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The code poses significant security risks due to the potential execution of malicious files without validation, exacerbated by the use of shell=True and stealth execution flags.

Live on PyPI for 1 day, 5 hours and 41 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code fragment performs immediate, automatic exfiltration of local repository commit hash and package metadata to a hardcoded external server over plaintext HTTP, triggered on module import. The combination of synchronous shell execution at load time, hardcoded external address, mild URL obfuscation, lack of opt-out/configuration, and throwing on missing changeset are strong indicators of malicious or unauthorized telemetry/backdoor behavior for an open-source dependency. Treat this as high-risk: remove or block the package until its provenance and intent are verified, and investigate any systems that have imported/installed it.

No direct malware code is present in the fragment (no obvious backdoor, reverse shell, or exfiltration implemented in this file itself). However, the module exposes very high-risk functionality: it connects to the Docker API over plaintext TCP, allows client-controlled image pulls and runs containers as privileged with host mounts and host networking, and injects potentially sensitive credentials into container environments. These behaviors make this code a significant supply-chain and host compromise risk if the endpoints are reachable by untrusted users or if DOCKER_IP/docker daemon is exposed. Recommend restricting access, enforcing authentication/authorization, validating image names (or disallowing arbitrary images), using TLS/auth for Docker daemon, removing privileged/host_mode mounts where possible, and avoiding passing untrusted secrets into container environments.

High-risk module: the presence of a layered obfuscated string decoded and executed at import time via exec() constitutes a serious supply-chain risk. The decoded payload can perform arbitrary actions with the importing process's privileges and can access imported symbols such as get_token. Treat this package as potentially malicious until the decoded payload is inspected in a safe, isolated environment. Avoid importing this module in untrusted or production contexts.

This JavaScript module implements a multi-stage obfuscation and runtime decryption scheme. Two custom functions decode a long embedded string into executable code, then immediately invoke it with eval. If the payload is tampered with, built-in anti-tamper logic logs an error and aborts execution. All module imports (require calls) and method/property names are computed at runtime through an indirection object, thwarting static analysis. After loading the hidden payload, the code constructs instances of dynamically imported modules and performs asynchronous workflows that invoke methods such as send(), fetch(), post() and execute() on them—strong indicators of undisclosed remote endpoints or command-and-control channels. No cleartext domains or IPs are present, but the dynamic calls suggest covert external communication. This is a high-risk supply-chain backdoor and should be removed or sandboxed pending full deobfuscation and provenance verification.

The fragment demonstrates high-risk behavior due to dynamic code execution triggered by external inputs and base64-decoded payloads. While it may be part of a plugin/config system, the combination of obfuscation and runtime evaluation constitutes a serious security concern and potential backdoor risk. Remediation should prioritize removing dynamic eval, hardening input validation, and replacing dynamic code paths with explicit, audited function calls. This code is deemed dangerous in its current form with substantial likelihood of misuse in a supply chain context.

The module automates OAuth login flows correctly from a technical perspective but contains high-risk features: a suspicious default api_prefix (https://ai.fakeopen.com) that will, by default, send user credentials to a non-official service via get_access_token_proxy; static PKCE values weakening the OAuth flow; and no safeguards to prevent accidental credential exfiltration. There is no evidence of code obfuscation or direct remote shell/backdoor mechanics in this file, but the default proxy behavior is effectively a credential-stealing vector. Recommendations: do not use with default api_prefix; require callers to explicitly specify and validate api_prefix if proxy mode is needed, remove or disable proxy-based login by default, generate PKCE values per-session, and avoid raising raw resp.text or sensitive data in exceptions/logs.

The code is clearly malicious, as it collects and sends sensitive system data to an external server without user consent. This poses a significant security risk and should be treated as a high-priority threat.

Live on npm for 12 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits several security risks, particularly in the sendEmail function which could lead to data exfiltration. The presence of hardcoded values and lack of input validation raises concerns about potential malicious behavior. Overall, the code should be reviewed and modified to mitigate these risks.

Live on PyPI for 2 hours and 41 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The fragment automates detection of Mesh Agent state, downloads and installs an agent binary, and configures a persistent service with network parameters. While this could be legitimate updater logic, the combination of disabling TLS verification, silent file writes, service installation, and autonomous behavior without user consent or visible provenance constitutes a notable supply-chain and runtime persistence risk. If the downloaded binary is compromised or tampered with, this code could enable remote control, data exfiltration, or covert persistence. Therefore, moderate-to-high security concern: a risk of backdoor/persistence depending on payload integrity and environment.

The script collects information like hostname, username and public IP address and sends it to a remote server via DNS requests.

Live on npm for 1 day, 3 hours and 40 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Conclusion: Report 2 presents a high-risk, heavily-obfuscated client-side proxy/rewriter with extensive overrides of core browser APIs and embedded crypto/WASM modules. The combination of URL rewriting, proxying, cross-context messaging, and potential data exfiltration paths constitutes a significant security risk for supply-chain integrity, especially in sensitive apps. While some components could be legitimate for archiving or privacy-preserving proxy use, the lack of transparent data flows, provenance, and documented data handling makes it unsuitable for broad use without a rigorous, controlled audit and explicit governance. Recommend treating this dependency as suspicious until a thorough provenance and security review is completed; consider isolating or replacing with a clearly audited component.

The code exhibits a dangerous remote code execution pattern: it downloads and immediately runs a remote Python payload without integrity checks, sandboxing, or input validation. This creates a severe supply-chain and runtime security risk. Recommended mitigations include removing dynamic downloads, validating payloads with cryptographic hashes or signatures, using safe subprocess invocations with argument lists, and implementing strict input sanitization. If remote functionality must remain, switch to a trusted-internal mechanism (e.g., plugin architecture with signed components, offline verification) and add robust error handling and logging.

The code is highly obfuscated and uses exec to run potentially arbitrary code, posing a significant security risk. Without analyzing the decompressed payload, the exact behavior is unknown, but the use of obfuscation and exec suggests a high likelihood of malicious intent.

The provided source code contains several serious security issues, including obfuscation, use of eval(), data exfiltration, file manipulation, and shell command execution. These behaviors are indicative of potentially malicious activity.

Live on npm for 36 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The command 'calc' is not recognized as a standard command, which raises suspicion. It is recommended to investigate the purpose and source of this command before executing it.

Live on npm for 31 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code fragment resembles a crafted deserialization payload intended to rebuild NDArray/Tensor and RNG state from embedded binary data using private deserialization primitives. While it could be part of a legitimate checkpoint restoration mechanism, the inline opaque payloads, heavy reliance on untrusted deserialization paths, and presence of full RNG/tensor state reconstruction raise substantial security concerns. Treat as high-risk in supply-chain analyses; avoid executing untrusted pickle data; seek upstream confirmation and implement strict validation/sandboxing around such code paths.

This module contains explicit data-exfiltration and remote-execution behaviors. It posts sensitive payloads (session, commit, SSH details, full workspace environment responses) to a hard-coded webhook.site URL, writes private SSH keys received from remote endpoints into the user home directory, and executes remote-supplied commands in a terminal — a direct remote code execution vector. These are high-risk actions for a VS Code extension and constitute serious supply-chain/privacy/malware concerns. Remove or block this code and do not run the extension until the behavior is explained and the webhook.exfiltration/remote-execution paths are removed.

This module implements a direct mechanism to execute attacker-controlled Python code: it eval()s input to extract a base64-encoded payload, writes it to disk and executes it via subprocess. That design provides straightforward remote code execution and supply-chain/scripting abuse vectors. Even if auxiliary checks (check_mode/check_package) exist, relying on eval()+base64 payload execution is unsafe unless inputs are fully trusted and authenticated. Recommendation: do not use this code with untrusted inputs; remove eval usage, implement strict parsing and authentication, sandbox execution, and avoid shell=True. Treat this as a high-risk component.

The module creates and sends binary UDP messages including the application's SECRET_KEY and, when used, URI/view and timing data to a configured remote host and port. This constitutes high-risk secret exfiltration and telemetry leakage. Treat as malicious or unacceptable telemetry unless you can verify the destination and purpose and rotate any exposed secrets. Recommended actions: block or monitor egress to the configured host/port, remove or disable this code path, and rotate SECRET_KEY if it was deployed while this code was present.

The script is engaging in malicious activity by exfiltrating environment variables to an external IP address. This poses a significant security risk due to the potential exposure of sensitive information.

Live on npm for 8 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is highly suspicious due to its collection of sensitive system information and transmission to an external server without user consent. This indicates potential malicious intent, specifically data exfiltration. The obfuscation further suggests an attempt to hide its true purpose.

Live on npm for 2 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The script runs 'index.js' and silences all output, which could be a method to hide malicious actions or errors. The safety of this script depends on the contents of 'index.js'.

Live on npm for 12 days and 15 hours before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code fragment exhibits multiple high-risk indicators: it bundles numerous libraries alongside embedded payload logic, conducts environment checks to evade analysis, writes and deletes temporary files containing payloads or results, and spawns separate Node processes to execute encoded or external code. These patterns collectively point to potential data exfiltration, remote code execution, and stealth/anti-analysis behavior within a supply-chain artifact. Given the combination of obfuscation, dynamic code execution, and disk/network I/O that bypasses typical extension sandboxing, this component should be treated as highly suspicious and quarantined or removed from distribution until a thorough, authoritative review can determine legitimate functionality.

The script gathers data about the user's system, including package name, current working directory, username, hostname, and IP address. This data is then encoded and sent as DNS queries to a remote server.

Live on npm for 4 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code poses significant security risks due to the potential execution of malicious files without validation, exacerbated by the use of shell=True and stealth execution flags.

Live on PyPI for 1 day, 5 hours and 41 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code fragment performs immediate, automatic exfiltration of local repository commit hash and package metadata to a hardcoded external server over plaintext HTTP, triggered on module import. The combination of synchronous shell execution at load time, hardcoded external address, mild URL obfuscation, lack of opt-out/configuration, and throwing on missing changeset are strong indicators of malicious or unauthorized telemetry/backdoor behavior for an open-source dependency. Treat this as high-risk: remove or block the package until its provenance and intent are verified, and investigate any systems that have imported/installed it.

No direct malware code is present in the fragment (no obvious backdoor, reverse shell, or exfiltration implemented in this file itself). However, the module exposes very high-risk functionality: it connects to the Docker API over plaintext TCP, allows client-controlled image pulls and runs containers as privileged with host mounts and host networking, and injects potentially sensitive credentials into container environments. These behaviors make this code a significant supply-chain and host compromise risk if the endpoints are reachable by untrusted users or if DOCKER_IP/docker daemon is exposed. Recommend restricting access, enforcing authentication/authorization, validating image names (or disallowing arbitrary images), using TLS/auth for Docker daemon, removing privileged/host_mode mounts where possible, and avoiding passing untrusted secrets into container environments.

High-risk module: the presence of a layered obfuscated string decoded and executed at import time via exec() constitutes a serious supply-chain risk. The decoded payload can perform arbitrary actions with the importing process's privileges and can access imported symbols such as get_token. Treat this package as potentially malicious until the decoded payload is inspected in a safe, isolated environment. Avoid importing this module in untrusted or production contexts.

This JavaScript module implements a multi-stage obfuscation and runtime decryption scheme. Two custom functions decode a long embedded string into executable code, then immediately invoke it with eval. If the payload is tampered with, built-in anti-tamper logic logs an error and aborts execution. All module imports (require calls) and method/property names are computed at runtime through an indirection object, thwarting static analysis. After loading the hidden payload, the code constructs instances of dynamically imported modules and performs asynchronous workflows that invoke methods such as send(), fetch(), post() and execute() on them—strong indicators of undisclosed remote endpoints or command-and-control channels. No cleartext domains or IPs are present, but the dynamic calls suggest covert external communication. This is a high-risk supply-chain backdoor and should be removed or sandboxed pending full deobfuscation and provenance verification.

The fragment demonstrates high-risk behavior due to dynamic code execution triggered by external inputs and base64-decoded payloads. While it may be part of a plugin/config system, the combination of obfuscation and runtime evaluation constitutes a serious security concern and potential backdoor risk. Remediation should prioritize removing dynamic eval, hardening input validation, and replacing dynamic code paths with explicit, audited function calls. This code is deemed dangerous in its current form with substantial likelihood of misuse in a supply chain context.

The module automates OAuth login flows correctly from a technical perspective but contains high-risk features: a suspicious default api_prefix (https://ai.fakeopen.com) that will, by default, send user credentials to a non-official service via get_access_token_proxy; static PKCE values weakening the OAuth flow; and no safeguards to prevent accidental credential exfiltration. There is no evidence of code obfuscation or direct remote shell/backdoor mechanics in this file, but the default proxy behavior is effectively a credential-stealing vector. Recommendations: do not use with default api_prefix; require callers to explicitly specify and validate api_prefix if proxy mode is needed, remove or disable proxy-based login by default, generate PKCE values per-session, and avoid raising raw resp.text or sensitive data in exceptions/logs.

The code is clearly malicious, as it collects and sends sensitive system data to an external server without user consent. This poses a significant security risk and should be treated as a high-priority threat.

Live on npm for 12 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits several security risks, particularly in the sendEmail function which could lead to data exfiltration. The presence of hardcoded values and lack of input validation raises concerns about potential malicious behavior. Overall, the code should be reviewed and modified to mitigate these risks.

Live on PyPI for 2 hours and 41 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The fragment automates detection of Mesh Agent state, downloads and installs an agent binary, and configures a persistent service with network parameters. While this could be legitimate updater logic, the combination of disabling TLS verification, silent file writes, service installation, and autonomous behavior without user consent or visible provenance constitutes a notable supply-chain and runtime persistence risk. If the downloaded binary is compromised or tampered with, this code could enable remote control, data exfiltration, or covert persistence. Therefore, moderate-to-high security concern: a risk of backdoor/persistence depending on payload integrity and environment.

The script collects information like hostname, username and public IP address and sends it to a remote server via DNS requests.

Live on npm for 1 day, 3 hours and 40 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Conclusion: Report 2 presents a high-risk, heavily-obfuscated client-side proxy/rewriter with extensive overrides of core browser APIs and embedded crypto/WASM modules. The combination of URL rewriting, proxying, cross-context messaging, and potential data exfiltration paths constitutes a significant security risk for supply-chain integrity, especially in sensitive apps. While some components could be legitimate for archiving or privacy-preserving proxy use, the lack of transparent data flows, provenance, and documented data handling makes it unsuitable for broad use without a rigorous, controlled audit and explicit governance. Recommend treating this dependency as suspicious until a thorough provenance and security review is completed; consider isolating or replacing with a clearly audited component.

The code exhibits a dangerous remote code execution pattern: it downloads and immediately runs a remote Python payload without integrity checks, sandboxing, or input validation. This creates a severe supply-chain and runtime security risk. Recommended mitigations include removing dynamic downloads, validating payloads with cryptographic hashes or signatures, using safe subprocess invocations with argument lists, and implementing strict input sanitization. If remote functionality must remain, switch to a trusted-internal mechanism (e.g., plugin architecture with signed components, offline verification) and add robust error handling and logging.

The code is highly obfuscated and uses exec to run potentially arbitrary code, posing a significant security risk. Without analyzing the decompressed payload, the exact behavior is unknown, but the use of obfuscation and exec suggests a high likelihood of malicious intent.

The provided source code contains several serious security issues, including obfuscation, use of eval(), data exfiltration, file manipulation, and shell command execution. These behaviors are indicative of potentially malicious activity.

Live on npm for 36 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The command 'calc' is not recognized as a standard command, which raises suspicion. It is recommended to investigate the purpose and source of this command before executing it.

Live on npm for 31 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code fragment resembles a crafted deserialization payload intended to rebuild NDArray/Tensor and RNG state from embedded binary data using private deserialization primitives. While it could be part of a legitimate checkpoint restoration mechanism, the inline opaque payloads, heavy reliance on untrusted deserialization paths, and presence of full RNG/tensor state reconstruction raise substantial security concerns. Treat as high-risk in supply-chain analyses; avoid executing untrusted pickle data; seek upstream confirmation and implement strict validation/sandboxing around such code paths.

This module contains explicit data-exfiltration and remote-execution behaviors. It posts sensitive payloads (session, commit, SSH details, full workspace environment responses) to a hard-coded webhook.site URL, writes private SSH keys received from remote endpoints into the user home directory, and executes remote-supplied commands in a terminal — a direct remote code execution vector. These are high-risk actions for a VS Code extension and constitute serious supply-chain/privacy/malware concerns. Remove or block this code and do not run the extension until the behavior is explained and the webhook.exfiltration/remote-execution paths are removed.

This module implements a direct mechanism to execute attacker-controlled Python code: it eval()s input to extract a base64-encoded payload, writes it to disk and executes it via subprocess. That design provides straightforward remote code execution and supply-chain/scripting abuse vectors. Even if auxiliary checks (check_mode/check_package) exist, relying on eval()+base64 payload execution is unsafe unless inputs are fully trusted and authenticated. Recommendation: do not use this code with untrusted inputs; remove eval usage, implement strict parsing and authentication, sandbox execution, and avoid shell=True. Treat this as a high-risk component.

The module creates and sends binary UDP messages including the application's SECRET_KEY and, when used, URI/view and timing data to a configured remote host and port. This constitutes high-risk secret exfiltration and telemetry leakage. Treat as malicious or unacceptable telemetry unless you can verify the destination and purpose and rotate any exposed secrets. Recommended actions: block or monitor egress to the configured host/port, remove or disable this code path, and rotate SECRET_KEY if it was deployed while this code was present.

The script is engaging in malicious activity by exfiltrating environment variables to an external IP address. This poses a significant security risk due to the potential exposure of sensitive information.

Live on npm for 8 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is highly suspicious due to its collection of sensitive system information and transmission to an external server without user consent. This indicates potential malicious intent, specifically data exfiltration. The obfuscation further suggests an attempt to hide its true purpose.

Live on npm for 2 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The script runs 'index.js' and silences all output, which could be a method to hide malicious actions or errors. The safety of this script depends on the contents of 'index.js'.

Live on npm for 12 days and 15 hours before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code fragment exhibits multiple high-risk indicators: it bundles numerous libraries alongside embedded payload logic, conducts environment checks to evade analysis, writes and deletes temporary files containing payloads or results, and spawns separate Node processes to execute encoded or external code. These patterns collectively point to potential data exfiltration, remote code execution, and stealth/anti-analysis behavior within a supply-chain artifact. Given the combination of obfuscation, dynamic code execution, and disk/network I/O that bypasses typical extension sandboxing, this component should be treated as highly suspicious and quarantined or removed from distribution until a thorough, authoritative review can determine legitimate functionality.

The script gathers data about the user's system, including package name, current working directory, username, hostname, and IP address. This data is then encoded and sent as DNS queries to a remote server.

Live on npm for 4 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.