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mcpify-openapi
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Turn any OpenAPI REST API into an MCP server so AI agents can call it — a focused, production-ready CLI with zero runtime dependencies
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Turn any OpenAPI REST API into an MCP server — so Claude Code, Cursor, and every other MCP client can call your API directly. One command, zero runtime dependencies:
mcpify serve https://your-company.com/openapi.json
# try it right now, nothing installed (uvx pulls from PyPI on demand)
uvx --from mcpify-openapi mcpify list examples/petstore.json --cost
Focused, production-ready, CLI-first: one job (OpenAPI → MCP). Everything else — governance, credentials, token economics, operations — is opt-in and stays out of the way until you need it:
--lazy), secret masking (--redact), blast-radius limits (--read-only, per-token RBAC)From spec to server
parameters + requestBody, internal $refs are resolvedmcpify diff old.yaml new.yaml reports added/removed/changed operations with per-change breaking verdicts and a migration guide; --fail-on-breaking is a CI gatemcpify doctor — tells you if your spec is agent-friendly before you ship: missing operationIds, missing summaries, instruction-like tool text, overlong descriptions; --probe dials the API once — with your real credential (--auth-env) when you want auth proven end-to-end, and --fail-on-http-error for a strict CI gatemcpify try / mcpify mock / mcpify output-server — call the tools without an agent client, serve a schema-shaped fake API for CI, or bake a serve command into a shareable scriptCredentials & policy
--write-oauth2-* gives non-GET calls a second client identity so reads and writes authenticate as different clients--write-auth-env splits the static credential (reads on your read key, writes on a dedicated key), --read-only filters the surface, --deny/--allow hides mutating GETs, per-token RBAC gives each bearer token its own allow/deny scopes--redact password,token — values whose key names a secret are masked with *** at every level of every response (error bodies included, case-insensitive); the model never sees them--plugin loads your Python module for auth/request/result hooksToken economics
mcpify list --cost prices the surface (~4 chars/token): what every agent pays in EVERY tools/list; multi-API configs get per-API and total prices in one run--fields id,event — response projection that selects at every level: selected keys keep their value, non-selected containers stay transparent, emptied containers drop. Live weather.gov: 350 alerts in full inside the budget that previously truncated at ~189"truncated": true marker, never mid-document--lazy search-then-call — cut api.weather.gov's listing by 95.5%; search results now show what pulling each full schema would cost, so the agent pulls only what it needs[tool-text] overrides — doctor flags model-facing instruction-like descriptions; you replace them per tool in configOperations
serve --http 8080 speaks MCP Streamable HTTP (SSE responses for clients that ask, JSON otherwise) so a whole team shares one server, with optional bearer tokens[apis.NAME] sections in .mcpify.toml: per-API auth, caching, retries, filters and rate limits; collision-safe renames; aggregated health; mcpify status probes every API in parallel--wait-on-429 honors Retry-After, --rate-limit RPS caps requests/second (per upstream in multi-API, retries included)--metrics (call counters, latencies, cache, health — plus projection/redaction counters when those run), --otel spans, --reload hot swap, mcpify ui local dashboardpip install 'mcpify[yaml]'# install (installs the `mcpify` command)
pipx install mcpify-openapi
# run without installing (uvx — pulls from PyPI on demand)
uvx --from mcpify-openapi mcpify list ./openapi.json --read-only
# first time? the wizard writes a config for you
uvx --from mcpify-openapi mcpify init
# ...as a container (GHCR, published on every release)
docker run -i ghcr.io/furkan708/mcpify:latest serve ./openapi.json --read-only
# ...or from source
git clone https://github.com/furkan708/mcpify.git
cd mcpify && pip install .
# 1. preview the tools that will be generated (add --cost for the context price)
mcpify list examples/petstore.json
# 2. validate the spec is agent-friendly (+ --probe for a live pre-flight)
mcpify doctor examples/petstore.json
# 3. serve it over MCP
mcpify serve examples/petstore.json --base-url https://petstore.example.com/v1
# 4. no agent client at hand? try the tools in your terminal
mcpify try examples/petstore.json --base-url https://petstore.example.com/v1
# 5. or share it over HTTP with the whole team
mcpify serve examples/petstore.json --http 8080 --http-token $SHARED_TOKEN
# Bearer token read from the environment (never hardcoded)
export PETSTORE_KEY="sk-..."
mcpify serve petstore.json \
--base-url https://petstore.example.com/v1 \
--auth-env PETSTORE_KEY \
--auth-style bearer \ # optional: auto-detected from the spec
--read-only
No explicit style needed in the common case — the spec's security
declarations pick bearer/basic/header/query (with the right name) for
you. For HTTP Basic, the env variable holds username:password:
--auth-style basic --auth-env CREDS.
| Flag | Meaning |
|---|---|
--auth-env VAR | environment variable holding the credential |
--auth-style bearer|basic|header|query | how it is sent (default: auto-detected from the spec) |
--auth-name NAME | header / query name for non-bearer styles (e.g. X-API-Key) |
For APIs behind an OAuth2 identity provider (RFC 6749 §4.4). Credentials
live in the environment; the access token is fetched, cached until its
expires_in, refreshed transparently, and re-fetched automatically once
if the API answers 401 mid-flight:
export OAUTH2_CLIENT_ID="..."
export OAUTH2_CLIENT_SECRET="..."
mcpify serve api.json \
--oauth2-token-url https://idp.example.com/oauth2/token \
--oauth2-client-id-env OAUTH2_CLIENT_ID \
--oauth2-client-secret-env OAUTH2_CLIENT_SECRET \
--oauth2-scope "read write" # optional; --oauth2-client-auth body for token endpoints that reject Basic
Split write identities too: --write-oauth2-token-url (+ client/scope
flags) runs a second client-credentials flow for non-GET calls — reads
authenticate as the read client, writes as the write client, each with
its own token cache and the same 401 self-heal. Mutually exclusive with
--write-auth-env (pick one credential kind for writes).
Put several OpenAPI documents in one config and serve them as a single tool surface — no gateway, no per-API process:
# .mcpify.toml
[apis.catalog]
spec = "https://shop.example.com/openapi.json"
auth-env = "CATALOG_TOKEN" # per-API credential
cache-ttl = 60
rate-limit = 5 # per-API courtesy throttle (req/s)
redact = "password,client_secret" # per-API response masking
[apis.crm]
spec = "./crm.yaml"
read-only = true # per-API policy
base-url = "https://crm.internal/v2"
fields = "id,name" # per-API response projection
[apis.weather]
spec = "https://api.weather.gov/openapi.json"
timeout = 10
Surface switches (--lazy, --enable-preview, --http, --format) are
server-wide flags; credentials, policies, caching and retries are per-API.
mcpify list --cost # preview every API and price each surface
mcpify serve # stdio, all three APIs, prefixed on collisions
mcpify serve --http 8080
mcpify try # REPL across every API
mcpify status # probes each API concurrently
mcpify status reports per API — [catalog] reachable (status 200, 0.03s) — https://shop.example.com — 31 tools — and exits non-zero if any API is
unreachable. When two APIs expose the same tool name (list_pets), both
get renamed with their label (catalog_list_pets, crm_list_pets) so
nothing silently wins; non-conflicting names stay untouched. The
mcpify_health tool returns one report covering every API. Precedence
per key: CLI flags > [apis.NAME] > [serve]. Pass a positional spec
or [apis.*] sections — never both.
Claude Code:
claude mcp add my-api -- mcpify serve openapi.json --read-only
Claude Desktop / Cursor / any MCP client (claude_desktop_config.json):
{
"mcpServers": {
"petstore": {
"command": "mcpify",
"args": ["serve", "~/specs/petstore.json", "--auth-env", "PETSTORE_KEY"]
}
}
}
HTTP transport (team-shared server) — run mcpify serve api.json --http 0.0.0.0:8080 --http-token $TOKEN once, then point HTTP-capable clients at it:
{
"mcpServers": {
"petstore": {
"type": "http",
"url": "http://your-host:8080",
"headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer <token>" }
}
}
}
Now ask your agent: "list the pets, then create one named Milo" — it discovers list_pets and create_pet, fills the arguments, and performs real HTTP calls.
| OpenAPI | mcpify |
|---|---|
operationId | tool name (sanitized; falls back to method_path) |
summary / description | tool description the agent reads |
deprecated: true | shown by mcpify list before you expose old endpoints |
parameters (path/query/header) | individual typed arguments with enums |
requestBody (JSON) | a body object argument |
$ref pointers | resolved inline (components → real schemas) |
servers[0].url | default base URL (override: --base-url) |
The agent only ever sees the tool list and your API's JSON responses — mcpify adds no middleware, caches nothing you did not ask for, and sends credentials nowhere except your API.
$ mcpify doctor my-api.json
openapi: 3.0.3
title: Acme API
paths: 23
tools: 41 operations
servers: https://api.acme.com
warning: 12/41 operations have no operationId (names fall back to method_path)
warning: 30/41 operations have no summary (agents see no description)
Add --probe for a live pre-flight — after the static report, mcpify
dials one argument-free GET (or the base URL) and reports reachability;
a connection failure exits non-zero so CI and shell scripts stop before
serving:
$ mcpify doctor https://api.weather.gov/openapi.json --probe
...
probe: GET /alerts → 200 reachable (2.80s)
mcpify list <spec> [--tag T] [--include P] [--exclude P] [--read-only] [--json]
mcpify list --cost # price the surface (~4 chars/token)
mcpify list --cost --lazy # ...and the 3-meta-tool lazy surface
mcpify list --config .mcpify.toml --cost # multi-API: every surface priced
mcpify serve <spec> [--base-url URL] [--server INDEX|NAME] [--name N] [--auth-env VAR]
[--auth-style bearer|header|query] [--auth-name NAME]
[--oauth2-token-url URL --oauth2-client-id-env VAR
--oauth2-client-secret-env VAR] [--timeout S]
[--read-only] [--tag T] [--include P] [--exclude P]
[--http [HOST:]PORT] [--http-token TOKEN] [--wait-on-429 SEC]
mcpify try <spec> [same serve flags] # interactive REPL, no agent needed
mcpify output-server <spec> -o FILE [-- <any serve flags>]
mcpify ui <spec> [same serve flags] # local dashboard (tool explorer, health, config)
mcpify mock <spec> [--http 8000] [--delay-ms N]
mcpify diff OLD NEW [--json] [--fail-on-breaking] # upgrade report + CI gate
mcpify diff OLD NEW --probe [--auth-env V] # ...+ live check of the NEW API + cost delta
mcpify config-schema # JSON Schema for .mcpify.toml (editor wiring)
mcpify doctor <spec> [--probe --auth-env V --fail-on-http-error] # static audit + live pre-flight / CI gate
# token economics: --fields id,name (projection), --redact password,token (masking),
# --rate-limit RPS (upstream courtesy, retries included)
# credential split: --write-auth-env WRITE_KEY_ENV or --write-oauth2-token-url (reads keep --auth-env)
# tool-text overrides: [tool-text.TOOL] description = "..." in .mcpify.toml
# multi-API: define [apis.NAME] sections in .mcpify.toml, then run
# mcpify list|serve|try|status|ui (no positional spec) — one process, every API
# ops add-ons for serve/ui: --metrics [HOST:]PORT --reload --cache-warm
# --audit-log FILE --http-token-file FILE --plugin FILE (repeatable) --otel [ENDPOINT]
pip install 'mcpify[yaml]'$ref targets (files or URLs) are bundled automatically at load; circular
cross-file refs are left in place rather than unwound (surface skips what it cannot resolve)--fields selects at every level by documented rule (selected keys verbatim,
non-selected containers transparent); it is a projection, not a security boundary —
use --redact when a field must never reach the modelbody object argument — predictable over cleverAccept: text/event-stream get it framed as a
single SSE message event. Server-initiated streams (a GET stream with sessions)
stay deliberately out of scope for a stateless servermcpify is audited on every release against a 10-category checklist of MCP best practices and published production failure modes — not just our own examples:
$refs, multipart uploads,
allOf schemas, server URL variables, relative base URLs, oversized
responses — every scenario derived from a documented real-world failure,
fixed, and locked in by a regression test. Sources include the arXiv
study of REST→MCP generation across 18 real APIs.initialize handshake.isError tool result with remediation — never a dead
stdio connection (the failure mode reported against other OpenAPI-to-MCP
servers, replayed here and locked in by regression tests).--timeout, credentials never logged.Full checklist with per-item status: docs/AUDIT-CHECKLIST.md
520 passing, plus one live-integration test that loads the real
api.weather.gov document (auto-skipped when offline) and an OTel positive
test that runs wherever the optional tracing extra is installed. Every
suite runs on Python 3.10–3.12 across Linux and Windows; ruff, strict
mypy and CodeQL gate every push.
| Suite | Tests | What it pins down |
|---|---|---|
| Spec parsing & resolution | 13 | OpenAPI 3.x + YAML loading, $ref chains, allOf merge, server variables, malformed input |
| Tool translation | 19 | operationId naming with collision suffixing, input schemas, enums, body handling, annotation & output-schema derivation |
| Agent surface | 32 | HTTP-derived annotations, structured output contract, remediation errors, --lazy search, dry-run previews |
| CLI | 15 | list / doctor / serve flags, --json output, deprecated badges |
| Hostile corpus | 11 | circular $refs, multipart bodies, relative base URLs, 300 KB truncation, 500-op performance — each traced to a documented real-world failure |
| Lifecycle & hygiene | 8 | initialize handshake (-32002), byte-pure stdio, credentials never logged |
| Protocol end-to-end | 9 | real JSON-RPC over stdio against a live local HTTP API, wire-level assertions |
| Policy layer | 7 | --read-only, --allow / --deny precedence, mutating-GET protection |
$ref parameters | 4 | parameter schemas resolved against the full spec — the weather.gov bug class (one test hits the live document) |
| Ops & configuration | 47 | config files + env precedence, init wizard, cache TTL & bounds, retry safety, XML conversion, discovery, batching, status/health |
| Protocol version compat | 5 | 2026-07-28 stateless _meta requests and the legacy 2025-06-18 handshake, on the same wire |
| HTTP transport | 19 | Streamable HTTP: lifecycle over POST, 405/411/413/415 error ladder, parse/batch rejections, bearer enforcement, bind-string parser |
| OAuth2 client-credentials | 18 | token fetch/cache/refresh with a fake clock, Basic vs body client auth, public clients, every failure mode, 401 self-heal end-to-end |
try REPL | 26 | piped-stdin sessions: selection by number/name, typed prompts, re-prompt on bad input, :raw/:info, clean EOF/Ctrl+C exits, read-only surface |
output-server | 11 | embedded spec integrity, guard rails (existing file, bad spec, unknown flags), secret warnings, and a real subprocess E2E handshake |
| Server selection | 17 | `--server INDEX |
| Auth auto-detection & Basic | 22 | securitySchemes → style/name resolution (OpenAPI + Swagger 2.0), requirement-order precedence, operation-level security, exact hint text, HTTP Basic header encoding, CLI/try/doctor wiring, explicit-style override |
Rate-limit courtesy (--wait-on-429) | 9 | Retry-After honored once within cap, cap exceeded returns 429 untouched, missing header falls back to retry delay, HTTP-date form never waits, POST never auto-waited, CLI wiring |
| Multi-API aggregation | 26 | [apis.*] merge with two-sided collision prefixes and _2 suffixes, per-API routing/auth/cache isolation, concurrent aggregated health (dead-API named in hint), lazy search across APIs incl. label match, preview routing, status exit codes, --env inheritance, both-rejected flag combos |
| Ops: dashboard, metrics, mock, reload | 25 | /metrics text format (counters/histograms/cache hit-miss/health gauges), token'd UI routes, masked preview API, config-form writer (+unknown-key 400), schema-shaped mock responses with template routing, hot-reload rebuild incl. broken-spec survival |
| CLI connectivity glue | 10 | --http wiring, MCPIFY_HTTP_TOKEN fallback, OAuth2 flag rules, config-file keys, wizard option 5, try smoke test |
Spec diff (mcpify diff) | 14 | added/removed/changed ops, breaking verdicts (required param added/became, body became required, op removal), deprecation & operationId warnings, migration guide, document-level diff, CLI exit contract 0/1/2, --json |
| v1.11 serving: audit, cache, RBAC, plugins | 17 | JSONL audit trail with argument fingerprints + fail-safe on unwritable files, ETag 304 revalidation on stale entries, mcpify_cache_invalidate (scoped + full), --cache-warm pre-calls argument-free GETs only, token-file scoping end-to-end (401 / filtered lists / refused calls, deny wins, duplicate-token rejection), plugin hooks on real requests, mcpify ui dispatch (dead-command regression), config-schema matches the config module, OTel guard |
External $ref bundling | 6 | file + URL-base targets inlined, component-only target files, nested refs resolved relative to their own file, missing targets skipped, circular refs survive, same-document refs untouched |
| Governance: split keys, tool text, valid truncation | 21 | read-key/write-key per method over a live upstream (shared-identity default unchanged), style/name inheritance + explicit override, config write-auth-* keys in serve/envs/apis, [tool-text] override through list --json, unknown-tool warnings, validator errors, schema/keys parity, doctor instruction-like + overlong-description counts, oversized array → valid JSON with marker, object key-keeping, non-JSON fallback, error-prefix survival |
| v1.13: cost, projection, SSE, OAuth2 write | 20 | surface pricing in JSON + human output, recursive projection with transparent envelopes (both rules pinned: the top-level-only first rule failed live), selected keys keep their arrays, SSE framing vs JSON clients, write-flow resolution + mutual exclusion with --write-auth-env |
| v1.16: status policy, REPL session controls, diff probe + cost delta | 12 | policy (fields/redact/rate-limit) in multi-API JSON+human status and single-spec policy: line, :redact/:fields session set/show/clear over a live upstream (masking verified on the wire), diff surface-cost delta in JSON+human, --probe reachable/unreachable exit contract (2 on probe failure), form retry-delay float |
| v1.15: auth-probe, strict gate, metrics, lazy pricing | 16 | probe with a real credential (401-without vs 200-with over a live local upstream), strict-mode verdicts, doctor CLI exit contract, projection/redaction Prometheus counters (values counted, fresh-session enable), count_redact_targets, lazy-surface pricing lines, init --probe reachable/unreachable, dashboard-form token keys (float coercion, unknown-key rejection) |
| v1.14: redact, rate-limit, probe, multi list | 29 | masking at every level incl. error bodies and selected-key overlap, arrays masked in place, limiter slots with a fake clock, retry throttling, probe target selection + reachability exit contract, config redact/rate-limit in serve/apis/envs, per-upstream limiters, multi-API list + pricing |
Policy on failures: every bug found in the wild becomes a pinned regression test before the fix ships — the suite only grows.
Run it locally:
pip install pytest pyyaml
pytest -v
The v1.6–1.16 roadmap is fully shipped. Possible future work (not promised): server-initiated SSE (a GET stream with sessions — deliberately out for a stateless transport).
status policy visibility, REPL :redact/:fields, diff --probe + cost delta, form examplesdoctor --probe + --fail-on-http-error CI gate, init --probe, projection/redaction metrics, lazy-surface pricing--redact, --rate-limit, doctor --probe, lazy-search costs, multi-API list--write-oauth2-*), list --cost, --fields projection, SSE POST responses$ref bundling + OTel extraserve process fronting several OpenAPI documentsmcpify try REPL--output-serverMIT — see the LICENSE file for details.
FAQs
Turn any OpenAPI REST API into an MCP server so AI agents can call it — a focused, production-ready CLI with zero runtime dependencies
We found that mcpify-openapi demonstrated a healthy version release cadence and project activity because the last version was released less than a year ago. It has 1 open source maintainer collaborating on the project.

Security News
Two compromised GitHub Actions were re-enabled with malicious tags intact, exposing thousands of downstream repositories to Mini Shai-Hulud.

Research
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