Shamir's Secret Sharing
A implementation of Shamir's Secret Sharing
algorithm over GF(256) in both Java and JavaScript.
Add to your Java project
<dependency>
<groupId>com.codahale</groupId>
<artifactId>shamir</artifactId>
<version>0.7.0</version>
</dependency>
Note: module name for Java 9+ is com.codahale.shamir
.
Use the thing in Java
import com.codahale.shamir.Scheme;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.security.SecureRandom;
import java.util.Map;
class Example {
void doIt() {
final Scheme scheme = new Scheme(new SecureRandom(), 5, 3);
final byte[] secret = "hello there".getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
final Map<Integer, byte[]> parts = scheme.split(secret);
final byte[] recovered = scheme.join(parts);
System.out.println(new String(recovered, StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
}
}
Use the thing in JavaScript
const { split, join } = require('shamir');
const { randomBytes } = require('crypto');
const PARTS = 5;
const QUORUM = 3;
function doIt() {
const secret = 'hello there';
const utf8Encoder = new TextEncoder();
const utf8Decoder = new TextDecoder();
const secretBytes = utf8Encoder.encode('hello there');
const parts = split(randomBytes, PARTS, QUORUM, secretBytes);
delete parts[2];
delete parts[3];
const recovered = join(parts);
console.log(utf8Decoder.decode(recovered));
}
How it works
Shamir's Secret Sharing algorithm is a way to split an arbitrary secret S
into N
parts, of which
at least K
are required to reconstruct S
. For example, a root password can be split among five
people, and if three or more of them combine their parts, they can recover the root password.
Splitting secrets
Splitting a secret works by encoding the secret as the constant in a random polynomial of K
degree. For example, if we're splitting the secret number 42
among five people with a threshold of
three (N=5,K=3
), we might end up with the polynomial:
f(x) = 71x^3 - 87x^2 + 18x + 42
To generate parts, we evaluate this polynomial for values of x
greater than zero:
f(1) = 44
f(2) = 298
f(3) = 1230
f(4) = 3266
f(5) = 6822
These (x,y)
pairs are then handed out to the five people.
Joining parts
When three or more of them decide to recover the original secret, they pool their parts together:
f(1) = 44
f(3) = 1230
f(4) = 3266
Using these points, they construct a Lagrange
polynomial, g
, and calculate g(0)
. If the
number of parts is equal to or greater than the degree of the original polynomial (i.e. K
), then
f
and g
will be exactly the same, and f(0) = g(0) = 42
, the encoded secret. If the number of
parts is less than the threshold K
, the polynomial will be different and g(0)
will not be 42
.
Implementation details
Shamir's Secret Sharing algorithm only works for finite fields, and this library performs all
operations in GF(256). Each byte of a secret is
encoded as a separate GF(256)
polynomial, and the resulting parts are the aggregated values of
those polynomials.
Using GF(256)
allows for secrets of arbitrary length and does not require additional parameters,
unlike GF(Q)
, which requires a safe modulus. It's also much faster than GF(Q)
: splitting and
combining a 1KiB secret into 8 parts with a threshold of 3 takes single-digit milliseconds, whereas
performing the same operation over GF(Q)
takes several seconds, even using per-byte polynomials.
Treating the secret as a single y
coordinate over GF(Q)
is even slower, and requires a modulus
larger than the secret.
Java Performance
It's fast. Plenty fast.
For a 1KiB secret split with a n=4,k=3
scheme:
Benchmark (n) (secretSize) Mode Cnt Score Error Units
Benchmarks.join 4 1024 avgt 200 196.787 ± 0.974 us/op
Benchmarks.split 4 1024 avgt 200 396.708 ± 1.520 us/op
N.B.: split
is quadratic with respect to the number of shares being combined.
Tiered sharing
Some usages of secret sharing involve levels of access: e.g. recovering a secret requires two admin
shares and three user shares. As @ba1ciu discovered, these can be implemented by building a tree of
shares:
class BuildTree {
public static void shareTree(String... args) {
final byte[] secret = "this is a secret".getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
final Scheme adminScheme = new Scheme(new SecureRandom(), 5, 2);
final Map<Integer, byte[]> admins = adminScheme.split(secret);
final Scheme userScheme = Scheme.of(4, 3);
final Map<Integer, Map<Integer, byte[]>> admins =
users.entrySet()
.stream()
.collect(Collectors.toMap(Map.Entry::getKey, e -> userScheme.split(e.getValue())));
System.out.println("Admin shares:");
System.out.printf("%d = %s\n", 1, Arrays.toString(admins.get(1)));
System.out.printf("%d = %s\n", 2, Arrays.toString(admins.get(2)));
System.out.println("User shares:");
System.out.printf("%d = %s\n", 1, Arrays.toString(users.get(3).get(1)));
System.out.printf("%d = %s\n", 2, Arrays.toString(users.get(3).get(2)));
System.out.printf("%d = %s\n", 3, Arrays.toString(users.get(3).get(3)));
System.out.printf("%d = %s\n", 4, Arrays.toString(users.get(3).get(4)));
}
}
By discarding the third admin share and the first two sets of user shares, we have a set of shares
which can be used to recover the original secret as long as either two admins or one admin and three
users agree.
License
Copyright © 2017 Coda Hale
Copyright © 2019 Simon Massey
Distributed under the Apache License 2.0.