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GlassWASM: WebAssembly Malware Found in Trojanized Open VSX Extensions
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@orangecheck/vote-core
Advanced tools
OC Vote protocol core — canonicalization, content-addressed ids, weight modes, deterministic tally. Reference implementation of oc-vote-protocol v0.
Reference implementation of oc-vote-protocol v0 — stake-weighted, sybil-resistant, offline-tallyable polls on Bitcoin.
npm i @orangecheck/vote-core
canonicalize(obj) / canonicalBytes(obj) — RFC 8785 canonicalization with the spec's options[] preservation rule.pollId(poll) / ballotId(ballot) / revealId(reveal) — content-addressed ids via SHA-256 of canonical bytes with sig.value emptied.commit(pollId, voter, option) — secret-mode commitment per SPEC §4.4.voterWeight({ utxos, snapshot, minSats, minDays, mode, params }) — three canonical weight modes: one_per_address, sats, sats_days.tally({ poll, ballots, utxosAt, revealedOptions?, verifyBip322?, skipSignatures? }) — deterministic pure tally function.Poll, Ballot, Reveal, TallyResult.The package ships vitest suite that loads the canonical fixtures from oc-vote-protocol/test-vectors/ and asserts byte-identical canonical bytes, ids, commits, and tally output for all five vectors (v01 minimal public, v02 sats-weighted, v03 sats_days with cap, v04 vote-change, v05 secret-ballot).
import { tally, pollId } from '@orangecheck/vote-core';
const result = await tally({
poll,
ballots,
utxosAt: (addr, snapshotBlock) => fetchUtxos(addr, snapshotBlock),
skipSignatures: false,
verifyBip322: async (address, message, sig) => {
const { Verifier } = await import('bip322-js');
return Verifier.verifySignature(address, message, sig);
},
});
// { state: 'tallied', snapshot_block: 900000, turnout: {...}, tallies: {...} }
import { ballotId } from '@orangecheck/vote-core';
const draft = {
v: 0, kind: 'oc-vote/ballot',
poll_id, voter, option: 'yes',
attestation_id: null, secret: null,
created_at: new Date().toISOString().replace(/\.\d+Z$/, 'Z'),
sig: { alg: 'bip322', pubkey: voter, value: '' },
} as const;
const id = ballotId(draft);
// ask your wallet to BIP-322 sign `id`, then set sig.value
import { commit } from '@orangecheck/vote-core';
const c = commit(pollId, voterAddr, 'yes');
// embed `c` in ballot.secret.commit; encrypt the option id to poll.reveal_pk
// via an oc-lock envelope in ballot.secret.envelope.
See oc-vote-protocol/WHY.md for the design rationale.
orangecheck/oc-vote-protocol@orangecheck/lock-core (encryption primitive; composed here for secret-ballot envelopes)MIT.
FAQs
OC Vote protocol core — canonicalization, content-addressed ids, weight modes, deterministic tally. Reference implementation of oc-vote-protocol v0.
We found that @orangecheck/vote-core demonstrated a healthy version release cadence and project activity because the last version was released less than a year ago. It has 1 open source maintainer collaborating on the project.
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