@laver/mcp
An MCP server for Laver. Gives an agent tools to read and
drive kanban boards, tickets and the workspace wiki.
Every tool is a thin call to the same public REST API the web app uses. There is
no local state, no cache, and no second implementation of anything — if Laver
refuses a write, the refusal comes back verbatim, because an agent can act on
"409, re-read and retry" and cannot act on "something went wrong".
Setup
Create a workspace-scoped API key in Laver under Admin → API keys. It acts
as the person who created it, so it can do exactly what they can do and nothing
more, and it can be revoked without touching their account.
{
"mcpServers": {
"laver": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@laver/mcp"],
"env": { "LAVER_API_KEY": "your key here" }
}
}
}
LAVER_API_URL overrides the API host; it defaults to https://api.laver.app.
LAVER_API_KEY_FILE is an alternative to LAVER_API_KEY: a path to either a
file containing nothing but the key, or a .env-style file with a
LAVER_API_KEY=… line among others (an assignment line wins; quotes and an
export prefix are both fine). That is how the .mcp.json in this repo
registers the server without a secret in a tracked file.
A file with neither — no assignment line, and more than one token in it — yields
no key at all, and you get the "key is not set" error. It used to send the
whole file as the token, which is fine for a file holding one secret and is a
leak for anything else.
LAVER_API_URL must be https, except for localhost.
Working in this repo
.mcp.json at the repo root registers this server for anyone who opens the
project, reading the key from the gitignored .env. Nothing to export.
It runs the published package, npx -y @laver/mcp, rather than the
mcp/server.js beside it. That is deliberate: pointing it at the local file
meant everyone here ran the one code path no user takes, and that is precisely
how 0.1.0 shipped with an entry point that never connected its transport when
started through bin — which is the only way a real client starts it. Running
what we publish means we meet what users meet.
If you are editing this server, that same choice will fool you: your changes
do nothing until they are published. Point the client at the working copy while
you work on it —
{ "command": "node", "args": ["mcp/server.js"] }
— and put it back before you commit. npm run check and
frontend/tests/check-mcp-bin-entrypoint.mjs both run against the working copy
regardless, so the tests never depend on a publish.
A client only connects to MCP servers at startup. claude mcp add while a
session is already running does not retrofit the tools into that session — the
tool list was built before the server existed. Start a new session (or
reconnect from the client's MCP panel) and the tools appear.
Tools
Reading
list_workspaces | Where to start when you have no uuids |
list_boards | The boards in a workspace |
get_board | A board with its status columns, labels, members and tickets |
list_tickets | Tickets on a board, filterable, paged — updated_since is how you follow a board |
list_workspace_tickets | Triage across every board at once — overdue, unassigned, or free text |
get_ticket | One ticket in full, its subtasks, including its version |
get_ticket_comments | Comments and activity history |
get_ticket_flow | How long the ticket has spent in each column |
list_custom_fields | A board's custom field definitions — the uuids update_ticket writes against |
list_labels | Every label in the workspace, not only the ones already used on one board |
search | Boards, tickets, wiki pages and comments across a whole workspace at once |
list_workspace_tickets is the stand-up read: it needs no board_uuid, and it
is the only thing here that answers "what is late" and "what does nobody own"
without walking every board. It is deliberately the small sibling of
list_tickets — one page, 50 by default and 200 at most, no cursor — so narrow
it rather than paging it.
get_ticket_flow derives its numbers from the moves already in a ticket's
history. Read visits rather than the by_status totals if you are adding
several tickets up: tickets worked in one batch overlap, and their totals do not.
gaps says when the history and the ticket's current column disagree, which
makes the totals a floor rather than a measurement.
To follow a board, call list_tickets again with updated_since set to the
server_time the previous call returned; you get back the tickets that changed
and nothing else. There is no tool for the server-sent event stream at
GET /boards/:uuid/events — a tool call is one request and one answer, and a
stream that never ends is neither.
Asking for less. A tool result is charged against the model's context, and
three of these calls are the ones you cannot route around: a status_uuid or a
label_uuid comes from get_board, and a page_uuid comes from
get_wiki_tree. On a busy board they were 154 kB, 119 kB and 180 kB. Each now
takes a parameter that narrows the reply, and every one of them is opt-in — a
call that passes none of them is unchanged.
get_board(include_tasks: false) | the structure alone — statuses, labels, fields | 155 kB → 17 kB |
get_wiki_tree(depth: 1) | the top level, nothing nested under it | 119 kB → 1.8 kB |
get_wiki_tree(parent_page_uuid: …) | one page and everything beneath it | 119 kB → 9.8 kB |
list_tickets(include_descriptions: false) | titles and uuids without the bodies | 167 kB → 45 kB |
Reach for get_board(include_tasks: false) whenever you called it for a uuid
rather than for the tickets, and list_tickets when you want the tickets —
that one takes status and limit as well.
Writing
create_ticket | status takes the column name, or pass status_uuid; markdown in description is parsed |
update_ticket | Needs version; markdown in description is parsed; custom_fields is keyed by field uuid and replaces the whole object |
move_ticket | Needs version, and a column — neither column is a 400 |
comment_on_ticket | Markdown in body is parsed; no version, so it cannot 409 |
update_comment | Your own comments only; replaces the whole body and is marked as edited |
delete_comment | Your own comments only; to the trash, and nothing here restores one |
mark_comments_read | Clears this ticket's unread badge for the user the key acts as |
add_subtask | One checklist item, appended — plain text, not markdown |
update_subtask | Tick it off (is_done), rename it, or move it up the list |
delete_subtask | Not recoverable — a checklist item has no trash |
archive_ticket | To the trash — recoverable for 30 days |
delete_ticket | Destroys one already in the trash — permanent |
create_board | Optionally from a template — crm or sales-leads |
link_tickets | "this before that" — direction is blocks or blocked_by |
unlink_tickets | From either end, and removes every kind of link on the pair |
Comments are not versioned, so none of the three comment writes takes a
version and none of them can 409 — the last edit wins. Only the author may
edit or delete one, and somebody else's is a 404 indistinguishable from a
comment that does not exist, so these never report who wrote what.
get_ticket_comments deliberately marks nothing read; mark_comments_read is
the only call that does, and it marks up to the newest comment that exists at
that moment rather than subscribing.
Subtasks are the checklist on a ticket — a progress count on the card, and where
acceptance criteria belong when they are meant to be ticked off one at a time.
get_ticket returns the items themselves, so there is no separate list tool.
Board structure
create_status | A new column, appended to the right-hand end |
update_status | Rename, recolour, or set is_complete — a board has at most one |
reorder_statuses | The complete list of uuids, in order; a stale list is a 409 |
delete_status | The column must be empty, and a board keeps one |
create_group | A swimlane; there is no rename route, so a wrong name is deleted and remade |
reorder_groups | Same complete-list contract as reorder_statuses |
delete_group | Tickets in it survive, ungrouped — and their versions all move |
create_custom_field | Workspace owner or admin; type cannot be changed afterwards |
update_custom_field | Rename, reorder, or replace a select's whole options list |
delete_custom_field | Takes every ticket's value in that field with it — no trash, no restore |
This is what a board an agent creates needs to stop being its template's
defaults. The two reorder tools want the whole list because a partial one is how
two simultaneous reorders silently drop a column: read the uuids off get_board
immediately before calling, and re-read on a 409.
Labels
list_labels | Workspace-wide, alphabetical — get_board shows only what a board uses |
create_label | A hex colour is required; names are unique ignoring case and space |
update_label | Renames it everywhere — one label, not a copy per board |
delete_label | Removes it from every ticket that carries it |
A label is a workspace object shared by every board, which is the thing to be
sure of before renaming one: it changes for everybody. The uuids these return
are what update_ticket takes as label_uuids.
Attachments
list_ticket_attachments | Name, type, size and uuid — never the bytes |
get_ticket_attachment | Text inline, an image as an image block, anything else via save_to |
upload_ticket_attachment | file_path for a file on disk, or text + filename for something written |
delete_ticket_attachment | To the trash for 30 days; there is no restore tool |
get_ticket reports attachment_total, so you know whether listing is worth a
round trip.
Binary content crosses the tool boundary by not crossing it. A tool result
is text, Laver allows 25 MB per file, and 25 MB of base64 is roughly nine
million tokens — so only text, CSV and images under 4 MB come back inline, and
everything else needs save_to, which writes the file to a path on the machine
running this server (normally the agent's own, since the client starts it as a
subprocess). Uploads go the same way round: file_path reads from that machine
and costs no context.
An image comes back as an MCP image block rather than as text, which is the only
form a model can actually look at — that is the whole point of the tool, since
the screenshot somebody attached is usually the specification.
Wiki
list_wikis, search_wiki, get_wiki_tree, get_wiki_page,
get_wiki_page_version, append_wiki_page, create_wiki_page — which
takes the body as markdown and nests under parent_page_uuid — and
restore_wiki.
Archiving a wiki (done in the browser; there is no tool here for it) takes it
and every page under it out of list_wikis entirely. list_wikis takes
archived: true to see those instead — the only place an archived
wiki_uuid is visible at all — and restore_wiki is the only thing here
that does something with one: it un-archives the wiki, and every page under
it, in one call.
get_wiki_page_version is how you read something that was overwritten. It is a
read: the page does not move. There is deliberately no tool to put an old
version back, for the same reason there is none to edit a page.
Create and append only: there is no tool to edit or delete a page. Wiki pages sit behind a
live collaborative editor, so an overwrite from here would destroy whatever
somebody had open. Until that has a real conflict story the server can add to a
wiki and cannot damage one.
The markdown goes through the same parser ticket descriptions do. Headings,
lists, tables, code blocks, blockquotes, rules and links survive; so does an
 image, as a reference to that URL — there is no tool here to
upload an attachment, so the URL has to be public already. Raw HTML is kept as
literal text rather than interpreted.
Automations
list_automations | The rules on a board, each with its version |
get_automation | One rule in full — the conditions and actions an edit replaces |
list_automation_runs | What a rule has actually done, newest first |
create_automation | Owner or admin only — and see below before calling it |
update_automation | Needs version; enabled: false is the reversible stop |
delete_automation | Needs version, and takes the rule's whole run history with it |
An automation rule is a trigger, optional conditions and up to twenty actions,
stored against a board. Three things about them are worth knowing before an
agent touches these tools:
- A rule created here is live immediately. It fires on its trigger within a
couple of seconds, so read
list_automation_runs afterwards rather than
creating one speculatively to see what it would do.
- A rule is a standing grant. It runs as the user this key acts as, every
time it is triggered, for as long as it exists — not once, like every other
write in this server. Revoking the key does not stop it; disabling or deleting
the rule does.
- Pause before you delete.
update_automation with enabled: false stops a
misbehaving rule at once and keeps its history; deleting destroys the history
along with the rule. conditions and actions replace the stored lists rather
than merging into them, so build them from get_automation and not from
memory.
Both writes take the rule's version and answer 409 with the current one, the
same contract ticket writes have.
Published links
list_published_links is the inventory read: what of this workspace's is on the
public internet right now, each row with its share token, who published it, when,
and how many strangers have looked. live is what a stranger actually gets and
dark_reason says why a row is not, which is the only way to find a published
page that is currently archived and would go straight back online if somebody
restored it. Workspace owner or admin only; an ordinary member is a 403. Taking
a link back down is deliberately not a tool — report what is published and let a
person decide what comes off.
Not covered
The REST API is larger than this server, and the difference is deliberate rather
than accidental — mcp/route-coverage.js lists every backend route with either
the tool that calls it or the reason it has none, and npm run check fails if a
route appears that is in neither. That is what keeps this section true: it went
stale before, silently, which is how the server spent its whole life unable to
read a ticket's attachments while every check stayed green.
Not yet — wanted, not built:
- Notifications. Still the biggest gap, and now blocked on something a tool
cannot fix: an agent cannot see that it was mentioned or assigned, and
backend/notifications/index.js installs session_only on the whole plugin,
so every route there answers a key with a 401 however good the tool is.
Adding one means first deciding whether a key may read its owner's inbox at
all — a surface carrying other people's messages — which is a product and
security call rather than a delivery task. list_workspace_tickets covers the
triage half and is the closest substitute meanwhile.
- Listing subtasks on their own. Needs no tool rather than lacking one:
get_ticket already returns the checklist items themselves — uuid, title and
done state — so a dedicated list route would be a second way to ask the same
question. Writing them is covered.
- Board templates. A workspace can save one of its own boards as a template
and start the next board from it. Listing them has no tool, which is what
keeps the saved ones out of reach:
create_board names the two built-in ids
in its schema, and a saved template's id is a uuid nothing here can discover.
Saving and deleting are deliberately absent rather than pending — a template
is workspace-wide furniture in everyone's board-create form, and adding to or
removing from that list is a decision taken in front of the board.
- Attachment thumbnails. Deliberate, not a gap. The thumbnail route serves
the web client a downscaled webp so a card cover costs kilobytes instead of
megabytes; an agent wants the file somebody actually uploaded, and
get_ticket_attachment already returns that at full resolution in its
original format.
- Board analytics. A small loss now that the triage half is covered by
list_workspace_tickets. What is left is shaped for charts rather than for a
decision: stats and board-wide flow are aggregates a person reads on a screen,
activity is a feed, search-text serves find-as-you-type, and export hands back
a file. get_ticket_flow covers the one figure an agent acts on, per ticket,
where it can be attributed.
- Pressing an automation button. Deliberate rather than pending: a
manual
rule exists so that a person decides when it runs, and a tool that pressed it
would hand that back. Creating one is the safe half and is covered.
- Ticket history, duplication and recurrence.
- Sprints. Blocked in the same place notifications are:
backend/sprints/index.js installs session_only on the plugin, so a key gets
a 401 from every route there — POST /boards/:uuid/sprints included. Opening
them to keys is a decision about what a key may do to a team's planning cadence
(a rollover migrates every unfinished ticket onto a new board), not a matter of
writing the tools.
- Editing and deleting a wiki page. Waiting on a conflict story; see the
wiki section above. Removing a whole wiki (
DELETE /wikis/:wiki_uuid, which
archives it and every page under it) is in the same group: it takes a wiki's
published pages off the internet in the same instant it archives them, which
is consent, not editing. Its restore route is covered instead, by
restore_wiki, now that list_wikis can find an archived uuid to give it.
- Imports and feedback forms.
Not ever, from a key:
- Public links and publishing. Publishing turns something private into
something anyone with the URL can read. That is consent, and a tool call is
the wrong shape for it.
- Taking a published link back down. The read shipped and the two DELETEs
did not, which is the same split: a tool cannot carry consent, and that says
nothing about ASKING what is public.
list_published_links answers the
question and grants no power the caller did not already have, since every link
it names is public by definition. Retracting one is a bounded admin power
exercised in front of a screen showing what is about to go dark, so an agent
reports the inventory and a person decides what comes down.
- Taking a board away, and how it looks. The structure half of this group is
covered — statuses, groups and custom fields all have tools. What is left is
removal and decoration. Archiving and deleting a board are one write under two
names, and a tool over either would let a key take a whole board and every
ticket on it out of the workspace's view in one call; restore is uncovered as
a consequence, since nothing an agent can do archives a board and
list_boards
deliberately cannot find an archived uuid. Permanent deletion is firmer still
— the row, its tickets and their attachments' bytes all go — and is a person's
decision made twice, from a screen showing what they are about to lose. The
board's colour and background picture are decoration chosen while looking at
the board, which is the one thing an agent cannot do. A column's entry
requirements sit here too: the read needs no tool, because get_board already
sends each column's entry_requirements and a refused move_ticket names
every one the ticket does not meet — but a key that could set them could
remove them and then move the ticket, so the gate would only be as strong as
the weakest tool over it.
- Workspace and membership administration. A key acts as the person who
created it; renaming or deleting their workspace, or answering an invitation
for them, reaches further than delegating a board task ever meant.
- The whole-workspace export.
POST /workspaces/:uuid/exports and the
routes beside it build one file holding every ticket, comment and wiki page in
the workspace, and they refuse a key before looking at anything else. A key in
a CI variable that could ask for one turns any leak of it into a full data
breach rather than the scoped access it was issued for. Taking a copy of the
company's data is a thing a person does, signed in, from Admin, and the audit
trail records which person.
- Bulk ticket writes.
POST /tasks/archive bins a list in one call.
archive_ticket, one at a time, is the deliberate choice.
- Trash. One-way on purpose: an agent can archive and can destroy what it
already archived, and a person puts things back.
- The board event stream. Server-sent events; a tool call is one request and
one answer.
list_tickets with updated_since is the replacement.
- Scheduler endpoints. The deployment's own cron hooks.
Removing a ticket
Two steps, deliberately, so that nothing is destroyed by a single call:
archive_ticket task_uuid → the workspace trash, recoverable for 30 days
delete_ticket workspace_uuid + task_uuid → gone, and nothing brings it back
delete_ticket refuses anything that is not already archived, so the order is
enforced by the server rather than by convention. There is no restore tool here
— a ticket in the trash is put back from the web app — so treat
archive_ticket as the furthest you can go on your own.
Read the ticket before you archive it if you intend to destroy it:
delete_ticket needs the workspace_uuid, get_ticket is where you get one,
and an archived ticket can no longer be read.
Working out what to do next
Every ticket read carries blocked_by, blocks and is_blocked. is_blocked
is false once every blocker has reached a completion column, so the tickets a
board is ready for are the ones where it is false. link_tickets records the
dependency; a link that would make a loop is refused with a 409, because a loop
makes the ordering unanswerable.
The one rule worth knowing
Tickets carry a version. Every write must send the version you read, and a
write against a stale one is refused with 409 rather than silently
overwriting whoever got there first. The server turns that into an instruction,
and Laver's refusal carries the current version, so the instruction can include
it rather than spending a second call on it:
Laver 409: Task was updated by another request.
Somebody wrote first, so the version you sent is stale. The current version is 12. If your change does not depend on what you read — moving a ticket to a
named column, say — retry with that version. If it does, call get_ticket again
and decide against the ticket as it now is, or you will quietly undo the other
write.
Read, then write. Do not cache a version across a long turn.
When the key is refused
A 401 is the key: missing, mistyped, revoked, expired, or a placeholder that
was never filled in. The underlying message is not always a fair description of
what happened — a key the JWT layer cannot parse comes back as "Authorization
token is invalid: The token is malformed", which sounds like a corrupted string
when the usual cause is simply a key that was replaced. The server appends what
to do about it, including the part that catches people out:
An MCP client reads that environment once, when it starts this server, so it
must be restarted afterwards — editing the config in a running session changes
nothing.
A 403 is different and is never worth retrying: the key was accepted, and
then refused this particular action. It is scoped to another workspace, or the
person it acts as has a read-only role, or is a guest without access to that
board.
The key itself is read in exactly one place, sent as a bearer token, and never
logged, echoed, or included in any error text.
Checking it
node check.js
node check.js --require-live
LAVER_API_KEY_FILE=../.env node check.js --live-api
Two halves. The first is static: every tool registered, classified read or
write, described, and given a schema. The second boots the backend from
../backend on a spare port, creates a workspace of its own, mints a key
against it, and calls every read-only tool — through the tool's own zod
schema and then its handler — sending every parameter the tool declares.
That half exists because the first one passed while list_wikis sent
?workspace= at a route that requires workspace_uuid. It 400'd on every call
it ever made, and since it is the only tool that yields a wiki_uuid, the whole
wiki half of this server was unreachable from the day it shipped — with
registration, descriptions and schema shape perfect throughout.
It needs the same things npm test in backend/ needs: that directory, its
node_modules, its .env, and the Postgres they point at. No API key and no
network beyond localhost — a real LAVER_API_KEY in the environment is ignored.
Without a backend it prints a banner saying the tools were not called and
runs the schema half alone; --require-live turns that into a failure.
It is only as local as backend/.env is, though. Running it writes to
whatever database that file points at: it creates a workspace, a board, two
tickets, a comment, a wiki, a page and an API key, and deletes them again at the
end. It also loads the backend into its own process. It listens with
app.server.listen rather than app.listen — the same idiom the collab and
board-events integration tests use — so Fastify's onListen hooks do not fire
and none of the seven schedulers start; without that, the billing sweep alone
would run against every workspace in that database. Point backend/.env at
staging and this is a check that writes to staging.
The sweep is read-only and stays that way: a check that creates tickets in
somebody's workspace every time it runs is a check people stop running. The
write tools are covered by the schema half only — see the note at the foot of
check.js for the way to cover them without sending a write.
Ctrl-C is safe. The sweep stops after the call in flight and the fixture
workspace is deleted before the process exits; a second Ctrl-C kills it outright
if the call in flight is the thing that is stuck.
Against the deployed API
--live-api points the same calls at LAVER_API_URL — https://api.laver.app
unless you say otherwise — with a real key, taken from LAVER_API_KEY or from
the file LAVER_API_KEY_FILE names, exactly as the server itself takes it.
It exists because a green local run and a working published package are two
different claims. The local sweep proves the tools agree with the code in front
of you; this package talks to the deployed API, so a route that ships a rename
before the package does breaks every agent in the field while the local sweep
stays green. That is a narrow window — the tools and the routes live in one repo
and move together — but it is exactly the window publishing to npm opens.
Both modes run the same table, in cases.js, and every case carries an
expectation for each: exact counts locally, where the fixture is known, and
shapes and invariants live, where the workspace is somebody's real one and
cannot be seeded or torn down. A case with only one of the two is a failure, so
a new call cannot cover one transport and skip the other.
It creates nothing and deletes nothing, and that is enforced rather than
promised: live mode replaces fetch with one that refuses any method but GET,
so a write tool called by mistake cannot reach the network at all.
frontend/tests/check-mcp-live-api-mode.mjs runs the whole mode against a stub
API and asserts that every request that left the process was a GET.
Instead of a fixture it goes looking for something to point at, and wants a
board with at least two tickets in at least two columns, in a workspace with a
wiki that has a page. It refuses to run against anything thinner rather than
passing quietly: a filter case against an empty board passes whether or not the
filter was applied, which is the failure this whole file exists to prevent.
Opt-in, and never part of npm run check:all or CI — it needs a key and a
network, and neither belongs in a check that runs on a box with no secrets.
Publishing
0.1.0 is published and is broken. Do not tell anyone to install it. It
starts, registers all 20 tools, connects no transport, and exits 0 without
writing anything to stdout or stderr — so a client sees the process end and
nothing else. The entry-point guard compared the basename of process.argv[1]
against this file's name, which is true only for node mcp/server.js; npm's
shim for bin makes argv[1] node_modules/.bin/laver-mcp, so npx -y @laver/mcp — the way this README tells everyone to run it — never matched.
Fixed in 0.1.1, and tests/check-mcp-bin-entrypoint.mjs now spawns the server
through a symlink and speaks MCP to it, so the same class of bug cannot ship
again.
When 0.1.1 goes out, mark the broken one so nobody lands on it:
npm deprecate @laver/mcp@0.1.0 "Never connects its stdio transport when run via npx or the bin shim. Use 0.1.1 or later."
Unpublishing 0.1.0 is the other option and is worse: within 72 hours it removes
the version, but the number stays burned either way, and anything that already
pinned it breaks rather than being warned.
The publish itself is the owner's to run, because it is public, permanent enough
to matter, and takes a name nobody else can then have.
The name. laver on npm is taken — v1.0.0, published in 2021 by an
unrelated maintainer — so the bare name is not available and never will be.
This package is therefore @laver/mcp: the brand name kept as the scope,
with the generic part where it belongs. Checked against the registry on
6 Aug 2026 — @laver/mcp is free, and nothing has ever been published under the
old unscoped laver-mcp, so the rename costs nothing.
The scope exists and the first publish has happened. 0.1.0 and 0.1.1 are
on the registry under @laver/mcp, created 2026-08-06T22:14Z — which is the
only proof that matters that the scope resolves and the publishing account may
write to it. This paragraph used to say the scope did not exist yet; that was
true when it was written and is not now.
Do not re-test it with https://registry.npmjs.org/-/org/laver. That URL is a
404 unauthenticated whether the org exists or not, so it cannot tell the two
apart — read the package document instead:
curl -s 'https://registry.npmjs.org/@laver%2Fmcp' | python3 -m json.tool
For a self-hosted fork publishing under its own scope, the first publish still
needs that scope created at https://www.npmjs.com/org/create (free for public
packages) or confirmed as the account's own username, with npm whoami to
check membership. npm publish fails with
404 Not Found - PUT https://registry.npmjs.org/@<scope>%2fmcp if the scope
does not exist, which reads like a network fault rather than a missing org.
The executable stays laver-mcp. The package is @laver/mcp, but bin is
deliberately not renamed to mcp: a global install would put a command called
mcp on the PATH, which is far too generic and collides with every other MCP
server anyone installs. npx -y @laver/mcp works regardless — npx runs the
package's only bin whatever it is called — so nothing in the config snippet
above depends on the command's name.
repository and bugs point at the public mirror. They were absent while
github.com/Developyn/laver was the only home — it is private, npm renders both
fields as links on the package page, and aiming the only two "where does this
come from" links at a 404 is worse than having neither. Since August 2026 the
published files are mirrored to github.com/Developyn/laver-mcp, which is
public, so both now resolve. Note there is no "directory" key: the mirror's
root is the package, whereas here the same files live under mcp/.
The mirror is what every MCP directory anchors a listing to, so it has to keep
up. After each publish, copy the published tarball's contents over it —
npm pack @laver/mcp && tar xzf laver-mcp-<version>.tgz — and commit. Its
Dockerfile, glama.json and CI workflow are mirror-only and are not in
files, so they never ship to npm.
mcpName is for the official MCP registry, which matches the package
against the server name being published there. It must equal the namespace
mcp-publisher login github actually grants you — io.github.developyn/… if it
authorises the org, io.github.melvyn-developyn/… if only the personal account.
Getting it wrong is not fatal, but correcting it costs another version.
Before each one
- 2FA on the publishing account, if it is set to require it for publishing (npm
enforces this for some accounts and packages and prompts for others). Passing
--otp saves a prompt from failing a non-interactive run; drop it if not
enrolled.
npm whoami answering with that account — npm login if not.
- For CI instead of a laptop: an automation token in
NPM_TOKEN (granular,
write-scoped to this package). Automation tokens bypass the 2FA prompt, which
classic read-write tokens do not.
- A version the registry does not already have. npm refuses to republish an
existing one, so this is not tidying — it is what makes a publish possible at
all. Check what is live first, because the repo's number and the registry's
can be equal while the contents differ, and nothing warns you:
npm view @laver/mcp version. Minor for new tools, patch for fixes to
existing ones.
The publish
cd mcp
npm ci
npm run check
npm pack --dry-run
npm publish --access public --otp=<code-from-your-authenticator>
npm ci deletes and reinstalls mcp/node_modules. In the shared development
checkout that directory is shared with every agent running against it, and
removing it mid-run breaks their tests — which is why the agent instructions
forbid it and why an agent preparing a release stops before this block. It is
correct and expected for whoever actually publishes; just do not run it while
others are working in the same tree.
--access public is required here: scoped packages default to restricted,
and a restricted publish on a free account is refused outright. publishConfig
in package.json already sets it, so the flag is belt and braces rather than the
only thing standing between this and a private package.
Afterwards
npx -y @laver/mcp
npm view @laver/mcp
A mistake is recoverable only briefly: npm unpublish @laver/mcp@<version>
works within 72 hours, and the version number is burned afterwards regardless.
The package name is not returned to the pool by unpublishing a version.
Licence
MIT — see LICENSE, which ships in the package.