Security APIs

Package managedblockchain provides the API client, operations, and parameter types for Amazon Managed Blockchain. Amazon Managed Blockchain is a fully managed service for creating and managing blockchain networks using open-source frameworks. Blockchain allows you to build applications where multiple parties can securely and transparently run transactions and share data without the need for a trusted, central authority. Managed Blockchain supports the Hyperledger Fabric and Ethereum open-source frameworks. Because of fundamental differences between the frameworks, some API actions or data types may only apply in the context of one framework and not the other. For example, actions related to Hyperledger Fabric network members such as CreateMember and DeleteMember don't apply to Ethereum. The description for each action indicates the framework or frameworks to which it applies. Data types and properties that apply only in the context of a particular framework are similarly indicated.

Package jwt provides a simplified and secure API for encoding, decoding and verifying JSON Web Tokens (JWT). See https://jwt.io/ and https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519 The API is designed to be instantly familiar to users of the standard crypto and json packages:

Package kyber provides a toolbox of advanced cryptographic primitives, for applications that need more than straightforward signing and encryption. This top level package defines the interfaces to cryptographic primitives designed to be independent of specific cryptographic algorithms, to facilitate upgrading applications to new cryptographic algorithms or switching to alternative algorithms for experimentation purposes. This toolkits public-key crypto API includes a kyber.Group interface supporting a broad class of group-based public-key primitives including DSA-style integer residue groups and elliptic curve groups. Users of this API can write higher-level crypto algorithms such as zero-knowledge proofs without knowing or caring exactly what kind of group, let alone which precise security parameters or elliptic curves, are being used. The kyber.Group interface supports the standard algebraic operations on group elements and scalars that nontrivial public-key algorithms tend to rely on. The interface uses additive group terminology typical for elliptic curves, such that point addition is homomorphically equivalent to adding their (potentially secret) scalar multipliers. But the API and its operations apply equally well to DSA-style integer groups. As a trivial example, generating a public/private keypair is as simple as: The first statement picks a private key (Scalar) from a the suites's source of cryptographic random or pseudo-random bits, while the second performs elliptic curve scalar multiplication of the curve's standard base point (indicated by the 'nil' argument to Mul) by the scalar private key 'a'. Similarly, computing a Diffie-Hellman shared secret using Alice's private key 'a' and Bob's public key 'B' can be done via: Note that we use 'Mul' rather than 'Exp' here because the library uses the additive-group terminology common for elliptic curve crypto, rather than the multiplicative-group terminology of traditional integer groups - but the two are semantically equivalent and the interface itself works for both elliptic curve and integer groups. Various sub-packages provide several specific implementations of these cryptographic interfaces. In particular, the 'group/mod' sub-package provides implementations of modular integer groups underlying conventional DSA-style algorithms. The `group/nist` package provides NIST-standardized elliptic curves built on the Go crypto library. The 'group/edwards25519' sub-package provides the kyber.Group interface using the popular Ed25519 curve. Other sub-packages build more interesting high-level cryptographic tools atop these primitive interfaces, including: - share: Polynomial commitment and verifiable Shamir secret splitting for implementing verifiable 't-of-n' threshold cryptographic schemes. This can be used to encrypt a message so that any 2 out of 3 receivers must work together to decrypt it, for example. - proof: An implementation of the general Camenisch/Stadler framework for discrete logarithm knowledge proofs. This system supports both interactive and non-interactive proofs of a wide variety of statements such as, "I know the secret x associated with public key X or I know the secret y associated with public key Y", without revealing anything about either secret or even which branch of the "or" clause is true. - sign: The sign directory contains different signature schemes. - sign/anon provides anonymous and pseudonymous public-key encryption and signing, where the sender of a signed message or the receiver of an encrypted message is defined as an explicit anonymity set containing several public keys rather than just one. For example, a member of an organization's board of trustees might prove to be a member of the board without revealing which member she is. - sign/cosi provides collective signature algorithm, where a bunch of signers create a unique, compact and efficiently verifiable signature using the Schnorr signature as a basis. - sign/eddsa provides a kyber-native implementation of the EdDSA signature scheme. - sign/schnorr provides a basic vanilla Schnorr signature scheme implementation. - shuffle: Verifiable cryptographic shuffles of ElGamal ciphertexts, which can be used to implement (for example) voting or auction schemes that keep the sources of individual votes or bids private without anyone having to trust more than one of the shuffler(s) to shuffle votes/bids honestly. As should be obvious, this library is intended to be used by developers who are at least moderately knowledgeable about cryptography. If you want a crypto library that makes it easy to implement "basic crypto" functionality correctly - i.e., plain public-key encryption and signing - then [NaCl secretbox](https://godoc.org/golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/secretbox) may be a better choice. This toolkit's purpose is to make it possible - and preferably easy - to do slightly more interesting things that most current crypto libraries don't support effectively. The one existing crypto library that this toolkit is probably most comparable to is the Charm rapid prototyping library for Python (https://charm-crypto.com/category/charm). This library incorporates and/or builds on existing code from a variety of sources, as documented in the relevant sub-packages. This library is offered as-is, and without a guarantee. It will need an independent security review before it should be considered ready for use in security-critical applications. If you integrate Kyber into your application it is YOUR RESPONSIBILITY to arrange for that audit. If you notice a possible security problem, please report it to dedis-security@epfl.ch.

Package jwt provides a simplified and secure API for encoding, decoding and verifying JSON Web Tokens (JWT). See https://jwt.io/ and https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519 The API is designed to be instantly familiar to users of the standard crypto and json packages:

Package kyber provides a toolbox of advanced cryptographic primitives, for applications that need more than straightforward signing and encryption. This top level package defines the interfaces to cryptographic primitives designed to be independent of specific cryptographic algorithms, to facilitate upgrading applications to new cryptographic algorithms or switching to alternative algorithms for experimentation purposes. This toolkits public-key crypto API includes a kyber.Group interface supporting a broad class of group-based public-key primitives including DSA-style integer residue groups and elliptic curve groups. Users of this API can write higher-level crypto algorithms such as zero-knowledge proofs without knowing or caring exactly what kind of group, let alone which precise security parameters or elliptic curves, are being used. The kyber.Group interface supports the standard algebraic operations on group elements and scalars that nontrivial public-key algorithms tend to rely on. The interface uses additive group terminology typical for elliptic curves, such that point addition is homomorphically equivalent to adding their (potentially secret) scalar multipliers. But the API and its operations apply equally well to DSA-style integer groups. As a trivial example, generating a public/private keypair is as simple as: The first statement picks a private key (Scalar) from a the suites's source of cryptographic random or pseudo-random bits, while the second performs elliptic curve scalar multiplication of the curve's standard base point (indicated by the 'nil' argument to Mul) by the scalar private key 'a'. Similarly, computing a Diffie-Hellman shared secret using Alice's private key 'a' and Bob's public key 'B' can be done via: Note that we use 'Mul' rather than 'Exp' here because the library uses the additive-group terminology common for elliptic curve crypto, rather than the multiplicative-group terminology of traditional integer groups - but the two are semantically equivalent and the interface itself works for both elliptic curve and integer groups. Various sub-packages provide several specific implementations of these cryptographic interfaces. In particular, the 'group/mod' sub-package provides implementations of modular integer groups underlying conventional DSA-style algorithms. The `group/nist` package provides NIST-standardized elliptic curves built on the Go crypto library. The 'group/edwards25519' sub-package provides the kyber.Group interface using the popular Ed25519 curve. Other sub-packages build more interesting high-level cryptographic tools atop these primitive interfaces, including: - share: Polynomial commitment and verifiable Shamir secret splitting for implementing verifiable 't-of-n' threshold cryptographic schemes. This can be used to encrypt a message so that any 2 out of 3 receivers must work together to decrypt it, for example. - proof: An implementation of the general Camenisch/Stadler framework for discrete logarithm knowledge proofs. This system supports both interactive and non-interactive proofs of a wide variety of statements such as, "I know the secret x associated with public key X or I know the secret y associated with public key Y", without revealing anything about either secret or even which branch of the "or" clause is true. - sign: The sign directory contains different signature schemes. - sign/anon provides anonymous and pseudonymous public-key encryption and signing, where the sender of a signed message or the receiver of an encrypted message is defined as an explicit anonymity set containing several public keys rather than just one. For example, a member of an organization's board of trustees might prove to be a member of the board without revealing which member she is. - sign/cosi provides collective signature algorithm, where a bunch of signers create a unique, compact and efficiently verifiable signature using the Schnorr signature as a basis. - sign/eddsa provides a kyber-native implementation of the EdDSA signature scheme. - sign/schnorr provides a basic vanilla Schnorr signature scheme implementation. - shuffle: Verifiable cryptographic shuffles of ElGamal ciphertexts, which can be used to implement (for example) voting or auction schemes that keep the sources of individual votes or bids private without anyone having to trust more than one of the shuffler(s) to shuffle votes/bids honestly. As should be obvious, this library is intended to be used by developers who are at least moderately knowledgeable about cryptography. If you want a crypto library that makes it easy to implement "basic crypto" functionality correctly - i.e., plain public-key encryption and signing - then [NaCl secretbox](https://godoc.org/golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/secretbox) may be a better choice. This toolkit's purpose is to make it possible - and preferably easy - to do slightly more interesting things that most current crypto libraries don't support effectively. The one existing crypto library that this toolkit is probably most comparable to is the Charm rapid prototyping library for Python (https://charm-crypto.com/category/charm). This library incorporates and/or builds on existing code from a variety of sources, as documented in the relevant sub-packages. This library is offered as-is, and without a guarantee. It will need an independent security review before it should be considered ready for use in security-critical applications. If you integrate Kyber into your application it is YOUR RESPONSIBILITY to arrange for that audit. If you notice a possible security problem, please report it to dedis-security@epfl.ch.

Package kyber provides a toolbox of advanced cryptographic primitives, for applications that need more than straightforward signing and encryption. This top level package defines the interfaces to cryptographic primitives designed to be independent of specific cryptographic algorithms, to facilitate upgrading applications to new cryptographic algorithms or switching to alternative algorithms for experimentation purposes. This toolkits public-key crypto API includes a kyber.Group interface supporting a broad class of group-based public-key primitives including DSA-style integer residue groups and elliptic curve groups. Users of this API can write higher-level crypto algorithms such as zero-knowledge proofs without knowing or caring exactly what kind of group, let alone which precise security parameters or elliptic curves, are being used. The kyber.Group interface supports the standard algebraic operations on group elements and scalars that nontrivial public-key algorithms tend to rely on. The interface uses additive group terminology typical for elliptic curves, such that point addition is homomorphically equivalent to adding their (potentially secret) scalar multipliers. But the API and its operations apply equally well to DSA-style integer groups. As a trivial example, generating a public/private keypair is as simple as: The first statement picks a private key (Scalar) from a the suites's source of cryptographic random or pseudo-random bits, while the second performs elliptic curve scalar multiplication of the curve's standard base point (indicated by the 'nil' argument to Mul) by the scalar private key 'a'. Similarly, computing a Diffie-Hellman shared secret using Alice's private key 'a' and Bob's public key 'B' can be done via: Note that we use 'Mul' rather than 'Exp' here because the library uses the additive-group terminology common for elliptic curve crypto, rather than the multiplicative-group terminology of traditional integer groups - but the two are semantically equivalent and the interface itself works for both elliptic curve and integer groups. Various sub-packages provide several specific implementations of these cryptographic interfaces. In particular, the 'group/mod' sub-package provides implementations of modular integer groups underlying conventional DSA-style algorithms. The `group/nist` package provides NIST-standardized elliptic curves built on the Go crypto library. The 'group/edwards25519' sub-package provides the kyber.Group interface using the popular Ed25519 curve. Other sub-packages build more interesting high-level cryptographic tools atop these primitive interfaces, including: - share: Polynomial commitment and verifiable Shamir secret splitting for implementing verifiable 't-of-n' threshold cryptographic schemes. This can be used to encrypt a message so that any 2 out of 3 receivers must work together to decrypt it, for example. - proof: An implementation of the general Camenisch/Stadler framework for discrete logarithm knowledge proofs. This system supports both interactive and non-interactive proofs of a wide variety of statements such as, "I know the secret x associated with public key X or I know the secret y associated with public key Y", without revealing anything about either secret or even which branch of the "or" clause is true. - sign: The sign directory contains different signature schemes. - sign/anon provides anonymous and pseudonymous public-key encryption and signing, where the sender of a signed message or the receiver of an encrypted message is defined as an explicit anonymity set containing several public keys rather than just one. For example, a member of an organization's board of trustees might prove to be a member of the board without revealing which member she is. - sign/cosi provides collective signature algorithm, where a bunch of signers create a unique, compact and efficiently verifiable signature using the Schnorr signature as a basis. - sign/eddsa provides a kyber-native implementation of the EdDSA signature scheme. - sign/schnorr provides a basic vanilla Schnorr signature scheme implementation. - shuffle: Verifiable cryptographic shuffles of ElGamal ciphertexts, which can be used to implement (for example) voting or auction schemes that keep the sources of individual votes or bids private without anyone having to trust more than one of the shuffler(s) to shuffle votes/bids honestly. As should be obvious, this library is intended to be used by developers who are at least moderately knowledgeable about cryptography. If you want a crypto library that makes it easy to implement "basic crypto" functionality correctly - i.e., plain public-key encryption and signing - then [NaCl secretbox](https://godoc.org/golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/secretbox) may be a better choice. This toolkit's purpose is to make it possible - and preferably easy - to do slightly more interesting things that most current crypto libraries don't support effectively. The one existing crypto library that this toolkit is probably most comparable to is the Charm rapid prototyping library for Python (https://charm-crypto.com/category/charm). This library incorporates and/or builds on existing code from a variety of sources, as documented in the relevant sub-packages. This library is offered as-is, and without a guarantee. It will need an independent security review before it should be considered ready for use in security-critical applications. If you integrate Kyber into your application it is YOUR RESPONSIBILITY to arrange for that audit. If you notice a possible security problem, please report it to dedis-security@epfl.ch.

Package ovirtclient provides a human-friendly Go client for the oVirt Engine. It provides an abstraction layer for the oVirt API, as well as a mocking facility for testing purposes. This documentation contains two parts. This introduction explains setting up the client with the credentials. The API doc contains the individual API calls. When reading the API doc, start with the Client interface: it contains all components of the API. The individual API's, their documentation and examples are located in subinterfaces, such as DiskClient. There are several ways to create a client instance. The most basic way is to use the New() function as follows: The mock client simulates the oVirt engine behavior in-memory without needing an actual running engine. This is a good way to provide a testing facility. It can be created using the NewMock method: That's it! However, to make it really useful, you will need the test helper which can set up test fixtures. The test helper can work in two ways: Either it sets up test fixtures in the mock client, or it sets up a live connection and identifies a usable storage domain, cluster, etc. for testing purposes. The ovirtclient.NewMockTestHelper() function can be used to create a test helper with a mock client in the backend: The easiest way to set up the test helper for a live connection is by using environment variables. To do that, you can use the ovirtclient.NewLiveTestHelperFromEnv() function: This function will inspect environment variables to determine if a connection to a live oVirt engine can be established. The following environment variables are supported: URL of the oVirt engine API. Mandatory. The username for the oVirt engine. Mandatory. The password for the oVirt engine. Mandatory. A file containing the CA certificate in PEM format. Provide the CA certificate in PEM format directly. Disable certificate verification if set. Not recommended. The cluster to use for testing. Will be automatically chosen if not provided. ID of the blank template. Will be automatically chosen if not provided. Storage domain to use for testing. Will be automatically chosen if not provided. VNIC profile to use for testing. Will be automatically chosen if not provided. You can also create the test helper manually: This library provides extensive logging. Each API interaction is logged on the debug level, and other messages are added on other levels. In order to provide logging this library uses the go-ovirt-client-log (https://github.com/oVirt/go-ovirt-client-log) interface definition. As long as your logger implements this interface, you will be able to receive log messages. The logging library also provides a few built-in loggers. For example, you can log via the default Go log interface: Or, you can also log in tests: You can also disable logging: Finally, we also provide an adapter library for klog here: https://github.com/oVirt/go-ovirt-client-log-klog Modern-day oVirt engines run secured with TLS. This means that the client needs a way to verify the certificate the server is presenting. This is controlled by the tls parameter of the New() function. You can implement your own source by implementing the TLSProvider interface, but the package also includes a ready-to-use provider. Create the provider using the TLS() function: This provider has several functions. The easiest to set up is using the system trust root for certificates. However, this won't work own Windows: Now you need to add your oVirt engine certificate to your system trust root. If you don't want to, or can't add the certificate to the system trust root, you can also directly provide it to the client. Finally, you can also disable certificate verification. Do we need to say that this is a very, very bad idea? The configured tls variable can then be passed to the New() function to create an oVirt client. This library attempts to retry API calls that can be retried if possible. Each function has a sensible retry policy. However, you may want to customize the retries by passing one or more retry flags. The following retry flags are supported: This strategy will stop retries when the context parameter is canceled. This strategy adds a wait time after each time, which is increased by the given factor on each try. The default is a backoff with a factor of 2. This strategy will cancel retries if the error in question is a permanent error. This is enabled by default. This strategy will abort retries if a maximum number of tries is reached. On complex calls the retries are counted per underlying API call. This strategy will abort retries if a certain time has been elapsed for the higher level call. This strategy will abort retries if a certain underlying API call takes longer than the specified duration.

Package bahamut contains everything needed to build a fast and secure API server based on a set of Regolithe Specifications. Bahamut uses an Elemental model generated from a set of Regolithe Specifications You will just need to write various processors to handle the business logic and storage.

Package dns implements a full featured interface to the Domain Name System. Server- and client-side programming is supported. The package allows complete control over what is send out to the DNS. The package API follows the less-is-more principle, by presenting a small, clean interface. The package dns supports (asynchronous) querying/replying, incoming/outgoing zone transfers, TSIG, EDNS0, dynamic updates, notifies and DNSSEC validation/signing. Note that domain names MUST be fully qualified, before sending them, unqualified names in a message will result in a packing failure. Resource records are native types. They are not stored in wire format. Basic usage pattern for creating a new resource record: Or directly from a string: Or when the default TTL (3600) and class (IN) suit you: Or even: In the DNS messages are exchanged, these messages contain resource records (sets). Use pattern for creating a message: Or when not certain if the domain name is fully qualified: The message m is now a message with the question section set to ask the MX records for the miek.nl. zone. The following is slightly more verbose, but more flexible: After creating a message it can be send. Basic use pattern for synchronous querying the DNS at a server configured on 127.0.0.1 and port 53: Suppressing multiple outstanding queries (with the same question, type and class) is as easy as setting: If these "advanced" features are not needed, a simple UDP query can be send, with: When this functions returns you will get dns message. A dns message consists out of four sections. The question section: in.Question, the answer section: in.Answer, the authority section: in.Ns and the additional section: in.Extra. Each of these sections (except the Question section) contain a []RR. Basic use pattern for accessing the rdata of a TXT RR as the first RR in the Answer section: Both domain names and TXT character strings are converted to presentation form both when unpacked and when converted to strings. For TXT character strings, tabs, carriage returns and line feeds will be converted to \t, \r and \n respectively. Back slashes and quotations marks will be escaped. Bytes below 32 and above 127 will be converted to \DDD form. For domain names, in addition to the above rules brackets, periods, spaces, semicolons and the at symbol are escaped. DNSSEC (DNS Security Extension) adds a layer of security to the DNS. It uses public key cryptography to sign resource records. The public keys are stored in DNSKEY records and the signatures in RRSIG records. Requesting DNSSEC information for a zone is done by adding the DO (DNSSEC OK) bit to a request. Signature generation, signature verification and key generation are all supported. Dynamic updates reuses the DNS message format, but renames three of the sections. Question is Zone, Answer is Prerequisite, Authority is Update, only the Additional is not renamed. See RFC 2136 for the gory details. You can set a rather complex set of rules for the existence of absence of certain resource records or names in a zone to specify if resource records should be added or removed. The table from RFC 2136 supplemented with the Go DNS function shows which functions exist to specify the prerequisites. The prerequisite section can also be left empty. If you have decided on the prerequisites you can tell what RRs should be added or deleted. The next table shows the options you have and what functions to call. An TSIG or transaction signature adds a HMAC TSIG record to each message sent. The supported algorithms include: HmacMD5, HmacSHA1, HmacSHA256 and HmacSHA512. Basic use pattern when querying with a TSIG name "axfr." (note that these key names must be fully qualified - as they are domain names) and the base64 secret "so6ZGir4GPAqINNh9U5c3A==": When requesting an zone transfer (almost all TSIG usage is when requesting zone transfers), with TSIG, this is the basic use pattern. In this example we request an AXFR for miek.nl. with TSIG key named "axfr." and secret "so6ZGir4GPAqINNh9U5c3A==" and using the server 176.58.119.54: You can now read the records from the transfer as they come in. Each envelope is checked with TSIG. If something is not correct an error is returned. Basic use pattern validating and replying to a message that has TSIG set. RFC 6895 sets aside a range of type codes for private use. This range is 65,280 - 65,534 (0xFF00 - 0xFFFE). When experimenting with new Resource Records these can be used, before requesting an official type code from IANA. see http://miek.nl/2014/September/21/idn-and-private-rr-in-go-dns/ for more information. EDNS0 is an extension mechanism for the DNS defined in RFC 2671 and updated by RFC 6891. It defines an new RR type, the OPT RR, which is then completely abused. Basic use pattern for creating an (empty) OPT RR: The rdata of an OPT RR consists out of a slice of EDNS0 (RFC 6891) interfaces. Currently only a few have been standardized: EDNS0_NSID (RFC 5001) and EDNS0_SUBNET (draft-vandergaast-edns-client-subnet-02). Note that these options may be combined in an OPT RR. Basic use pattern for a server to check if (and which) options are set: SIG(0) From RFC 2931: It works like TSIG, except that SIG(0) uses public key cryptography, instead of the shared secret approach in TSIG. Supported algorithms: DSA, ECDSAP256SHA256, ECDSAP384SHA384, RSASHA1, RSASHA256 and RSASHA512. Signing subsequent messages in multi-message sessions is not implemented.

Package dns implements a full featured interface to the Domain Name System. Server- and client-side programming is supported. The package allows complete control over what is send out to the DNS. The package API follows the less-is-more principle, by presenting a small, clean interface. The package dns supports (asynchronous) querying/replying, incoming/outgoing AXFR/IXFR, TSIG, EDNS0, dynamic updates, notifies and DNSSEC validation/signing. Note that domain names MUST be fully qualified, before sending them, unqualified names in a message will result in a packing failure. Resource records are native types. They are not stored in wire format. Basic usage pattern for creating a new resource record: Or directly from a string: Or when the default TTL (3600) and class (IN) suit you: Or even: In the DNS messages are exchanged, these messages contain resource records (sets). Use pattern for creating a message: Or when not certain if the domain name is fully qualified: The message m is now a message with the question section set to ask the MX records for the miek.nl. zone. The following is slightly more verbose, but more flexible: After creating a message it can be send. Basic use pattern for synchronous querying the DNS at a server configured on 127.0.0.1 and port 53: For asynchronous queries it is easy to wrap Exchange() in a goroutine. Suppressing multiple outstanding queries (with the same question, type and class) is as easy as setting: A dns message consists out of four sections. The question section: in.Question, the answer section: in.Answer, the authority section: in.Ns and the additional section: in.Extra. Each of these sections (except the Question section) contain a []RR. Basic use pattern for accessing the rdata of a TXT RR as the first RR in the Answer section: DNSSEC (DNS Security Extension) adds a layer of security to the DNS. It uses public key cryptography to sign resource records. The public keys are stored in DNSKEY records and the signatures in RRSIG records. Requesting DNSSEC information for a zone is done by adding the DO (DNSSEC OK) bit to an request. Signature generation, signature verification and key generation are all supported. EDNS0 is an extension mechanism for the DNS defined in RFC 2671 and updated by RFC 6891. It defines a standard RR type, the OPT RR, which is then completely abused. Basic use pattern for creating an (empty) OPT RR: The rdata of an OPT RR consists out of a slice of EDNS0 interfaces. Currently only a few have been standardized: EDNS0_NSID (RFC 5001) and EDNS0_SUBNET (draft). Note that these options may be combined in an OPT RR. Basic use pattern for a server to check if (and which) options are set: TRANSACTION SIGNATURE (TSIG) An TSIG or transaction signature adds a HMAC TSIG record to each message sent. The supported algorithms include: HmacMD5, HmacSHA1 and HmacSHA256. Basic use pattern when querying with a TSIG name "axfr." (note that these key names must be fully qualified - as they are domain names) and the base64 secret "so6ZGir4GPAqINNh9U5c3A==": When requesting an AXFR (almost all TSIG usage is when requesting zone transfers), with TSIG, this is the basic use pattern. In this example we request an AXFR for miek.nl. with TSIG key named "axfr." and secret "so6ZGir4GPAqINNh9U5c3A==" and using the server 85.223.71.124 You can now read the records from the AXFR as they come in. Each envelope is checked with TSIG. If something is not correct an error is returned. Basic use pattern validating and replying to a message that has TSIG set. Dynamic updates reuses the DNS message format, but renames three of the sections. Question is Zone, Answer is Prerequisite, Authority is Update, only the Additional is not renamed. See RFC 2136 for the gory details. You can set a rather complex set of rules for the existence of absence of certain resource records or names in a zone to specify if resource records should be added or removed. The table from RFC 2136 supplemented with the Go DNS function shows which functions exist to specify the prerequisites. 3.2.4 - Table Of Metavalues Used In Prerequisite Section The prerequisite section can also be left empty. If you have decided on the prerequisites you can tell what RRs should be added or deleted. The next table shows the options you have and what functions to call. 3.4.2.6 - Table Of Metavalues Used In Update Section

Package etm provides a set of Encrypt-Then-MAC AEAD implementations, which combine block ciphers like AES with HMACs. An AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) construction provides a unified API for sealing messages in a way which provides both confidentiality *and* integrity. This not only prevents malicious tampering but also eliminates online attacks like padding oracle attacks which can allow an attacker to recover plaintexts without knowledge of the secret key (e.g., Lucky 13 attack, BEAST attack, etc.). By rejecting ciphertexts which have been modified, these types of attacks are eliminated. This package implements five proposed standards: All five constructions combine AES in CBC mode with an HMAC, but vary in the degree of security offered and the amount of overhead required. See http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-02 for full technical details. AEAD_AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 requires a 32-byte key, provides 128 bits of security for both confidentiality and integrity, and adds up to 56 bytes of overhead per message. AEAD_AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 requires a 48-byte key, provides 192 bits of security for both confidentiality and integrity, and adds up to 64 bytes of overhead per message. AEAD_AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 requires a 56-byte key, provides 256 bits of security for confidentiality, provides 192 bits of security for integrity, and adds up to 64 bytes of overhead per message. AEAD_AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 requires a 64-byte key, provides 256 bits of security for both confidentiality and integrity, and adds up to 72 bytes of overhead per message. AEAD_AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA1 requires a 36-byte key, provides 128 bits of security for confidentiality, provides 96 bits of security for integrity, and adds up to 52 bytes of overhead per message. (This construction uses SHA-1, and should only be used when the use of SHA2 is not possible.)

Package ovirtclient provides a human-friendly Go client for the oVirt Engine. It provides an abstraction layer for the oVirt API, as well as a mocking facility for testing purposes. This documentation contains two parts. This introduction explains setting up the client with the credentials. The API doc contains the individual API calls. When reading the API doc, start with the Client interface: it contains all components of the API. The individual API's, their documentation and examples are located in subinterfaces, such as DiskClient. There are several ways to create a client instance. The most basic way is to use the New() function as follows: The mock client simulates the oVirt engine behavior in-memory without needing an actual running engine. This is a good way to provide a testing facility. It can be created using the NewMock method: That's it! However, to make it really useful, you will need the test helper which can set up test fixtures. The test helper can work in two ways: Either it sets up test fixtures in the mock client, or it sets up a live connection and identifies a usable storage domain, cluster, etc. for testing purposes. The ovirtclient.NewMockTestHelper() function can be used to create a test helper with a mock client in the backend: The easiest way to set up the test helper for a live connection is by using environment variables. To do that, you can use the ovirtclient.NewLiveTestHelperFromEnv() function: This function will inspect environment variables to determine if a connection to a live oVirt engine can be established. The following environment variables are supported: URL of the oVirt engine API. Mandatory. The username for the oVirt engine. Mandatory. The password for the oVirt engine. Mandatory. A file containing the CA certificate in PEM format. Provide the CA certificate in PEM format directly. Disable certificate verification if set. Not recommended. The cluster to use for testing. Will be automatically chosen if not provided. ID of the blank template. Will be automatically chosen if not provided. Storage domain to use for testing. Will be automatically chosen if not provided. VNIC profile to use for testing. Will be automatically chosen if not provided. You can also create the test helper manually: This library provides extensive logging. Each API interaction is logged on the debug level, and other messages are added on other levels. In order to provide logging this library uses the go-ovirt-client-log (https://github.com/oVirt/go-ovirt-client-log) interface definition. As long as your logger implements this interface, you will be able to receive log messages. The logging library also provides a few built-in loggers. For example, you can log via the default Go log interface: Or, you can also log in tests: You can also disable logging: Finally, we also provide an adapter library for klog here: https://github.com/oVirt/go-ovirt-client-log-klog Modern-day oVirt engines run secured with TLS. This means that the client needs a way to verify the certificate the server is presenting. This is controlled by the tls parameter of the New() function. You can implement your own source by implementing the TLSProvider interface, but the package also includes a ready-to-use provider. Create the provider using the TLS() function: This provider has several functions. The easiest to set up is using the system trust root for certificates. However, this won't work own Windows: Now you need to add your oVirt engine certificate to your system trust root. If you don't want to, or can't add the certificate to the system trust root, you can also directly provide it to the client. Finally, you can also disable certificate verification. Do we need to say that this is a very, very bad idea? The configured tls variable can then be passed to the New() function to create an oVirt client. This library attempts to retry API calls that can be retried if possible. Each function has a sensible retry policy. However, you may want to customize the retries by passing one or more retry flags. The following retry flags are supported: This strategy will stop retries when the context parameter is canceled. This strategy adds a wait time after each time, which is increased by the given factor on each try. The default is a backoff with a factor of 2. This strategy will cancel retries if the error in question is a permanent error. This is enabled by default. This strategy will abort retries if a maximum number of tries is reached. On complex calls the retries are counted per underlying API call. This strategy will abort retries if a certain time has been elapsed for the higher level call. This strategy will abort retries if a certain underlying API call takes longer than the specified duration.

Package scylla implements an efficient shard-aware driver for ScyllaDB. Pass a keyspace and a list of initial node IP addresses to DefaultSessionConfig to create a new cluster configuration: Port can be specified as part of the address, the above is equivalent to: It is recommended to use the value set in the Scylla config for broadcast_address or listen_address, an IP address not a domain name. This is because events from Scylla will use the configured IP address, which is used to index connected hosts. Then you can customize more options (see SessionConfig): When ready, create a session from the configuration and context.Context, once the context is done session will close automatically, stopping requests from being sent and new connections from being made. Don't forget to Close the session once you are done with it and not sure context will be done: CQL protocol uses a SASL-based authentication mechanism and so consists of an exchange of server challenges and client response pairs. The details of the exchanged messages depend on the authenticator used. Currently the driver supports only default password authenticator which can be used like this: It is possible to secure traffic between the client and server with TLS, to do so just pass your tls.Config to session config. For example: The driver by default will route prepared queries to nodes that hold data replicas based on partition key, and non-prepared queries in a round-robin fashion. To route queries to local DC first, use TokenAwareDCAwarePolicy. For example, if the datacenter you want to primarily connect is called dc1 (as configured in the database): The driver can only use token-aware routing for queries where all partition key columns are query parameters. For example, instead of use Create queries with Session.Query. Query values can be reused between different but must not be modified during executions of the query. To execute a query use Query.Exec: Result rows can be read like this See Example for complete example. The driver can prepare DML queries (SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE/BATCH statements). CQL protocol does not support preparing other query types. Session is safe to use from multiple goroutines, so to execute multiple concurrent queries, just execute them from several worker goroutines. Gocql provides synchronously-looking API (as recommended for Go APIs) and the queries are executed asynchronously at the protocol level. The driver supports paging of results with automatic prefetch of 1 page, see Query.PageSize and Query.Iter. It is also possible to control the paging manually with Query.PageState. Manual paging is useful if you want to store the page state externally, for example in a URL to allow users browse pages in a result. You might want to sign/encrypt the paging state when exposing it externally since it contains data from primary keys. Paging state is specific to the CQL protocol version and the exact query used. It is meant as opaque state that should not be modified. If you send paging state from different query or protocol version, then the behaviour is not defined (you might get unexpected results or an error from the server). For example, do not send paging state returned by node using protocol version 3 to a node using protocol version 4. Also, when using protocol version 4, paging state between Cassandra 2.2 and 3.0 is incompatible (https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CASSANDRA-10880). The driver does not check whether the paging state is from the same protocol version/statement. You might want to validate yourself as this could be a problem if you store paging state externally. For example, if you store paging state in a URL, the URLs might become broken when you upgrade your cluster. Call Query.PageState(nil) to fetch just the first page of the query results. Pass the page state returned in Result.PageState by Query.Exec to Query.PageState of a subsequent query to get the next page. If the length of slice in Result.PageState is zero, there are no more pages available (or an error occurred). Using too low values of PageSize will negatively affect performance, a value below 100 is probably too low. While Scylla returns exactly PageSize items (except for last page) in a page currently, the protocol authors explicitly reserved the right to return smaller or larger amount of items in a page for performance reasons, so don't rely on the page having the exact count of items. Queries can be marked as idempotent. Marking the query as idempotent tells the driver that the query can be executed multiple times without affecting its result. Non-idempotent queries are not eligible for retrying nor speculative execution. Idempotent queries are retried in case of errors based on the configured RetryPolicy. If you need to use a custom Retry or HostSelectionPolicy please see the transport package documentation.

Package dns implements a full featured interface to the Domain Name System. Server- and client-side programming is supported. The package allows complete control over what is send out to the DNS. The package API follows the less-is-more principle, by presenting a small, clean interface. The package dns supports (asynchronous) querying/replying, incoming/outgoing zone transfers, TSIG, EDNS0, dynamic updates, notifies and DNSSEC validation/signing. Note that domain names MUST be fully qualified, before sending them, unqualified names in a message will result in a packing failure. Resource records are native types. They are not stored in wire format. Basic usage pattern for creating a new resource record: Or directly from a string: Or when the default TTL (3600) and class (IN) suit you: Or even: In the DNS messages are exchanged, these messages contain resource records (sets). Use pattern for creating a message: Or when not certain if the domain name is fully qualified: The message m is now a message with the question section set to ask the MX records for the miek.nl. zone. The following is slightly more verbose, but more flexible: After creating a message it can be send. Basic use pattern for synchronous querying the DNS at a server configured on 127.0.0.1 and port 53: Suppressing multiple outstanding queries (with the same question, type and class) is as easy as setting: If these "advanced" features are not needed, a simple UDP query can be send, with: When this functions returns you will get dns message. A dns message consists out of four sections. The question section: in.Question, the answer section: in.Answer, the authority section: in.Ns and the additional section: in.Extra. Each of these sections (except the Question section) contain a []RR. Basic use pattern for accessing the rdata of a TXT RR as the first RR in the Answer section: Both domain names and TXT character strings are converted to presentation form both when unpacked and when converted to strings. For TXT character strings, tabs, carriage returns and line feeds will be converted to \t, \r and \n respectively. Back slashes and quotations marks will be escaped. Bytes below 32 and above 127 will be converted to \DDD form. For domain names, in addition to the above rules brackets, periods, spaces, semicolons and the at symbol are escaped. DNSSEC (DNS Security Extension) adds a layer of security to the DNS. It uses public key cryptography to sign resource records. The public keys are stored in DNSKEY records and the signatures in RRSIG records. Requesting DNSSEC information for a zone is done by adding the DO (DNSSEC OK) bit to an request. Signature generation, signature verification and key generation are all supported. Dynamic updates reuses the DNS message format, but renames three of the sections. Question is Zone, Answer is Prerequisite, Authority is Update, only the Additional is not renamed. See RFC 2136 for the gory details. You can set a rather complex set of rules for the existence of absence of certain resource records or names in a zone to specify if resource records should be added or removed. The table from RFC 2136 supplemented with the Go DNS function shows which functions exist to specify the prerequisites. The prerequisite section can also be left empty. If you have decided on the prerequisites you can tell what RRs should be added or deleted. The next table shows the options you have and what functions to call. An TSIG or transaction signature adds a HMAC TSIG record to each message sent. The supported algorithms include: HmacMD5, HmacSHA1, HmacSHA256 and HmacSHA512. Basic use pattern when querying with a TSIG name "axfr." (note that these key names must be fully qualified - as they are domain names) and the base64 secret "so6ZGir4GPAqINNh9U5c3A==": When requesting an zone transfer (almost all TSIG usage is when requesting zone transfers), with TSIG, this is the basic use pattern. In this example we request an AXFR for miek.nl. with TSIG key named "axfr." and secret "so6ZGir4GPAqINNh9U5c3A==" and using the server 176.58.119.54: You can now read the records from the transfer as they come in. Each envelope is checked with TSIG. If something is not correct an error is returned. Basic use pattern validating and replying to a message that has TSIG set. RFC 6895 sets aside a range of type codes for private use. This range is 65,280 - 65,534 (0xFF00 - 0xFFFE). When experimenting with new Resource Records these can be used, before requesting an official type code from IANA. see http://miek.nl/posts/2014/Sep/21/Private%20RRs%20and%20IDN%20in%20Go%20DNS/ for more information. EDNS0 is an extension mechanism for the DNS defined in RFC 2671 and updated by RFC 6891. It defines an new RR type, the OPT RR, which is then completely abused. Basic use pattern for creating an (empty) OPT RR: The rdata of an OPT RR consists out of a slice of EDNS0 (RFC 6891) interfaces. Currently only a few have been standardized: EDNS0_NSID (RFC 5001) and EDNS0_SUBNET (draft-vandergaast-edns-client-subnet-02). Note that these options may be combined in an OPT RR. Basic use pattern for a server to check if (and which) options are set: SIG(0) From RFC 2931: It works like TSIG, except that SIG(0) uses public key cryptography, instead of the shared secret approach in TSIG. Supported algorithms: DSA, ECDSAP256SHA256, ECDSAP384SHA384, RSASHA1, RSASHA256 and RSASHA512. Signing subsequent messages in multi-message sessions is not implemented.

Package appfabric provides the API client, operations, and parameter types for AppFabric. Amazon Web Services AppFabric quickly connects software as a service (SaaS) applications across your organization. This allows IT and security teams to easily manage and secure applications using a standard schema, and employees can complete everyday tasks faster using generative artificial intelligence (AI). You can use these APIs to complete AppFabric tasks, such as setting up audit log ingestions or viewing user access. For more information about AppFabric, including the required permissions to use the service, see the Amazon Web Services AppFabric Administration Guide. For more information about using the Command Line Interface (CLI) to manage your AppFabric resources, see the AppFabric section of the CLI Reference.

Package paymentcryptography provides the API client, operations, and parameter types for Payment Cryptography Control Plane. Amazon Web Services Payment Cryptography Control Plane APIs manage encryption keys for use during payment-related cryptographic operations. You can create, import, export, share, manage, and delete keys. You can also manage Identity and Access Management (IAM) policies for keys. For more information, see Identity and access managementin the Amazon Web Services Payment Cryptography User Guide. To use encryption keys for payment-related transaction processing and associated cryptographic operations, you use the Amazon Web Services Payment Cryptography Data Plane. You can perform actions like encrypt, decrypt, generate, and verify payment-related data. All Amazon Web Services Payment Cryptography API calls must be signed and transmitted using Transport Layer Security (TLS). We recommend you always use the latest supported TLS version for logging API requests. Amazon Web Services Payment Cryptography supports CloudTrail for control plane operations, a service that logs Amazon Web Services API calls and related events for your Amazon Web Services account and delivers them to an Amazon S3 bucket you specify. By using the information collected by CloudTrail, you can determine what requests were made to Amazon Web Services Payment Cryptography, who made the request, when it was made, and so on. If you don't configure a trail, you can still view the most recent events in the CloudTrail console. For more information, see the CloudTrail User Guide.

Package codegurusecurity provides the API client, operations, and parameter types for Amazon CodeGuru Security. Amazon CodeGuru Security is in preview release and is subject to change. This section provides documentation for the Amazon CodeGuru Security API operations. CodeGuru Security is a service that uses program analysis and machine learning to detect security policy violations and vulnerabilities, and recommends ways to address these security risks. By proactively detecting and providing recommendations for addressing security risks, CodeGuru Security improves the overall security of your application code. For more information about CodeGuru Security, see the Amazon CodeGuru Security User Guide.

Package pcaconnectorad provides the API client, operations, and parameter types for PcaConnectorAd. Amazon Web Services Private CA Connector for Active Directory creates a connector between Amazon Web Services Private CA and Active Directory (AD) that enables you to provision security certificates for AD signed by a private CA that you own. For more information, see Amazon Web Services Private CA Connector for Active Directory.

Package apigateway provides the client and types for making API requests to Amazon API Gateway. Amazon API Gateway helps developers deliver robust, secure, and scalable mobile and web application back ends. API Gateway allows developers to securely connect mobile and web applications to APIs that run on AWS Lambda, Amazon EC2, or other publicly addressable web services that are hosted outside of AWS. See apigateway package documentation for more information. https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sdk-for-go/api/service/apigateway/ To Amazon API Gateway with the SDK use the New function to create a new service client. With that client you can make API requests to the service. These clients are safe to use concurrently. See the SDK's documentation for more information on how to use the SDK. https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sdk-for-go/api/ See aws.Config documentation for more information on configuring SDK clients. https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sdk-for-go/api/aws/#Config See the Amazon API Gateway client APIGateway for more information on creating client for this service. https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sdk-for-go/api/service/apigateway/#New

Package session provides a convenient way to store session data (such as a user ID) securely in a web browser cookie or other authentication token. Cookie values generated by this package use modern authenticated encryption, so they can't be inspected or altered by client processes. Most users of this package will use functions Set and Get, which manage cookies directly. An analogous pair of functions, Encode and Decode, help when the session data will be stored somewhere other than a browser cookie; for example, an API token configured by hand in an API client process.

Package dns implements a full featured interface to the Domain Name System. Server- and client-side programming is supported. The package allows complete control over what is send out to the DNS. The package API follows the less-is-more principle, by presenting a small, clean interface. The package dns supports (asynchronous) querying/replying, incoming/outgoing zone transfers, TSIG, EDNS0, dynamic updates, notifies and DNSSEC validation/signing. Note that domain names MUST be fully qualified, before sending them, unqualified names in a message will result in a packing failure. Resource records are native types. They are not stored in wire format. Basic usage pattern for creating a new resource record: Or directly from a string: Or when the default TTL (3600) and class (IN) suit you: Or even: In the DNS messages are exchanged, these messages contain resource records (sets). Use pattern for creating a message: Or when not certain if the domain name is fully qualified: The message m is now a message with the question section set to ask the MX records for the miek.nl. zone. The following is slightly more verbose, but more flexible: After creating a message it can be send. Basic use pattern for synchronous querying the DNS at a server configured on 127.0.0.1 and port 53: Suppressing multiple outstanding queries (with the same question, type and class) is as easy as setting: If these "advanced" features are not needed, a simple UDP query can be send, with: When this functions returns you will get dns message. A dns message consists out of four sections. The question section: in.Question, the answer section: in.Answer, the authority section: in.Ns and the additional section: in.Extra. Each of these sections (except the Question section) contain a []RR. Basic use pattern for accessing the rdata of a TXT RR as the first RR in the Answer section: Both domain names and TXT character strings are converted to presentation form both when unpacked and when converted to strings. For TXT character strings, tabs, carriage returns and line feeds will be converted to \t, \r and \n respectively. Back slashes and quotations marks will be escaped. Bytes below 32 and above 127 will be converted to \DDD form. For domain names, in addition to the above rules brackets, periods, spaces, semicolons and the at symbol are escaped. DNSSEC (DNS Security Extension) adds a layer of security to the DNS. It uses public key cryptography to sign resource records. The public keys are stored in DNSKEY records and the signatures in RRSIG records. Requesting DNSSEC information for a zone is done by adding the DO (DNSSEC OK) bit to an request. Signature generation, signature verification and key generation are all supported. Dynamic updates reuses the DNS message format, but renames three of the sections. Question is Zone, Answer is Prerequisite, Authority is Update, only the Additional is not renamed. See RFC 2136 for the gory details. You can set a rather complex set of rules for the existence of absence of certain resource records or names in a zone to specify if resource records should be added or removed. The table from RFC 2136 supplemented with the Go DNS function shows which functions exist to specify the prerequisites. 3.2.4 - Table Of Metavalues Used In Prerequisite Section The prerequisite section can also be left empty. If you have decided on the prerequisites you can tell what RRs should be added or deleted. The next table shows the options you have and what functions to call. 3.4.2.6 - Table Of Metavalues Used In Update Section An TSIG or transaction signature adds a HMAC TSIG record to each message sent. The supported algorithms include: HmacMD5, HmacSHA1, HmacSHA256 and HmacSHA512. Basic use pattern when querying with a TSIG name "axfr." (note that these key names must be fully qualified - as they are domain names) and the base64 secret "so6ZGir4GPAqINNh9U5c3A==": When requesting an zone transfer (almost all TSIG usage is when requesting zone transfers), with TSIG, this is the basic use pattern. In this example we request an AXFR for miek.nl. with TSIG key named "axfr." and secret "so6ZGir4GPAqINNh9U5c3A==" and using the server 176.58.119.54: You can now read the records from the transfer as they come in. Each envelope is checked with TSIG. If something is not correct an error is returned. Basic use pattern validating and replying to a message that has TSIG set. RFC 6895 sets aside a range of type codes for private use. This range is 65,280 - 65,534 (0xFF00 - 0xFFFE). When experimenting with new Resource Records these can be used, before requesting an official type code from IANA. see http://miek.nl/posts/2014/Sep/21/Private%20RRs%20and%20IDN%20in%20Go%20DNS/ for more information. EDNS0 is an extension mechanism for the DNS defined in RFC 2671 and updated by RFC 6891. It defines an new RR type, the OPT RR, which is then completely abused. Basic use pattern for creating an (empty) OPT RR: The rdata of an OPT RR consists out of a slice of EDNS0 (RFC 6891) interfaces. Currently only a few have been standardized: EDNS0_NSID (RFC 5001) and EDNS0_SUBNET (draft-vandergaast-edns-client-subnet-02). Note that these options may be combined in an OPT RR. Basic use pattern for a server to check if (and which) options are set: SIG(0) From RFC 2931: It works like TSIG, except that SIG(0) uses public key cryptography, instead of the shared secret approach in TSIG. Supported algorithms: DSA, ECDSAP256SHA256, ECDSAP384SHA384, RSASHA1, RSASHA256 and RSASHA512. Signing subsequent messages in multi-message sessions is not implemented.

Package chacha20poly1305 implements the AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 algorithm, which combines ChaCha20, a secure stream cipher, with Poly1305, a secure MAC function. (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04) The AEAD (Athenticated Encryption with Associated Data) construction provides a unified API for sealing messages in a way which provides both confidentiality *and* integrity. Unlike unauthenticated modes like CBC, AEAD algorithms are resistant to chosen ciphertext attacks, such as padding oracle attacks, etc., and add only 16 bytes of overhead. AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 has a significant speed advantage over other AEAD algorithms like AES-GCM, as well as being extremely resistant to timing attacks.

Package inspectorscan provides the API client, operations, and parameter types for Inspector Scan. Amazon Inspector Scan is a vulnerability discovery service that scans a provided Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for security vulnerabilities.

Command goat provides an implementation of a BitTorrent tracker, written in Go. goat can be built using Go 1.1+. It can be downloaded, built, and installed, simply by running: In addition, goat depends on a MySQL server for data storage. After creating a database and user for goat, its database schema may be imported from the SQL files located in 'res/'. goat will not run unless MySQL is installed, and a database and user are properly configured for its use. Optionally, goat can be built to use ql (https://github.com/cznic/ql) as its storage backend. This is done by supplying the 'ql' tag in the go get command: A blank ql database file is located under 'res/ql/goat.db', and will be copied to '~/.config/goat/goat.db' on UNIX systems. goat is now able to use ql as its storage backend, for those who do not wish to use an external, MySQL backend. goat is capable of listening for torrent traffic in three modes: HTTP, HTTPS, and UDP. HTTP/HTTPS are the recommended methods, and are required in order for goat to serve its API, and to allow use of private tracker passkeys. HTTP is considered the standard mode of operation for goat. HTTP allows gathering a great number of metrics, use of passkeys, use of a client whitelist, and access to goat's RESTful API, when configured. For most trackers, this will be the only listener which is necessary in order for goat to function properly. The HTTPS listener provides a method to encrypt traffic to the tracker, but must be used with caution. Unless the SSL certificate in use is signed by a proper certificate authority, it will distress most clients, and they may outright refuse to announce to it. If you are in possession of a certificate signed by a certificate authority, this mode may be more ideal, as it provides added security for your clients. The UDP listener is the most unusual method of the three, and should only be used for public trackers. The BitTorrent UDP tracker protocol specifies a very specific packet format, meaning that additional information or parameters cannot be packed into a UDP datagram in a standard way. The UDP tracker may be the fastest and least bandwidth-intensive, but as stated, should only be used for public trackers. A new feature goat added to goat in order to allow better interoperability with many languages is a RESTful API, which is served using the HTTP or HTTPS listeners. This API enables easy retrieval of tracker statistics, while allowing goat to run as a completely independent process. It should be noted that the API is only enabled when configured, and when a HTTP or HTTPS listener is enabled. Without a transport mechanism, the API will be inaccessible. The API features several modes of authentication, including HTTP Basic for login and HMAC-SHA1 other calls. Upon logging into the API using HTTP Basic with a username and password pair, an API public key and secret will be generated. The public key is used as the username for HTTP Basic authentication, and the secret key is used to calculate a HMAC-SHA1 signature for the password. As part of API signature generation, a random nonce value must be generated and added to the request. It is added to the password portion of the HTTP Basic request, and also to the string which is used to create the signature. Nonce values must be changed on every request, or the request will fail. The current pseudocode format of the HMAC-SHA1 signature is as follows: The proper format for a HTTP Basic request is as follows: When the public key, nonce, and API signature are sent via HTTP Basic, the server will verify the signature. Successful authentication will allow access to the API. This list contains all API calls currently recognized by goat. Each call must be authenticated using the aforementioned methods. Request an API public key and secret key for this user. The public key, user ID, and secret key are used to authenticate further API calls. The expire time indicates when this key is set to expire. Further API calls will extend the expiration time. Retrieve a list of all files tracked by goat. Some extended attributes are not added to reduce strain on database, and to provide a more general overview. Retrieve extended attributes about a specific file with matching ID. This provides counts for number of completions, seeders, leechers, and a list of fileUser relationships associated with a given file. Retrieve a variety of metrics about the current status of goat, including its PID, hostname, memory usage, number of HTTP/UDP hits, etc. Create a user with the specified username, password, and torrent limit. Reterieve a list of all users registered to goat, including their ID, torrent limit, and username. Retrieve information about a single user with matching ID, including their ID, torrent limit, and username. goat is configured using a JSON file, which will be created under '~/.config/goat/config.json' on UNIX systems. Here is an example configuration, describing the settings available to the user.

Package goBolt implements drivers for the Neo4J Bolt Protocol Versions 1-4. There are some limitations to the types of collections the internalDriver supports. Specifically, maps should always be of type map[string]interface{} and lists should always be of type []interface{}. It doesn't seem that the Bolt protocol supports uint64 either, so the biggest number it can send right now is the int64 max. The URL format is: `bolt://(user):(password)@(host):(port)` Schema must be `bolt`. User and password is only necessary if you are authenticating. TLS is supported by using query parameters on the connection string, like so: `bolt://host:port?tls=true&tls_no_verify=false` The supported query params are: * timeout - the number of seconds to set the connection timeout to. Defaults to 60 seconds. * tls - Set to 'true' or '1' if you want to use TLS encryption * tls_no_verify - Set to 'true' or '1' if you want to accept any server certificate (for testing, not secure) * tls_ca_cert_file - path to a custom ca cert for a self-signed TLS cert * tls_cert_file - path to a cert file for this client (need to verify this is processed by Neo4j) * tls_key_file - path to a key file for this client (need to verify this is processed by Neo4j) Errors returned from the API support wrapping, so if you receive an error from the library, it might be wrapping other errors. You can get the innermost error by using the `InnerMost` method. Failure messages from Neo4J are reported, along with their metadata, as an error. In order to get the failure message metadata from a wrapped error, you can do so by calling `err.(*errors.Error).InnerMost().(messages.FailureMessage).Metadata` If there is an error with the database connection, you should get a sql/internalDriver ErrBadConn as per the best practice recommendations of the Golang SQL Driver. However, this error may be wrapped, so you might have to call `InnerMost` to get it, as specified above.

Package sasl implements the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) as defined by RFC 4422. Most users of this package will only need to create a Negotiator using NewClient or NewServer and call its Step method repeatedly. Authors implementing SASL mechanisms other than the builtin ones will want to create a Mechanism struct which will likely use the other methods on the Negotiator. Be advised: This API is still unstable and is subject to change.

Package uma extends the OpenAPI spec to describe UMA resources and scopes in an API. It can generate an http middleware from an OpenAPI spec in order to enforce UMA permissions. 1. Define resource types An UMA resource type contains fields that tend to stay the same for resources of the same type. Define resource types by adding `x-uma-resource-types` section to the root level of the spec e.g. 2. Enable UMA in security schemes UMA access control only work with oauth2 or openIdConnect security scheme. To enable, add the key `x-uma-enabled` to the security scheme: 3. Define resources UMA resources can be defined at the root level or at individual paths. Root level resource represents the default resource at all paths. Path level resource overrides root-level resource. e.g. Each resource object has 2 keys: type and name. Type must be one of the types defined earlier. Name is the name template string that can be rendered using path parameters. 4. Define scopes UMA scopes are simply oauth2 and openIdConnect scopes. They will work as UMA scopes as long as the security scheme is uma-enabled: 5. Generate code This package can generate relevant go code from the OpenAPI spec: The generated code will work with any server compatible with the net/http package. It can works by itself or works along side other generated codes such as those generated by github.com/deepmap/oapi-codegen 6. Use the generated code

The Escher HTTP request signing framework is intended to provide a secure way for clients to sign HTTP requests, and servers to check the integrity of these messages. The goal of the protocol is to introduce an authentication solution for REST API services, that is more secure than the currently available protocols. RFC 2617 (HTTP Authentication) defines Basic and Digest Access Authentication. They’re widely used, but Basic Access Authentication doesn’t encrypt the secret and doesn’t add integrity checks to the requests. Digest Access Authentication sends the secret encrypted, but the algorithm with creating a checksum with a nonce and using md5 should not be considered highly secure these days, and as with Basic Access Authentication, there’s no way to check the integrity of the message. RFC 6749 (OAuth 2.0 Authorization) enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This is not helpful for a machine-to-machine communication situation, like a REST API authentication, because typically there’s no third-party user involved. Additionally, after a token is obtained from the authorization endpoint, it is used with no encryption, and doesn’t provide integration checking, or prevent repeating messages. OAuth 2.0 is a stateful protocol which needs a database to store the tokens for client sessions. Amazon and other service providers created protocols addressing these issues, however there is no public standard with open source implementations available from them. As Escher is based on a publicly documented, widely, in-the-wild used protocol, the specification does not include novelty techniques. 2. Signing an HTTP Request Escher defines a stateless signature generation mechanism. The signature is calculated from the key parts of the HTTP request, a service identifier string called credential scope, and a client key and client secret. The signature generation steps are: canonicalizing the request, creating a string to calculate the signature, and adding the signature to the original request. Escher supports two hash algorithms: SHA256 and SHA512 designed by the NSA (U.S. National Security Agency). 2.1. Canonicalizing the Request In order to calculate a checksum from the key HTTP request parts, the HTTP request method, the request URI, the query parts, the headers, and the request body have to be canonicalized. The output of the canonicalization step will be a string including the request parts separated by LF (line feed, “n”) characters. The string will be used to calculate a checksum for the request. 2.1.1. The HTTP method The HTTP method defined by RFC2616 (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) is case sensitive, and must be available in upper case, no transformation has to be applied: POST 2.1.2. The Path The path is the absolute path of the URL. Starts with a slash (/) character, and does not include the query part (and the question mark). Escher follows the rules defined by RFC3986 (Uniform Resource Identifier) to normalize the path. Basically it means: Convert relative paths to absolute, remove redundant path components. URI-encode each path components: the “reserved characters” defined by RFC3986 (Uniform Resource Identifier) have to be kept as they are (no encoding applied) all other characters have to be percent encoded, including SPACE (to %20, instead of +) non-ASCII, UTF-8 characters should be percent encoded to 2 or more pieces (á to %C3%A1) percent encoded hexadecimal numbers have to be upper cased (eg: a%c2%b1b to a%C2%B1b) Normalize empty paths to /. For example: 2.1.3. The Query String RFC3986 (Uniform Resource Identifier) should provide guidance for canonicalization of the query string, but here’s the complete list of the rules to be applied: URI-encode each query parameter names and values the “reserved characters” defined by RFC3986 (Uniform Resource Identifier) have to be kept as they are (no encoding applied) all other characters have to be percent encoded, including SPACE (to %20, instead of +) non-ASCII, UTF-8 characters should be percent encoded to 2 or more pieces (á to %C3%A1) percent encoded hexadecimal numbers have to be upper cased (eg: a%c2%b1b to a%C2%B1b) Normalize empty query strings to empty string. Sort query parameters by the encoded parameter names (ASCII order). Do not shorten parameter values if their parameter name is the same (key=B&key=A is a valid output), the order of parameters in a URL may be significant (this is not defined by the HTTP standard). Separate parameter names and values by = signs, include = for empty values, too Separate parameters by & For example: To canonicalize the headers, the following rules have to be followed: Lower case the header names. Separate header names and values by a :, with no spaces. Sort header names to alphabetical order (ASCII). Group headers with the same names into a header, and separate their values by commas, without sorting. Trim header values, keep all the spaces between quote characters ("). For example: 2.1.5. Signed Headers The list of headers to include when calculating the signature. Lower cased value of header names, separated by ;, like this: date;host 2.1.6. Body Checksum A checksum for the request body, aka the payload has to be calculated. Escher supports SHA-256 and SHA-512 algorithms for checksum calculation. If the request contains no body, an empty string has to be used as the input for the hash algorithm. The selected algorithm will be added later to the authorization header, so the server will be able to use the same algorithm for validation. The checksum of the body has to be presented as a lower cased hexadecimal string, for example: 2.1.7. Concatenating the Canonicalized Parts All the steps above produce a row of data, except the headers canonicalization, as it creates one row per headers. These have to be concatenated with LF (line feed, “n”) characters into a string. An example: 2.2. Creating the Signature The next step is creating another string which will be directly used to calculate the signature. 2.2.1. Algorithm ID The algorithm ID comes from the algo_prefix (default value is ESR) and the algorithm used to calculate checksums during the signing process. The string algo_prefix, “HMAC”, and the algorithm name should be concatenated with dashes, like this: 2.2.2. Long Date The long date is the request date in the ISO 8601 basic format, like YYYYMMDD + T + HHMMSS + Z. Note that the basic format uses no punctuation. Example is: This date has to be added later, too, as a date header (default header name is X-Escher-Date). 2.2.3. Date and Credential Scope Next information is the short date, and the credential scope concatenated with a / character. The short date is the request date’s date part, an ISO 8601 basic formatted representation, the credential scope is defined by the service. Example: This will be added later, too, as part of the authorization header (default header name is X-Escher-Auth). 2.2.4. Checksum of the Canonicalized Request Take the output of step 2.1.7., and create a checksum from the canonicalized checksum string. This checksum has to be represented as a lower cased hexadecimal string, too. Something like this will be an output: 2.2.5. Concatenating the Signing String Concatenate the outputs of steps 2.2. with LF characters. Example output: 2.2.6. The Signing Key The signing key is based on the algo_prefix, the client secret, the parts of the credential scope, and the request date. Take the algo_prefix, concatenate the client secret to it. First apply the HMAC algorithm to the request date, then apply the actual value on each of the credential scope parts (splitted at /). The end result is a binary signing key. Pseudo code: 2.2.7. Create the Signature The signature is created from the output of steps 2.2.5. (Signing String) and 2.2.6. (Signing Key). With the selected algorithm, create a checksum. It has to be represented as a lower cased hexadecimal string. Something like this will be an output: 2.3. Adding the Signature to the Request The final step of the Escher signing process is adding the Signature to the request. Escher adds a new header to the request, by default, the header name is X-Escher-Auth. The header value will include the algorithm ID (see 2.2.1.), the client key, the short date and the credential scope (see 2.2.3.), the signed headers string (see 2.1.5.) and finally the signature (see 2.2.7.). The values of this inputs have to be concatenated like this: 3. Presigning a URL The URL presigning process is very similar to the request signing procedure. But for a URL, there are no headers, no request body, so the calculation of the Signature is different. Also, the Signature cannot be added to the headers, but is included as query parameters. A significant difference is that the presigning allows defining an expiration time. By default, it is 86400 secs, 24 hours. The current time and the expiration time will be included in the URL, and the server has to check if the URL is expired. 3.1. Canonicalizing the URL to Presign The canonicalization for URL presigning is the same process as for HTTP requests, in this section we will cover the differences only. 3.1.1. The HTTP method The HTTP method for presigned URLs is fixed to: For example: 3.1.3. The Query String The query is coming from the URL, but the algorithm, credentials, date, expiration time, and signed headers have to be added to the query parts. 3.1.4. The Headers A URL has no headers, Escher creates the Host header based on the URL’s domain information, and adds it to the canonicalized request. For example: 3.1.5. Signed Headers It will be host, as that’s the only header included. Example:

Package egoscale is a mapping for with the CloudStack API (http://cloudstack.apache.org/api.html) from Go. It has been designed against the Exoscale (https://www.exoscale.com/) infrastructure but should fit other CloudStack services. To build a request, construct the adequate struct. This library expects a pointer for efficiency reasons only. The response is a struct corresponding to the data at stake. E.g. DeployVirtualMachine gives a VirtualMachine, as a pointer as well to avoid big copies. Then everything within the struct is not a pointer. Find below some examples of how egoscale may be used to interact with a CloudStack endpoint, especially Exoscale itself. If anything feels odd or unclear, please let us know: https://github.com/exoscale/egoscale/issues This example deploys a virtual machine while controlling the job status as it goes. It enables a finer control over errors, e.g. HTTP timeout, and eventually a way to kill it of (from the client side). As this library is mostly an HTTP client, you can reuse all the existing tools around it. Nota bene: when running the tests or the egoscale library via another tool, e.g. the exo cli (or the cs cli), the environment variable EXOSCALE_TRACE=prefix does the above configuration for you. As a developer using egoscale as a library, you'll find it more convenient to plug your favorite io.Writer as it's Logger. All the available APIs on the server and provided by the API Discovery plugin Security Groups provide a way to isolate traffic to VMs. Rules are added via the two Authorization commands. Security Group also implement the generic List, Get and Delete interfaces (Listable, Gettable and Deletable). See: http://docs.cloudstack.apache.org/projects/cloudstack-administration/en/stable/networking_and_traffic.html#security-groups A Zone corresponds to a Data Center. You may list them. Zone implements the Listable interface, which let you perform a list in two different ways. The first exposes the underlying CloudStack request while the second one hide them and you only manipulate the structs of your interest. An Elastic IP is a way to attach an IP address to many Virtual Machines. The API side of the story configures the external environment, like the routing. Some work is required within the machine to properly configure the interfaces. See: http://docs.cloudstack.apache.org/projects/cloudstack-administration/en/latest/networking_and_traffic.html#about-elastic-ips

Package sasl implements the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) as defined by RFC 4422. Most users of this package will only need to create a Negotiator using NewClient or NewServer and call its Step method repeatedly. Authors implementing SASL mechanisms other than the builtin ones will want to create a Mechanism struct which will likely use the other methods on the Negotiator. Be advised: This API is still unstable and is subject to change.

Package dns implements a full featured interface to the Domain Name System. Both server- and client-side programming is supported. The package allows complete control over what is sent out to the DNS. The API follows the less-is-more principle, by presenting a small, clean interface. It supports (asynchronous) querying/replying, incoming/outgoing zone transfers, TSIG, EDNS0, dynamic updates, notifies and DNSSEC validation/signing. Note that domain names MUST be fully qualified before sending them, unqualified names in a message will result in a packing failure. Resource records are native types. They are not stored in wire format. Basic usage pattern for creating a new resource record: Or directly from a string: Or when the default origin (.) and TTL (3600) and class (IN) suit you: Or even: In the DNS messages are exchanged, these messages contain resource records (sets). Use pattern for creating a message: Or when not certain if the domain name is fully qualified: The message m is now a message with the question section set to ask the MX records for the miek.nl. zone. The following is slightly more verbose, but more flexible: After creating a message it can be sent. Basic use pattern for synchronous querying the DNS at a server configured on 127.0.0.1 and port 53: Suppressing multiple outstanding queries (with the same question, type and class) is as easy as setting: More advanced options are available using a net.Dialer and the corresponding API. For example it is possible to set a timeout, or to specify a source IP address and port to use for the connection: If these "advanced" features are not needed, a simple UDP query can be sent, with: When this functions returns you will get dns message. A dns message consists out of four sections. The question section: in.Question, the answer section: in.Answer, the authority section: in.Ns and the additional section: in.Extra. Each of these sections (except the Question section) contain a []RR. Basic use pattern for accessing the rdata of a TXT RR as the first RR in the Answer section: Both domain names and TXT character strings are converted to presentation form both when unpacked and when converted to strings. For TXT character strings, tabs, carriage returns and line feeds will be converted to \t, \r and \n respectively. Back slashes and quotations marks will be escaped. Bytes below 32 and above 127 will be converted to \DDD form. For domain names, in addition to the above rules brackets, periods, spaces, semicolons and the at symbol are escaped. DNSSEC (DNS Security Extension) adds a layer of security to the DNS. It uses public key cryptography to sign resource records. The public keys are stored in DNSKEY records and the signatures in RRSIG records. Requesting DNSSEC information for a zone is done by adding the DO (DNSSEC OK) bit to a request. Signature generation, signature verification and key generation are all supported. Dynamic updates reuses the DNS message format, but renames three of the sections. Question is Zone, Answer is Prerequisite, Authority is Update, only the Additional is not renamed. See RFC 2136 for the gory details. You can set a rather complex set of rules for the existence of absence of certain resource records or names in a zone to specify if resource records should be added or removed. The table from RFC 2136 supplemented with the Go DNS function shows which functions exist to specify the prerequisites. The prerequisite section can also be left empty. If you have decided on the prerequisites you can tell what RRs should be added or deleted. The next table shows the options you have and what functions to call. An TSIG or transaction signature adds a HMAC TSIG record to each message sent. The supported algorithms include: HmacMD5, HmacSHA1, HmacSHA256 and HmacSHA512. Basic use pattern when querying with a TSIG name "axfr." (note that these key names must be fully qualified - as they are domain names) and the base64 secret "so6ZGir4GPAqINNh9U5c3A==": If an incoming message contains a TSIG record it MUST be the last record in the additional section (RFC2845 3.2). This means that you should make the call to SetTsig last, right before executing the query. If you make any changes to the RRset after calling SetTsig() the signature will be incorrect. When requesting an zone transfer (almost all TSIG usage is when requesting zone transfers), with TSIG, this is the basic use pattern. In this example we request an AXFR for miek.nl. with TSIG key named "axfr." and secret "so6ZGir4GPAqINNh9U5c3A==" and using the server 176.58.119.54: You can now read the records from the transfer as they come in. Each envelope is checked with TSIG. If something is not correct an error is returned. Basic use pattern validating and replying to a message that has TSIG set. RFC 6895 sets aside a range of type codes for private use. This range is 65,280 - 65,534 (0xFF00 - 0xFFFE). When experimenting with new Resource Records these can be used, before requesting an official type code from IANA. See https://miek.nl/2014/September/21/idn-and-private-rr-in-go-dns/ for more information. EDNS0 is an extension mechanism for the DNS defined in RFC 2671 and updated by RFC 6891. It defines an new RR type, the OPT RR, which is then completely abused. Basic use pattern for creating an (empty) OPT RR: The rdata of an OPT RR consists out of a slice of EDNS0 (RFC 6891) interfaces. Currently only a few have been standardized: EDNS0_NSID (RFC 5001) and EDNS0_SUBNET (draft-vandergaast-edns-client-subnet-02). Note that these options may be combined in an OPT RR. Basic use pattern for a server to check if (and which) options are set: SIG(0) From RFC 2931: It works like TSIG, except that SIG(0) uses public key cryptography, instead of the shared secret approach in TSIG. Supported algorithms: DSA, ECDSAP256SHA256, ECDSAP384SHA384, RSASHA1, RSASHA256 and RSASHA512. Signing subsequent messages in multi-message sessions is not implemented.

Package memguard implements a secure software enclave for the storage of sensitive information in memory. There are two main container objects exposed in this API. Enclave objects encrypt data and store the ciphertext whereas LockedBuffers are more like guarded memory allocations. There is a limit on the maximum number of LockedBuffer objects that can exist at any one time, imposed by the system's mlock limits. There is no limit on Enclaves. The general workflow is to store sensitive information in Enclaves when it is not immediately needed and decrypt it when and where it is. After use, the LockedBuffer should be destroyed. If you need access to the data inside a LockedBuffer in a type not covered by any methods provided by this API, you can type-cast the allocation's memory to whatever type you want. This is of course an unsafe operation and so care must be taken to ensure that the cast is valid and does not result in memory unsafety. Further examples of code and interesting use-cases can be found in the examples subpackage. Several functions exist to make the mass purging of data very easy. It is recommended to make use of them when appropriate. Core dumps are disabled by default. If you absolutely require them, you can enable them by using unix.Setrlimit to set RLIMIT_CORE to an appropriate value.

Package dns implements a full featured interface to the Domain Name System. Both server- and client-side programming is supported. The package allows complete control over what is sent out to the DNS. The API follows the less-is-more principle, by presenting a small, clean interface. It supports (asynchronous) querying/replying, incoming/outgoing zone transfers, TSIG, EDNS0, dynamic updates, notifies and DNSSEC validation/signing. Note that domain names MUST be fully qualified before sending them, unqualified names in a message will result in a packing failure. Resource records are native types. They are not stored in wire format. Basic usage pattern for creating a new resource record: Or directly from a string: Or when the default origin (.) and TTL (3600) and class (IN) suit you: Or even: In the DNS messages are exchanged, these messages contain resource records (sets). Use pattern for creating a message: Or when not certain if the domain name is fully qualified: The message m is now a message with the question section set to ask the MX records for the miek.nl. zone. The following is slightly more verbose, but more flexible: After creating a message it can be sent. Basic use pattern for synchronous querying the DNS at a server configured on 127.0.0.1 and port 53: Suppressing multiple outstanding queries (with the same question, type and class) is as easy as setting: More advanced options are available using a net.Dialer and the corresponding API. For example it is possible to set a timeout, or to specify a source IP address and port to use for the connection: If these "advanced" features are not needed, a simple UDP query can be sent, with: When this functions returns you will get dns message. A dns message consists out of four sections. The question section: in.Question, the answer section: in.Answer, the authority section: in.Ns and the additional section: in.Extra. Each of these sections (except the Question section) contain a []RR. Basic use pattern for accessing the rdata of a TXT RR as the first RR in the Answer section: Both domain names and TXT character strings are converted to presentation form both when unpacked and when converted to strings. For TXT character strings, tabs, carriage returns and line feeds will be converted to \t, \r and \n respectively. Back slashes and quotations marks will be escaped. Bytes below 32 and above 127 will be converted to \DDD form. For domain names, in addition to the above rules brackets, periods, spaces, semicolons and the at symbol are escaped. DNSSEC (DNS Security Extension) adds a layer of security to the DNS. It uses public key cryptography to sign resource records. The public keys are stored in DNSKEY records and the signatures in RRSIG records. Requesting DNSSEC information for a zone is done by adding the DO (DNSSEC OK) bit to a request. Signature generation, signature verification and key generation are all supported. Dynamic updates reuses the DNS message format, but renames three of the sections. Question is Zone, Answer is Prerequisite, Authority is Update, only the Additional is not renamed. See RFC 2136 for the gory details. You can set a rather complex set of rules for the existence of absence of certain resource records or names in a zone to specify if resource records should be added or removed. The table from RFC 2136 supplemented with the Go DNS function shows which functions exist to specify the prerequisites. The prerequisite section can also be left empty. If you have decided on the prerequisites you can tell what RRs should be added or deleted. The next table shows the options you have and what functions to call. An TSIG or transaction signature adds a HMAC TSIG record to each message sent. The supported algorithms include: HmacMD5, HmacSHA1, HmacSHA256 and HmacSHA512. Basic use pattern when querying with a TSIG name "axfr." (note that these key names must be fully qualified - as they are domain names) and the base64 secret "so6ZGir4GPAqINNh9U5c3A==": If an incoming message contains a TSIG record it MUST be the last record in the additional section (RFC2845 3.2). This means that you should make the call to SetTsig last, right before executing the query. If you make any changes to the RRset after calling SetTsig() the signature will be incorrect. When requesting an zone transfer (almost all TSIG usage is when requesting zone transfers), with TSIG, this is the basic use pattern. In this example we request an AXFR for miek.nl. with TSIG key named "axfr." and secret "so6ZGir4GPAqINNh9U5c3A==" and using the server 176.58.119.54: You can now read the records from the transfer as they come in. Each envelope is checked with TSIG. If something is not correct an error is returned. Basic use pattern validating and replying to a message that has TSIG set. RFC 6895 sets aside a range of type codes for private use. This range is 65,280 - 65,534 (0xFF00 - 0xFFFE). When experimenting with new Resource Records these can be used, before requesting an official type code from IANA. See https://miek.nl/2014/September/21/idn-and-private-rr-in-go-dns/ for more information. EDNS0 is an extension mechanism for the DNS defined in RFC 2671 and updated by RFC 6891. It defines an new RR type, the OPT RR, which is then completely abused. Basic use pattern for creating an (empty) OPT RR: The rdata of an OPT RR consists out of a slice of EDNS0 (RFC 6891) interfaces. Currently only a few have been standardized: EDNS0_NSID (RFC 5001) and EDNS0_SUBNET (draft-vandergaast-edns-client-subnet-02). Note that these options may be combined in an OPT RR. Basic use pattern for a server to check if (and which) options are set: SIG(0) From RFC 2931: It works like TSIG, except that SIG(0) uses public key cryptography, instead of the shared secret approach in TSIG. Supported algorithms: DSA, ECDSAP256SHA256, ECDSAP384SHA384, RSASHA1, RSASHA256 and RSASHA512. Signing subsequent messages in multi-message sessions is not implemented.

Package drbg implements several DRBGs as recommended by NIST SP-800-90A (see http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf). The hash, HMAC and block cipher mode DRBGs are implemented. DRBG instances are automatically reseeded once the current seed period expires. All DRBGs are instantiated with the maximum security strength associated with the requested configuration. The security strength cannot be specified via the API. DRBGs are instantiated by default using the platform's default entropy source (via the crypto/rand package). This entropy source can be overridden, but it must provide truly random data in order to achieve the selected security strength. Note that prediction resistance is not implemented. Prediction resistance requires that the supplied entropy source is non-deterministic.