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ccs-mcp-server
Advanced tools
MCP security server for AI agents — runtime verification and receipt verification for Claude Code, Cursor, Cline and Windsurf. 7-dimension CCS checks, Ed25519 tamper-evident receipts, offline verification, zero runtime dependencies.
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that brings CCS runtime verification to any MCP-compatible client — Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, and more.
It verifies AI agent tool calls at runtime, blocks unsafe ones by default, issues tamper-evident evidence records for every decision, and verifies that actual tool arguments match the agent's declared intent — catching cross-model parameter drift.
Runtime evidence layer, not a static scanner. Every decision is enforced at call time and produces independently verifiable cryptographic evidence.
本工具的合规授权与批量能力可通过支付宝 SkillPay 获取:
China users: purchase via Alipay SkillPay — see above.
npx -y ccs-mcp-server
Add it to any MCP client — paste this into your mcpServers config in Claude Desktop, Cursor or Cline:
{
"mcpServers": {
"ccs-runtime-evidence": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "ccs-mcp-server"]
}
}
}
Or install from the official MCP Registry: search "Correctover" inside your client, or open registry.modelcontextprotocol.io and find io.github.Correctover/ccs.
No API key, no account, no environment variables required — an Ed25519 signing key is generated automatically on first run (set CCS_KEY_DIR, or CCS_PRIVATE_KEY/CCS_PUBLIC_KEY, only if you want to pin a persistent key). Zero dependencies. Pure Node.js stdlib (Node ≥ 18). No install scripts.
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
verify_tool_call | 7-dimension runtime verification (Structure/Schema/Security/Identity/Integrity/Latency/Cost) + semantic attack-chain analysis + math overflow detection. Blocks by default. |
issue_evidence | Issue a tamper-evident evidence record (content_hash + evidence_hash, chainable). Produced for allowed AND denied calls. |
audit_mcp_config | Audit MCP configuration JSON for security risks. |
verify_intent_binding | Verify actual tool arguments match a declared intent — zero tolerance, zero LLM calls. Catches cross-model parameter drift (planner says amount: 100, executor writes amount: 10000 → DENIED). |
verify_receipt | Offline-verify a CCS Ed25519-signed receipt: checks the signature against the embedded signer public key, reports tampering, and optionally pins an expected signer key or fingerprint. |
Agent planners (Claude, GPT) declare one thing; executors (Qwen, DeepSeek) sometimes write another. No existing protocol verifies that actual tool call arguments match the agent's declared intent:
CCS Intent Binding fills this layer. The agent framework declares a structured intent before execution; CCS verifies actual arguments against it in sub-millisecond, zero-LLM time.
// Intent declared by planner
{
"intent_id": "int-001",
"intent_type": "payment",
"fields": {
"amount": { "value": 100, "binding_mode": "exact" },
"recipient": { "value": "Alice", "binding_mode": "exact" }
},
"issued_at": 1755000000000,
"ttl_ms": 30000
}
// Actual arguments from executor
{ "amount": 10000, "recipient": "Alice" }
// Result: DENIED — intent_arg_mismatch
// field: amount, expected: 100, actual: 10000
| Mode | Behavior | Example |
|---|---|---|
exact | Deep equality with math normalization | 100, 100.0, 1e2 all match; 10000 does not |
numeric_tolerance | Absolute tolerance | 100 ± 0.01 matches 100.005 |
pattern | Regex match on string fields | ^[A-Z]{3}$ matches "USD" |
No intent declared? Falls through to standard 7-dimension verification. Zero breaking changes.
curl|sh, rm -rf, eval()../, /etc/passwd, /proc/self/169.254.169.254 (cloud metadata), localhost, private ranges — across any toolexfil_chain--insecure, TLS disabledEvery decision produces evidence with dual hashes (content_hash + evidence_hash) and chain linkage (parent_evidence_hash). Any third party can independently verify that evidence has not been tampered with — without trusting the operator.
evidence 1: allowed (fs.read_file) parent: null
evidence 2: denied (shell.exec curl|sh) parent: ev1
evidence 3: denied (http.fetch SSRF) parent: ev2
evidence 4: denied (fs + curl exfil) parent: ev3
Receipts are Ed25519-signed and JSON-based: verify them offline with the built-in verify_receipt tool, or independently with any Ed25519 library. Cross-tool receipt verification (same crypto, chain linkage, field mapping) is designed to work without this package installed.
Elastic License 2.0 (ELv2). See LICENSE.
FAQs
MCP security server for AI agents — runtime verification and receipt verification for Claude Code, Cursor, Cline and Windsurf. 7-dimension CCS checks, Ed25519 tamper-evident receipts, offline verification, zero runtime dependencies.
The npm package ccs-mcp-server receives a total of 227 weekly downloads. As such, ccs-mcp-server popularity was classified as not popular.
We found that ccs-mcp-server demonstrated a healthy version release cadence and project activity because the last version was released less than a year ago. It has 1 open source maintainer collaborating on the project.

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