taskbounty-check
Pre-launch safety check for AI-built apps. Built it with Lovable, Bolt, Replit, Cursor, or v0?
This scans your GitHub Actions + CI hygiene locally before you ship. Your source code and
workflow contents never leave your machine. The default code path makes no outbound
requests; fetch is additionally blocked as defense in depth (this is not a complete network
sandbox). Only --gh-org intentionally uses the network.
Scope, honestly: this checks GitHub Actions workflow + update-automation hygiene. It does
not check exposed secrets, auth, payments, webhooks, or runtime behavior — those need a
manual review. It is a maintenance check, not a full security audit.
--share uploads nothing. It writes a sanitized, counts-only local file for you to submit
manually; network stays off under --share.
Quick start (60 seconds)
npx taskbounty-check@latest .
npx taskbounty-check@latest . --format sarif --output taskbounty.sarif
npx taskbounty-check@latest init
npx taskbounty-check@latest mcp
Reproducible, pinned invocation (recommended): npx taskbounty-check@0.1.4 .
Privacy: the scan runs locally and sends nothing by default. Source code, workflow
contents, filenames, line numbers, and evidence never leave your machine. The only thing that can
ever be transmitted is a sanitized counts-only summary, and only when you explicitly choose to.
Supported checks (and honest limitations)
Checks (GitHub Actions + CI maintenance hygiene):
- Third-party actions pinned to a movable tag/branch instead of a commit SHA
- Broad (write-all) workflow token permissions
- Missing explicit
permissions: block
- Update automation (Dependabot/Renovate) presence
- Context-dependent workflow patterns flagged for private review (e.g.
pull_request_target, script injection)
Does NOT check (these need a manual review): exposed secrets, auth/authorization, payments,
webhooks, runtime behavior. It is a maintenance/hygiene check, not a full security audit or a
penetration test.
What it does
- Reads only your GitHub Actions workflow files and update-automation config, scans them
in-process with a deterministic ruleset (the same rules as the public checker), and writes a
local HTML + JSON report. It does not execute workflows, install dependencies, or run any
repository code.
Modes
| Single repo | npx taskbounty-check . | none |
| Directory of repos | npx taskbounty-check ./all-repos | none |
| Explicit paths | npx taskbounty-check --manifest repos.json | none |
GitHub org (your gh session) | npx taskbounty-check --gh-org <org> | yes, opt-in |
--gh-org uses your existing gh CLI session to fetch each repo's workflow files to this
machine (read-only). Your GitHub token is never read by this tool and never sent to TaskBounty.
What is read, written, transmitted
Run --explain-data to print this at any time.
- Reads (allowlist — nothing else is opened):
<repo>/.github/workflows/*.yml|*.yaml and
update-automation config (dependabot.yml/renovate.json*). Never source files, .env,
secrets, SSH keys, credential stores, or anything outside the selected repository roots.
Symlinks that escape a root are skipped, never followed.
- Writes (local only):
<out>.json (full detail) and <out>.html.
- Transmits: nothing by default.
--share uploads nothing — it writes a sanitized,
counts-only file (scan id, label, candidate counts by category, private-review count,
scanner version, timestamps; repo names only with --include-repo-names) for you to submit
manually. Network stays off under --share. Only --gh-org intentionally uses the network.
Flags
--share · --gh-org <org> · --manifest <file> · --org-label <label> ·
--include-repo-names · --dry-run · --explain-data · --delete-local-report ·
--no-network (default everywhere except --gh-org) · --out <basename> · --version · --help
Want help interpreting or fixing these results?
Request a free 20-minute launch-safety review:
https://www.task-bounty.com/ai-app-security-check/review?utm_source=npm&utm_medium=npm_readme&utm_campaign=workflow_security
TaskBounty receives nothing unless you submit that form. The scan runs locally and the full
report stays on your machine; the review form gives us no access to your repositories, source,
workflows, or secrets.
GitHub Code Scanning (SARIF)
Emit SARIF 2.1.0 and surface findings in your repo's Security → Code scanning tab:
npx taskbounty-check@latest . --format sarif --output taskbounty.sarif
The SARIF carries deterministic rule ids (taskbounty/<rule>), severity levels, and file/line
references — no source contents, secrets, or environment values, and no network access.
Confirmed findings are emitted as kind: fail; lower-confidence items as kind: review.
Help interpreting SARIF results: https://www.task-bounty.com/ai-app-security-check/review?utm_source=github&utm_medium=sarif_docs&utm_campaign=workflow_security
Upload it with the official action (full example in examples/code-scanning.yml):
permissions:
contents: read
security-events: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- run: npx taskbounty-check@latest . --format sarif --output taskbounty.sarif
- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
with:
sarif_file: taskbounty.sarif
Local agent (MCP)
Run a local stdio MCP server so Codex, Claude Code, or Cursor can scan and reason about findings
in your editor. It runs locally, makes zero outbound network requests, uploads no source, and
never modifies files — generate_fix_plan returns a plan as text for you to apply yourself.
npx taskbounty-check@latest mcp
Tools: scan_repo (local scan summary), explain_finding (plain-language explanation), generate_fix_plan (text fix plan).
Want a human to review the plan? https://www.task-bounty.com/ai-app-security-check/review?utm_source=mcp&utm_medium=mcp_docs&utm_campaign=workflow_security
Cursor — .cursor/mcp.json:
{ "mcpServers": { "taskbounty-check": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "taskbounty-check@latest", "mcp"] } } }
Claude Code:
claude mcp add taskbounty-check -- npx -y taskbounty-check@latest mcp
Codex — in ~/.codex/config.toml:
[mcp_servers.taskbounty-check]
command = "npx"
args = ["-y", "taskbounty-check@latest", "mcp"]
Security
Zero runtime dependencies. Published with npm provenance; verify checksums. See the threat model
(design-docs/security-cli-threat-model.md) and external-review packet
(design-docs/security-expansion/external-review-packet.md) in the project repository.