
Research
/Security News
PolinRider Spreads Through Compromised GitHub Accounts and Packagist
Operators behind PolinRider used a compromised GitHub account to plant malware in four development versions of a Packagist package with 700,000+ downloads.
@reachpad/mcp
Advanced tools
Development infrastructure for coding agents: persistent cloud environments they create, operate and test software in, over API, MCP or CLI.
Development infrastructure for coding agents. A reachpad environment is a cloud development computer an agent operates itself: a repo, a filesystem, installed dependencies, background processes and build state that all survive between calls — not an ephemeral sandbox that forgets.
This is the MCP server. It lets Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, OpenCode or your own agent create an environment, run commands in it, fork it, and come back to it later, without a developer keeping a laptop open for them.
The API is the product boundary, not a web UI: reachpad.dev.
npx -y @reachpad/mcp # stdio, for a local client
In Claude Code:
claude mcp add reachpad -e REACHPAD_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL=… -- npx -y @reachpad/mcp
npx @reachpad/mcp # stdio
REACHPAD_MCP_HTTP_PORT=8722 npx @reachpad/mcp # streamable http
stdio is what a local client talks to; Streamable HTTP is what a remote connector talks to. Same tools, same behaviour — added rather than forked, because two implementations of one surface is how they drift.
The HTTP side answers 405 to GET: every tool here is request/response, and
the spec permits declining the server-initiated stream rather than holding a
connection open for traffic that never comes. There are no sessions —
nothing is held across calls that a restart could not rebuild. And it carries
no credential of its own: whatever authorizes the HTTP request is what
authorizes reachpad.
| variable | meaning |
|---|---|
REACHPAD_ENDPOINT | your reachpad host. Plaintext http:// to anything but loopback is refused before a socket opens. |
REACHPAD_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL | your per-user credential. It names one account and can act for no other — the server takes the identity from the credential's own record, never from the request. |
REACHPAD_API_KEY | optional, per-environment scoped and revocable. When set, run_command uses it and needs no identity exchange. |
REACHPAD_MCP_HTTP_PORT | serve HTTP instead of stdio. |
REACHPAD_MCP_HTTP_HOST | default 127.0.0.1. This process bridges to a control plane with your credentials, so binding it to the world is a decision made on purpose, behind a proxy that terminates TLS. |
REACHPAD_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN | bearer token, compared in constant time. Absent, every caller that can reach the port is authorized, and the server says so on stderr. |
REACHPAD_MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS | comma-separated. A request carrying an unlisted Origin is refused — a browser cannot forge it, which closes DNS rebinding. No Origin at all is a non-browser client and is allowed. |
If several credentials are set, the narrowest wins, and a refused credential is never retried under a broader one — falling back would be privilege escalation nobody chose to perform.
| tool | what it does |
|---|---|
create_environment(name, repo?, ref?) | a new environment, optionally with a repository cloned into /work |
list_environments() | your environments and how many forks each has |
get_environment(environment) | what it resumes from — a snapshot carrying memory resumes mid-process; a disk-only one boots |
run_command(environment, argv, cwd?, env?, timeout_ms?) | one command, its exit code and its output. A paused environment resumes to serve it. |
checkpoint_environment(environment, name?) | fork from the last sealed snapshot; the original is untouched |
delete_environment(environment) | archive it and free the plan slot. Nothing is deleted — snapshots and history survive. |
Not here, deliberately: exposing a port and starting an agent inside the environment. Both are in reachpad's roadmap and neither is in the fleet yet — a tool that always fails costs a model a turn and teaches it to distrust the rest, so this server advertises nothing it cannot serve.
These are the ways a naive client of a streaming exec API misleads a model, and what this one does instead.
node --test 'test/*.test.mjs'
No network and no credentials. The protocol suite spawns the shipped server as a child process and speaks real JSON-RPC over its stdio against a stub control plane on a real socket, so nothing under test is an internal import. One test runs the same arc against a real reachpad and skips when no endpoint is configured.
This repository is the source. It is deliberately separate from the reachpad backend: this code is public, it is published to npm, and its release workflow holds publishing rights — none of which belong in the same repository as the control plane. Nothing here can read the backend's source, and no job in the backend copies files out to here.
Two server constants are mirrored in src/client.js — the exec grace period
and the default exec timeout. A mirrored constant normally rots; this one does
not, because the backend's own CI fetches this published package and fails if
they disagree. The check lives where the number would change.
FAQs
reachpad lets Claude, Codex and other coding agents build full-stack apps in persistent workspaces and share them by link, without a separate deployment.
The npm package @reachpad/mcp receives a total of 85 weekly downloads. As such, @reachpad/mcp popularity was classified as not popular.
We found that @reachpad/mcp demonstrated a healthy version release cadence and project activity because the last version was released less than a year ago. It has 1 open source maintainer collaborating on the project.

Research
/Security News
Operators behind PolinRider used a compromised GitHub account to plant malware in four development versions of a Packagist package with 700,000+ downloads.

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