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telegram-slack-mcp
Advanced tools
MCP servers that give Claude access to your personal Telegram and Slack accounts
mcp-name: io.github.nileshpatil6/telegram-slack-mcp
MCP servers that give Claude access to your personal Telegram and Slack accounts. Python distribution of telegram-slack-mcp.
There is also an npm build of the same servers if you prefer Node:
npx -y telegram-slack-mcp telegram.
uvx telegram-slack-mcp telegram # or: pipx install telegram-slack-mcp
Register with Claude Code:
claude mcp add telegram -- uvx telegram-slack-mcp telegram
claude mcp add slack -- uvx telegram-slack-mcp slack
Uses MTProto as your account, so it sees your real DMs, groups and channels, not just messages sent to a bot.
api_id and api_hash from https://my.telegram.org → API development tools.TELEGRAM_API_ID and TELEGRAM_API_HASH.login_start with your phone, you paste the
code Telegram sends, it calls login_complete. One time only.Tools: login_start, login_complete, whoami, list_chats, read_chat,
search_messages, unread_summary, send_message.
Reads and posts across all your workspaces at once.
xoxp-...) each time.SLACK_USER_TOKENS to all of them, comma separated.Tools: whoami, list_channels, list_dms, read_channel, read_thread,
search_messages, unread_summary, send_message. Every tool takes an optional
workspace filter.
| variable | meaning |
|---|---|
TELEGRAM_API_ID / TELEGRAM_API_HASH | from my.telegram.org |
TELEGRAM_ALLOW_SEND | 1 to allow sending as you (default off) |
SLACK_USER_TOKENS | one xoxp- token per workspace, comma separated |
SLACK_ALLOW_SEND | 1 to allow posting as you (default off) |
CHAT_MCP_DATA_DIR | where sessions live (default ~/.chat-mcp) |
Nothing is sent to any server belonging to this project. There is no such server.
Everything runs on your machine. The only outbound traffic is to Telegram's and Slack's own APIs with your own credentials. No telemetry, no analytics, no phone-home.
Credentials never reach Claude — they stay in ~/.chat-mcp and your environment. What
reaches Claude is only the chat content you ask it to read, handled under Anthropic's
privacy policy like any text you paste in yourself. The servers are passive and read
nothing in the background.
These act as you, not as a bot. Sending is off by default in both servers.
The Telegram session file and Slack xoxp- tokens are full account credentials —
keep them out of git. Automating a personal Telegram account is a userbot, which
Telegram's ToS restricts; light personal use is common, bulk automation risks a ban.
Anything Claude reads enters the model's context.
MIT licensed. Full docs: https://github.com/nileshpatil6/telegram-slack-mcp
FAQs
MCP servers that give Claude access to your personal Telegram and Slack accounts
The pypi package telegram-slack-mcp receives a total of 22 weekly downloads. As such, telegram-slack-mcp popularity was classified as not popular.
We found that telegram-slack-mcp demonstrated a healthy version release cadence and project activity because the last version was released less than a year ago. It has 1 open source maintainer collaborating on the project.

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