@deepfirstsearch/agent-pay
x402 v2 payments for AI agents where the model proposes and the owner's policy decides.
npm install @deepfirstsearch/agent-pay
npx @deepfirstsearch/agent-pay demo
Beta, unaudited. Agent Safe is live on Base Sepolia and in a capped mainnet beta; an independent audit is being arranged. Use small amounts and at your own risk.
import { createAgentPay, MerchantRegistry, burnerPayers } from "@deepfirstsearch/agent-pay";
const registry = new MerchantRegistry([
{ origin: "https://api.pricing-intel.io", payTo: "0x…", network: "eip155:8453", maxPerTx: 50_000n, pricePin: 10_000n },
]);
const pay = createAgentPay({
registry,
policy: { allowedNetworks: ["eip155:8453"], approvalThreshold: 1_000_000n, periodBudget: { amount: 20_000_000n, periodMs: 86_400_000 } },
payer: burnerPayers(ownerSeed, vaultAddress),
session: { readsUntrustedInput: true, accessesSensitiveData: false, canPay: true },
approve: askHumanViaPasskey,
ensureFunded: topUpFromAgentSafe,
});
const plan = pay.commitPlan([{ origin: "https://api.pricing-intel.io", maxSpend: 100_000n }], 10 * 60_000);
const res = await pay.fetch("https://api.pricing-intel.io/v1/prices", {}, { plan });
What it refuses
- A 402 whose
payTo, asset, network, EIP-712 domain, scheme or timeout differ from owner configuration.
- Prices above the pinned price, the per-merchant cap, the sealed plan or the period budget.
- Merchants not in the registry; payees suggested by web content (tainted data).
- x402 v1, malformed or oversized headers, and 402s reached through cross-origin redirects.
- Retrying a payment: one signature per request, recorded in a hash-chained audit log.
Guards
commitPlan (plan-then-execute)
taint / isTrusted (provenance)
quarantinedExtract (dual LLM with schema validation)
spotlight (datamarking)
requiresHumanForEveryPayment (Rule of Two)
RateLimiter, KillSwitch
AuditLog / verifyChain
Test without a chain
@deepfirstsearch/agent-pay/testing exports the offline x402 merchant used by the demo and our own tests. Routes can be honest or hostile (tamper rewrites the 402), and it verifies the EIP-3009 signatures like a facilitator would:
import { startMockServer } from "@deepfirstsearch/agent-pay/testing";
const merchant = await startMockServer({
"/data": { price: 10_000n, payTo: "0x1111…", body: '{"ok":true}' },
"/evil": { price: 10_000n, payTo: "0x1111…", tamper: (r) => ({ ...r, payTo: "0x9999…" }) },
});
Owner CLI: vault and budgets in three commands
export AGENT_PAY_BURNER_SEED=0x…
npx @deepfirstsearch/agent-pay owner create-vault --keystore ~/.foundry/keystores/owner
npx @deepfirstsearch/agent-pay owner fund --vault 0x… --amount 5 --keystore ~/.foundry/keystores/owner
npx @deepfirstsearch/agent-pay owner budget --vault 0x… --merchant 0x… --agent 0x… \
--per-tx 0.05 --per-day 0.50 --keystore ~/.foundry/keystores/owner
npx @deepfirstsearch/agent-pay owner status --vault 0x…
--network base-sepolia (default) or --network base. On Base mainnet every transaction asks for confirmation and warns that this is an unaudited beta.
- The owner key comes from a Foundry/geth keystore (
--keystore, password prompted) or AGENT_PAY_OWNER_KEY; never from arguments.
budget derives the merchant's payer address from AGENT_PAY_BURNER_SEED, signs the budget, proposes it, and prints the intentId plus a ready-to-paste entry for the MCP server config.
- Also:
pause, unpause, revoke --intent, withdraw --amount, flush-fees, and --json for scripts.
The official addresses and ABIs are exported too: AGENT_SAFE.base.factory, BUDGET_VAULT_FULL_ABI, BUDGET_VAULT_FACTORY_ABI, FEE_JAR_ABI.
When a merchant's receipt is missing
Some merchants answer a paid request without a usable receipt (no transaction in PAYMENT-RESPONSE). The SDK then reports the payment as unconfirmed rather than guessing. To let the chain decide, pass confirmAuthorization: on that failure path only, it reads USDC's authorizationState for the exact authorization you signed.
import { createPublicClient, http } from "viem";
import { base } from "viem/chains";
import { createAgentPay, usdcAuthorizationCheck } from "@deepfirstsearch/agent-pay";
const pay = createAgentPay({
confirmAuthorization: usdcAuthorizationCheck({ "eip155:8453": createPublicClient({ chain: base, transport: http() }) }),
});
If the authorization was used but the merchant didn't deliver, you get a clear error and nothing is resent.
Pay real x402 APIs on Base mainnet (2 cents, 1 minute)
examples/real-merchants.ts pays three public x402 APIs (Blockchain.com, Spraay, CoinGecko) through the SDK, 0.012 USDC per run, then shows an injected 402 for 5 USDC being refused before anything is signed. The payer needs a few cents of USDC on Base and no ETH.
git clone https://github.com/DeepFirstHQ/deepfirstsearch && cd deepfirstsearch/sdk && npm ci
PAYER_KEY=0x… npx tsx examples/real-merchants.ts
Fourteen merchants, each tested with a real payment, have a step-by-step guide at deepfirstsearch.com/developers.
Try the whole loop on Base Sepolia (free, about 1 hour)
examples/sepolia-live.ts runs a real x402 payment end to end with your own testnet keys: it creates a vault, signs a budget, waits out the timelock, then an agent pays a local x402 endpoint and the public facilitator settles it on-chain.
- Make two fresh testnet-only keys (owner and agent), e.g.
cast wallet new, and any merchant address.
- Fund the owner with Base Sepolia ETH (the Coinbase CDP faucet) and at least 0.2 test USDC (Circle faucet, Base Sepolia).
- Run it:
git clone https://github.com/DeepFirstHQ/deepfirstsearch && cd deepfirstsearch/sdk && npm ci
export OWNER_PK=0x… AGENT_PK=0x… MERCHANT=0x… BURNER_SEED=0x$(openssl rand -hex 32) \
FACTORY=0xf245d3cb8700a804432ea50b253a923b4b32c0c7 STATE_FILE=./sepolia-state.json
npx tsx examples/sepolia-live.ts setup
npx tsx examples/sepolia-live.ts pay
Never reuse these keys on mainnet.
Deployments
| Base Sepolia (84532) | 0xf245d3cb8700a804432ea50b253a923b4b32c0c7 | 0x4ae59cf9462d1601de4fc5aa4538d376e93a79f2 | v0.4, testnet |
| Base (8453) | 0xDe17e1B889efa4671852e0b268e100967A7a257E | 0xa375245D25bdB557801Ad07A50c19b3442cA3Ae4 | v0.4, unaudited beta: small amounts only |
Full list and transactions: docs/DEPLOYMENTS.md. Questions or bugs: open an issue; security reports go through SECURITY.md.
Signing a budget (owner side)
The owner, never the agent, signs one budget per merchant. The budget names the agent key, the merchant and the only payer address the vault may top up:
import { burnerAddress, signIntent } from "@deepfirstsearch/agent-pay";
const intent = {
agent: agentAddress,
counterparty: merchant.payTo,
burner: burnerAddress({ ownerSeed, vault, chainId: 8453, counterparty: merchant.payTo }),
token: USDC,
maxPerTx: 50_000n,
maxPerPeriod: 500_000n,
trancheCap: 100_000n,
period: 86_400,
validAfter: 0n,
expiry: BigInt(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 30 * 86_400),
nonce: BigInt(Date.now()),
};
const signature = await signIntent(owner, vault, 8453, intent);
Who holds what:
- Owner key: only the owner (ideally a Safe or hardware wallet). It signs budgets and can pause, revoke and withdraw. Never on the agent's machine.
- Agent key and burner seed: the payment process that runs the SDK. Run it apart from the model (a separate process or service): the model only asks for a URL, and the SDK decides. The burner seed must be its own random secret, never the owner key.
- If the payment process is compromised, the loss is bounded: the agent key can only top up the signed payers within
maxPerTx, maxPerPeriod and trancheCap, and each payer never holds more than trancheCap. Revoke the intent and rotate the seed (epoch).
Funding payers from Agent Safe
vaultFunder({ agent, publicClient, vault, usdc, intents, tranche, dataSuffix }) returns an ensureFunded hook that tops up each merchant's payer from the BudgetVault right before a payment. The vault enforces every limit on-chain, and each top-up counts as one transaction: keep tranche at or below both the intent's trancheCap and its maxPerTx, or fundBurner reverts with OverPerTx/OverTranche. dataSuffix appends your Base Builder Code (ERC-8021 attribution) to those transactions.
Privacy level 1: exchange-funded payers
createFundingService({ registry, payerFor, withdraw, limits }) runs in the owner's process and holds the exchange credentials. The agent uses remoteFunder(url, token) as its ensureFunded hook and can only ask "top up the payer for merchant X". The service derives the payer address itself and applies a per-top-up limit and a daily limit. On-chain, the public sees "exchange → fresh payer" instead of "your vault → fresh payer". The exchange and lawful authorities can still see it. You provide withdraw(to, amount) for your exchange's API.
Operational notes
- Keep the agent machine's clock synced (NTP): facilitators check authorization validity windows against wall-clock time.
Privacy, honestly
- Each merchant sees a different payer address.
- Vault → payer funding is public on-chain; exchange-funded payers (level 1) and a third-party compliant pool (level 2) are next.
- Facilitators see your IP and timing; use a proxy.
- ERC-5564 stealth helpers are included for payee-side privacy.
Develop
npm ci
npm test
npm run demo
npm run build