Encryption

Package nkn provides Go implementation of NKN client and wallet SDK. The SDK consists of a few components: 1. NKN Client: Send and receive data for free between any NKN clients regardless their network condition without setting up a server or relying on any third party services. Data are end to end encrypted by default. Typically you might want to use multiclient instead of using client directly. 2. NKN MultiClient: Send and receive data using multiple NKN clients concurrently to improve reliability and latency. In addition, it supports session mode, a reliable streaming protocol similar to TCP based on ncp (https://github.com/nknorg/ncp-go). 3. NKN Wallet: Wallet SDK for NKN blockchain (https://github.com/nknorg/nkn). It can be used to create wallet, transfer token to NKN wallet address, register name, subscribe to topic, etc. Advantages of using NKN client/multiclient for data transmission: 1. Network agnostic: Neither sender nor receiver needs to have public IP address or port forwarding. NKN clients only establish outbound (websocket) connections, so Internet access is all they need. This is ideal for client side peer to peer communication. 2. Top level security: All data are end to end authenticated and encrypted. No one else in the world except sender and receiver can see or modify the content of the data. The same public key is used for both routing and encryption, eliminating the possibility of man in the middle attack. 3. Decent performance: By aggregating multiple overlay paths concurrently, multiclient can get ~100ms end to end latency and 10+mbps end to end session throughput between international devices. 4. Everything is free, open source and decentralized. (If you are curious, node relay traffic for clients for free to earn mining rewards in NKN blockchain.) This library is designed to work with gomobile (https://godoc.org/golang.org/x/mobile/cmd/gomobile) and run natively on iOS/Android without any modification. You can use gomobile to compile it to Objective-C framework for iOS: and Java AAR for Android: It's recommended to use the latest version of gomobile that supports go modules.

Package pgpmail implements PGP encryption for e-mail messages. PGP/MIME is defined in RFC 3156.

Package sessions is a sessions package for fasthttp, it provides cookie and filesystem sessions and infrastructure for custom session backends. The key features are: Let's start with an example that shows the sessions API in a nutshell: First we initialize a session store calling NewCookieStore() and passing a secret key used to authenticate the session. Inside the handler, we call store.Get() to retrieve an existing session or a new one. Then we set some session values in session.Values, which is a map[interface{}]interface{}. And finally we call session.Save() to save the session in the response. Important Note: application must to call sessions.Clear at the end of a request lifetime. An easy way to do this is to wrap your handler with sessions.ClearHandler. That's all you need to know for the basic usage. Let's take a look at other options, starting with flash messages. Flash messages are session values that last until read. The term appeared with Ruby On Rails a few years back. When we request a flash message, it is removed from the session. To add a flash, call session.AddFlash(), and to get all flashes, call session.Flashes(). Here is an example: Flash messages are useful to set information to be read after a redirection, like after form submissions. There may also be cases where you want to store a complex datatype within a session, such as a struct. Sessions are serialised using the encoding/gob package, so it is easy to register new datatypes for storage in sessions: As it's not possible to pass a raw type as a parameter to a function, gob.Register() relies on us passing it a value of the desired type. In the example above we've passed it a pointer to a struct and a pointer to a custom type representing a map[string]interface. (We could have passed non-pointer values if we wished.) This will then allow us to serialise/deserialise values of those types to and from our sessions. Note that because session values are stored in a map[string]interface{}, there's a need to type-assert data when retrieving it. We'll use the Person struct we registered above: By default, session cookies last for a month. This is probably too long for some cases, but it is easy to change this and other attributes during runtime. Sessions can be configured individually or the store can be configured and then all sessions saved using it will use that configuration. We access session.Options or store.Options to set a new configuration. The fields are basically a subset of http.Cookie fields. Let's change the maximum age of a session to one week: Sometimes we may want to change authentication and/or encryption keys without breaking existing sessions. The CookieStore supports key rotation, and to use it you just need to set multiple authentication and encryption keys, in pairs, to be tested in order: New sessions will be saved using the first pair. Old sessions can still be read because the first pair will fail, and the second will be tested. This makes it easy to "rotate" secret keys and still be able to validate existing sessions. Note: for all pairs the encryption key is optional; set it to nil or omit it and and encryption won't be used. Multiple sessions can be used in the same request, even with different session backends. When this happens, calling Save() on each session individually would be cumbersome, so we have a way to save all sessions at once: it's sessions.Save(). Here's an example: This is possible because when we call Get() from a session store, it adds the session to a common registry. Save() uses it to save all registered sessions.

Package sio implements a provable secure authenticated encryption scheme for continuous byte streams.

add sm2 support

Package kyber provides a toolbox of advanced cryptographic primitives, for applications that need more than straightforward signing and encryption. This top level package defines the interfaces to cryptographic primitives designed to be independent of specific cryptographic algorithms, to facilitate upgrading applications to new cryptographic algorithms or switching to alternative algorithms for experimentation purposes. This toolkits public-key crypto API includes a kyber.Group interface supporting a broad class of group-based public-key primitives including DSA-style integer residue groups and elliptic curve groups. Users of this API can write higher-level crypto algorithms such as zero-knowledge proofs without knowing or caring exactly what kind of group, let alone which precise security parameters or elliptic curves, are being used. The kyber.Group interface supports the standard algebraic operations on group elements and scalars that nontrivial public-key algorithms tend to rely on. The interface uses additive group terminology typical for elliptic curves, such that point addition is homomorphically equivalent to adding their (potentially secret) scalar multipliers. But the API and its operations apply equally well to DSA-style integer groups. As a trivial example, generating a public/private keypair is as simple as: The first statement picks a private key (Scalar) from a the suites's source of cryptographic random or pseudo-random bits, while the second performs elliptic curve scalar multiplication of the curve's standard base point (indicated by the 'nil' argument to Mul) by the scalar private key 'a'. Similarly, computing a Diffie-Hellman shared secret using Alice's private key 'a' and Bob's public key 'B' can be done via: Note that we use 'Mul' rather than 'Exp' here because the library uses the additive-group terminology common for elliptic curve crypto, rather than the multiplicative-group terminology of traditional integer groups - but the two are semantically equivalent and the interface itself works for both elliptic curve and integer groups. Various sub-packages provide several specific implementations of these cryptographic interfaces. In particular, the 'group/mod' sub-package provides implementations of modular integer groups underlying conventional DSA-style algorithms. The `group/nist` package provides NIST-standardized elliptic curves built on the Go crypto library. The 'group/edwards25519' sub-package provides the kyber.Group interface using the popular Ed25519 curve. Other sub-packages build more interesting high-level cryptographic tools atop these primitive interfaces, including: - share: Polynomial commitment and verifiable Shamir secret splitting for implementing verifiable 't-of-n' threshold cryptographic schemes. This can be used to encrypt a message so that any 2 out of 3 receivers must work together to decrypt it, for example. - proof: An implementation of the general Camenisch/Stadler framework for discrete logarithm knowledge proofs. This system supports both interactive and non-interactive proofs of a wide variety of statements such as, "I know the secret x associated with public key X or I know the secret y associated with public key Y", without revealing anything about either secret or even which branch of the "or" clause is true. - sign: The sign directory contains different signature schemes. - sign/anon provides anonymous and pseudonymous public-key encryption and signing, where the sender of a signed message or the receiver of an encrypted message is defined as an explicit anonymity set containing several public keys rather than just one. For example, a member of an organization's board of trustees might prove to be a member of the board without revealing which member she is. - sign/cosi provides collective signature algorithm, where a bunch of signers create a unique, compact and efficiently verifiable signature using the Schnorr signature as a basis. - sign/eddsa provides a kyber-native implementation of the EdDSA signature scheme. - sign/schnorr provides a basic vanilla Schnorr signature scheme implementation. - shuffle: Verifiable cryptographic shuffles of ElGamal ciphertexts, which can be used to implement (for example) voting or auction schemes that keep the sources of individual votes or bids private without anyone having to trust more than one of the shuffler(s) to shuffle votes/bids honestly. For now this library should currently be considered experimental: it will definitely be changing in non-backward-compatible ways, and it will need independent security review before it should be considered ready for use in security-critical applications. However, we intend to bring the library closer to stability and real-world usability as quickly as development resources permit, and as interest and application demand dictates. As should be obvious, this library is intended to be used by developers who are at least moderately knowledgeable about cryptography. If you want a crypto library that makes it easy to implement "basic crypto" functionality correctly - i.e., plain public-key encryption and signing - then [NaCl secretbox](https://godoc.org/golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/secretbox) may be a better choice. This toolkit's purpose is to make it possible - and preferably easy - to do slightly more interesting things that most current crypto libraries don't support effectively. The one existing crypto library that this toolkit is probably most comparable to is the Charm rapid prototyping library for Python (https://charm-crypto.com/category/charm). This library incorporates and/or builds on existing code from a variety of sources, as documented in the relevant sub-packages.

Package saltyim is a secure, easy, self-hosted messaging salty.im is an open specification for a new Saltpack based e2e encrypted messaging protocol and platform for secure communications with a focus on privacy, security and being self-hosted. For more information please refer to https://salty.im/

kms is a package that provides key management system features for go-kms-wrapping Wrappers. The following domain terms are key to understanding the system and how to use it: wrapper: all keys within the system are a Wrapper from go-kms-wrapping. root external wrapper: the external wrapper that will serve as the root of trust for the kms system. Typically you'd get this root wrapper via go-kms-wrapper from a KMS provider. See the go-kms-wrapper docs for further details. scope: a scope defines a rotational boundary for a set of keys. The system tracks only the scope identifier and which is used to find keys with a specific scope. **IMPORTANT**: You should define a FK from kms_root_key.scope_id with cascading deletes and updates to the PK of the table within your domain that tracks scopes. This FK will prevent orphaned kms keys. For example, you could assign organizations and projects scope IDs and then associate a set of keys with each org and project within your domain. root key: the KEKs (keys to encrypt keys) of the system. data key: the DEKs (keys to encrypt data) of the system and must have a parent root key and a purpose. purpose: Each data key (DEK) must have a one purpose. For example, you could define a purpose of client-secrets for a DEK that will be used encrypt/decrypt wrapper operations on `client-secrets` You'll find the database schema within the migrations directory. Currently postgres and sqlite are supported. The implementation does make some use of triggers to ensure some of its data integrity. The migrations are intended to be incorporated into your existing go-migrate migrations. Feel free to change the migration file names, as long as they are applied in the same order as defined here. FYI, the migrations include `kms_version` table which is used to ensure that the schema and module are compatible.

Package kyber provides a toolbox of advanced cryptographic primitives, for applications that need more than straightforward signing and encryption. This top level package defines the interfaces to cryptographic primitives designed to be independent of specific cryptographic algorithms, to facilitate upgrading applications to new cryptographic algorithms or switching to alternative algorithms for experimentation purposes. This toolkits public-key crypto API includes a kyber.Group interface supporting a broad class of group-based public-key primitives including DSA-style integer residue groups and elliptic curve groups. Users of this API can write higher-level crypto algorithms such as zero-knowledge proofs without knowing or caring exactly what kind of group, let alone which precise security parameters or elliptic curves, are being used. The kyber.Group interface supports the standard algebraic operations on group elements and scalars that nontrivial public-key algorithms tend to rely on. The interface uses additive group terminology typical for elliptic curves, such that point addition is homomorphically equivalent to adding their (potentially secret) scalar multipliers. But the API and its operations apply equally well to DSA-style integer groups. As a trivial example, generating a public/private keypair is as simple as: The first statement picks a private key (Scalar) from a the suites's source of cryptographic random or pseudo-random bits, while the second performs elliptic curve scalar multiplication of the curve's standard base point (indicated by the 'nil' argument to Mul) by the scalar private key 'a'. Similarly, computing a Diffie-Hellman shared secret using Alice's private key 'a' and Bob's public key 'B' can be done via: Note that we use 'Mul' rather than 'Exp' here because the library uses the additive-group terminology common for elliptic curve crypto, rather than the multiplicative-group terminology of traditional integer groups - but the two are semantically equivalent and the interface itself works for both elliptic curve and integer groups. Various sub-packages provide several specific implementations of these cryptographic interfaces. In particular, the 'group/mod' sub-package provides implementations of modular integer groups underlying conventional DSA-style algorithms. The `group/nist` package provides NIST-standardized elliptic curves built on the Go crypto library. The 'group/edwards25519' sub-package provides the kyber.Group interface using the popular Ed25519 curve. Other sub-packages build more interesting high-level cryptographic tools atop these primitive interfaces, including: - share: Polynomial commitment and verifiable Shamir secret splitting for implementing verifiable 't-of-n' threshold cryptographic schemes. This can be used to encrypt a message so that any 2 out of 3 receivers must work together to decrypt it, for example. - proof: An implementation of the general Camenisch/Stadler framework for discrete logarithm knowledge proofs. This system supports both interactive and non-interactive proofs of a wide variety of statements such as, "I know the secret x associated with public key X or I know the secret y associated with public key Y", without revealing anything about either secret or even which branch of the "or" clause is true. - sign: The sign directory contains different signature schemes. - sign/anon provides anonymous and pseudonymous public-key encryption and signing, where the sender of a signed message or the receiver of an encrypted message is defined as an explicit anonymity set containing several public keys rather than just one. For example, a member of an organization's board of trustees might prove to be a member of the board without revealing which member she is. - sign/cosi provides collective signature algorithm, where a bunch of signers create a unique, compact and efficiently verifiable signature using the Schnorr signature as a basis. - sign/eddsa provides a kyber-native implementation of the EdDSA signature scheme. - sign/schnorr provides a basic vanilla Schnorr signature scheme implementation. - shuffle: Verifiable cryptographic shuffles of ElGamal ciphertexts, which can be used to implement (for example) voting or auction schemes that keep the sources of individual votes or bids private without anyone having to trust more than one of the shuffler(s) to shuffle votes/bids honestly. For now this library should currently be considered experimental: it will definitely be changing in non-backward-compatible ways, and it will need independent security review before it should be considered ready for use in security-critical applications. However, we intend to bring the library closer to stability and real-world usability as quickly as development resources permit, and as interest and application demand dictates. As should be obvious, this library is intended to be used by developers who are at least moderately knowledgeable about cryptography. If you want a crypto library that makes it easy to implement "basic crypto" functionality correctly - i.e., plain public-key encryption and signing - then [NaCl secretbox](https://godoc.org/golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/secretbox) may be a better choice. This toolkit's purpose is to make it possible - and preferably easy - to do slightly more interesting things that most current crypto libraries don't support effectively. The one existing crypto library that this toolkit is probably most comparable to is the Charm rapid prototyping library for Python (https://charm-crypto.com/category/charm). This library incorporates and/or builds on existing code from a variety of sources, as documented in the relevant sub-packages.

Package securecookie encodes and decodes authenticated and optionally encrypted cookie values. Secure cookies can't be forged, because their values are validated using HMAC. When encrypted, the content is also inaccessible to malicious eyes. To use it, first create a new SecureCookie instance: The hashKey is required, used to authenticate the cookie value using HMAC. It is recommended to use a key with 32 or 64 bytes. The blockKey is optional, used to encrypt the cookie value -- set it to nil to not use encryption. If set, the length must correspond to the block size of the encryption algorithm. For AES, used by default, valid lengths are 16, 24, or 32 bytes to select AES-128, AES-192, or AES-256. Strong keys can be created using the convenience function GenerateRandomKey(). Once a SecureCookie instance is set, use it to encode a cookie value: Later, use the same SecureCookie instance to decode and validate a cookie value: We stored a map[string]string, but secure cookies can hold any value that can be encoded using encoding/gob. To store custom types, they must be registered first using gob.Register(). For basic types this is not needed; it works out of the box.