agent-memguard
Advanced tools
Governed shared memory for coding agents.
Local-first MCP memory with automatic organization, scoped rules, evidence, and rollback.
Let agents write without turning shared memory into an unreviewed pile. MemoryGuard organizes each write, preserves the evidence behind changes, and keeps governance decisions reversible.
No account. No remote server. No remote telemetry. Local-only usage telemetry is optional and stores bounded, privacy-preserving aggregates locally.
Quick start · Upgrade · Knowledge Library · Architecture · Supported hosts · Privacy and safety
A synthetic governed projection: signals move through memory categories while raw conversation text remains outside the graph.
v0.7.12 improves MCP discovery, bounded read delivery, and local usage telemetry while preserving the existing governed action checks and MCP name:
tools/list, including capability discovery and the
governed invocation broker. memoryguard_capabilities provides paginated
metadata for registered MCP operations and reviewed headless GUI operations;
exact advanced MCP names remain callable for compatibility.io.github.irisxc4/memoryguard.See the v0.7.12 release note and release history.
Earlier release details are kept in the Changelog and GitHub release records.
Usage events distinguish measured_cached_input from
measured_cache_write_input. measured_cache_coverage.cache_read and
cache_write report complete, partial, or unavailable; measured zero
remains 0, while missing provider data remains None/unavailable.
Character-based estimates remain explicitly labelled
estimated mg_deterministic_unit, never provider tokens.
Run the benchmark only against an authorized local workspace:
python scripts/benchmark_usage_telemetry.py --workspace . --window-days 7 --sync
Read the benchmark guide for measured, estimated, derived, and unsupported semantics. Use the demo recording checklist for a sanitized walkthrough. The repository's synthetic graph artwork is not a live product capture; it is not evidence of usage or savings.
v0.6.0 was a production data-plane refactor, not a storage-only upgrade:
V1_ACTIVE → V2_BUILDING → V2_READY → V2_ACTIVE is fail-closed; V2 never silently falls back to legacy stores or dual-writes after READY/ACTIVE.Persistent memory solves storage. It does not solve governance.
When several coding agents write into the same context, records become duplicated, stale, contradictory, over-broad, or unsafe to reuse. MemoryGuard sits between coding agents and their shared memory to keep that context usable.
| Without governance | With MemoryGuard |
|---|---|
| Notes accumulate without a canonical state | Writes are classified, deduplicated, superseded, or surfaced as conflicts |
| A correction silently destroys the old value | Evidence and supersede chains preserve what changed and why |
| Tokens and credentials can remain active | Sensitive-looking content is quarantined from active memory |
| Every write needs manual approval | Agents write normally; people review exceptions and outcomes |
| Raw chat logs leak into future context | Conversation history remains a separate, explicitly read evidence archive |
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flowchart TB
Hosts["CODING-AGENT HOSTS<br/>Claude Code · Codex · Cursor · TRAE "]:::host
Gateway["LOCAL INTEGRATION<br/>MCP stdio · redirect rules · lifecycle hooks "]:::gateway
subgraph Core["GOVERNANCE CORE "]
direction LR
Identity["TRUST<br/>identity · scope "]:::core
MemoryAPI["MEMORY<br/>governed I/O "]:::active
Rules["RULES<br/>scope · assignment "]:::rule
HistoryAPI["HISTORY<br/>search · timeline "]:::history
Security["SAFETY<br/>validate · quarantine "]:::danger
Identity --> MemoryAPI
Identity --> Rules
Identity --> HistoryAPI
MemoryAPI --> Security
end
subgraph Stores["LOCAL GOVERNED STORES "]
direction LR
SharedDB[("V2 DOMAIN STORES<br/>Memory · Rules · Evidence · Content ")]:::store
HistoryDB[("HISTORY STORE<br/>isolated conversations ")]:::historyStore
AuditDB[("RECOVERY STORE<br/>versions · receipts · backups ")]:::store
end
Bootstrap["BOUNDED CONTEXT BOOTSTRAP<br/>mandatory rule pack · relevant recall "]:::bootstrap
Control["HUMAN CONTROL<br/>CLI · desktop governance console "]:::surface
Hosts --> Gateway --> Identity
MemoryAPI --> SharedDB
Rules --> SharedDB
HistoryAPI --> HistoryDB
Security --> AuditDB
SharedDB --> Bootstrap
Control --> Identity
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classDef core fill:#12243A,stroke:#557287,color:#EEF4F8,stroke-width:1.4px;
classDef active fill:#0D383A,stroke:#38D5C8,color:#EEF4F8,stroke-width:2px;
classDef rule fill:#3B2C18,stroke:#F3B562,color:#EEF4F8,stroke-width:1.8px;
classDef history fill:#102F45,stroke:#73C7F5,color:#EEF4F8,stroke-width:1.8px;
classDef danger fill:#3A2028,stroke:#EA6A6A,color:#EEF4F8,stroke-width:1.8px;
classDef bootstrap fill:#EEF4F8,stroke:#38D5C8,color:#071521,stroke-width:2.4px;
classDef store fill:#0B1624,stroke:#7F96A8,color:#EEF4F8,stroke-width:1.4px;
classDef historyStore fill:#102436,stroke:#73C7F5,color:#EEF4F8,stroke-width:1.4px;
classDef surface fill:#EEF4F8,stroke:#38D5C8,color:#071521,stroke-width:2px;
style Core fill:#081827,stroke:#27445A,stroke-width:1px,color:#EEF4F8
style Stores fill:#081827,stroke:#27445A,stroke-width:1px,color:#EEF4F8
linkStyle default stroke:#557287,stroke-width:1.4px;
This package exposes a local stdio MCP server as io.github.irisxc4/memoryguard.
Registry metadata is kept in server.json, and the marker above
ships with the PyPI package README. Releases are published through GitHub OIDC
to PyPI and the official MCP Registry. Verify the current package version and
the Registry entry's active/latest state through their live public records.
python -m pip install agent-memguard
For the desktop governance console:
python -m pip install "agent-memguard[gui]"
memoryguard source add .
Global provider configuration is rebuilt from the real binding in the canonical user data home. The command is idempotent and removes superseded MemoryGuard project-level overrides after a successful global takeover.
# Repair one provider
memoryguard provider repair claude
memoryguard provider repair codex
memoryguard provider repair cursor
memoryguard provider repair trae
# Repair every detected provider
memoryguard provider repair all
Restart the host after installation, then verify the integration:
memoryguard doctor
memoryguard mcp-status
memoryguard hooks status --provider all
Launch the desktop console:
memoryguard gui
memoryguard-gui . remains available for desktop shortcuts. A bare
memoryguard gui always opens the canonical user-level control directory
(default %LOCALAPPDATA%\MemoryGuard on Windows), so running it from a project
or from C:\Windows\System32 cannot silently switch databases.
MEMORYGUARD_WORKSPACE is an explicit operator override; an explicit
memoryguard gui <project-path> or memoryguard gui --workspace <project-path>
selects a specific workspace.
It does not remember a previously selected project or open a folder picker.
On Windows, memoryguard gui detaches the native window from the terminal, so
closing PowerShell does not close the GUI.
Provider-specific setup and behavior:
Codex/Router binds MemoryGuard to the stable local Codex program and control installation. An account profile is an endpoint/alias, not a new memory owner: switching profiles automatically discovers or repairs the profile and reuses the verified Agent binding and active group. Request identity remains fail-closed; this does not share records across machines or with arbitrary accounts.
MemoryGuard currently upgrades through Python's package manager:
python -m pip install --upgrade agent-memguard
memoryguard --version
memoryguard doctor
If you installed the GUI extra, keep it during the upgrade:
python -m pip install --upgrade "agent-memguard[gui]"
There is no package self-update command. The package manager is the
authoritative package-upgrade path; memoryguard upgrade below is the explicit
workspace migration flow, not a package updater.
Upgrade the package, then run the verified migration. No workspace, data-home, apply, or confirmation arguments are required for the normal user-level data home:
python -m pip install --upgrade agent-memguard
memoryguard --version # confirms installed version
memoryguard upgrade
memoryguard doctor
The command prepares V2, validates the frozen and live source evidence,
migrates Agent/Group control, activates only after all gates pass, and removes
only the backup batch belonging to that successful migration. Re-running it on
V2_ACTIVE is idempotent. For a zero-write report, use:
memoryguard upgrade --preview
Advanced explicit workspace/data-home options remain available for operators managing an isolated installation. A failed gate stays non-active and preserves its evidence; successful activation does not keep a redundant migration backup.
v0.6.0 never auto-activates an existing workspace. Upgrade the package first, then use the packaged operator CLI:
# Read-only manifest status
memoryguard-v2 status -w .
# Build a frozen-source V2 shadow and stop at V2_READY
memoryguard-v2 prepare -w . --apply
# Activate only after the prepare result is V2_READY / ready=true
memoryguard-v2 activate -w . --confirm V2_ACTIVE
The prepare step uses coherent SQLite online backups, preserves V1 and
migration-backups, and rechecks live-source drift before READY. Activation
performs another fresh drift check before changing the manifest. Do not delete
legacy V1 data or migration backups as part of the upgrade.
The desktop console can turn a selected folder or file set into one governed local knowledge library. Source files remain where they are; MemoryGuard stores the searchable index in its user data home instead of copying a runtime database into every source project. Knowledge metadata never becomes a second source-body store.
| Capability | Current behavior |
|---|---|
| File/folder ingestion | Add a folder as a book or selected files as documents |
| Structure | Parse documents, preserve chapter/section context, and create traceable chunks |
| Retrieval | Full-text search, optional embeddings, and a layered knowledge graph |
| Natural synchronization | Re-ingest changed files; a partial or failed scan does not silently remove previously indexed content |
| Lifecycle | Move a book to the library trash, restore it, or explicitly purge its recovery snapshot |
| Memory candidates | Preview evidence-backed candidates before accepting them into governed long-term memory |
Open the desktop console and choose Knowledge Library. Remote embedding or model-backed indexing is opt-in and requires explicit authorization; local full-text retrieval remains available without sending source text to a remote provider. Background imports, re-ingests, and smart rebuilds have durable task receipts: retrying the same request reuses its task, while reusing that key for a different request is rejected. A live task for a different request reports busy rather than claiming that work was accepted.
The first CodeGraph build is an explicit, confirmed full build. After a scope
has been built, each successful trusted file write can trigger an incremental
refresh for that scope, subject to strict source-path and active-binding
validation. Unchanged content hashes are a no-op; deleted files are retired;
the next context receives one bounded affected receipt. MemoryGuard does not
run a daemon or watcher for this path and does not infer paths from shell or
free-form text. A projectless MCP caller first builds an already-bound directory
source, then passes its codegraph_source_id to select that exact scope for
query, status, update, and graph reads.
The GUI has eight visible navigation entries: seven governance pages plus a separate Token usage-and-savings view:
Agent lists use readable program/provider names; the underlying ID remains available in the detail view. Empty data is shown as an explicit empty state.
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flowchart TD
subgraph Intake["01 · INTAKE "]
direction LR
Write(["Memory write "]):::entry
Scope["Resolve identity<br/>scope · audience "]:::core
Validate{"Authorized? "}:::decision
Reject["Reject<br/>no persistence "]:::danger
Write --> Scope --> Validate
Validate -- NO --> Reject
end
subgraph Organize["02 · ORGANIZE "]
direction TB
Secret{"Sensitive? "}:::decision
Quarantine["Quarantine<br/>outside active set "]:::danger
Compare["Classify · compare<br/>governed records "]:::active
Relation{"Relationship "}:::decision
New["NEW<br/>create active record "]:::result
Duplicate["DUPLICATE<br/>merge provenance "]:::result
Correction["CORRECTION<br/>supersede old record "]:::rule
Conflict["CONFLICT<br/>preserve both sides "]:::danger
Secret -- YES --> Quarantine
Secret -- NO --> Compare --> Relation
Relation --> New
Relation --> Duplicate
Relation --> Correction
Relation --> Conflict
end
subgraph Govern["03 · GOVERN "]
direction LR
Receipt[("Evidence event<br/>version receipt ")]:::store
Review["CLI or desktop review "]:::surface
Action["Correct · merge<br/>restore · delete "]:::rule
Snapshot["Reversible<br/>snapshot "]:::active
Receipt --> Review --> Action --> Snapshot
end
Validate -- YES --> Secret
Quarantine --> Receipt
New --> Receipt
Duplicate --> Receipt
Correction --> Receipt
Conflict --> Receipt
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classDef core fill:#12243A,stroke:#557287,color:#EEF4F8,stroke-width:1.5px;
classDef decision fill:#0D3338,stroke:#38D5C8,color:#EEF4F8,stroke-width:2px;
classDef active fill:#0D383A,stroke:#38D5C8,color:#EEF4F8,stroke-width:2px;
classDef result fill:#12243A,stroke:#38D5C8,color:#EEF4F8,stroke-width:1.6px;
classDef rule fill:#3B2C18,stroke:#F3B562,color:#EEF4F8,stroke-width:1.8px;
classDef danger fill:#3A2028,stroke:#EA6A6A,color:#EEF4F8,stroke-width:1.8px;
classDef store fill:#0B1624,stroke:#7F96A8,color:#EEF4F8,stroke-width:1.4px;
classDef surface fill:#EEF4F8,stroke:#38D5C8,color:#071521,stroke-width:2px;
style Intake fill:#081827,stroke:#27445A,stroke-width:1px,color:#EEF4F8
style Organize fill:#081827,stroke:#27445A,stroke-width:1px,color:#EEF4F8
style Govern fill:#081827,stroke:#27445A,stroke-width:1px,color:#EEF4F8
linkStyle default stroke:#557287,stroke-width:1.4px;
The console is not an approval queue. Agents keep moving. MemoryGuard records the outcome and exposes the evidence needed to correct it later.
| Signal | Governance action |
|---|---|
| Duplicate or stale memory | Inspect the canonical record and supersede chain; restore an earlier version when needed |
| Conflicting memories | Keep both visible until the conflict is resolved deliberately |
| Secrets, tokens, or credentials | Quarantine the record so it cannot enter active shared memory |
| Incorrect automatic organization | Correct, merge, lock, restore, or roll back with evidence |
| Multiple coding agents | Bind agents to one shared group while preserving source identity and scope |
| Mandatory rules | Assign rules to an Agent, project, provider, runtime role, or shared group |
MemoryGuard deliberately keeps governed long-term memory and raw conversation history on different paths.
| Surface | Purpose | Context behavior |
|---|---|---|
| Rules and habits | Preferences, procedures, corrections, facts, projects, and scoped mandatory rules | Mandatory rules use an independent char/token budget after scope, exclude, conflict, and semantic dedup. Effective count above 20 is a health warning, not a hard block; storage is not capped by count. Sensitive, corrupt, per-item oversize, and aggregate overflow still fail closed with no silent truncation. Ordinary records are recalled when relevant |
| Conversation history | Local raw-evidence archive with owner and shared-group access controls | Never enters bootstrap automatically; raw text is read only through explicit history tools |
| Neuron graph | Navigation and governance over memory, rules, projects, agents, and sessions | History nodes contain safe metadata and summaries, not raw chat content |
History retrieval is progressive: search results, then a bounded timeline, then an explicitly selected turn or session. Extracting from history creates a preview first; it does not silently write a long-term memory.
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flowchart LR
subgraph HistoryPath["CONVERSATION EVIDENCE "]
direction TB
Archive[("Raw local history ")]:::historyStore
Search["Search summaries "]:::history
Timeline["Bounded timeline "]:::history
Read["Explicit turn or session "]:::history
Preview["Evidence-backed<br/>extraction preview "]:::history
Confirm["Explicit acceptance "]:::surface
Isolation["NO AUTOMATIC<br/>BOOTSTRAP PATH "]:::barrier
Archive --> Search --> Timeline --> Read --> Preview --> Confirm
Archive -.-> Isolation
end
subgraph GovernedMemory["GOVERNED LONG-TERM MEMORY "]
direction TB
Mandatory["Scoped mandatory rules "]:::rule
Assignments["Agent · project<br/>role · group scope "]:::core
RulePack["Mandatory-rule<br/>budget "]:::budget
Ordinary["Facts · preferences<br/>projects · procedures "]:::memory
Recall["Task-relevant<br/>recall budget "]:::budget
Context["BOUNDED CONTEXT PACKET "]:::context
Mandatory --> Assignments --> RulePack --> Context
Ordinary --> Recall --> Context
end
HistoryPath ==>|GOVERNED WRITE | GovernedMemory
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classDef budget fill:#12243A,stroke:#38D5C8,color:#EEF4F8,stroke-width:1.6px;
classDef context fill:#EEF4F8,stroke:#38D5C8,color:#071521,stroke-width:2.4px;
classDef history fill:#102F45,stroke:#73C7F5,color:#EEF4F8,stroke-width:1.6px;
classDef historyStore fill:#102436,stroke:#73C7F5,color:#EEF4F8,stroke-width:1.6px;
classDef surface fill:#EEF4F8,stroke:#73C7F5,color:#071521,stroke-width:2px;
classDef barrier fill:#3A2028,stroke:#EA6A6A,color:#EEF4F8,stroke-width:2px;
style GovernedMemory fill:#081827,stroke:#27445A,stroke-width:1px,color:#EEF4F8
style HistoryPath fill:#081827,stroke:#27445A,stroke-width:1px,color:#EEF4F8
linkStyle default stroke:#557287,stroke-width:1.4px;
| Host | Integration | Current boundary |
|---|---|---|
| Claude Code | Global MCP binding, redirect rules, user-level lifecycle Hook | Verified takeover path |
| Codex | Global MCP binding, redirect rules, user-level lifecycle Hook | Verified takeover path |
| Cursor | Global MCP binding, redirect rules, user-level lifecycle Hook | Verified takeover path |
| TRAE | MCP binding and redirect rules | No verified Hook seam; reported as a fallback instead of full takeover |
Provider status is reported honestly as redirected, observed, operational, or unsupported. MemoryGuard does not claim it can disable every host's native memory when the host exposes no reliable integration point.
| Layer | Responsibility |
|---|---|
| Evidence & Content | Authorized sources, immutable evidence, content-addressed blobs/occurrences, source manifests, and conversation archives |
| Memory & Rules | Scoped memory atoms, revisions, bindings, rule definitions, decisions, evidence links, and compensating governance operations |
| Runtime & Projection | Bounded working context, scenario/profile projections, CodeGraph, Assets, and Skills metadata |
| Cutover & Governance | Four-state manifest, native MCP/CLI/GUI/Hook routing, Reference Audit, maintenance, provider adapters, and rollback evidence |
V2 uses separate authoritative SQLite domains rather than one shared-memory
database. The runtime reads and writes V2 only after the manifest reaches
V2_ACTIVE; V2_BUILDING and V2_READY never silently fall back or dual-write.
Evidence remains traceable without being treated as automatically trusted memory.
.memoryguard/usage_telemetry.sqlite; it does not upload data. Token savings
are estimates based on MemoryGuard deterministic units, not a provider billing
statement. Hosts without token reporting remain unsupported in the measured
columns.MEMORYGUARD_HOME or the platform user
data directory, so a selected source folder does not receive its own
knowledge database..memoryguard/ into
explicit Memory, Rules, Evidence, Content, Runtime, Projection, Assets,
CodeGraph, Skills, and System domains; History, Source, Binding, and Group
control are V2-native surfaces. Legacy V1 artifacts are preserved as local
rollback/audit evidence after cutover and are no longer the active V2 runtime
write path; only memoryguard.migration may read them.The installed memoryguard command exposes these top-level operations:
| Command | Purpose |
|---|---|
audit [path] | Run a read-only audit and generate a report |
open [path] | Open the latest interactive report |
explain <finding_id> | Explain evidence and risk for a finding |
source <action> | List, add, remove, or preview authorized sources |
scan | Scan authorized sources and build the coverage ledger |
doctor | Diagnose V2 manifest, domain availability, and native coverage |
mcp-status | Inspect V2 MCP/backend health; tenant counts require a bound Agent scope |
hooks <action> | Install, inspect, pause, repair, or remove host Hooks |
provider <action> | Inspect or repair global provider integrations |
| `storage audit | report` |
| `storage sweep | compact` |
groups <action> | Inspect governed group state |
gui [path] | Launch the interactive governance console |
desktop | Launch the trusted desktop executor |
The old V1 plan, apply, verify, undo, import, and gc workflows may
remain parseable as explicit retired compatibility surfaces, but are not a V1
runtime path. Under V2_ACTIVE they return a stable retired result instead of
writing through a legacy store. Legacy data input is accepted only by the
explicit memoryguard.migration upgrade flow.
Run memoryguard --help or memoryguard <command> --help for the live command
reference.
The default MCP discovery surface is intentionally compact. New MCP clients
receive these eleven day-to-day tools through tools/list:
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
memoryguard_context_bootstrap | Load bounded mandatory rules and relevant memory context |
memoryguard_memory_search | Search governed memories by query, lifecycle status, and bounded limit. kind is not an MCP search filter; semantic duplicate/conflict checks are separate advanced governance. |
memoryguard_memory_read | Read one governed memory |
memoryguard_memory_write | Write and organize a governed memory |
memoryguard_memory_update | Update the body, kind, recall policy, or priority of one known memory. It does not change lifecycle status. |
memoryguard_memory_delete | Soft-delete a governed memory |
memoryguard_memory_status | Inspect shared-memory status |
memoryguard_audit | Run a read-only local governance audit |
memoryguard_explain | Explain one audit finding and its evidence |
memoryguard_capabilities | Discover registered MCP operations and reviewed headless GUI operations with bounded pagination and optional on-demand JSON Schema |
memoryguard_invoke | Invoke one discovered MCP or reviewed headless GUI operation; mutating targets require confirmation and an idempotency key |
Advanced governance remains available through the GUI and CLI: rule lifecycle,
bindings and shared groups, source scanning, CodeGraph, knowledge and history
review, provider controls, external MCP import, and maintenance operations.
Existing advanced MCP names remain callable for compatibility when an installed
client invokes an exact name, but they are not returned by the default
tools/list. This reduces discovery/schema overhead without removing those
governance capabilities.
memoryguard_capabilities is the discovery path for the broader compatibility
catalog. It supports exact operation lookup, English or Chinese query text,
domain filtering, and offset pagination; schemas are returned only when
include_schema=true is requested for the selected page. The catalog exposes
162 reviewed headless GUI business operations through memoryguard_invoke.
Eight GUI operations remain explicitly restricted by their existing authority:
desktop-only path/folder actions, desktop-admin CodeGraph selection/build, and
SafeBridge protocol actions.
MemoryGuard minifies JSON text by default. A replayable read response is capped
at 24,000 UTF-8 bytes across the complete MCP envelope, including every
content block and existing structuredContent. Small responses keep their
existing shape. An oversized read returns a compact receipt with response_ref
and required identifiers; it does not silently truncate the original result.
Fetch a page through the existing broker, after discovering
memoryguard_response_read with memoryguard_capabilities:
{
"operation": "memoryguard_response_read",
"arguments": {
"response_ref": "opaque-id",
"fields": ["/data/memory_id"],
"offset": 0,
"limit": 3000
}
}
Pages are UTF-8 JSON fragments with next_offset; concatenate them in order.
limit is 4–4096 bytes and offsets must be UTF-8 character boundaries. On a
single JSON text payload, fields selects business fields: use a top-level
name or an object-only JSON Pointer such as /data/memory_id. Multi-content
and non-JSON results reject field selection and remain available only as
whole-envelope pages.
Private references live only in the MCP process for at most five minutes: at
most 16 snapshots, each at most 512,000 bytes. They are bound to the exact
trusted session, principal, scope, and active binding revision. Each page
reruns the original read under current authorization and compares its
digest. A denial, changed output, binding/session change, or expired reference
returns a stable refusal such as response_ref_access_denied,
response_ref_expired, or response_ref_result_changed; cached old content
is never used to bypass the current read. Public capability metadata uses its
existing offset pagination. Writes and context bootstrap keep their existing
complete receipt/mandatory-rule contracts and cannot request response
pagination, so a page read never reruns a mutation. If an oversized read cannot
safely create a reference, its bounded receipt reports
delivery.status="unavailable" and action="narrow_query" rather than
promising the whole result can be retrieved.
Example discovery and invocation using the published schemas:
{"operation":"memoryguard_task_list","include_schema":true,"limit":1}
{"operation":"memoryguard_task_list","arguments":{"limit":20}}
For a mutating target, the invoke envelope must also carry
"confirmed":true and a non-empty "idempotency_key"; the broker forwards
those proofs to the target's existing permission and scope checks.
The underlying compatibility catalog also covers:
Use MCP tools/list for the compact default discovery set. Use
memoryguard_capabilities for the registered compatibility catalog and its
reviewed operation metadata.
3 / 3 result
plus the real full-repository export/projection described above. It does not
claim that upstream Graphify's full-repository test suite passed.Issues and pull requests are welcome. Read CONTRIBUTING.md before submitting a change. Pull requests require agreement to the CLA.
FAQs
Local-first MCP memory backend and governance console for coding agents
We found that agent-memguard demonstrated a healthy version release cadence and project activity because the last version was released less than a year ago. It has 1 open source maintainer collaborating on the project.
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