
Security News
PHP Foundation Says Chainguard Broke Security Embargo Ahead of Emergency Patches
The PHP Foundation says Chainguard broke a security embargo ahead of critical RCE patches, as leaks disrupted the coordinated release.
MCP server for the Cyborg Skill catalog: search, read provenance and rights, and install into your agent.
The Cyborg Skill catalog, as an MCP server. Your agent searches the catalog, reads a Skill's provenance and rights, reads a Stack, and installs a Skill into its own skill directory, without a terminal and without an account.
It is the third door into the same catalog. The other two are the web surface at
cyborg.floom.dev and the CLI, cyborg-skills.
Claude Code:
claude mcp add cyborg -- npx -y cyborg-mcp
Anything that reads an mcpServers block, which is Cursor, Windsurf, Codex,
Claude Desktop and most others, paste this:
{
"mcpServers": {
"cyborg": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "cyborg-mcp"]
}
}
}
No API key, no login. Every read route it uses is public and unauthenticated.
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
cyborg_search_skills | Search published Skills by keyword, capability, runtime, integration or publisher. Lexical ranking. |
cyborg_get_skill | One Skill: release and content hash, upstream source and exact revision, labels, declared permissions, compatibility, rights basis. |
cyborg_get_stack | One Stack: curator, rationale, and the ordered Skills with the exact release each item pins. |
cyborg_install_skill | Writes one Skill into an agent's skill directory on this machine. |
cyborg_install_skill takes slug, an optional agent
(claude, codex, cursor, gemini, opencode) and an optional scope
(global, the default, or project). It names the agent back to you in the
result, and it refuses to guess when more than one agent is present.
It does not have its own copy of the write path. It imports the one
cyborg-skills uses, so both obey the same rules:
..,
or contains a control character;<skillsDir>/.floom/tmp/ and moved into place with a
single atomic rename, so an interrupted install never leaves a half-written
Skill where the agent will read it;lstated and refused if it is a symlink, so
a planted .floom cannot relocate the write outside the agent directory;.floom/backups/<slug>/<timestamp>/
before it is replaced.Cyborg is in private preview, and the Skills in it passed a deliberately narrow offline check. The exact claim is:
A deterministic offline static planning or composition artifact passed the candidate-specific conformance contract.
No complete upstream workflow ran. Nothing here holds a Tested,
Evaluated, Signed, Recommended or Verified Publisher state, and
this server never reports one. It reports the catalog's trust field exactly as
the catalog holds it, which for the preview is empty.
No tool here returns an install count, a popularity signal, or a ranking by either, and none exists to return: search order is lexical relevance and is not a quality ranking. The one thing this server does send is the self-reported install described below, which the catalog keeps privately and marks unverified. It is a claim, it is not exposed by any tool, and it reaches no public counter.
Attribution and rights are exactly as recorded in each Skill's own
ATTRIBUTION.json, which carries the source repository, the exact pinned
revision, the Skill body hash, the license hash, and endorsement: false.
Listing a Skill in this catalog is not an endorsement by the source repository,
by its authors, or by any company named in it.
Installing records two things, and the result says what each one is.
The catalog records, server-side, that an install link was fetched:
Preview install-link fetch recorded. Private preview only; a link fetch is not an install, not a Verified Agent Upgrade, and is not counted publicly.
Then, after the files are written and only then, this server reports the install
itself. A fetch is not an install — a fetch can be followed by a failed write,
and a crawler can fetch and install nothing — so the report is the only thing
that states one. It sends exactly three values: slug (which Skill), agent
(which agent's skill directory), and installer (cyborg-mcp/<version>).
No path, no home directory, no username, no hostname, no machine identifier, no
file count, no timing.
Nothing on the catalog's side can observe a write to your disk, so the row is stored and displayed as a self-reported claim, permanently, and reaches no public counter:
Recorded as a self-reported install. You told us this; we did not observe it. It is not an install receipt, not a Verified Agent Upgrade, and it is not counted publicly.
A failed or refused report never fails an install.
| Variable | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
CYBORG_CATALOG_URL | https://cyborg.floom.dev | Catalog origin. Subject to the same allowlist as everything else: an arbitrary host is refused rather than trusted because it was typed. |
CYBORG_NO_INSTALL_REPORT | unset | Set to 1 to send no self-reported install report. Read before any request is built, so nothing is sent rather than sent and discarded. |
FLOOM_DEV | unset | Set to 1 to allow a loopback catalog origin, for local development only. |
From a checkout of this repository:
node packages/mcp/scripts/proof-round-trip.mjs
It launches the published package the way an agent does (npx -y cyborg-mcp),
connects a real MCP client over stdio, lists the tools, searches, reads a Skill
and a Stack, and installs into a throwaway HOME that is deleted afterwards.
Node 20 or newer.
MIT. The Skills it installs carry their own licenses, recorded in each Skill's
ATTRIBUTION.json.
FAQs
MCP server for the Cyborg Skill catalog: search, read provenance and rights, and install into your agent.
We found that cyborg-mcp demonstrated a healthy version release cadence and project activity because the last version was released less than a year ago. It has 1 open source maintainer collaborating on the project.

Security News
The PHP Foundation says Chainguard broke a security embargo ahead of critical RCE patches, as leaks disrupted the coordinated release.

Security News
PHP releases emergency patches for two critical RCE vulnerabilities as agencies urge organizations to take unpatched sites offline.

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