
Research
/Security News
OpenAPI React Query Codegen Compromised in Mini Shai-Hulud npm Supply Chain Attack
Ten malicious OpenAPI React Query Codegen versions were published to npm in the Mini Shai-Hulud attack, all with valid provenance.
Like JSON.stringify, but handles
obj.self = obj)[value, value])undefined, Infinity, NaN, -0Map and SetBigIntArrayBuffer and Typed ArraysURL and URLSearchParamsTemporalstringifyAsync)Try it out here.
devalue.stringify with one version and devalue.parse with another, things may break)There are two ways to use devalue:
unevalThis function takes a JavaScript value and returns the JavaScript code to create an equivalent value — sort of like eval in reverse:
import * as devalue from 'devalue';
let obj = { message: 'hello' };
devalue.uneval(obj); // '{message:"hello"}'
obj.self = obj;
devalue.uneval(obj); // '(function(a){a.message="hello";a.self=a;return a}({}))'
Use uneval when you want the most compact possible output and don't want to include any code for parsing the serialized value.
stringify and parseThese two functions are analogous to JSON.stringify and JSON.parse:
import * as devalue from 'devalue';
let obj = { message: 'hello' };
let stringified = devalue.stringify(obj); // '[{"message":1},"hello"]'
devalue.parse(stringified); // { message: 'hello' }
obj.self = obj;
stringified = devalue.stringify(obj); // '[{"message":1,"self":0},"hello"]'
devalue.parse(stringified); // { message: 'hello', self: [Circular] }
Use stringify and parse when evaluating JavaScript isn't an option.
stringifyAsyncstringifyAsync is an async version of stringify that can handle promises:
import * as devalue from 'devalue';
let obj = {
quick: 'data',
slow: fetch('/api/slow').then((r) => r.json())
};
let stringified = await devalue.stringifyAsync(obj);
devalue.parse(stringified); // { quick: 'data', slow: { ... } }
Promises are awaited and their resolved values are serialized. The output format is identical to stringify, so parse and unflatten work unchanged.
unflattenIn the case where devalued data is one part of a larger JSON string, unflatten allows you to revive just the bit you need:
import * as devalue from 'devalue';
const json = `{
"type": "data",
"data": ${devalue.stringify(data)}
}`;
const data = devalue.unflatten(JSON.parse(json).data);
You can serialize and deserialize custom types by passing a second argument to stringify containing an object of types and their reducers, and a second argument to parse or unflatten containing an object of types and their revivers:
class Vector {
constructor(x, y) {
this.x = x;
this.y = y;
}
magnitude() {
return Math.sqrt(this.x * this.x + this.y * this.y);
}
}
const stringified = devalue.stringify(new Vector(30, 40), {
Vector: (value) => value instanceof Vector && [value.x, value.y]
});
console.log(stringified); // [["Vector",1],[2,3],30,40]
const vector = devalue.parse(stringified, {
Vector: ([x, y]) => new Vector(x, y)
});
console.log(vector.magnitude()); // 50
If a function passed to stringify returns a truthy value, it's treated as a match.
You can also use custom types with uneval by specifying a custom replacer:
devalue.uneval(vector, (value, uneval) => {
if (value instanceof Vector) {
return `new Vector(${value.x},${value.y})`;
}
}); // `new Vector(30,40)`
Note that any variables referenced in the resulting JavaScript (like Vector in the example above) must be in scope when it runs.
If uneval or stringify encounters a function or a non-POJO that isn't handled by a custom replacer/reducer, it will throw an error. You can find where in the input data the offending value lives by inspecting error.path:
try {
const map = new Map();
map.set('key', function invalid() {});
uneval({
object: {
array: [map]
}
});
} catch (e) {
console.log(e.path); // '.object.array[0].get("key")'
}
Say you're server-rendering a page and want to serialize some state, which could include user input. JSON.stringify doesn't protect against XSS attacks:
const state = {
userinput: `</script><script src='https://evil.com/mwahaha.js'>`
};
const template = `
<script>
// NEVER DO THIS
var preloaded = ${JSON.stringify(state)};
</script>`;
Which would result in this:
<script>
// NEVER DO THIS
var preloaded = {"userinput":"
</script>
<script src="https://evil.com/mwahaha.js">
"};
</script>
Using uneval or stringify, we're protected against that attack:
const template = `
<script>
var preloaded = ${uneval(state)};
</script>`;
<script>
var preloaded = {
userinput:
"\\u003C\\u002Fscript\\u003E\\u003Cscript src='https:\\u002F\\u002Fevil.com\\u002Fmwahaha.js'\\u003E"
};
</script>
This, along with the fact that uneval and stringify bail on functions and non-POJOs, stops attackers from executing arbitrary code. Strings generated by uneval can be safely deserialized with eval or new Function:
const value = (0, eval)('(' + str + ')');
While uneval prevents the XSS vulnerability shown above, meaning you can use it to send data from server to client, you should not send user data from client to server using the same method. Since it has to be evaluated, an attacker that successfully submitted data that bypassed uneval would have access to your system.
When using eval, ensure that you call it indirectly so that the evaluated code doesn't have access to the surrounding scope:
{
const sensitiveData = 'Setec Astronomy';
eval('sendToEvilServer(sensitiveData)'); // pwned :(
(0, eval)('sendToEvilServer(sensitiveData)'); // nice try, evildoer!
}
Using new Function(code) is akin to using indirect eval.
stringify/parse approach in devalue was inspired by arsonFlatted is a package similar to devalue that can serialize and deserialize JavaScript objects with circular references using a flat structure. Unlike devalue, Flatted uses a JSON-compatible format and focuses specifically on circular data structures.
Serialize-javascript is another package that offers serialization of JavaScript objects into a string, including regular expressions, dates, and functions. It is similar to devalue but does not handle circular references as gracefully.
FAQs
Gets the job done when JSON.stringify can't
The npm package devalue receives a total of 10,648,825 weekly downloads. As such, devalue popularity was classified as popular.
We found that devalue demonstrated a healthy version release cadence and project activity because the last version was released less than a year ago. It has 2 open source maintainers collaborating on the project.

Research
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