * target.
+ *
+ * Exported so tests can derive their traversal depth from the real cap instead of hardcoding a
+ * value that would silently rot if the cap changed.
+ */
+export declare const MIN_MEMBRANE_RECURSION_DEPTH = 256;
+/**
  * Categorized blocked properties for defense-in-depth
@@ -21,0 +38,0 @@ *

src/adapters/worker-pool/package.json

 {
   "name": "@enclave-vm/core",
-  "version": "2.15.0",
+  "version": "2.15.1",
   "description": "Sandbox runtime for secure JavaScript code execution",
@@ -49,4 +49,4 @@ "author": "AgentFront <[e-mail]>",
     "@babel/standalone": "^7.29.0",
-    "@enclave-vm/ast": "2.15.0",
-    "@enclave-vm/types": "2.15.0",
+    "@enclave-vm/ast": "2.15.1",
+    "@enclave-vm/types": "2.15.1",
     "@types/estree": "1.0.8",
@@ -53,0 +53,0 @@ "acorn": "8.15.0",

New alerts

Long strings

Supply chain risk

Contains long string literals, which may be a sign of obfuscated or packed code.

Fixed alerts

Long strings

Supply chain risk

Contains long string literals, which may be a sign of obfuscated or packed code.

Improved metrics

Total package byte prevSize

1194582

1.71%

Lines of code

32612

1.01%

Worsened metrics

Number of low supply chain risk alerts

49

4.26%

Dependency changes

• + Added

  @enclave-vm/ast@2.15.1
  (transitive)

• + Added

  @enclave-vm/types@2.15.1
  (transitive)

• - Removed

  @enclave-vm/ast@2.15.0
  (transitive)

• - Removed

  @enclave-vm/types@2.15.0
  (transitive)

• Updated

  @enclave-vm/ast@2.15.1

• Updated

  @enclave-vm/types@2.15.1