
Security News
Open VSX Unblocks Extension IDs Used in Malware Campaign
Open VSX has removed three extension IDs from its malicious-extension list as the legitimate publishers they impersonated move to claim the names for themselves.
@ar-agents/ap2
Advanced tools
First faithful TypeScript implementation of the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2) v0.2. Schemas, ES256 SD-JWT VC mandates (Checkout + Payment, open + closed), 8 constraint evaluators, and signed Checkout/Payment receipts. Edge-Runtime-compatible. Aligned with
First faithful TypeScript implementation of the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2) v0.2. Schemas, crypto, SD-JWT VC primitives, all 8 constraint evaluators, and signed Checkout/Payment receipts. Edge-Runtime-compatible. Aligned with the FIDO Alliance Agentic Auth Working Group reference Python SDK.
pnpm add @ar-agents/ap2 zod
AP2 v0.2 (April 2026) is the agentic-payments protocol Google donated to the FIDO Alliance. It binds an agent's payment action to a cryptographically signed mandate carrying the user's intent — the missing trust layer for ChatGPT Buy / Claude / Gemini / x402 / Visa-IC / Mastercard-Agent-Pay.
As of May 2026, there is no production-grade TypeScript implementation
of AP2. The community agentic-payments package fails the rainbow-table
defense rule (uses Ed25519 for checkout_jwt — explicitly forbidden by
spec). Google's reference implementation is Python-only.
This package fills that gap. It implements every primitive AP2 v0.2 defines, faithfully to spec.
Phase 2.1 — single-hop AP2. Sufficient for direct flows where the Trusted Surface signs both open and closed mandates (the most common agent-direct-action case).
| Surface | Status |
|---|---|
| All four mandate types — Open + Closed × Checkout + Payment | ✅ Zod schemas, validated round-trip |
All ten constraint types — checkout.allowed_merchants, checkout.line_items, payment.amount_range, payment.allowed_payees, payment.allowed_payment_instruments, payment.allowed_pisps, payment.budget, payment.agent_recurrence, payment.execution_date, payment.reference | ✅ Evaluators with max-flow for line_items |
| ES256 (P-256 ECDSA) sign/verify, jose-backed | ✅ |
checkout_jwt rainbow-table defense (Ed25519 forbidden) | ✅ Throws at signing time |
SD-JWT VC primitives — disclosures (RFC 9901), _sd, sd_hash, compact parser | ✅ Single-hop only |
| KB-JWT (Key Binding JWT) — build + verify (audience, nonce, sd_hash) | ✅ |
| Issuer factories for all 4 mandate types | ✅ |
| Verifier for all 4 mandate types + role-specific checks | ✅ |
CheckoutReceipt + PaymentReceipt build + verify (plain JWT, signed by issuer) | ✅ |
| 88 tests across schemas, crypto, sd-jwt, constraints, end-to-end Direct flow | ✅ |
~~-separated), dSD-JWT delegation
(gco-delegate-sd-jwt)payment.budget + payment.agent_recurrence
(BudgetTracker default impl)import {
generateAp2KeyPair,
signCheckoutJwt,
computeCheckoutHash,
issueOpenCheckoutMandate,
issueClosedCheckoutMandate,
issueOpenPaymentMandate,
issueClosedPaymentMandate,
verifyClosedCheckoutMandate,
verifyOpenCheckoutMandate,
verifyClosedPaymentMandate,
verifyOpenPaymentMandate,
buildCheckoutReceipt,
buildPaymentReceipt,
parseSdJwt,
computeSdHash,
} from "@ar-agents/ap2";
// 1. Setup keys (per role).
const merchant = await generateAp2KeyPair("ES256");
const agent = await generateAp2KeyPair("ES256");
const mpp = await generateAp2KeyPair("ES256");
// 2. Merchant signs the inner checkout_jwt.
const checkoutJwt = await signCheckoutJwt(
{
order_id: "ord_1",
merchant: { id: "merchant_1", name: "Demo" },
line_items: [{
id: "li_1",
product: { id: "shoe_red", title: "Red Shoe", price: 199, currency: "USD" },
quantity: 1,
}],
total_price: 199,
currency: "USD",
},
merchant.privateKey,
);
const checkoutHash = await computeCheckoutHash(checkoutJwt);
// 3. Trusted Surface signs Open Checkout Mandate (intent constraints).
const openCheckoutPresentation = await issueOpenCheckoutMandate({
mandate: {
vct: "mandate.checkout.open.1",
constraints: [
{ type: "checkout.allowed_merchants", allowed: [{ id: "merchant_1" }] },
{
type: "checkout.line_items",
items: [{
id: "c_shoes",
acceptable_items: [{ id: "shoe_red" }, { id: "shoe_blue" }],
quantity: 1,
}],
},
],
cnf: { jwk: agent.publicJwk },
},
signingCtx: { privateKey: merchant.privateKey, alg: "ES256" },
});
// 4. Agent signs Closed Checkout Mandate carrying the merchant's checkout_jwt.
const closedCheckoutPresentation = await issueClosedCheckoutMandate({
mandate: {
vct: "mandate.checkout.1",
checkout_jwt: checkoutJwt,
checkout_hash: checkoutHash,
},
signingCtx: { privateKey: agent.privateKey, alg: "ES256" },
});
// 5. Merchant verifies closed checkout + open constraints.
const closedVerify = await verifyClosedCheckoutMandate(
closedCheckoutPresentation,
{ issuerKey: agent.publicJwk, checkoutJwtKey: merchant.publicJwk },
);
if (!closedVerify.ok) throw new Error(closedVerify.reason);
const openVerify = await verifyOpenCheckoutMandate(openCheckoutPresentation, {
issuerKey: merchant.publicJwk,
closedCheckout: closedVerify.mandate.checkout,
closedMandate: closedVerify.mandate.closed,
});
if (!openVerify.ok) throw new Error(openVerify.reason);
// 6. Merchant issues CheckoutReceipt — `reference` = sd_hash of closed mandate.
const checkoutReceiptJwt = await buildCheckoutReceipt({
receipt: {
status: "Success",
iss: "merchant_1",
iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
reference: closedVerify.sdHash,
order_id: "ord_1",
},
signingKey: merchant.privateKey,
});
// 7. Agent signs Open + Closed Payment Mandate. transaction_id = checkout_hash.
const openCheckoutParts = parseSdJwt(openCheckoutPresentation);
const openCheckoutDigest = await computeSdHash({
issuerJwt: openCheckoutParts.issuerJwt,
disclosures: openCheckoutParts.disclosures,
});
const openPaymentPresentation = await issueOpenPaymentMandate({
mandate: {
vct: "mandate.payment.open.1",
constraints: [
{ type: "payment.reference", conditional_transaction_id: openCheckoutDigest },
{ type: "payment.amount_range", currency: "USD", max: 50000 },
{ type: "payment.allowed_payees", allowed: [{ id: "merchant_1" }] },
],
cnf: { jwk: agent.publicJwk },
},
signingCtx: { privateKey: merchant.privateKey, alg: "ES256" },
});
const closedPaymentPresentation = await issueClosedPaymentMandate({
mandate: {
vct: "mandate.payment.1",
transaction_id: checkoutHash,
payee: { id: "merchant_1" },
payment_amount: { amount: 19900, currency: "USD" },
payment_instrument: { id: "card_x", type: "card" },
},
signingCtx: { privateKey: agent.privateKey, alg: "ES256" },
});
// 8. Credential Provider verifies + emits PaymentReceipt.
const closedPaymentVerify = await verifyClosedPaymentMandate(
closedPaymentPresentation,
{ issuerKey: agent.publicJwk, expectedTransactionId: checkoutHash },
);
if (!closedPaymentVerify.ok) throw new Error(closedPaymentVerify.reason);
const openPaymentVerify = await verifyOpenPaymentMandate(openPaymentPresentation, {
issuerKey: merchant.publicJwk,
closedMandate: closedPaymentVerify.mandate.closed,
linkedCheckoutMandateDigest: openCheckoutDigest,
});
if (!openPaymentVerify.ok) throw new Error(openPaymentVerify.reason);
const paymentReceiptJwt = await buildPaymentReceipt({
receipt: {
status: "Success",
iss: "mpp.acme",
iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
reference: closedPaymentVerify.mandate.sdHash,
payment_id: "PAY-001",
},
signingKey: mpp.privateKey,
});
The inner checkout_jwt MUST use ECDSA. Per spec §A.1 + the
rainbow-table attack section in security_and_privacy_considerations.md,
Ed25519 is forbidden because deterministic signatures leak no entropy
to defeat preimage attacks against checkout_hash. We enforce this in
signCheckoutJwt — passing alg: "EdDSA" throws CheckoutJwtAlgError.
Single-hop only in v0.1. Multi-hop chains (~~-separated, with
per-hop cnf.jwk PoP binding for delegated SD-JWT presentations) ship
in Phase 2.2. The single-hop case covers Direct flows where the Trusted
Surface holds both signing keys (the most common agent-direct-action
shape today). For Trusted Agent Provider models with delegated chains,
wait for Phase 2.2 or open an issue.
Currency is ISO 4217 alpha-3. AP2 examples use uppercase ("USD",
"ARS"); we accept both upper and lowercase on parse. CLP / PYG / JPY /
KRW are 0-decimal — use divisorFor(currency) to convert major-unit
values correctly.
payment.budget + payment.agent_recurrence are stateful. They
require a BudgetTracker that knows how much has been spent against
the same Open Payment Mandate. Phase 2.1 ships an interface; the
default in-memory tracker lands in Phase 2.2. In the meantime, these
constraints PASS-THROUGH when no tracker is wired (loud warning in
production code is your responsibility).
The receipt reference is the sd_hash of the closed mandate, NOT
the closed mandate's payload-side claim. The verifier returns sdHash
on a successful VerificationOutcome — pass that into your
buildCheckoutReceipt / buildPaymentReceipt call.
@ar-agents/*| Package | What it does | AP2 role |
|---|---|---|
@ar-agents/agentic-commerce-bridge | ACP merchant facilitator (5 endpoints + signed webhooks + idempotency) for MercadoPago/MercadoLibre | Optional Phase 2 layer: receive AP2 mandates as payment_data.instrument.credential |
@ar-agents/mercadopago | MP Subscriptions / Payments / Checkout Pro toolkit | Where the receipt-issuing MPP lives |
@ar-agents/identity | CUIT + ARCA padrón | Buyer-fiscal context for Argentine AP2 receipts |
@ar-agents/facturacion | AFIP/ARCA Factura A/B/C/E (WSFE) | Fiscal receipts on top of AP2 receipts |
pnpm test # 88 tests across all surfaces
pnpm test:coverage # full coverage report
pnpm typecheck # strict TS, no `any`, exactOptionalPropertyTypes
MIT, same as @ar-agents/*. Built by Naza Clemente / Hello Astro.
FAQs
First faithful TypeScript implementation of the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2) v0.2. Schemas, ES256 SD-JWT VC mandates (Checkout + Payment, open + closed), 8 constraint evaluators, and signed Checkout/Payment receipts. Edge-Runtime-compatible. Aligned with
The npm package @ar-agents/ap2 receives a total of 32 weekly downloads. As such, @ar-agents/ap2 popularity was classified as not popular.
We found that @ar-agents/ap2 demonstrated a healthy version release cadence and project activity because the last version was released less than a year ago. It has 1 open source maintainer collaborating on the project.

Security News
Open VSX has removed three extension IDs from its malicious-extension list as the legitimate publishers they impersonated move to claim the names for themselves.

Product
Socket’s PHP and Composer support is now in Beta for all customers, with PHP reachability analysis generally available.

Product
Socket is bringing experimental protection to Firefox, scanning 97,000+ extensions in Mozilla's official directory for malware and risky updates.