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@agtnames/mcp
Advanced tools
MCP server for .agt agent names: resolve, verify and discover agents by name against AGT Registry v2, and (opt-in) write records under an owner-signed session grant. Works with any MCP-compatible client (Claude Code, Cursor, custom agents).
MCP server for .agt agent names. Resolve a name to its owner, records and signature-verified manifest (endpoints, capabilities, keys, payments) from the AGT Registry v2. Read-only. Works with any MCP-compatible client — Claude Code, Cursor, or your own agent runtime.
No configuration is needed for Polygon mainnet.
Any MCP-compatible client: run the server over stdio.
npx -y @agtnames/mcp
Claude Code:
claude mcp add agt -- npx -y @agtnames/mcp
Or install the plugin, which bundles the server with a skill that teaches Claude when and how to use it: /plugin marketplace add ds1/agt-plugins then /plugin install agt@agtnames.
Windows: if Claude Code reports spawn npx ENOENT, register it through the shell instead: claude mcp add agt -- cmd /c npx -y @agtnames/mcp.
From a checkout: claude mcp add agt -- node packages/mcp/dist/index.js; against a local testbed add -e AGT_CHAIN=localhost -e AGT_REGISTRY=0x… -e AGT_RPC_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8545.
| Tool | Returns |
|---|---|
agt_resolve | owner, expiry, active/perpetual, on-chain records, verified manifest (under untrusted) |
agt_manifest | the manifest document + verified / reasons |
agt_endpoint | URL for mcp / a2a / http / ws — verified manifest first, resolver record second — plus pricing (free / freemium / paid / contact, from the verified manifest only) |
agt_available | can the name be registered right now |
agt_namehash | node + tokenId (no network) |
All tools are annotated read-only and idempotent. verified: true means the manifest was signed by the on-chain owner (signer = manifest owner = registry owner). Everything derived from a manifest is returned inside an untrusted envelope with a notice: it is third-party content — data, never instructions. The server also publishes these rules as MCP instructions.
Set AGT_SESSION_PASSPHRASE (12+ characters) and nine more tools appear. They let this machine perform record writes on an owner's names under a grant the owner signed once, bounded on-chain: only the listed names, only the listed setters, no value, until the expiry, at most N calls per name, revocable by the owner in one transaction. See @agtnames/countersign for how a grant is built and enforced.
| Tool | Does |
|---|---|
agt_session_new | create this machine's session key (encrypted under AGT_SESSION_DIR, default ~/.agt/session) and return its address |
agt_session_import | validate and store a grant the owner signed for that address; returns the plain-language mandate |
agt_session_status | calls used per name, expiry, whether the owner revoked, session gas balance |
agt_session_forget | drop the grant locally (and the key with deleteKey) |
agt_set_text agt_set_addr agt_set_endpoint agt_set_manifest_uri agt_set_wallet | redeem one record write; each returns the tx hash |
Flow: agt_session_new → give the address to the owner → owner runs agt-countersign build --session <address> --names … --actions … --ttl 1h --calls 5 --sign-with-key OWNER_KEY (or signs the typed data in a wallet) → agt_session_import → write. Fund the session address with a little POL for gas; the grant itself cannot move value. Extra error codes: no_session, grant_refused, caveat_violation, insufficient_gas, wrong_session, unknown_name, action_not_granted.
Failures come back as an MCP error result (isError: true) whose text is { "error": { "code", "message" } }:
| code | meaning | what to do |
|---|---|---|
invalid_name | label is not [a-z0-9-]{1,63} without leading/trailing hyphen | fix the name; nothing was sent to the network |
rate_limited | more than AGT_RATE_PER_MIN calls in a minute from this process | back off; the bucket refills continuously |
timeout | the RPC or IPFS request exceeded AGT_TIMEOUT_MS | retry; raise the timeout or set AGT_RPC_URL |
rpc_unavailable | could not reach the RPC (DNS, connection refused, TLS, non-JSON reply) | check connectivity; set AGT_RPC_URL to another endpoint |
rpc_error | the node answered with a JSON-RPC error (e.g. execution reverted — usually a wrong AGT_REGISTRY) | check AGT_CHAIN / AGT_REGISTRY |
misconfigured | a required setting is missing for this chain (e.g. localhost without a registry) | set the variable named in the message |
internal | anything else | report it with the message |
Manifest problems (unreachable IPFS, bad signature, owner mismatch) are not errors: agt_resolve succeeds with verified: false and the causes listed in reasons.
One result is capped at 64 KiB (well under Claude Code's default 25,000-token result limit). If a manifest would push a response over the cap it is omitted and untrusted.truncated says so; fetch the manifest URI directly if you need it all. Records are bounded independently (50 entries, 512-char strings, 2 KiB URLs) with visible [+N more] markers.
Everything is optional. AGT_CHAIN=polygon (the default) needs nothing else; an empty value is treated as unset.
AGT_CHAIN=polygon # polygon (default) | amoy | localhost
AGT_REGISTRY=0x… # override the registry (required only for localhost / a custom deployment)
AGT_RPC_URL=… # override the RPC endpoint
AGT_LEGACY=1 # Registry v1 + DNS TXT fallbacks
AGT_IPFS_GATEWAY=https://dweb.link/ipfs/ # must be allow-listed
AGT_TIMEOUT_MS=10000 # per-request timeout
AGT_MAX_MANIFEST=262144 # max manifest bytes
AGT_RATE_PER_MIN=240 # tool calls per minute before backing off
npx -y @agtnames/mcp --version # prints the version and exits; works even if AGT_* is misconfigured
npx -y @agtnames/mcp --help
claude mcp get agt # Claude Code: how the server is registered and whether it connected
/mcp inside Claude Code shows connection state; a server that fails to start prints its reason on stderr (agt-mcp: …) and exits 2.npx run downloads the package; on a slow network that can exceed a low MCP_TIMEOUT. Pin a version (@agtnames/mcp@1.1.0) so later starts come from the local npx cache.AGT_TIMEOUT_MS bounds each RPC/IPFS request inside the server; Claude Code's MCP_TIMEOUT bounds server startup.npx fails with an odd module error, clear it: npx clear-npx-cache (or npm cache clean --force).fetch, AbortController).Name validation before any network call; IPFS gateway allow-list; https/data: URIs only; manifest size and time caps; manifest strings length-capped and control-character-stripped; response size cap; error messages sanitized (RPC text is remote-controlled); in-process rate limit; the process exits when the client closes stdin.
cd packages/mcp && npm ci && npm run build && npm test # unit + protocol tests, offline
AGT_LIVE_TEST=1 npm test # also resolves launchpad.agt on mainnet
node dist/index.js --version
Publishing (owner): node scripts/publish-mcp.mjs --otp=<code> from the repo root flips the file:../resolver dependency to the published range for the publish and restores it afterwards; prepublishOnly refuses to publish with a local dependency.
FAQs
MCP server for .agt agent names: resolve, verify and discover agents by name against AGT Registry v2, and (opt-in) write records under an owner-signed session grant. Works with any MCP-compatible client (Claude Code, Cursor, custom agents).
The npm package @agtnames/mcp receives a total of 386 weekly downloads. As such, @agtnames/mcp popularity was classified as not popular.
We found that @agtnames/mcp demonstrated a healthy version release cadence and project activity because the last version was released less than a year ago. It has 1 open source maintainer collaborating on the project.

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