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@tenkicloud/mcp
Advanced tools
Model Context Protocol server for Tenki Cloud — disposable microVM sandboxes for AI agents. Create sandboxes, run code, read/write files, run git, expose preview URLs — from any MCP client.
@tenkicloud/mcpA Model Context Protocol server for Tenki Cloud. Give any agent — Claude, Codex, Cursor — a disposable microVM it can create, run code in, read and write files, run git, and expose to the web. Sandboxes boot in ~2 seconds and are billed per second.
Part of making Tenki the execution layer coding agents reach for: the agent writes code and Tenki runs it in isolation. (Tenki's Code Reviewer and Runners — AI PR review and managed CI — are separate products; this server currently exposes the Sandbox.)
"Run this Python in a fresh sandbox and tell me what it prints."
│
▼ tenki_run_code
boots a microVM → runs it → returns stdout → tears it down
export TENKI_API_KEY=tk_your_key_here
npx -y @tenkicloud/mcp # speaks MCP over stdio
Nothing to clone or build. The package installs one command, tenki-mcp.
Connect to Tenki's hosted MCP service and sign in with your Tenki account:
claude mcp add --transport http tenki https://mcp.tenki.cloud/mcp
claude mcp login tenki
Claude Code's mcp add command stores the server configuration; mcp login performs the one-time browser authorization and workspace selection.
Alternatively, run the MCP server locally with an API key:
claude mcp add tenki --env TENKI_API_KEY=tk_your_key_here -- npx -y @tenkicloud/mcp
The repo doubles as a plugin marketplace. This prompts for your API key on install and stores it in your OS keychain — no env var to manage:
/plugin marketplace add LuxorLabs/tenki-mcp
/plugin install tenki@tenki
Add to claude_desktop_config.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"tenki": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@tenkicloud/mcp"],
"env": { "TENKI_API_KEY": "tk_your_key_here" }
}
}
}
Add the same block to .cursor/mcp.json (project) or ~/.cursor/mcp.json (global):
{
"mcpServers": {
"tenki": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@tenkicloud/mcp"],
"env": { "TENKI_API_KEY": "tk_your_key_here" }
}
}
}
The OpenAI Codex CLI reads MCP servers from ~/.codex/config.toml. Add:
[mcp_servers.tenki]
command = "npx"
args = ["-y", "@tenkicloud/mcp"]
env = { TENKI_API_KEY = "tk_your_key_here" }
After adding the server, start a fresh session so the client loads it, then ask your agent one of:
print(2+2) in a fresh Tenki sandbox." — a full boot → run → teardown round-trip.If the tenki_* tools don't show up, restart the client so it re-reads its config.
No key yet? Start the server without one and ask the agent to check tenki_auth_status — it reports what to set and where. See Auth.
For development, or to run an unreleased change:
git clone https://github.com/LuxorLabs/tenki-mcp.git && cd tenki-mcp
npm install && npm run build
TENKI_API_KEY=tk_your_key_here node dist/index.js
Substitute node /absolute/path/to/tenki-mcp/dist/index.js for the npx command in any of the configs above. See CONTRIBUTING.md for the full development loop.
| Variable | Default | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
TENKI_API_KEY | — | API key (tk_…). One of this or TENKI_AUTH_TOKEN is required. |
TENKI_AUTH_TOKEN | — | Session token (ory_st_… or cookie value). Takes precedence over TENKI_API_KEY when both are set. |
TENKI_API_ENDPOINT | https://api.tenki.cloud | Control-plane base URL (TENKI_API_URL is an alias). |
TENKI_MCP_READONLY | off | 1 registers only read tools (no create/run/delete/spend). |
TENKI_MCP_DISABLED_TOOLS | — | Comma-separated tool names to skip registering. |
TENKI_MCP_AUDIT | off | 1 logs each tool call name + arg keys to stderr. |
TENKI_MCP_TRANSPORT | stdio | http serves Streamable HTTP instead (see below). |
PORT | 3000 | HTTP transport port. |
TENKI_MCP_HTTP_HOST | 127.0.0.1 | HTTP bind host; non-loopback requires TENKI_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN. |
TENKI_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN | — | Bearer token for the HTTP endpoint; optional on loopback, required on a non-loopback host. |
TENKI_MCP_PUBLIC_URL | — | Public base URL for an OAuth-protected hosted server. |
TENKI_MCP_OAUTH_ISSUER | — | OAuth authorization-server issuer. Enables delegated OAuth HTTP mode. |
TENKI_MCP_OAUTH_RESOURCE | <public URL>/mcp | RFC 8707 resource identifier accepted in access-token audiences. |
TENKI_MCP_OAUTH_SCOPE | mcp | Required delegated scope. |
TENKI_MCP_IDENTITY_URL | — | Internal Tenki Identity service endpoint used to exchange OAuth access tokens. |
TENKI_MCP_IDENTITY_SERVICE_TOKEN | — | Service credential for the private Identity token-exchange RPC. |
71 tools — all 68 public unary API methods (enforced by a CI parity audit), two workflow helpers, and tenki_auth_status. Implementation-only control-plane methods are intentionally excluded. Grouped by domain:
| Domain | Tools |
|---|---|
| Auth | tenki_auth_status (which credential is configured, and does it work — the only tool available when none is) |
| Identity | tenki_whoami |
| Run | tenki_run_code (one-shot: boot → run shell/python/js → tear down) |
| Sandboxes | tenki_create_sandbox · tenki_get_sandbox · tenki_list_sandboxes · tenki_terminate_sandbox · tenki_pause_sandbox · tenki_resume_sandbox |
| Session admin | tenki_extend_sandbox · tenki_update_sandbox · tenki_terminate_sandboxes (bulk) · tenki_report_sandbox_activity · tenki_list_workspace_sandboxes |
| Exec | tenki_exec (stdout/stderr/exit inline) |
| Files | tenki_read_file · tenki_write_file · tenki_list_files · tenki_stat_path · tenki_make_dir · tenki_remove_path · tenki_move_path |
| Git | tenki_git (clone/checkout/diff/log — the API supports exactly these four; run other git commands via tenki_exec) |
| Ports & previews | expose · list-exposed · unexpose · create-preview-url · open-preview · list/get/delete-preview-url · touch-preview · bind/unbind-preview-url · resolve-preview-token |
| Artifacts (binary transfer) | tenki_get_upload_url · tenki_get_download_url (signed URLs for binary PUT/GET) |
| SSH | tenki_update_ssh_keys · tenki_issue_ssh_cert · tenki_list_ssh_gateways |
| Snapshots | create · get · list · list-session · list-workspace · list-dangling · update · delete · get-download-url |
| Volumes | create · get · list · update · delete · resize · attach · detach |
| Templates | create · get · list · update · delete · build · cancel-build · get-build · list-active-builds |
| Workspace | tenki_get_workspace_usage · tenki_get_workspace_settings · tenki_update_workspace_settings · tenki_get_snapshot_retention_settings · tenki_update_snapshot_retention_settings |
Full per-release breakdown in CHANGELOG.md.
Set one of TENKI_API_KEY or TENKI_AUTH_TOKEN — when both are set, TENKI_AUTH_TOKEN wins. The header is chosen by token prefix: tk_… → Authorization: Bearer, ory_st_… → X-Session-Token, otherwise a session cookie. Override the endpoint with TENKI_API_ENDPOINT (default https://api.tenki.cloud).
Without a credential the server still starts, registering only tenki_auth_status — so instead of an MCP client reporting an opaque "server failed to start", the agent can call that tool and get told what to set. Ask it "check tenki auth status" any time other tools return auth errors: it reports the credential kind (API key vs session token), the endpoint, and whether a live identity probe succeeded — never the token itself. It reports status only; get a credential with tenki login or from the dashboard.
Besides stdio, the server speaks Streamable HTTP so it can be hosted for remote MCP clients:
TENKI_MCP_TRANSPORT=http PORT=3000 TENKI_API_KEY=… npx -y @tenkicloud/mcp
# → tenki-mcp running on http://127.0.0.1:3000/mcp (Streamable HTTP) [loopback only, no auth]
For a single-user deployment, HTTP mode can hold one shared TENKI_API_KEY and therefore exposes a powerful capability. By default it:
127.0.0.1) only — set TENKI_MCP_HTTP_HOST=0.0.0.0 to expose it, but thenTENKI_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN and send Authorization: Bearer <token>. It refuses to start on a non-loopback host without one.# expose to a network safely:
TENKI_MCP_TRANSPORT=http TENKI_MCP_HTTP_HOST=0.0.0.0 PORT=3000 \
TENKI_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 32) TENKI_API_KEY=… npx -y @tenkicloud/mcp
Point an HTTP-capable MCP client at /mcp. Static-key mode uses one shared TENKI_API_KEY for all sessions. Verified end-to-end (test/http-transport.test.mjs: auth gate, DNS-rebinding rejection, connect → tools/list → tool call over HTTP).
Hosted multi-tenant deployments instead use Tenki Identity's OAuth facade. The MCP server publishes RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata and exchanges each caller's access token through the private Identity service. Identity owns Hydra, validates the requested audience and scope, and issues a short-lived API delegation bound to the user, client, and workspace selected on the Tenki consent page. tenki-mcp has no Hydra Admin access and does not hold the delegation-signing secret.
Tenki's API is ConnectRPC — JSON over HTTP/1.1, not REST. Every control-plane call is POST https://api.tenki.cloud/tenki.sandbox.v1.SandboxService/{Method} with a lowerCamelCase JSON body. Per-session file I/O runs on a separate data-plane endpoint returned at create time, authenticated with a short-lived session certificate. This server owns both transports so the tools stay one-liners.
Command output: tenki_exec and tenki_run_code capture stdout/stderr by redirecting to files (sh -c '… > out 2> err') and reading them back over the data plane, so you get the output inline through a plain HTTP client.
The wire details are ported from the live-verified n8n community node.
This server holds a Tenki API key and can run code + spend credits, so treat it as a capability. Full model + CSA MCP Server Top-10 mapping in SECURITY.md. Quick controls:
readOnlyHint / destructiveHint). Run TENKI_MCP_READONLY=1 for an inspection-only server (read tools only), or TENKI_MCP_DISABLED_TOOLS=tenki_run_code,… to drop specific tools.TENKI_MCP_AUDIT=1 logs each tool call's name to stderr.tenki_run_code/tenki_exec/tenki_read_file return output from untrusted code — clients should treat tool results as data, not instructions.Report vulnerabilities via a private security advisory, not a public issue.
MIT
FAQs
Model Context Protocol server for Tenki Cloud — disposable microVM sandboxes for AI agents. Create sandboxes, run code, read/write files, run git, expose preview URLs — from any MCP client.
The npm package @tenkicloud/mcp receives a total of 67 weekly downloads. As such, @tenkicloud/mcp popularity was classified as not popular.
We found that @tenkicloud/mcp demonstrated a healthy version release cadence and project activity because the last version was released less than a year ago. It has 3 open source maintainers collaborating on the project.

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