@true402.dev/ai-sdk - npm Package Compare versions

Comparing version 1.0.2 to 1.1.0

dist/index.d.ts

@@ -56,2 +56,40 @@ import * as ai from 'ai';
     };
+    true402_tx_preflight: ai.Tool<z.ZodObject<{
+        from: z.ZodString;
+        to: z.ZodString;
+        data: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+        value: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    }, "strip", z.ZodTypeAny, {
+        from: string;
+        to: string;
+        value?: string | undefined;
+        data?: string | undefined;
+    }, {
+        from: string;
+        to: string;
+        value?: string | undefined;
+        data?: string | undefined;
+    }>, unknown> & {
+        execute: (args: {
+            from: string;
+            to: string;
+            value?: string | undefined;
+            data?: string | undefined;
+        }, options: ai.ToolExecutionOptions) => PromiseLike<unknown>;
+    };
+    true402_liquidity_history: ai.Tool<z.ZodObject<{
+        token: z.ZodString;
+        limit: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodNumber>;
+    }, "strip", z.ZodTypeAny, {
+        token: string;
+        limit?: number | undefined;
+    }, {
+        token: string;
+        limit?: number | undefined;
+    }>, unknown> & {
+        execute: (args: {
+            token: string;
+            limit?: number | undefined;
+        }, options: ai.ToolExecutionOptions) => PromiseLike<unknown>;
+    };
     true402_deployer_check: ai.Tool<z.ZodObject<{
@@ -58,0 +96,0 @@ token: z.ZodString;

dist/index.js

@@ -85,2 +85,12 @@ // src/index.ts
 var addressSchema = z.object({ address: z.string().describe("Any Base address (0x\u2026) \u2014 an EOA or a contract") });
+var historySchema = z.object({
+  token: z.string().describe("A Base ERC-20 token contract address (0x\u2026)"),
+  limit: z.number().int().min(1).max(200).optional().describe("Max removal events to return (1\u2013200, default 50)")
+});
+var preflightSchema = z.object({
+  from: z.string().describe("Sender address (0x\u2026). Asserted, never proven \u2014 no signature is taken."),
+  to: z.string().describe("Destination contract or address (0x\u2026)"),
+  data: z.string().optional().describe("Calldata hex (0x\u2026). Omit for a plain native transfer."),
+  value: z.string().optional().describe("Native value in wei, decimal string. Default 0.")
+});
 function true402Tools(opts) {
@@ -103,2 +113,12 @@ return {
     }),
+    true402_tx_preflight: tool({
+      description: `Check a Base transaction BEFORE signing it. Send the UNSIGNED transaction (from, to, data, value) and get three lenses: a simulation against current state (does it revert?), the decoded intent (is this an unlimited approval that outlives the trade?), and the counterparty's liquidity-removal history. Takes NO private key and NO signature, so it cannot broadcast or front-run the transaction it inspects. Never returns "safe" \u2014 a clean result means these checks found nothing, and every response states its limits. Call this LAST, immediately before signing. ~$0.008 USDC over x402.`,
+      parameters: preflightSchema,
+      execute: ({ from, to, data, value }) => payStall("/v1/base/tx-preflight", { from, to, ...data !== void 0 ? { data } : {}, ...value !== void 0 ? { value } : {} }, opts)
+    }),
+    true402_liquidity_history: tool({
+      description: `What has ALREADY happened to a Base token's liquidity, from true402's own DEX archive: every removal event with the amount, block and transaction hash, plus the other tokens drained in the SAME transaction (one actor, several pools). A live honeypot simulation cannot see this \u2014 a pool drained last month simulates fine today if it was re-seeded. Every answer carries the block range the index covers, so "none observed" is not a claim of safety. ~$0.005 USDC over x402.`,
+      parameters: historySchema,
+      execute: ({ token, limit }) => payStall("/v1/base/liquidity-history", { token, ...limit !== void 0 ? { limit } : {} }, opts)
+    }),
     true402_deployer_check: tool({
@@ -105,0 +125,0 @@ description: "Deployer reputation for a Base token: resolves who created it and that wallet's track record (age, contracts shipped, fresh-throwaway flag) to catch serial ruggers a structural check can't see. ~$0.008 USDC over x402.",

package.json

 {
   "name": "@true402.dev/ai-sdk",
-  "version": "1.0.2",
+  "version": "1.1.0",
   "description": "true402 tools for the Vercel AI SDK \u2014 pay-per-call on-chain rug/honeypot & address safety for Base AI agents over x402 (USDC, no account, no API key).",
@@ -5,0 +5,0 @@ "type": "module",

README.md

@@ -29,2 +29,4 @@ # @true402.dev/ai-sdk
 | `true402_address_safety` | Profile + risk for any address before you send/approve/call it (proxy detection) | $0.005 |
+| `true402_tx_preflight` | Check an **unsigned** transaction before signing: does it revert, does it grant an unlimited approval, has the counterparty been draining liquidity. Takes no key and no signature | $0.008 |
+| `true402_liquidity_history` | What already happened to a token's liquidity — every removal with amount/block/tx, plus the tokens drained in the same transaction | $0.005 |
 | `true402_deployer_check` | Deployer reputation — who made the token + their track record | $0.008 |
@@ -31,0 +33,0 @@

Fixed alerts

AI-detected potential code anomaly

Supply chain risk

AI has identified unusual behaviors that may pose a security risk.

Improved metrics

Total package byte prevSize

15310

32.9%

Lines of code

237

34.66%

Number of lines in readme file

45

4.65%

Number of low supply chain risk alerts

2

-33.33%

No dependency changes