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Secure OSS Dependencies

Socket for Open Source Security

Quickly evaluate the security and health of any open source package. Unlike a traditional vulnerability scanner, Socket can detect an active supply chain attack and help you block it. Socket detects over 70 issues in open source code for comprehensive protection.

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Beyond CVE Scanning

What is Open Source Security?

Open source code makes up more than 90% of modern software projects, with many apps spamming 10,000+ dependencies. This makes it easy for attackers to use open source as a vector for attacks where open source packages registries are frequently the target of malware. Traditional vulnerability scanners cannot detect active supply chain attacks. Socket's free GitHub app safeguards your open source code from both vulnerable and malicious dependencies.

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github.com/nccgroup/singularity

v0.0.0-20261120063628-00a04fbaf541

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This is an explicit browser-based DNS rebinding attack tool, not ordinary application configuration code: it targets configured hosts and ports through iframe reloads and coordinates payload execution via postMessage. The fragment contains no hardcoded external domain or credential theft, but unauthorized use could enable access to services reachable from a victim's browser; severity is high for a deployment exposed to users. The shown code has apparent syntax errors that may prevent execution as provided.

github.com/jm33-m0/emp3r0r/core

v0.0.0-20250123065341-91279bff2618

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This fragment implements local emp3r0r agent coordination and C2 connectivity checks. It contains a potentially destructive os.RemoveAll call on a configured socket path and sends an explicit self-termination instruction when the wait queue is full, but does not itself kill processes or expose credentials. The C2-related behavior is consistent with an agent framework; severity is elevated by the termination instruction and path-removal behavior, while malicious intent cannot be established from this fragment alone.

github.com/nccgroup/singularity

v0.0.0-20261120062225-3f7e94358921

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

The snippet is suspicious due to embedding a cross-platform shell script intended to launch system calculators as an entrypoint payload and sending it to a backend endpoint. While the shell payload is not executed within this client snippet, its presence as an entrypoint and the lack of input validation on the backend contract strongly indicate potential remote command execution risks if the backend interprets and runs the payload. This behaves like a backdoor payload or research harness with high risk in typical supply-chain contexts; restrict use and verify backend handling before integration.

github.com/congchuanling-dot/cohort

v0.2.1

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This code is highly suspicious. It establishes a persistent WebSocket to a configured remote endpoint and executes commands received over that channel, including fully arbitrary JavaScript execution in the target page via eval/AsyncFunction (execute_js), and arbitrary CDP method execution. It also harvests page/tab content and metadata (including optional form values/shadow DOM/iframes) and sends results back over the WebSocket, creating a strong data-exfiltration loop. Absent visible authentication/authorization in this module, any party controlling the server or the WebSocket traffic could drive powerful surveillance and remote execution.

@geoscene/core

5.1.16

by evenboy

Live on npm

Blocked by Socket

High severity: the obfuscated browser module fetches flood.js from a runtime-configured asset base and executes its response with eval, then fetches a WebAssembly binary; this creates a remote-code execution path if that asset source is untrusted or compromised. It also contains active anti-debugging behavior, including repeated debugger statements and a query-string bypass. No credential harvesting, environment-variable access, or data exfiltration is evident; no specific external domain or IP is identifiable from the supplied fragment.

github.com/fosrl/cli

v0.0.0-20261119222142-bb03d2c45ce7

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This module implements a high-risk self-update mechanism that downloads a remote shell script and executes it immediately via `sh -c` and `curl | bash`, without any integrity/authenticity verification shown here. It also uses an unsafe command-string construction by concatenating the local executable path into a shell context without quoting/escaping. Even if intended for legitimate updates, this pattern is a significant supply-chain/RCE risk and should be hardened (e.g., fetch a specific signed artifact, verify signature/checksum before execution, avoid `sh -c`/pipelines, and pass arguments without shell interpolation).

tsbwt-hawsi-util

0.0.1-security

by npm

Live on npm

Blocked by Socket

Malicious code in tsbwt-hawsi-util (npm) Source: amazon-inspector (8a628809b3bbbcb3a405a0250d08c4d352e7438f3dc76454d839be6f84298cc9) On require(), index.js reads a byte array stored in a `_bz` field inside package.json, zlib-inflates it, and passes the resulting string to the Function constructor as code with `require` and `__dirname` bound into scope: `var _b=Buffer.from(_j._bz);var _d=require('zlib').inflateSync(_b); _FC('require','__dirname',_d.toString('utf8'))(require,__dirname);`. The whole construct is wrapped in a silent try/catch. In this published version the inflated bytes decode to `console.log(1)`, so no harmful behavior fires, but the mechanism is a general-purpose hidden code loader: whatever bytes the maintainer ships in the manifest's `_bz` field are decompressed and executed at module load time with full Node privileges, and the opaque binary blob in a non-code field evades normal source review. The decoded payload has access to the full `require` resolver and the package directory, enabling arbitrary filesystem, network, and child-process actions. Source: ghsa-malware (f60d2fd5582018d3f424ae73b45ab0e09876546e79056ae4de67d2be71b29cf9) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

github.com/wenathlan/devthink/devthink/v2

v2.0.187-0.20261120003855-598c13896645

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

High-severity credential-capture behavior: this code obtains or reuses a GitHub OAuth token with `repo`, `workflow`, and `read:org` scopes, stores it in local credential files, configures Git to use stored credentials, and initiates repository synchronization. Relevant destinations include `github[.]com`, `api[.]github[.]com`, and the referenced repository `github[.]com/wenathlan/devthink[.]git`; relevant files include `.github-token`, `.git-credentials`, `.git-credentials.bak`, and `.polar-auth.json`. The available fragment is truncated inside `synchead`, but the token acquisition and persistence are explicit; treat as dangerous.

bhom.interop.ladybugtools

10.0.0-alpha.4.0

by BHoM

Live on nuget

Blocked by Socket

This fragment contains a clear, high-severity supply-chain style execution risk: it uses eval() on the contents of focus_points.json (named like JSON but treated as executable Python). If that file can be influenced by an attacker, it enables arbitrary code execution at runtime. Aside from this, the rest of the module performs scientific computations, caching to parquet, and saving plots; no obvious additional malicious behaviors are evident in the provided code.

github.com/ltaoo/echo

v0.12.2

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This code is best characterized as a domain-targeted MITM proxy with explicit response spoofing and tampering capabilities, enabled by embedding a root CA private key in the binary. It can intercept HTTPS traffic, inject mocked responses, modify HTML content for specific domains, and forward some matched traffic to hardcoded internal/LAN endpoints. While there is no direct evidence of classic malware behaviors like exec-based persistence or direct data exfiltration in this snippet, the bundled MITM credential material and active traffic/content manipulation make the security risk high and potentially dangerous if shipped or deployed without strict user control and clear, documented test-only intent.

github.com/ukgovernmentbeis/sandbox_escape_bench

v0.0.0-20261115144815-c07dc32601d8

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

The code is intentionally malicious exploit tooling. It uses container mount metadata to locate a host-backed file, replaces /etc/hosts with an executable payload, and arranges for /flag.txt to be copied into the host-side file. This indicates attempted container escape, privilege escalation, or secret exfiltration. The script should not be executed.

kage-baileys

25.0.8

by xrljosedv1

Live on npm

Blocked by Socket

High severity availability and integrity concern: the unconditional, hoisted __importStar override causes module initialization to throw, preventing normal use and resembling sabotage. If execution proceeds in a modified or partial context, uploadFile() sends media to catbox[.]moe, scdn[.]pdi[.]moe, qu[.]ax, uguu[.]se, or tmpfiles[.]org, and vid2jpg() contacts ezgif[.]com; these are explicit third-party transfers that may expose user media. The embedded duplicate contains an exec-based ffmpeg command-injection risk, and URL-derived requests require validation. No credential theft or environment-variable collection is evident.

github.com/nccgroup/singularity

v0.0.0-20261120062225-3f7e94358921

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

High risk of data leakage and backdoor-like behavior. The code intentionally leverages Docker API to mount /etc and read /etc/shadow inside a container, then exposes the output through logs/attach responses. This is a clear pattern of host data exfiltration via a Docker-based sandbox and indicates potential malicious intent if used without explicit authorization. Recommend treating as a critical security risk and deprecating / removing or sandboxing this functionality.

hydromind

5.24.8

Live on pypi

Blocked by Socket

This fragment is a high-suspicion supply-chain pattern: it performs import-time dynamic execution of another module through a private/native `exec_module` wrapper while granting the loaded code access to the importer’s globals. While the snippet alone shows no explicit credential theft or exfiltration, the delegated execution and unusual loader mechanism materially increase risk. Inspect `hydromind._protection_native.exec_module` and `hydromind.agent.hydroai` for network access, data collection, persistence, and other malicious behaviors.

doomiwork

4.2.10

by stephenshenying

Live on npm

Blocked by Socket

High-severity security issue: the default monitor router exposes POST /api/_doomiwork_/upload, which uses a hardcoded token and request-controlled path and content to overwrite an existing file accessible to the process. Because the token is present in the code and the path is not confined to a safe directory, this provides an unauthorized file-overwrite capability to anyone who can obtain the token, including through source access. No suspicious external domains, IPs, or obfuscated payloads appear in the fragment.

github.com/slicingmelon/GoBypass403

v0.8.7

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This is an intentionally offensive payload-generation module, not a benign URL transformer. It constructs large sets of exploit-ready URIs designed to bypass Nginx/proxy ACLs via encoded newline + HTTP version injection, malformed normalization edge cases, and embedded scheme/host routing patterns (including localhost and non-HTTP schemes). It can also set the Host header in returned payloads. While it does not directly exfiltrate data or execute commands within this fragment, its purpose and output strongly indicate high risk for misuse in authenticated or unauthorized scanning/exploitation workflows.

github.com/jm33-m0/emp3r0r/core

v0.0.0-20250123065341-91279bff2618

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This is an emp3r0r command-and-control agent component, not a general-purpose utility: it fingerprints the host, can report tunnel data to its configured controller, accepts a peer instruction to terminate, and downloads and executes replacement agents. The upgrade is staged beneath RuntimeConfig.AgentRoot and launched with REPLACE_AGENT=true; the controller address and download endpoint are runtime-configured, with the comment identifying an /agent endpoint, while connectivity testing uses tun.UbuntuConnectivityURL. These are explicit remote-management and reconnaissance capabilities; checksum validation does not independently authenticate the download source. Severity is high if this code is present or run without authorization; no literal domain, IP, or credential target appears in this fragment.

vojmd-ajgkr-util

0.0.1-security

by npm

Live on npm

Blocked by Socket

Malicious code in vojmd-ajgkr-util (npm) Source: amazon-inspector (5b3375a0602d357de02ccffa4edfda2f067a70a2509a3fbdbad4c041853e6d4b) vojmd-ajgkr-util@1.0.0 is a stub package whose declared surface is empty (module.exports = {}) and whose only runtime effect is to execute a hidden payload on require(). The index.js entry reads an opaque byte array stored under a non-standard package.json field (_bz), zlib-inflates it, and passes the resulting string to the Function constructor invoked with (require, __dirname), dynamically executing attacker-controlled code smuggled inside a JSON data field. Execution is explicitly gated to return early when common CI/sandbox environment variables are present (CI, GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITLAB_CI, TRAVIS, CIRCLECI, SANDBOX), so the payload fires on developer machines while hiding from automated analysis. The package advertises itself only as 'utility', ships no legitimate functionality, and the payload is never exercised through any declared library API — the dropper is the entire package. Source: ghsa-malware (44ae46184c1ff90a2b9e214bfd20a0882d753a34a9eba02a2e368f8ceb7a4373) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

github.com/oracle/docker-images

v0.0.0-20261119175845-e8be1c6e0738

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This looks like an installation/bootstrap script that performs standard directory setup and environment persistence, but it also makes a very high-impact system change: it appends a hardcoded unrestricted passwordless sudo rule for the user 'oracle' to /etc/sudoers. It additionally weakens /etc/sudoers permissions to 666 before modifying it, creating a tampering window. Even if intended for a controlled provisioning scenario, this behavior is strongly suspicious from a supply-chain security perspective because it grants persistent, broad administrative access.

github.com/nccgroup/singularity

v0.0.0-20261120062225-3f7e94358921

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This code exhibits clear malicious intent: it probes for the AWS instance metadata service and contains a hardcoded external endpoint to which supplied data (body) is sent. It also logs sensitive inputs to console and registers itself in a registry for later invocation. Treat this code as a backdoor/data‑exfiltration component. Remove immediately, audit repository for other instances or callers that may supply credentials/metadata to attack(), and assume compromise of any secrets that may have been exposed.

github.com/nccgroup/singularity

v0.0.0-20261120062225-3f7e94358921

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This code is intentionally malicious: an automated exploit module that probes for an H2 Console, extracts a session identifier, and submits a form containing a hardcoded LDAP JNDI URL to register a Generic JNDI Data Source. If the target processes the configuration and performs JNDI lookups, this can lead to remote code execution or further compromise. Treat this code as hostile — remove it from any dependency tree, audit related components, and ensure no malicious LDAP endpoints are reachable from affected servers.

github.com/jm33-m0/emp3r0r/core

v0.0.0-20250123052205-5b62db85f75f

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This code is a high-confidence Spring Cloud Gateway actuator remote-code-execution exploit. It sends a crafted route containing a Runtime.exec Spring expression, refreshes the gateway configuration, and retrieves command output. It should not be used except in a tightly authorized security test environment; deploying or running it against third-party systems would be unauthorized exploitation.

github.com/jm33-m0/emp3r0r/core

v0.0.0-20250123052205-5b62db85f75f

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This Linux agent code implements persistent execution, attempts privilege-assisted execution, hides process and file information, and patches system utilities to load a shared object. These are strong indicators of a backdoor or rootkit-style payload; severity is critical, and the code should not be used. No external domain, URL, IP address, or credential harvesting is visible in this fragment.

github.com/nccgroup/singularity

v0.0.0-20261120063628-00a04fbaf541

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

The snippet is suspicious due to embedding a cross-platform shell script intended to launch system calculators as an entrypoint payload and sending it to a backend endpoint. While the shell payload is not executed within this client snippet, its presence as an entrypoint and the lack of input validation on the backend contract strongly indicate potential remote command execution risks if the backend interprets and runs the payload. This behaves like a backdoor payload or research harness with high risk in typical supply-chain contexts; restrict use and verify backend handling before integration.

hydromind

5.24.8

Live on pypi

Blocked by Socket

This module is a thin, import-time bootstrapper that delegates execution to a native helper to load and run `hydromind.mind.shared` inside the current module’s `globals()` namespace. The actual security-relevant behavior is hidden in `hydromind.mind.shared` and/or the compiled `_protection_native.exec_module`, which makes supply-chain auditing difficult. No explicit malicious indicators (network/files/credentials/process execution) are present in this fragment alone, but the dynamic native execution pattern is a meaningful security risk that warrants direct review of the delegated module and native helper implementation.

github.com/nccgroup/singularity

v0.0.0-20261120063628-00a04fbaf541

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This is an explicit browser-based DNS rebinding attack tool, not ordinary application configuration code: it targets configured hosts and ports through iframe reloads and coordinates payload execution via postMessage. The fragment contains no hardcoded external domain or credential theft, but unauthorized use could enable access to services reachable from a victim's browser; severity is high for a deployment exposed to users. The shown code has apparent syntax errors that may prevent execution as provided.

github.com/jm33-m0/emp3r0r/core

v0.0.0-20250123065341-91279bff2618

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This fragment implements local emp3r0r agent coordination and C2 connectivity checks. It contains a potentially destructive os.RemoveAll call on a configured socket path and sends an explicit self-termination instruction when the wait queue is full, but does not itself kill processes or expose credentials. The C2-related behavior is consistent with an agent framework; severity is elevated by the termination instruction and path-removal behavior, while malicious intent cannot be established from this fragment alone.

github.com/nccgroup/singularity

v0.0.0-20261120062225-3f7e94358921

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

The snippet is suspicious due to embedding a cross-platform shell script intended to launch system calculators as an entrypoint payload and sending it to a backend endpoint. While the shell payload is not executed within this client snippet, its presence as an entrypoint and the lack of input validation on the backend contract strongly indicate potential remote command execution risks if the backend interprets and runs the payload. This behaves like a backdoor payload or research harness with high risk in typical supply-chain contexts; restrict use and verify backend handling before integration.

github.com/congchuanling-dot/cohort

v0.2.1

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This code is highly suspicious. It establishes a persistent WebSocket to a configured remote endpoint and executes commands received over that channel, including fully arbitrary JavaScript execution in the target page via eval/AsyncFunction (execute_js), and arbitrary CDP method execution. It also harvests page/tab content and metadata (including optional form values/shadow DOM/iframes) and sends results back over the WebSocket, creating a strong data-exfiltration loop. Absent visible authentication/authorization in this module, any party controlling the server or the WebSocket traffic could drive powerful surveillance and remote execution.

@geoscene/core

5.1.16

by evenboy

Live on npm

Blocked by Socket

High severity: the obfuscated browser module fetches flood.js from a runtime-configured asset base and executes its response with eval, then fetches a WebAssembly binary; this creates a remote-code execution path if that asset source is untrusted or compromised. It also contains active anti-debugging behavior, including repeated debugger statements and a query-string bypass. No credential harvesting, environment-variable access, or data exfiltration is evident; no specific external domain or IP is identifiable from the supplied fragment.

github.com/fosrl/cli

v0.0.0-20261119222142-bb03d2c45ce7

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This module implements a high-risk self-update mechanism that downloads a remote shell script and executes it immediately via `sh -c` and `curl | bash`, without any integrity/authenticity verification shown here. It also uses an unsafe command-string construction by concatenating the local executable path into a shell context without quoting/escaping. Even if intended for legitimate updates, this pattern is a significant supply-chain/RCE risk and should be hardened (e.g., fetch a specific signed artifact, verify signature/checksum before execution, avoid `sh -c`/pipelines, and pass arguments without shell interpolation).

tsbwt-hawsi-util

0.0.1-security

by npm

Live on npm

Blocked by Socket

Malicious code in tsbwt-hawsi-util (npm) Source: amazon-inspector (8a628809b3bbbcb3a405a0250d08c4d352e7438f3dc76454d839be6f84298cc9) On require(), index.js reads a byte array stored in a `_bz` field inside package.json, zlib-inflates it, and passes the resulting string to the Function constructor as code with `require` and `__dirname` bound into scope: `var _b=Buffer.from(_j._bz);var _d=require('zlib').inflateSync(_b); _FC('require','__dirname',_d.toString('utf8'))(require,__dirname);`. The whole construct is wrapped in a silent try/catch. In this published version the inflated bytes decode to `console.log(1)`, so no harmful behavior fires, but the mechanism is a general-purpose hidden code loader: whatever bytes the maintainer ships in the manifest's `_bz` field are decompressed and executed at module load time with full Node privileges, and the opaque binary blob in a non-code field evades normal source review. The decoded payload has access to the full `require` resolver and the package directory, enabling arbitrary filesystem, network, and child-process actions. Source: ghsa-malware (f60d2fd5582018d3f424ae73b45ab0e09876546e79056ae4de67d2be71b29cf9) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

github.com/wenathlan/devthink/devthink/v2

v2.0.187-0.20261120003855-598c13896645

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

High-severity credential-capture behavior: this code obtains or reuses a GitHub OAuth token with `repo`, `workflow`, and `read:org` scopes, stores it in local credential files, configures Git to use stored credentials, and initiates repository synchronization. Relevant destinations include `github[.]com`, `api[.]github[.]com`, and the referenced repository `github[.]com/wenathlan/devthink[.]git`; relevant files include `.github-token`, `.git-credentials`, `.git-credentials.bak`, and `.polar-auth.json`. The available fragment is truncated inside `synchead`, but the token acquisition and persistence are explicit; treat as dangerous.

bhom.interop.ladybugtools

10.0.0-alpha.4.0

by BHoM

Live on nuget

Blocked by Socket

This fragment contains a clear, high-severity supply-chain style execution risk: it uses eval() on the contents of focus_points.json (named like JSON but treated as executable Python). If that file can be influenced by an attacker, it enables arbitrary code execution at runtime. Aside from this, the rest of the module performs scientific computations, caching to parquet, and saving plots; no obvious additional malicious behaviors are evident in the provided code.

github.com/ltaoo/echo

v0.12.2

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This code is best characterized as a domain-targeted MITM proxy with explicit response spoofing and tampering capabilities, enabled by embedding a root CA private key in the binary. It can intercept HTTPS traffic, inject mocked responses, modify HTML content for specific domains, and forward some matched traffic to hardcoded internal/LAN endpoints. While there is no direct evidence of classic malware behaviors like exec-based persistence or direct data exfiltration in this snippet, the bundled MITM credential material and active traffic/content manipulation make the security risk high and potentially dangerous if shipped or deployed without strict user control and clear, documented test-only intent.

github.com/ukgovernmentbeis/sandbox_escape_bench

v0.0.0-20261115144815-c07dc32601d8

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

The code is intentionally malicious exploit tooling. It uses container mount metadata to locate a host-backed file, replaces /etc/hosts with an executable payload, and arranges for /flag.txt to be copied into the host-side file. This indicates attempted container escape, privilege escalation, or secret exfiltration. The script should not be executed.

kage-baileys

25.0.8

by xrljosedv1

Live on npm

Blocked by Socket

High severity availability and integrity concern: the unconditional, hoisted __importStar override causes module initialization to throw, preventing normal use and resembling sabotage. If execution proceeds in a modified or partial context, uploadFile() sends media to catbox[.]moe, scdn[.]pdi[.]moe, qu[.]ax, uguu[.]se, or tmpfiles[.]org, and vid2jpg() contacts ezgif[.]com; these are explicit third-party transfers that may expose user media. The embedded duplicate contains an exec-based ffmpeg command-injection risk, and URL-derived requests require validation. No credential theft or environment-variable collection is evident.

github.com/nccgroup/singularity

v0.0.0-20261120062225-3f7e94358921

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

High risk of data leakage and backdoor-like behavior. The code intentionally leverages Docker API to mount /etc and read /etc/shadow inside a container, then exposes the output through logs/attach responses. This is a clear pattern of host data exfiltration via a Docker-based sandbox and indicates potential malicious intent if used without explicit authorization. Recommend treating as a critical security risk and deprecating / removing or sandboxing this functionality.

hydromind

5.24.8

Live on pypi

Blocked by Socket

This fragment is a high-suspicion supply-chain pattern: it performs import-time dynamic execution of another module through a private/native `exec_module` wrapper while granting the loaded code access to the importer’s globals. While the snippet alone shows no explicit credential theft or exfiltration, the delegated execution and unusual loader mechanism materially increase risk. Inspect `hydromind._protection_native.exec_module` and `hydromind.agent.hydroai` for network access, data collection, persistence, and other malicious behaviors.

doomiwork

4.2.10

by stephenshenying

Live on npm

Blocked by Socket

High-severity security issue: the default monitor router exposes POST /api/_doomiwork_/upload, which uses a hardcoded token and request-controlled path and content to overwrite an existing file accessible to the process. Because the token is present in the code and the path is not confined to a safe directory, this provides an unauthorized file-overwrite capability to anyone who can obtain the token, including through source access. No suspicious external domains, IPs, or obfuscated payloads appear in the fragment.

github.com/slicingmelon/GoBypass403

v0.8.7

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This is an intentionally offensive payload-generation module, not a benign URL transformer. It constructs large sets of exploit-ready URIs designed to bypass Nginx/proxy ACLs via encoded newline + HTTP version injection, malformed normalization edge cases, and embedded scheme/host routing patterns (including localhost and non-HTTP schemes). It can also set the Host header in returned payloads. While it does not directly exfiltrate data or execute commands within this fragment, its purpose and output strongly indicate high risk for misuse in authenticated or unauthorized scanning/exploitation workflows.

github.com/jm33-m0/emp3r0r/core

v0.0.0-20250123065341-91279bff2618

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This is an emp3r0r command-and-control agent component, not a general-purpose utility: it fingerprints the host, can report tunnel data to its configured controller, accepts a peer instruction to terminate, and downloads and executes replacement agents. The upgrade is staged beneath RuntimeConfig.AgentRoot and launched with REPLACE_AGENT=true; the controller address and download endpoint are runtime-configured, with the comment identifying an /agent endpoint, while connectivity testing uses tun.UbuntuConnectivityURL. These are explicit remote-management and reconnaissance capabilities; checksum validation does not independently authenticate the download source. Severity is high if this code is present or run without authorization; no literal domain, IP, or credential target appears in this fragment.

vojmd-ajgkr-util

0.0.1-security

by npm

Live on npm

Blocked by Socket

Malicious code in vojmd-ajgkr-util (npm) Source: amazon-inspector (5b3375a0602d357de02ccffa4edfda2f067a70a2509a3fbdbad4c041853e6d4b) vojmd-ajgkr-util@1.0.0 is a stub package whose declared surface is empty (module.exports = {}) and whose only runtime effect is to execute a hidden payload on require(). The index.js entry reads an opaque byte array stored under a non-standard package.json field (_bz), zlib-inflates it, and passes the resulting string to the Function constructor invoked with (require, __dirname), dynamically executing attacker-controlled code smuggled inside a JSON data field. Execution is explicitly gated to return early when common CI/sandbox environment variables are present (CI, GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITLAB_CI, TRAVIS, CIRCLECI, SANDBOX), so the payload fires on developer machines while hiding from automated analysis. The package advertises itself only as 'utility', ships no legitimate functionality, and the payload is never exercised through any declared library API — the dropper is the entire package. Source: ghsa-malware (44ae46184c1ff90a2b9e214bfd20a0882d753a34a9eba02a2e368f8ceb7a4373) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

github.com/oracle/docker-images

v0.0.0-20261119175845-e8be1c6e0738

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This looks like an installation/bootstrap script that performs standard directory setup and environment persistence, but it also makes a very high-impact system change: it appends a hardcoded unrestricted passwordless sudo rule for the user 'oracle' to /etc/sudoers. It additionally weakens /etc/sudoers permissions to 666 before modifying it, creating a tampering window. Even if intended for a controlled provisioning scenario, this behavior is strongly suspicious from a supply-chain security perspective because it grants persistent, broad administrative access.

github.com/nccgroup/singularity

v0.0.0-20261120062225-3f7e94358921

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This code exhibits clear malicious intent: it probes for the AWS instance metadata service and contains a hardcoded external endpoint to which supplied data (body) is sent. It also logs sensitive inputs to console and registers itself in a registry for later invocation. Treat this code as a backdoor/data‑exfiltration component. Remove immediately, audit repository for other instances or callers that may supply credentials/metadata to attack(), and assume compromise of any secrets that may have been exposed.

github.com/nccgroup/singularity

v0.0.0-20261120062225-3f7e94358921

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This code is intentionally malicious: an automated exploit module that probes for an H2 Console, extracts a session identifier, and submits a form containing a hardcoded LDAP JNDI URL to register a Generic JNDI Data Source. If the target processes the configuration and performs JNDI lookups, this can lead to remote code execution or further compromise. Treat this code as hostile — remove it from any dependency tree, audit related components, and ensure no malicious LDAP endpoints are reachable from affected servers.

github.com/jm33-m0/emp3r0r/core

v0.0.0-20250123052205-5b62db85f75f

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This code is a high-confidence Spring Cloud Gateway actuator remote-code-execution exploit. It sends a crafted route containing a Runtime.exec Spring expression, refreshes the gateway configuration, and retrieves command output. It should not be used except in a tightly authorized security test environment; deploying or running it against third-party systems would be unauthorized exploitation.

github.com/jm33-m0/emp3r0r/core

v0.0.0-20250123052205-5b62db85f75f

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

This Linux agent code implements persistent execution, attempts privilege-assisted execution, hides process and file information, and patches system utilities to load a shared object. These are strong indicators of a backdoor or rootkit-style payload; severity is critical, and the code should not be used. No external domain, URL, IP address, or credential harvesting is visible in this fragment.

github.com/nccgroup/singularity

v0.0.0-20261120063628-00a04fbaf541

Live on go

Blocked by Socket

The snippet is suspicious due to embedding a cross-platform shell script intended to launch system calculators as an entrypoint payload and sending it to a backend endpoint. While the shell payload is not executed within this client snippet, its presence as an entrypoint and the lack of input validation on the backend contract strongly indicate potential remote command execution risks if the backend interprets and runs the payload. This behaves like a backdoor payload or research harness with high risk in typical supply-chain contexts; restrict use and verify backend handling before integration.

hydromind

5.24.8

Live on pypi

Blocked by Socket

This module is a thin, import-time bootstrapper that delegates execution to a native helper to load and run `hydromind.mind.shared` inside the current module’s `globals()` namespace. The actual security-relevant behavior is hidden in `hydromind.mind.shared` and/or the compiled `_protection_native.exec_module`, which makes supply-chain auditing difficult. No explicit malicious indicators (network/files/credentials/process execution) are present in this fragment alone, but the dynamic native execution pattern is a meaningful security risk that warrants direct review of the delegated module and native helper implementation.

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