ophimcms/theme-dy bundled jQuery file.6 Malicious Packagist Themes Ship Trojanized jQuery and FUNNULL Redirect Payloads
Six malicious Packagist packages posing as OphimCMS themes contain trojanized jQuery that exfiltrates URLs, injects ads, and loads FUNNULL-linked redirects.
- Kush Pandya

Socket's Threat Research Team identified six malicious Composer packages published under the ophimcms namespace on Packagist (PHP). The packages mimic the naming conventions of OphimCMS, a Vietnamese-language Laravel CMS for movie streaming sites, to appear as legitimate themes for the platform. All six ship trojanized JavaScript assets, primarily disguised as legitimate jQuery libraries, that redirect visitors, exfiltrate URLs, inject ads, and in the most severe case load a second-stage payload - a mobile-targeted redirect to gambling and adult content sites, from infrastructure operated by FUNNULL Technology Inc.
FUNNULL is a Philippines-based infrastructure provider sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on May 29, 2025 for facilitating over $200 million in cryptocurrency investment scams. FUNNULL operates a content delivery network that security researchers have linked to more than 200,000 malicious hostnames, including fake investment platforms, gambling sites, and supply chain attack infrastructure.
The packages are live on Packagist at the time of publication. We have submitted takedown requests to the Packagist security team.

Socket's AI Scanner flagging the obfuscated second-stage loader from FUNNULL-operated infrastructure in
The Packages
#| Package | Composer Name | Behavior |
|---|---|---|
| theme-dy | ophimcms/theme-dy | FUNNULL redirect + URL exfiltration + analytics injection |
| theme-mtyy | ophimcms/theme-mtyy | URL exfiltration |
| theme-rrdyw | ophimcms/theme-rrdyw | URL exfiltration + ad injection + analytics injection |
| theme-pcc | ophimcms/theme-pcc | Click hijacking + ad injection |
| theme-motchill | ophimcms/theme-motchill | Full-screen overlay ads |
| theme-legend | ophimcms/theme-legend | Anti-debugging + redirect |
The remaining 20 packages from the threat actor are clean. All malicious code is confined to JavaScript assets bundled with the themes, not the PHP codebase.
Three of the five packages attributed to dev@ophim[.]cc carry the FUNNULL-linked payloads. Those attributed to opdlnf01@gmail[.]com carry ad injection, click hijacking, and anti-debugging payloads. These two email addresses cover all 26 packages in the set*.*
Two Accounts, One Organization
#The 26 packages are published through the https://github[.]com/ophimcms GitHub organization, which has 32 repositories and no public members. Git commit history links two GitHub accounts to the operation:
https://github[.]com/binhnguyen1998822(display names "To Nguyen", "NTBDEV") - createdtheme-dyin June 2024 and made all four initial commits through July 2024. This account maps to thedev@ophim[.]ccauthor email.https://github[.]com/phantom0803(display names "Hades", "OPDLNF") - authoredtheme-legend,theme-motchill,theme-pcc, and 18 clean themes from October 2022 onward. This account maps to theopdlnf01@gmail[.]comauthor email - the "OPDLNF" display name matches the email prefix.
Both accounts have write access to the ophimcms organization. Notably, phantom0803 committed to theme-dy in December 2025 - a package originally created by binhnguyen1998822, adding CSS fixes and updating the README 18 months after the initial commits. This cross-contribution means either both actors are collaborating within the same organization, or a single operator is using two accounts to maintain separate payload lines: FUNNULL redirects under one identity and ad injection under the other.

Git commit history for theme-dy showing contributions from both binhnguyen1998822 (June -July 2024) and phantom0803 (December 2025), confirming both accounts have write access to the ophimcms organization.
The Packagist listings link to repositories under the ophimcms GitHub organization, but the README inside each package links to the legitimate https://github.com/hacoidev/ophim-core project - a social engineering tactic designed to associate the malicious themes with the real OphimCMS project.
Background: Chinese Templates in a Vietnamese CMS
#The trojanized themes are not original OphimCMS work. They are Chinese-origin MacCMS templates ported to the Vietnamese ophimcms Laravel ecosystem. Several packages retain MacCMS configuration objects in their JavaScript, Chinese-language ad slot labels, and Baidu Analytics tracking IDs, all artifacts from their original deployment context. This matters because the most severe second-stage payload was built for Chinese audiences and carries timezone gating that targets Chinese timezones only, meaning it does not activate against Vietnamese users. A separate, less sophisticated attack chain present in the same files has no such restriction and affects all users regardless of location.

The Packagist page for ophimcms/theme-dy . The sidebar (left) links to github[.]com/ophimcms/theme-dy - the threat actor's organization - while the README (right) links to the legitimate hacoidev/ophim-core project, giving developers the impression that the theme is an official part of the real OphimCMS project.
The Payloads
#Trojanized jQuery Libraries
#The primary delivery mechanism across all packages carrying FUNNULL and URL exfiltration payloads is a legitimate jQuery library with malicious code injected into it, either appended after the closing jQuery IIFE or woven inline into the Sizzle CSS selector engine, making it harder to detect by inspecting only the beginning or end of the file.

Left: A legitimate jQuery 1.9.1 library ends at the closing IIFE. Right: *theme-dy's* copy of the same file with 1,349 bytes of obfuscated code appended after the identical closure, loading a second-stage payload from FUNNULL-operated infrastructure.
Attack Chain A: URL Exfiltration via userstat[.]net
#The packages theme-dy, theme-mtyy and theme-rrdyw, contain a payload that uses a Caesar cipher (character shift of -5) to encode its C2 domain and cookie name. The encoded string UMUWJKX decodes to PHPREFS, the cookie used to throttle execution to once per approximately 11 hours per visitor.
When the cookie is absent, the payload creates a <script> element and sets its src to:
https://userstat[.]net/get/script.js?referrer=<current_page_url>The current page URL is passed as a query parameter, exfiltrating the victim's browsing location to the C2. Google Ads has independently flagged sites loading scripts from userstat[.]net with hacked site indicators.
This chain has no geographic restriction. It fires on any HTTP-served site with a hostname containing a dot, targeting all ophimcms users regardless of timezone or device.
Attack Chain B: FUNNULL Redirect via union[.]macoms[.]la
#theme-dy carries a second, independent payload appended after the jQuery closure. It uses a custom Base64 decoder (avoiding the native atob() function, which is commonly flagged by static analysis tools) to decode the C2 URL:
https://union[.]macoms[.]la/jquery.min-3.6.8.jsBefore the second-stage script is even fetched, the first-stage loader gates on navigator.platform, only executing on platforms that are neither Mac nor Windows, and requires a valid external referrer (document.referrer), skipping execution on direct navigation. The second stage script is the FUNNULL second-stage payload. It employs 3-layer obfuscation (rotating string array, Base64 + RC4 encryption, and wrapper functions with offset indirection) and performs several environment checks before executing.
- Exits silently if
navigator.webdriveris set or other headless browser indicators are present - Only targets mobile devices
- Only fires between 8:00 AM and 11:59 PM in the visitor's local timezone
- Only activates on the second visit, using a cookie to filter one-time crawlers
- Only redirects approximately 50-80% of qualifying visitors (probabilistic sampling)
- Checks for
admin_idandadminlevelscookies and skips silently if the site administrator is logged in
When all conditions are satisfied, visitors are redirected via window.location.replace(), which replaces the history entry and prevents the Back button from returning to the original page, through a chain that terminates at a Chinese adult live-streaming platform.
union[.]macoms[.]la is a documented FUNNULL IOC listed by Sansec, XLab/Qianxin, and Silent Push. The payload was confirmed still live as of March 11th, 2026, with a Last-Modified header of March 10, 2026, nearly ten months after OFAC sanctions were imposed.

HTTP response headers from union[.]macoms[.]la on March 11, 2026. The last-modified date of March 10, 2026 confirms active maintenance of the payload nearly ten months after OFAC sanctions.
theme-dy Carries Both Chains Simultaneously
#theme-dy's jquery.js contains both Payload A (Caesar cipher → userstat[.]net) and Payload B (Base64 → union[.]macoms[.]la). Both execute independently. A visitor loading this file triggers both second-stage downloads simultaneously, assuming their respective trigger conditions are met.
Ad Injection (theme-rrdyw)
#theme-rrdyw ships three additional malicious files beyond its trojanized jQuery:
topinfo.jsinjects desktop ads sourced fromim[.]ue8im[.]com, pointing to a C2 athttp://23[.]225[.]52[.]67:4466/vip344[.]html, a hardcoded IP on a non-standard port hosted by CNSERVERS LLC in Los Angeles.indexbottom.jsruns the same injection targeting mobile devices, using a User-Agent regex matching iPhone, Android, and similar.tj.jsinjects two third-party analytics services without site owner consent: Baidu Analytics (hm.baidu.com) and 51.la, a Chinese web analytics service.
Click Hijacking (theme-pcc)
#theme-pcc's custom926f.js uses array-based obfuscation consistent with automated JavaScript obfuscators. Once deobfuscated, it attaches a click listener to all anchor elements on the page except those explicitly classed as banner URLs or links within modals. When a user clicks any matching link, the intended destination opens in a new tab via window.open() while the current window is simultaneously redirected to an ad URL. The hijack fires only once per browser session, stored in sessionStorage, to reduce user suspicion.
The script also loads an external ad script from cre-ads[.]com/G0bJZf9Uj1.
Full-Screen Overlay Ads (theme-motchill)
#theme-motchill appends a hex-obfuscated payload to an otherwise legitimate functions.js. The payload implements a full-screen ad overlay system: a <div> with z-index: 200 covering the entire viewport, containing a clickable ad image linking to an external page. A close button displaying Vietnamese text ("Đóng quảng cáo" / Close advertisement) appears after a timed delay, forcing users to view the ad before dismissing it. Ad impression state is tracked in localStorage with keys prefixed MPAd_.
Anti-Debugging (theme-legend)
#theme-legend takes a different approach. Instead of injecting ads or exfiltrating data, it actively prevents users and researchers from inspecting the page.
Image.__defineGetter__("id", function() { devtoolsOpen = true; });When Chrome DevTools is open and an Image object is logged to the console, the browser evaluates property getters for display purposes, triggering this getter and setting a flag. The page then redirects to xemphimlau[.]com, a Vietnamese piracy streaming site, preventing further analysis.
The script also blocks F12, all Ctrl key combinations, and Shift key combinations, disables right-click, and creates an infinite debugger trap via function(){}.constructor("debugger")(), which generates an endless breakpoint loop when DevTools is open.
FUNNULL Attribution
#The attribution of the union[.]macoms[.]la payload to FUNNULL rests on a documented evidence chain. macoms[.]la is a typosquat of maccms.la (the official MacCMS domain) and is listed as a FUNNULL IOC by Sansec (in connection with the Polyfill.io supply chain attack), XLab/Qianxin (in the RingH23/MacCMS supply chain analysis published March 5, 2026), and Silent Push (in the Triad Nexus FUNNULL report). DNS resolution of union[.]macoms[.]la routes through b0ca39f0[.]nqsaaskw[.]com to g941875[.]cdn[.]nqsaaskw[.]com, consistent with FUNNULL CDN naming conventions documented in the FBI FLASH advisory.
FUNNULL was designated a Specially Designated National under U.S. sanctions on May 29, 2025. The FBI FLASH advisory issued concurrently documents 548 CNAMEs linked to over 332,000 malicious domains and prohibits U.S. persons and entities from transacting with the network.

Live FUNNULL-operated gambling sites impersonating European sportsbook Bwin (left) and the Venetian Macau casino (right). Mobile visitors redirected through theunion[.]macoms[.]lapayload chain land on sites like these.
The XLab/Qianxin RingH23 report directly attributes macoms[.]la and ailyunoss[.]com (a typosquat of Alibaba Cloud used in the FUNNULL redirect chain) to the Funnull/RingH23 toolkit and documents confirmed code homology with the Polyfill.io attack and the GoEdge CDN poisoning campaign.
The userstat[.]net payload uses entirely different infrastructure, obfuscation, and targeting logic. Definitive attribution of userstat[.]net to FUNNULL cannot be established from available evidence. What is established is that it poses a greater practical threat to Vietnamese ophimcms users than the FUNNULL chain, because it has no geographic restriction.
Impact
#Any site running one of the six malicious themes is exposing its visitors to one or more of the following: URL exfiltration to userstat[.]net, FUNNULL-operated redirects to gambling and adult content sites on mobile devices, unauthorized ad injection, click hijacking, or analytics collection by third parties without consent. The JavaScript payloads execute client-side in the visitor's browser, so the server hosting the application is not directly compromised, but every user who loads the affected theme is affected.
The ad injection and click hijacking chains are not geographically restricted and affect all visitors regardless of device or location. The FUNNULL redirect chain is restricted to mobile devices in Chinese timezones.
Download counts across the six malicious packages total approximately 2750 installs at the time of analysis.
Outlook and Recommendations
#The malicious payloads in these packages are embedded inside bundled JavaScript assets, files that appear to be standard vendor libraries. Nothing in the PHP codebase, the service provider registration, or the composer.json configuration raises an obvious flag. A developer installing one of these themes and auditing only the PHP layer would find nothing suspicious.
The connection to FUNNULL infrastructure that remains actively maintained nearly ten months after OFAC sanctions imposed for facilitating over $200 million in cryptocurrency fraud, is a significant finding. The union[.]macoms[.]la payload was updated as recently as March 10, 2026, indicating the operator continues to invest in this campaign despite the designation.
Similar patterns will appear in other CMS ecosystems. Theme and plugin packages are a reliable supply chain vector because they bundle large quantities of front-end assets (JavaScript, CSS, images) that developers rarely audit at the file level after installation.
If you installed any of these packages:
- Remove the affected themes immediately.
- Audit your site's outbound network requests for connections to
userstat[.]net,union[.]macoms[.]la,23[.]225[.]52[.]67:4466, orcre-ads[.]com. - Inspect bundled jQuery files for code appended after the closing
})(window);or injected inline at the start of the Sizzle engine. - Check
localStoragefor keys prefixed withMPAd_as an indicator of the overlay ad system. - Notify your users if the site was running an affected theme, as their browsing activity may have been exfiltrated.
For security teams:
- Flag Composer packages that bundle JavaScript assets, particularly vendor libraries like jQuery, without integrity verification.
- Inspect JS files for code appended after a library's closing IIFE, and for inline injections at file scope.
- Watch for Caesar cipher and custom Base64 obfuscation patterns in front-end assets. Both are used here specifically to evade
atob()- based static analysis detection. - Any domain resolving through
.nqsaaskw[.]comCNAMEs should be treated as FUNNULL infrastructure.
Socket detects threats like this across the full dependency graph, including JavaScript assets bundled inside theme packages, before they reach production. The Socket GitHub App scans pull request dependency changes and flags suspicious asset injections before merge. The Socket CLI enforces allow and deny rules in CI pipelines, stopping risky dependency changes early. Socket Firewall blocks known malicious packages, including transitive dependencies, before they are fetched. The Socket browser extension surfaces risk signals during package evaluation on Packagist. Socket MCP prevents AI-assisted coding workflows from introducing suspicious or hallucinated dependencies into your projects.
MITRE ATT&CK
#- T1195.002 — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- T1027 — Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1059.007 — JavaScript Execution
- T1204.001 — User Execution: Malicious Link
- T1041 — Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1583.008 — Acquire Infrastructure: Malvertising
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
#Malicious Packages
#ophimcms/theme-dyophimcms/theme-mtyyophimcms/theme-rrdywophimcms/theme-pccophimcms/theme-motchillophimcms/theme-legend
Threat Actor Emails
#dev@ophim[.]ccopdlnf01@gmail[.]com
Threat Actor Github
#https://github[.]com/ophimcmshttps://github[.]com/phantom0803https://github[.]com/binhnguyen1998822
Network Indicators
#union[.]macoms[.]la- (FUNNULL second-stage payload)userstat[.]net- (URL exfiltration C2)cre-ads[.]com- (Click hijacking ad network)xemphimlau[.]com- (Anti-debug redirect target)im[.]ue8im[.]com- (Ad image hosting)23[.]225[.]52[.]67:4466- (Ad injection C2)oss-cn-guangzhou[.]ailyunoss[.]com- (Alibaba Cloud typosquat)dxtv1[.]com- (FUNNULL device-routing redirect hub)
File Hashes
#FDFCBF04343F4EB89BAB9EAF40FEE178D9002A42C7949C9BBD24C0E8831A04B0(SHA256) -union[.]macoms[.]la/jquery.min-3.6.8.js
Tracking IDs
#- Baidu Analytics:
71d6a48495935b1d8996cc128d9a6819(theme-dy) - Baidu Analytics:
998752431dfb16634c12a163110e90ea(theme-rrdyw) - 51.la:
KSj5TdeIpUCuuvpt(theme-rrdyw)




