@forestrie/mcp-verify
An MCP server whose only tools verify and decode Forestrie receipts.
No backend, no account, no key, no network.
{
"mcpServers": {
"forestrie-verify": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@forestrie/mcp-verify"]
}
}
}
npx -y @forestrie/mcp-verify demo
Why
Agents act on statements they did not witness being made: a quote, an
approval, a tool result, another agent's output. Usually the record of what
was said is kept by the party that said it, so nobody downstream can ask
"did you really say that, and did you say it to everyone?"
A Forestrie receipt is a proof that a statement was sealed into an
append-only transparency log. This package checks that proof against a trust
root you hold, in your own process, without contacting Forestrie. With the
right root it also answers the harder question: whether the log you were
shown is the log everyone else was shown. What transparency adds, where it
stops, and what a receipt contains: TRANSPARENCY.md.
What it proves
verify_receipt | forestrie verify | Were these exact payload bytes sequenced at this entry id? |
verify_grant_receipt | forestrie verify-grant | Was this grant admitted to this log — i.e. was the signer entitled to write? |
decode_receipt | forestrie decode-receipt --json | What is actually in this receipt? (Renders the CBOR only. Verifies nothing.) |
Every tool is annotated readOnlyHint: true, openWorldHint: false. That is
not decoration: it is the machine-readable form of "this tool touches
nothing", and an agent can see it without running anything.
Trust roots
You do not ask for "verification". You say which root you trust, and the
result says what that root can see:
genesis | the forest's genesis document, captured when you registered |
known-log-key | a log owner key you hold out of band |
known-accumulator | a snapshot of the log's peaks, from a chain read |
checkpoint-chain | a retained chain of .sth checkpoints |
The roots are not ordered by strength. The first two check the operator's signature
locally and cannot see a split view. The last two match the peak against an
accumulator the operator does not control, and can. Every result answers
four questions, sealing, split-view, append-authority and
attribution, each ok, failed, or not_answered_by_this_root. The
last is a real answer and must reach the user; a client that renders only
ok is using this tool wrong.
When each root is the effective choice, why a genesis document fetched at
check time is weaker than one kept from registration, what a signature root
cannot distinguish, and the demo transcript:
docs/trust-roots.md.
Not a trust circle
The root of trust is the univocity checkpoint the receipt chains to, not the
package; the package supplies the arithmetic, which any independent
implementation can re-run.
Which is why this repo goes to some trouble to make that re-running possible:
- A differential test against the published, sha256-pinned
forestrie
release binary. For every tamper variant under both signature roots, our ok,
stage, reason and stages[] must equal the reference's byte for byte.
Currently 18 tests, zero disagreements. See
docs/differential-test.md.
- Frozen conformance vectors, sha256-pinned to their manifest, shipped
inside the tarball. See fixtures/PROVENANCE.md.
files includes src. The package that asks you to trust its
arithmetic ships the arithmetic.
- Exact, provenance-attested dependencies — no bundling, so
npm ls and npm audit signatures both see the real graph. Bundling would
hide @forestrie/receipt-verify's own SLSA attestation behind ours.
The verification itself is @forestrie/receipt-verify@1.0.0, which is
published, MIT, and SLSA-attested independently of this package.
Development
mise install # node 22.14.0, pnpm 10.6.5
pnpm install
pnpm test # browser-safe gate + encoding-copy gate + unit tests
pnpm test:differential # needs the pinned forestrie CLI binary
pnpm build
Conventions, invariants and the release checklist: AGENTS.md.
Dependency surface and install weight:
docs/dependency-surface.md.
Licence
MIT.