Bridgistic MCP Server
mcp-name: io.github.Shubochandrosarker/bridgistic
Connect Claude (Desktop, Code, or any MCP client) to WordPress safely: every request is HMAC-SHA256-signed with a scoped, least-privilege key minted by the free Bridgistic WordPress plugin. Destructive operations support dry-run, human approval queues, and automatic snapshots with one-call rollback — and everything is audit-logged on the WordPress side.
Quick start
- Install the Bridgistic WordPress plugin on your site and activate it.
- In WP Admin → Bridgistic → Claude Setup, create a key (start with the Read-only preset). The secret is shown once.
- Run the server with your connection in the environment:
npx bridgistic-mcp-server
{
"mcpServers": {
"bridgistic": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "bridgistic-mcp-server"],
"env": {
"BRIDGISTIC_SITE_URL": "https://example.com",
"BRIDGISTIC_KEY_ID": "your_key_id",
"BRIDGISTIC_KEY_SECRET": "your_key_secret"
}
}
}
}
- Verify: ask Claude to run
bridgistic_get_site_info (read-only), then check WP Admin → Bridgistic → Logs.
Prefer zero-terminal setup? Grab the one-click Claude Desktop extension (bridgistic.mcpb) from the releases page.
Configuration
BRIDGISTIC_SITE_URL | yes* | Site address from WP Admin → Settings → General |
BRIDGISTIC_KEY_ID | yes* | Public key id (wpk_…) |
BRIDGISTIC_KEY_SECRET | yes* | Key secret (wps_…), shown once at creation |
BRIDGISTIC_CONNECTIONS | no | Absolute path to a multi-site registry JSON (alias → siteUrl/keyId/secret) |
BRIDGISTIC_TRANSPORT | no | stdio (default) or http (local dev only, loopback-guarded) |
BRIDGISTIC_LOG_LEVEL | no | error | warn | info | debug — stderr only, never logs secrets |
* Either the three single-site variables or BRIDGISTIC_CONNECTIONS (both can be combined; the agent targets sites by alias).
What's inside
43 tools across content (posts, media, users), site administration (options with allowlists, plugins, files), safety (snapshots, approvals, dry-run), intelligence (site memory, usage), and automation (playbooks, schedules) — each gated server-side by the key's scopes. The WordPress plugin is the enforcement point; a leaked tool call without a valid signature is useless.
Security model
- Secrets never travel on the wire — requests carry an HMAC-SHA256 signature over method/path/timestamp/nonce/body-hash.
- ±300 s timestamp window plus single-use nonces block replays.
- Scopes are checked before every operation; denials are audit-logged.
- Keys can require human approval: destructive calls pause until someone decides in WP Admin.
Full docs: SECURITY.md · Troubleshooting
License
GPL-2.0-or-later © WordPressistic