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GHSA-48hr-524c-v5w3

GHSA: GHSA-48hr-524c-v5w3

CVE: CVE-2026-71318

Patch Available (112)

Summary

MODERATE

Nuxt: Unauthorized Component Instantiation via Server Island Props

Details

Impact

Nuxt server islands accept props via the /__nuxt_island/ endpoint. When an application has a server island component that forwards props directly into Vue's dynamic component resolution (<component :is>, resolveDynamicComponent, or h()), an attacker can pass a plain string value (rather than a component definition) to instantiate any globally-registered Vue component or any native HTML element.

For example:

{ "as": "SomeGlobalComponent" }

...resolves and renders SomeGlobalComponent if it is globally registered, even though the attacker should only be able to drive props for the island's declared component. Similarly, { "as": "iframe" } renders an <iframe> element.

Unlike the primary RCE vector (GHSA-9473-5f9j-94wq), this does not require vue.runtimeCompiler to be enabled. A plain string prop is sufficient to trigger component resolution. The template/render key guard that addresses the RCE vector does not block plain string values.

Some component libraries expose a polymorphic as / asChild prop that forwards its value into <component :is>; @nuxt/ui (via reka-ui) is a widely used example. An application is affected if such a component receives the attacker-controlled value inside a server island. Note this does not require explicit prop forwarding: island props the island component does not declare fall through as attributes onto its single root element, so an island whose root is a reka-ui / @nuxt/ui component receives the attacker's as value implicitly. Unlike the RCE vector, no vue.runtimeCompiler is required, which makes this vector reachable in more configurations. These libraries are not themselves vulnerable; they are noted only because they commonly provide the dynamic-component sink. Installing @nuxt/ui does not by itself register any component as a server island: the application must define the island (a .server.vue file).

Mitigating factors

  • Exploitation requires a server island component that puts an attacker-controlled value onto a dynamic-component path (<component :is>, resolveDynamicComponent, h(), or a polymorphic as / asChild prop), either explicitly or via attribute fallthrough when the island's root is such a component.
  • Reachable components are limited to what is actually in the island app's global registry. In a default pages-enabled app that is RouterView and RouterLink (both registered globally by the pages router plugin, which runs even in component islands), plus any components/global/ component and any component a module registers globally. RouterLink in particular renders an attacker-influenced <a> (and, because an island that declares no props forwards all props, to and other RouterLink props ride the same fallthrough). Vue built-ins (Transition, KeepAlive, Teleport, Suspense) and Nuxt auto-imports (ClientOnly, NuxtLink, NuxtPage, etc.) are NOT in the island app's global registry and cannot be resolved this way; an unresolved name instead renders as a native HTML element (the element-injection half of this issue).
  • Declaring the props an island accepts, or setting inheritAttrs: false on it, prevents an undeclared as from falling through to a polymorphic root and neutralizes this vector.
  • Arbitrary JavaScript execution is not possible through this vector (no template/render compilation).
  • Island component names are constrained to the build-time component registry; an attacker cannot resolve arbitrary components.

Affected versions

Nuxt >=3.1.0 <3.21.10 and >=4.0.0 <4.5.1, with component islands active. The island prop-forwarding behavior has existed since server islands were introduced in v3.1.0, and this vector does not depend on vue.runtimeCompiler. Nuxt 2 is not affected.

Note the patch (below) closes the implicit attribute-fallthrough path, which is the majority case. An island that explicitly forwards an untrusted prop into dynamic component resolution (or forwards it under a prop name other than as) remains the application's responsibility in every version; see Workarounds.

Patches

Fixed in nuxt@4.5.1 and nuxt@3.21.10. Patched releases reject a top-level as island prop (HTTP 400 at the /__nuxt_island/ endpoint). This closes the implicit path: island props an island does not declare fall through as attributes onto its single root, so a top-level as would otherwise reach a polymorphic root component's as prop (the reka-ui / @nuxt/ui convention) and drive dynamic component resolution without the author binding it. Rejecting the top-level as prop blocks that fallthrough while leaving nested data and other prop names untouched.

The framework deliberately does not attempt to block every case: it cannot safely tell a string used as data from one used as a component selector, and it has no island-local hook into Vue's h() or resolveDynamicComponent(). An island that explicitly forwards an untrusted value into <component :is> / h() / resolveDynamicComponent(), or that forwards it under a different polymorphic prop name, is therefore not covered by the patch and must follow the guidance below. The Nuxt documentation now warns against this.

Workarounds

Upgrade to nuxt@4.5.1 or nuxt@3.21.10. That upgrade also removes the related object-prop RCE (GHSA-9473-5f9j-94wq). In addition, in any version:

  • Do not forward island props into <component :is>, resolveDynamicComponent, or h(). Map an untrusted discriminator through a closed allowlist of imported component definitions instead of passing the raw prop value.
  • Declare the props an island accepts, or set inheritAttrs: false on it, so request input cannot fall through to a polymorphic root component.
  • Avoid registering sensitive components globally that could leak information if instantiated by an attacker.

Metadata

Published:

8/5/2026

Modified:

9/10/2026

CVSS Vector:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

EPSS - Exploit Prediction Scoring System

Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild in the next 30 days

Current Exploitation Probability

0.32%

24.5th percentile

Low Risk

As of 11&#x2F;3&#x2F;2026

EPSS scores are updated daily and represent the probability (0-100%) that a CVE will be exploited in the next 30 days. Higher scores indicate higher risk.

CWEs (Common Weakness Enumeration)

CWE-20

Improper Input Validation

Abstraction Level:

Class

Description:

The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.

Extended Description:

Input validation is a frequently-used technique for checking potentially dangerous inputs in order to ensure that the inputs are safe for processing within the code, or when communicating with other components. Input can consist of: - raw data - strings, numbers, parameters, file contents, etc. - metadata - information about the raw data, such as headers or size Data can be simple or structured. Structured data can be composed of many nested layers, composed of combinations of metadata and raw data, with other simple or structured data. Many properties of raw data or metadata may need to be validated upon entry into the code, such as: - specified quantities such as size, length, frequency, price, rate, number of operations, time, etc. - implied or derived quantities, such as the actual size of a file instead of a specified size - indexes, offsets, or positions into more complex data structures - symbolic keys or other elements into hash tables, associative arrays, etc. - well-formedness, i.e. syntactic correctness - compliance with expected syntax - lexical token correctness - compliance with rules for what is treated as a token - specified or derived type - the actual type of the input (or what the input appears to be) - consistency - between individual data elements, between raw data and metadata, between references, etc. - conformance to domain-specific rules, e.g. business logic - equivalence - ensuring that equivalent inputs are treated the same - authenticity, ownership, or other attestations about the input, e.g. a cryptographic signature to prove the source of the data Implied or derived properties of data must often be calculated or inferred by the code itself. Errors in deriving properties may be considered a contributing factor to improper input validation.

Likelihood of Exploit:

High

Related Weaknesses:

CWE-707CWE-345CWE-22CWE-41CWE-74CWE-119CWE-770

Affected Packages (0)