CICD AIops
Governed AI-ops for self-managed GitLab and self-hosted Gitea.
cicd-aiops is for the team running its own CI/CD forge — a GitLab instance
or a Gitea server on your hardware, in your lab, behind your VPN — who want an
AI agent that can answer "why did the pipeline fail?", "which runner is
wedged?", "where did 40 GB of artifact storage go?" and "what work went
stale?" and then act (retry, cancel, pause, delete, protect) only through
an audited, budgeted, risk-tiered, undo-recorded governance harness. It is not
a SaaS integration: it speaks the GitLab REST API v4 and the Gitea API v1
directly against your server, with credentials encrypted at rest.
Verification status: modelled from each project's public API docs and
exercised against mocked HTTP responses; there is no recorded end-to-end run
against a live server yet. cicd-aiops doctor is the fastest live check —
see docs/VERIFICATION.md.
Routing: Do NOT use this for Kubernetes deploy state — use k8s-aiops.
This tool ends at the CI/CD server's API (pipelines, runners, artifacts,
repo hygiene).
What this tool does, and does not, decide
It delivers CI/CD operations — reads and writes — accurately and efficiently, and
records every one of them. It does not decide whether a write is allowed to
happen. That is the agent's judgement, or the permission of the token you connect
it with: give it a GitLab/Gitea access token without write scope and the writes
fail at the server — the place that actually owns the permission.
So there is no read-only switch, no policy file, no approval gate to configure.
The one thing the tool guarantees is that nothing is silent: every call, over
MCP and over the CLI alike, lands an audit row in ~/.cicd-aiops/audit.db,
and destructive writes still capture their before-state and record an inverse
where one exists.
Each tool declares a risk_level, kept in agreement with its [READ]/[WRITE]
documentation tag by a test, and carried into the audit row as a descriptive
tier — so a reviewer can see at a glance that a row was a high-risk delete. It
is a label, not a gate.
Running a smaller / local model? See
agent-guardrails.md — it lists
the guardrails this tool enforces for you (so you don't spend prompt budget
restating them) and gives a ready-made system prompt for what's left.
Quick start
uv tool install cicd-aiops
cicd-aiops init
cicd-aiops doctor
cicd-aiops overview
Then the interesting parts:
cicd-aiops rca pipelines dev/api
cicd-aiops rca runners
cicd-aiops rca storage
cicd-aiops rca stale dev/api
cicd-aiops pipelines retry dev/api 42 --dry-run
cicd-aiops artifacts delete dev/api --older-than-days 30 --dry-run
Every write has --dry-run and a double confirmation, and executes through
the same governed path the MCP tools use — so CLI writes are audited too.
Support scope
| Server version + token identity | ✅ | ✅ |
| Projects + storage statistics | ✅ (statistics=true) | ✅ (repo size) |
| Pipelines / runs, jobs, trace tails | ✅ | ✅ (Actions runs/jobs/logs) |
| Runner fleet (list/detail) | ✅ | ❌ teaching error (no API v1 equivalent) |
| Merge/pull requests, branches, protection, releases | ✅ | ✅ |
| Artifact inventory | ✅ (via jobs) | ✅ (Actions artifacts) |
retry_pipeline / cancel_pipeline | ✅ | ❌ teaching error |
pause_runner / resume_runner | ✅ | ❌ teaching error |
delete_artifacts | ✅ | ❌ teaching error |
update_branch_protection | ✅ | ✅ |
Where a platform lacks a surface, the platform registry raises a teaching
error naming the resources that are available — the agent learns instead
of hitting a mystery 404. GitLab.com / Gitea Cloud SaaS accounts are out of
scope by design: this tool targets self-managed instances.
Flagship analyses (the reason this tool exists)
pipeline_failure_rca — pulls recent failed pipelines with failed-job
trace tails and classifies each failure: test-failure /
dependency-network / runner-timeout / oom / script-error, with the matched
evidence, a cause, and an action per pipeline.
runner_health_rca — offline/stale/paused runners (contact-age
threshold), jobs queued past a threshold, and per-tag saturation (queued
jobs vs online runners).
artifact_storage_bloat_analysis — projects ranked by repo + artifact
bytes, expired-but-kept artifacts, and a reclaimable-bytes estimate that
feeds straight into delete_artifacts --dry-run.
stale_work_audit — merge/pull requests idle past N days, branches
with no commits for N days, and protection gaps (unprotected default
branch, force-push allowed).
All four are transparent heuristics: thresholds are named parameters and every
flag carries its numbers.
Governance (built in, always on)
Every MCP tool and every CLI write runs through the vendored harness in
cicd_aiops/governance/. It records; it does not authorize (see above).
- Audit — every call (params, result, status, duration, risk tier, and any
operator-supplied approver/rationale) is logged to
~/.cicd-aiops/audit.db
(relocatable via CICD_AIOPS_HOME). The CLI writes the same row the MCP path
does — there is no unaudited entry point.
- Runaway guard — a safety backstop, not an authorization gate: the same
call hammered in a tight loop trips a circuit breaker so a stuck agent can't
burn unbounded calls/time. Disable with
CICD_RUNAWAY_MAX=0; optional hard
ceilings via CICD_MAX_TOOL_CALLS / CICD_MAX_TOOL_SECONDS.
- Undo — reversible writes record a replayable inverse in
~/.cicd-aiops/undo.db, built from the fetched before-state:
pause_runner ⇄ resume_runner, and update_branch_protection replays the
prior settings. Irreversible writes (retry_pipeline, cancel_pipeline,
delete_artifacts) record priorState (status / bytes+count) instead.
- Risk tier — a descriptive label on the audit row derived from
risk_level (reads low; mutating writes medium; delete_artifacts
high); it gates nothing.
- Dry-run everywhere — every write takes
dry_run=True (MCP) /
--dry-run (CLI) and previews without calling the server.
- Sanitize — all server-returned text is folded through an
injection-safe normaliser (bounded strings, capped depth) before an agent
sees it; all path parameters are percent-encoded so an identifier can never
rewrite a URL.
Secrets
Tokens live in ~/.cicd-aiops/secrets.enc — Fernet-encrypted, key derived
from a master password via scrypt. Never plaintext on disk. Set
CICD_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD for non-interactive/MCP use, and manage with
cicd-aiops secret set|list|remove|migrate. TLS verification defaults ON
(the init wizard asks before turning it off for lab certs).
MCP server
26 governed tools (20 reads incl. the four flagship analyses, 6 writes).
{
"mcpServers": {
"cicd-aiops": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": ["--from", "cicd-aiops", "cicd-aiops-mcp"],
"env": {
"CICD_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD": "your-master-password"
}
}
}
}
Env-block caveat: MCP clients launch the server with a minimal
environment — your shell profile is not sourced. Anything the server needs
(CICD_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD, CICD_AIOPS_HOME, and any optional
CICD_AUDIT_APPROVED_BY audit annotation) must be set in the env block
above, not in ~/.zshrc.
Alternatively: cicd-aiops mcp (same server, CLI entry point).
Configuration
~/.cicd-aiops/config.yaml (the wizard writes this):
targets:
- name: gl1
platform: gitlab
base_url: https://git.example.com
verify_ssl: true
The token for each target is stored encrypted under the target's name.
Relocate all state (config, audit, undo, secrets) with CICD_AIOPS_HOME.
Development
uv sync
uv run pytest -q
uv run ruff check .
缺功能?
缺功能提 issue/PR 欢迎留言 — if a GitLab/Gitea surface you need is missing
(runner administration on newer Gitea, per-job retry, scheduled pipelines,
group-level rollups…), open an issue or PR at
https://github.com/AIops-tools/CICD-AIops. The platform registry is designed
so a new resource is one path-map entry, not a refactor.
License
MIT. GitLab is a trademark of GitLab Inc.; Gitea is a trademark of its
project owners. This project is independent and not affiliated with either.