@kryptosai/counterflow

Counterflow

Prove the contract, or reveal the exploit.

Counterflow is a smart contract security CLI: AI-translated, machine-proved formal verification for Solidity DeFi contracts — English invariants are checked by a trusted Z3/SMT core, backed by symbolic execution (Halmos, Foundry) and Echidna harness generation for invariant testing. 5 model types, 16 benchmark cases across erc20, amm, lending, staking, oracle, and governance, and 5 real DeFi exploits reproduced ($261M+).

The LLM never decides the verdict. A ~560-line human-auditable Z3 core either proves the invariant for all inputs or produces a concrete counterexample (an exploit trace).

Solidity + English invariants
        │
        ▼
  [LLM translate]          untrusted — DeepSeek/OpenAI, temperature 0
        │
        ▼
  binding.json             human-reviewable artifact (the real spec)
        │
        ▼
  [validate]               deterministic vocabulary/schema gate (5 models, 27 guards, 43 effects, 33 invariants)
        │
        ▼
  [Z3 inductive check]     TRUSTED — 5 model types: erc20_pool, amm_pool, lending_pool, staking_pool, cross_contract
        │
        ▼
  PROVED | VIOLATED (+ cex)   →   audit.jsonl (SHA-256 hash-chained)
        │
        ▼
  [Halmos bytecode]        TRUSTED — EVM symbolic exec (9 scenarios, 3 PASS / 6 FAIL confirming exploits)
  [Foundry fuzz+symb]      fuzz → cex → halmos symbolic proof
  [Echidna validation]     harness generation from binding

State model (5 types)

Model	Vocab	Guards	Effects	Invariants
erc20_pool	balances, shares, allowances, totals, ghost sums	11	16	10
amm_pool	reserveX/Y, lpSupply, lpBalances, initialK	5	8	5
lending_pool	collateral, debt, totals, liqThreshold	3	8	8
staking_pool	staked, rewards, totalStaked, rewardPool	2	6	5
cross_contract	cross-in-progress flag, snapshots	2	2	1
shared extensions	oracle (price, twap), governance (timelock)	4	3	4

All models share reentrancy vocabulary (lock/snapshot/external-call). The oracle and governance extensions are shared vocabulary usable across models.

Installation

npm install @kryptosai/counterflow
# deps: Python 3 + z3-solver (pip install z3-solver)
# optional: halmos (pip install halmos), Foundry (brew install foundry)
counterflow doctor   # check all deps

Quickstart

counterflow check examples/TokenPool.binding.json      # PROVED
counterflow check examples/TokenPoolBuggy.binding.json # VIOLATED + exploit
counterflow verify Contract.sol invariants.txt         # full AI pipeline (needs API key)
counterflow check binding.json                         # deterministic, no LLM
counterflow bytecode HalmosTest                        # 9 EVM symbolic tests
counterflow audit                                      # verify SHA-256 chain

Benchmark

16/16 solver cases correct (110-320ms per case):
  erc20_pool: TokenPool†, SafeVault†, TokenPoolBuggy✗, ApprovalDrain✗, UnbackedMintVault✗, BurnDesyncVault✗
  amm_pool:   AMMSwap†, AMMPriceManipulation✗
  lending:    LendingPool†, LendingUnbackedBorrow✗
  staking:    StakingPool†, StakingInfiniteReward✗
  oracle:     OracleSafe†, OracleManipulation✗
  governance: GovernanceTimelock†, GovernanceNoTimelock✗

5/5 DeFiHackLabs real exploits reproduced (deterministic, no LLM):
  FEI Protocol      ($80M)  reentrancy        → reentrancy_safe violated
  CREAM Finance     ($130M) ERC777 reentrancy  → nonneg_balance violated
  PancakeBunny      ($45M)  flash loan         → backing violated
  OpenLeverage      ($230K) access control     → backing violated
  Belt Finance      ($6.3M) arithmetic         → solvency violated

3/3 ValuePacket contracts PROVED at pool level
26/26 e2e tests pass

How it works

• You write invariants in English or Solidity comments
• LLM translates contract + invariants → structured binding JSON (untrusted layer)
• Deterministic Z3 core proves or produces a counterexample (trusted layer)
• Optional Halmos bytecode backstop closes spec-vs-implementation gap
• SHA-256 hash-chained audit log records every run

Counterflow vs the landscape

	Counterflow	Certora Prover	Kontrol	Halmos
Licence	MIT	GPL-3.0	BSD-3	AGPL-3.0
Input	English	CVL spec	Foundry tests	Foundry tests
Proof level	Z3 abstract	SMT	KEVM bytecode	Symbolic
Multi-contract	Yes (cross_contract model + Halmos)	Yes (scene linking)	Yes	Yes
Model types	5 (extensible)	Unlimited	Unlimited	N/A
Bytecode backstop	Halmos + Foundry	No	Native	Native
Audit chain	SHA-256	Cloud	No	No
Setup	npm + Python	Java + Gradle	K + Nix	pip

What a verdict means

• PROVED — the modeled transition preserves the invariant for all possible inputs
• VIOLATED — Z3 or Halmos found a concrete counterexample (exploit trace)
• UNKNOWN — solver could not decide within limits
• VACUOUS — (per-function flag) the function's guards are unsatisfiable, so its proofs are vacuous; review the binding

Open core (MIT)

CLI, translation prompts, validation, trusted Z3 core, Halmos tests, benchmark bindings, DeFiHackLabs corpus, defi hack runner, ValuePacket verification suite. Commercial layer (separate): hosted pipeline, CI integration, dashboards, proof storage.

Roadmap

• Kontrol integration as second bytecode backstop
• CVL export for Certora Prover interop
• Richer Z3 models: compound interest
• VS Code extension with inline binding review
• Public leaderboard on GitHub Pages