maskPiiInText, maskPiiInValue, PII_PATTERNS | security-proxy | Mask TC Kimlik No, VKN, IBAN, card, phone, email, provider API keys, private keys, connection strings and JWTs in tool results; an optional replacer turns matches into tokens |
SpanLookup, ModelDetector, MODEL_PII | @guardbee/ner, pii-bench | Mask what a model found (person names, via @guardbee/ner) in the same pass: run the model over the strings first, then pass a lookup as maskPiiInText's fifth argument. A lookup must throw for a text it has no result for, so an unscanned text is never passed as clean. person_name is a detector name in the ALL, KVKK and IDENTITY presets; without a lookup it finds nothing |
SPECIAL_CATEGORIES, preset KVKK_SENSITIVE | security-proxy, pii-bench | The nine KVKK Art. 6 special categories (health, religion and belief, ethnic origin, political opinion, union membership, criminal record, sex life, biometric, genetic): a term list per category, masked only when the text is about a person (a name from the lookup, a personal identifier, or a word that points at someone). Opt-in: in no preset but KVKK_SENSITIVE (KVKK plus these), or by name in include |
SECRET_RULES | secret-scanner, security-proxy | 76 secret rules (provider keys and tokens — cloud, AI providers, developer tools, SaaS, Turkish payment and SMS providers — private keys, connection strings, JWT). The scanner reports all of them; the proxy masks the 66 that are not marked broad |
isValidTcKimlik, isValidVkn, isValidIban, isValidLuhn, isValidTrPhone | security-proxy, prompt-leak-scanner | Validation after a regex match |
INJECTION_RULES, findInjections | prompt-injection-scanner, security-proxy | 27 injection rules in English and Turkish, with base64-decoding; the scanner uses the 17 precise ones |
scanForPromptInjection, scanToolResult | security-proxy | Block on a precise high/critical rule, warn on anything else |
gatewayPolicySchema, validatePolicy, policyShape | security-proxy, app.guardbee.ai | The gateway policy document (labels, rules, taint, approval, defaults, interceptors). The dashboard validates an edit with it before saving, so a policy that saves is one the proxy accepts |
classifyTool, CAPABILITY_RULES | toxic-flow-auditor, security-proxy | Label a tool as untrusted-content / sensitive-data / exfiltration / destructive (lethal trifecta) |