mcp-ooxml-ledger

An MCP server that edits Office documents and refuses to write one where an edit went unrecorded.
Before sealing a session it replays every recorded operation against the document's baseline
and compares the result to what is actually on disk. A change no operation explains means the
commit is refused. Of ~18 competing MCP document-editing projects, none gates the write on
that check. The refusal is the product.
Setup
uv add mcp-ooxml-ledger
Add to .mcp.json (project) or claude_desktop_config.json (desktop — use an absolute path,
${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR} isn't expanded there):
{
"mcpServers": {
"ooxml-ledger": {
"command": "uv",
"args": ["run", "--project", "${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR}", "ooxml-ledger-mcp"],
"env": { "OOXML_LEDGER_ROOTS": "${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR}" }
}
}
}
Needs uv on PATH; nothing else installed globally. Invoking the ooxml-ledger-mcp script
directly gives ENOENT — it lives in the project venv, not your shell's PATH.
OOXML_LEDGER_ROOTS is the security boundary. An os.pathsep-separated list; every
path any tool receives is resolved inside it and refused outside. Unset, it defaults to the
server's working directory — set it deliberately, since export_receipt writes anywhere
inside a root.
Tools
| session | open_document · close_document | writes |
| read | describe_structure · find_text | read-only |
| edit | preview_edits · apply_edits · delete_paragraph · insert_paragraph | writes |
| seal | commit_document | writes · enforces the gate |
| stateless | server_info · digest · verify · list_receipts | read-only |
| export_receipt | writes |
Typical loop:
open_document → find_text → preview_edits → apply_edits → commit_document → verify
sid = open_document(document="report.docx")["session_id"]
find_text(sid, query="Q3 revenue")
preview_edits(sid, edits=[...], author="alice")
apply_edits(sid, edits=[...], author="alice", mode="tracked")
commit_document(sid)
verify("report.docx")
preview_edits runs the same engine function as apply_edits against a throwaway copy, so
the two cannot disagree. Batches are all-or-nothing: a failing edit leaves the document
byte-identical.
mode="tracked" emits Word revision marks a reviewer sees in the document. mode="direct"
rewrites the text with none — still fully recorded, and the receipt discloses that a direct
edit touched a revision-capable part, so it is never silently indistinguishable from an
ordinary save.
Format matrix
Word .docx | Yes | Yes — tracked + direct, paragraph insert/delete |
PowerPoint .pptx | Yes | Direct only — PresentationML has no revision model, so every edit carries a mandatory disclosure |
Excel .xlsx | Yes | No — editing verbs refuse, naming the format |
Verification, digests, the gate and the receipt model are format-agnostic. Only the editing
engines are format-specific: wml.py (Word) and pml.py (PowerPoint).
Read-only deployment
OOXML_LEDGER_READ_ONLY=1 leaves exactly server_info, digest, verify, list_receipts.
The others aren't merely hidden — calling one answers Unknown tool. No write surface inside
the roots at all.
CLI
ooxml-ledger verify report.docx
No server, no session — digests the file, finds its receipt by content address, checks it.
Wire it into CI or a pre-commit hook and an unaccounted-for change fails the build.
Desktop bundle (.mcpb)
Every GitHub Release attaches a .mcpb file — a one-click Claude Desktop install: drag it onto
the app and Desktop launches it with
uv run --directory <bundle> --frozen --no-dev ooxml-ledger-mcp.
Nothing is vendored — the bundle carries only manifest.json, pyproject.toml, uv.lock,
README.md, LICENSE and src/. The host needs uv on PATH, and the first launch
resolves the exact dependency versions uv.lock pins from PyPI, which needs network access;
--frozen means it installs precisely the versions the test suite ran against, never a fresh
resolve, and --no-dev keeps the dev group (pytest, ruff, pre-commit) out of the install. mcpb/manifest.json exposes the document root and read-only toggle as install-time
settings instead of environment variables; the tool list matches the stdio server's.
CI builds and smoke-tests the bundle on macos-latest only, and the manifest's
compatibility.platforms declares darwin only — the bundle is built and proven on
macOS/arm64, nothing else. Because nothing is vendored, uv itself picks a Python
satisfying requires-python = ">=3.13" and installs the wheels uv.lock pins for the host's
own platform — native ones such as pydantic-core and cryptography included. That part is not
darwin-specific, but only the darwin launch path has actually been proven end-to-end here.
Honest limits
- An unsigned receipt is accident-evident, not tamper-evident. It catches an agent falling
back to a generic file write, an Office round-trip, a careless collaborator — not someone who
rewrites the receipt alongside the document. Anchoring its hash somewhere the holder doesn't
control (a git commit, a DOI, a submission portal) is what buys tamper-evidence.
verify never replays. It checks the digest and the receipt's internal consistency; the
replay runs once, at commit, and verify reports that verdict rather than recomputing it.
- pptx and xlsx have no human-visible record. Word tracked changes are a second recording
layer inside the document; those two formats have none, so the ledger is the only record.
- The Word engine reaches paragraph text only (
w:p/w:r/w:t). Styles, numbering,
settings and relationships are uneditable and covered by the accountability check alone.
Contributing and security
CONTRIBUTING.md covers setup, the branch and commit naming CI
enforces, and the release flow. SECURITY.md covers private vulnerability
reporting, and is explicit about which of this project's documented limits are design
rather than defects.
MIT licensed. Design notes and specifications live in docs/superpowers/.