@graneth/mcp-server

@graneth/mcp-server

An account-free Model Context Protocol server that catches AI-hallucinated dependencies and hardcoded secrets in your staged changes before you commit — straight inside your AI coding agent.

Zero runtime dependencies (verify: npm view @graneth/mcp-server dependencies). A supply-chain security tool should be auditable in full — so the MCP/JSON-RPC layer is a small hand-rolled core, not a framework, and npm audit on a fresh install is clean.

It exposes a single, always-free tool over stdio:

pre_flight_check

Give it your staged files (path + content). It will:

• Detect hallucinated / slopsquatted packages — every package referenced in import statements and declared in manifests (package.json, requirements*.txt, Cargo.toml, go.mod, Gemfile, composer.json) is checked live against six registries: npm, PyPI, crates.io, RubyGems, the Go module proxy, and Packagist. A package that doesn't exist (404) is the hallmark of an AI-invented dependency an attacker may have pre-registered. → BLOCKED. A manifest that cannot be parsed is reported, never silently skipped, and an unreachable registry is reported as "could not verify" — never as clean. → REVIEW_REQUIRED.
• Catch KNOWN hallucinated names — even after an attacker registers them. A bundled snapshot of Graneth's public threat feed (curated + community tiers) is checked locally, with no network call. This is the case a live existence check cannot see: once a slopsquatter registers the name, the package exists — but the shared list keeps it BLOCKED. Community reports (see report_hallucination below) ship to every user at the next release.
• Flag brand-new packages (published < 30 days ago) — the prime slopsquatting attack window. → REVIEW_REQUIRED.
• Risk-score the dependencies your AI agent introduced — existence is only the start. A real package can still carry the shape attackers exploit: brand-new and running an install script and near-zero adoption and no provenance attestation. None of those trips a single alarm; compounded they do. An advisory dependency_risk_shape warning surfaces that stacked shape at generation time — explicitly a risk assessment, never a malware claim. → REVIEW_REQUIRED.
• Catch hardcoded secrets — known credential patterns (AWS, GitHub, Slack, OpenAI sk-…/sk-proj-…, Anthropic sk-ant-…, Stripe sk_live_…, PEM private keys) plus Shannon-entropy analysis with semantic variable-name context. → BLOCKED / REVIEW_REQUIRED. Vendor-documented sample keys and secrets in test/fixture files are downgraded to warnings — surfaced, but they won't block a commit.

No Graneth account, API key, or hosted backend is required. The checks run locally; the only network calls are to the public package registries (npm, PyPI, crates.io, RubyGems, proxy.golang.org, Packagist).

Install / run

npx -y @graneth/mcp-server

Configure your agent

Most clients take this exact JSON block; only the file it goes in (or the CLI command) differs. Codex is the exception — it configures MCP in TOML — and Zed names the block context_servers:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "graneth": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@graneth/mcp-server"]
    }
  }
}

Client	Add it via	Config location
Claude Code (CLI)	claude mcp add --transport stdio graneth -- npx -y @graneth/mcp-server	Writes to ~/.claude.json (local scope, default). Add --scope project to write a shareable .mcp.json at the repo root instead.
OpenAI Codex (CLI)	codex mcp add graneth -- npx -y @graneth/mcp-server · verify with codex mcp list	~/.codex/config.toml — TOML, not JSON: [mcp_servers.graneth] with command = "npx" and args = ["-y", "@graneth/mcp-server"]
Gemini CLI	gemini mcp add graneth npx -y @graneth/mcp-server — or paste the snippet above	~/.gemini/settings.json (user) or .gemini/settings.json (this project only)
Cursor	Paste the snippet above	~/.cursor/mcp.json (global) or <project-root>/.cursor/mcp.json (this project only)
VS Code (GitHub Copilot, agent mode)	One-click "Add to VS Code" on graneth.com	VS Code's own MCP registry (Copilot reads it; Claude Code does not)
Windsurf	Paste the snippet above	~/.codeium/windsurf/mcp_config.json (macOS/Linux) · %USERPROFILE%\.codeium\windsurf\mcp_config.json (Windows)
Zed	Paste into settings — the block is context_servers, with "source": "custom"	settings.json (user) or <project-root>/.zed/settings.json
Claude Desktop	Paste the snippet above	macOS: ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json · Windows: %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json
Any other MCP host	Point it at npx -y @graneth/mcp-server	Nothing here is client-specific: the server speaks MCP over stdio and answers initialize + tools/list like any other.

Then ask your agent to run pre_flight_check before suggesting a commit. A BLOCKED verdict means: do not commit until the CRITICAL findings are fixed.

Verdicts

Verdict	Meaning
CLEAR	No issues — safe to commit.
REVIEW_REQUIRED	Warnings to confirm (new packages, lower-confidence).
BLOCKED	Critical issues (non-existent package / secret) — do not commit.

Second tool: report_hallucination (opt-in contribution)

When pre_flight_check catches a name that doesn't exist, you can donate it to Graneth's public threat feed — one tool call, only after the human explicitly agrees (the tool description instructs the agent to ask first). What you get back: the name stays caught for every user even if an attacker registers the package later, and the feed entry can carry your public handle (reporter, optional).

Privacy is structural, not a promise:

• The call sends exactly one package name + ecosystem — never file contents. It is the only tool that talks to graneth.com, and only when invoked; pre_flight_check itself stays local + public registries.
• Only flat public namespaces are reportable (npm unscoped, PyPI, crates.io, RubyGems). Scoped npm names, Go module paths and composer vendor/ pairs are rejected by the server — that's where company-internal names live, and a public feed must not leak them.
• The server re-verifies non-existence against the live registry before accepting, so the feed can't be poisoned with real packages.

How it relates to Graneth

This server shares its detection core with the hosted Graneth scanner via the @graneth/core-checks module — published in full alongside this package at zubovartemiy/graneth-mcp — so local pre-flight results match what the full PR scan would find.

How this package is released

The release script itself lives in the private monorepo, not in this tree — but what it refuses to do is worth stating, because it is the reason a supply-chain tool can be trusted with its own supply chain. Every step fails CLOSED:

• the monorepo's root manifest must still be private:true;
• the package being released must be exactly @graneth/mcp-server;
• branch master, clean working tree;
• the bundled threat-feed snapshot is refreshed first — a changed snapshot stops the release until its diff is reviewed and committed;
• the tarball's file list is checked against a hard allowlist — one file outside dist/, README.md, LICENSE, package.json aborts the publish;
• the public mirror you are reading must match the tree being released, compared file by file, so the repository link cannot point at older code than the package.

Guard 5 is what makes "accidentally publish the whole repository" structurally impossible rather than merely unlikely — this project has the incident that taught it.

License

MIT